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Significant improvement in American science education 
is desirable from many perspectives. This need can be 
encapsulated in the student learning goal of flexible, 
inquiry-based problem solving. To guide efforts to move 
towards this goal, an Amalgamated Model of science 
education is synthesized from six major trends in science 
education. Explication of this model is focused on the 
physical sciences, as is the research carried out to test 
one of the predictions of the Model. 
One keystone of the Amalgamated Model is the 
delineation and characterization of concepts according to 
the three properties of generality, complexity, and 
abstractness. Using these three properties, a conceptual 
structure for physical science is constructed. When this 
iv 
structure is compared with conventional physical science 
curricula, a large discrepency is in the treatment of the 
conservation of energy concept. The Model predicts that 
elementary and middle school age children develop 
intuitive understandings of the concept, whereas 
conventionally it is believed to be inherently difficult 
and comprehensible only to older, high school students. 
To test this prediction, two sets of tasks and 
associated clinical interviews are administered to 48 
subjects randomly drawn from a K-6 population. The first 
set of tasks consists of the classical Piagetian 
conservation instances and the second set investigates 
understanding of conservation of energy. The quantitative 
data generated by the two tasks is analyzed to measure the 
degree of connection within subjects' conceptual 
structures between their ability to conserve quantity, 
substance, weight and volume and their ability to conserve 
energy. 
The results indicated that understanding of 
conservation of energy is connected to and apparently 
develops from the understandings of Piagetian 
conservation. The experimental and analytical 
methodologies could be used for further mapping of 
conceptual structures. It would seem that the prediction 
of the Amalgamated Model cannot be rejected as false, 
providing some justification for using the Model as a 
v 
future framework for research in conceptual structures and 
for science curriculum development. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT.iv 
LIST OF TABLES.xii 
LIST OF FIGURES.xiii 
Chapter 
I. THE NEED TO IMPROVE AMERICAN SCIENCE EDUCATION . 1 
A. America Needs Scientifically Literate Students 1 
B. The Goal of American Secondary Education Is 
Unique.12 
C. American Education Cannot Emulate Others' 
W ys.25 
II. A MODEL FOR AMERICAN SCIENCE EDUCATION . 32 
A. Six Educational Models and Theories That Can 
Be Amalgamated Into a Coherent Model of 
Science Education.37 
1. Outcome-Based Education . 38 
2. Individualized/Interdisciplinary 
Education.40 
3. Performance-Based Education . 42 
4. Cognitive Science  42 
5. Process Learning Theory  43 
6. Constructivism.43 
B. Four Distinctions That Summarize the 
Amalgamated Model.44 
C. The Distinctions among the Three Categories 
of Learning Outcomes ..54 
D. How the Amalgamated Model Addresses the 
Gender Issue  57 
E. The Distinctions among Curriculum, 
Instruction, and Evaluation . 76 
F. The Distinctions among Concept, Content, 
and Process.84 
G. Implementation of the Amalgamated Model . . 116 
1. Educational Criteria for Cataloguing 
Curricular Materials . 122 
2. The Organizational Aspects of 
Implementation  133 
H. The Distinctions that Differentiate 
Concepts: Generality, Complexity, and 
Abstractness . 140 
III. AN INVESTIGATION OF THE AMALGAMATED MODEL . . . 148 
A. The Greatest Discrepancy between the 
Amalgamated Model and Conventional 
Curricula. 148 
B. A Review of Prior Literature.154 
C. Hypothesis.172 
1. Hypothesis Statement . 179 
2. Limitations.182 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN.184 
A. Subjects.185 
B. Measurements.189 
1. Piagetian Interviews  190 
a. Conservation of Discontinuous 
Quantity.190 
b. Conservation of Discontinuous 
Substance.191 
c. Conservation of Weight.191 
d. Conservation of Volume.192 
2. Proportional Causality (Energy 
Conservation) Interviews . 192 
a. Candles Demonstration - Equipment . 193 
b. Candles Demonstration - Diagram . . 194 
c. Candles Demonstration - Script . . 194 
i. Question CA.195 
ii. Question B.197 
iii. Question CC.197 
d. Ramp and Balls Demonstrations - 
Equipment.199 
e. Ramp and Balls Demonstrations - 
Diagram.200 
f. Ramp (R) and Balls (B) 
Demonstrations - Script . 200 
i. Question RA.201 
ii. Question BB.202 
iii. Question A.203 
■ • ■ 
vm 
V. OBSERVATIONS AND DATA 204 
A. Definitions and Illustrations of the Data 
Values.206 
1. Piagetian Tasks.206 
2. Candles Demonstration  207 
3. Ramp Demonstration.215 
4. Balls Demonstration . 217 
B. Quantitative Data.219 
VI. DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS.221 
A. Data Analysis Using a Scattergram.226 
B. Correlations Among the Four Demonstrations 229 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS, DISCUSSION, AND SUMMARY . . . 242 
A. Possible Modifications of the Investigative 
Procedure.242 
B. Discussion of the Experimental Method and 
Analysis.246 
C. Implications for American Science Education 253 
APPENDICES 
A. STUDENT LEARNING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR K-12 
SCIENCE EDUCATION . 257 
A. Student Performance Objectives Associated 
with Each of the Student Learning Goals . 258 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCEPTS TO SCIENCE CURRICULUM 263 
A. Curriculum Should Reflect Learning Theory . 265 
B. Functionalist Learning Theories Are the 
Foundation for Science Curriculum .... 272 
C. Behaviorism is Minimally Useful to Science 
Curriculum.274 
D. The Advent of Learning Theory in American 
Science Education . 276 
E. Six Learning Theorists Provide a Base for a 
Three Dimensional Science Curriculum . . 281 
F. The Importance of Concepts and of Defining 
Concepts.286 
G. Identifying Concepts of the Life Sciences . 289 
H. A Model for Defining Concepts.292 
I. The Objectivity of Concepts in the Physical 
Sciences.294 
ix 
C. THE CRITERIAL ATTRIBUTE OF GENERALITY . 298 
A. Concepts Represent Generic Categories . . . 298 
B. The Criterial Attribute of Generality . . . 304 
C. The Six Basic Concepts of the Physical 
Sciences.308 
D. The Curricular Implications of Generality . 330 
E. S mmary.335 
D. THE CRITERIAL ATTRIBUTE OF COMPLEXITY . 338 
A. The Difference between Concepts and 
Principles Is One of Complexity.339 
B. The Criterial Attribute of Complexity . . . 347 
C. The Types of Component Concepts that are 
Counted to Determine Complexity . 349 
D. Calculating the Complexity of Concepts . . 355 
E. The Conflict between Gagne and Ausubel 
on Calculating Complexity . 362 
F. The Curricular Implications of Complexity . 373 
E. AN ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS 
ACCORDING TO COMPLEXITY . 376 
A. The Complexity of the Nature-of-Matter 
Basic Concept.378 
B. The Complexity of Conservation of Energy . 401 
C. The Complexity of Waves.424 
D. The Complexity of Chemical Bonding .... 426 
E. The Complexity of Momentum and Forces . . . 427 
F. The Complexity of Electricity and Magnetism 436 
F. THE CRITERIAL ATTRIBUTE OF ABSTRACTNESS .... 439 
A. The Definition of Abstractness.440 
B. The Relationship between Concrete Concepts 
and Neurobiology.446 
C. Six Theorists' Views of Abstractness . . . 450 
D. Analyzing Some Physical Science Concepts 
According to Abstractness . 454 
E. The Abstractness of the Object-Concept . . 460 
F. The Abstractness of Various Properties . . 464 
G. The Abstractness of Time.483 
H. The Abstractness of Direction.487 
I. The Abstractness of Link Concepts.489 
J. Sorting Out Nature of Matter, Conservation 
of Energy, and Momentum and Forces ... 491 
G. SUMMARY OF A STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
CONCEPTS FOR K-12 CURRICULUM.498 
x 
H. EDUCATIONAL CRITERIA AND DATABASE DESIGN FOR 
CATALOGUING EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS . 507 
A. Introduction and General Scope  507 
B. How the CURRICULUM PLANNER Addresses the 
Goals of the Amalgamated Model.512 
C. Applicability of the CURRICULUM PLANNER 
to Non-Science Subject Areas . 517 
D. Structure of the CURRICULUM PLANNER .... 519 
E. Specification of the Educational Criteria 
in the CURRICULUM PLANNER.521 
F. Flexibility of Coding of Application 
Lessons for the CURRICULUM PLANNER . . . 526 
G. The Priority Order Used to Retrieve Lessons 530 
H. The Selection Default Procedures . 531 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  546 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
4.1 Age Distribution of Subjects.187 
4.2 Distribution of Piagetian Rankings of Subjects 187 
5.1 Quantitative Data.219 
6.1 Spearman Correlation Coefficients  230 
6.2 Multiple Regression Analysis . 239 
xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
2.1 Post Sputnik, Performance-Based Model of 
Science Education .  48 
2.2 Process Learning, Constructivist Model of 
Science Education  49 
2.3 Outcome-Based, Equity Model of Science Education 50 
2.4 Four Structural Levels of the Amalgamated 
Model of Science Education.51 
2.5 An Amalgamated Model of Science Education .... 52 
4.1 Equipment Set-up for Candles . 194 
4.2 Equipment Set-up for Ramp and Balls 
Demonstration . 200 
6.1 Scattergram of data.227 
G.l Sequence Code Key.501 
G.2 Elaboration of a K-12 Physical Science 
Conceptual Structure . 502 
G. 3 Elaboration of the Skills For the Domain of 
Scientific Process  506 
H. l Table of Major Educational Criteria Used by the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER . 522 
H.2 Chart of Menu Options of the CURRICULUM PLANNER 536 
xiii 
CHAPTER I 
THE NEED TO IMPROVE AMERICAN SCIENCE EDUCATION 
A. America Needs Scientifically Literate Students 
A few years ago. Dr. Ted Kurtz, formerly of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was explaining why 
he had written a textbook for the freshman mechanics 
classes that circumvented Newton's Laws. "We didn't want 
students to use any of what they had learned from high 
school science. We spent so much effort trying to un¬ 
teach freshman students that we decided to use a totally 
unfamiliar approach." As a physics teacher, I considered 
sending students to MIT to be the ultimate accomplishment. 
I was devastated to learn that what my best students took 
to college was not only inadequate, but counter¬ 
productive. My goal had been preparing the elite to 
become future scientists, yet my best efforts were clearly 
off target. What was the target? What was the goal of K- 
12 science education? Something had changed, not just at 
MIT, but throughout the country. 
Today there is a general perception, well fueled by 
the media, that not only do American students score poorly 
in an absolute sense on science knowledge, but they 
compare miserably with students in other countries. This 
poor academic performance then translates into a workforce 
that is unprepared to fill the job descriptions of an 
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economy that is increasingly service-oriented (Manegold, 
1994), that must compete globally (Drucker, 1991; 
Friedman, 1994), and that is already suffering at the 
hands of several foreign competitor nations. Whereas the 
post-World War II economy needed a relatively few highly 
trained scientists, tomorrow's economy needs the majority 
of the workforce to be scientifically literate. Instead 
of defining scientific literacy to mean the command of 
scientific information, it now means the ability to carry 
out flexible, inquiry-based problem solving. The goal for 
K-12 science education now seems to be teaching such 
literacy to all students. Science educators are 
constantly being reminded by newspapers, politicians and 
businesses that if substantial progress is not made 
towards this newly defined goal, then America will become 
a second-rate nation in the global economy. In these 
commentaries a common object of criticism is the teacher. 
Regardless of how justified such criticism is, it does 
focus attention on the arena where change must occur, the 
classroom. "Clearly, something is missing in the way we 
are educating our children. And despite our penchant for 
administrative and financial solutions,... we must look to 
the CONTENT (original emphasis) of education... for both a 
diagnosis and a cure" (Turner, 1986, p. 47). This focus 
is clear in the many national, state and local efforts to 
improve science curriculum. In the end, learning 
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flexible, inquiry-based problem solving is an 
interpersonal process that occurs in classrooms, and, as 
important as its context may be, this classroom process 
must be the center of attention. 
This description of what has changed is compelling 
and largely correct in its conclusions. The comparison 
with other nations feeds into the strong competitive 
nature of Americans, and the connection between poor 
American schooling and poor economic performance is a 
simple logic that spreads easily. However, its broad¬ 
brush perspective leaves many questions and assumptions 
that must be addressed before solutions will become 
evident. There are serious questions about the validity 
of the international comparisons (Berliner, 1992; O'Neil, 
1994; Cellis, 1994). The assumption of an American 
economy deteriorating in the face of international 
competition is questionable (Nasar, 1993; Krugman and 
Lawrence, 1994). Also open to serious question are those 
who maintain that the structure or formulation of the 
American educational system is the underlying culprit, 
incapable of producing properly educated workers for 
future economic needs regardless of how well the formula 
is implemented ("Training for jobs," 1994). 
Policy-making educators might not be anxious to 
dispel inaccuracies in the current, mass wisdom because, 
as "sound bites" within a crisis approach they constitute 
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such a compelling need for change. Although there is 
little doubt that the American educational system needs to 
improve, many of the valid reasons (not the least of which 
is that constant change and improvement should be part of 
the education profession as much as it is in the medical 
or legal professions) are much more difficult to sell to 
local taxpayers than fear of losing an international 
competition. The national attention being given to 
improving education is welcome, and perhaps the stimulus 
for that attention should not be examined too closely, in 
fear that the urgency would evaporate if the need were 
argued too closely. Educators do not want to return to 
the dark years of the late nineteen seventies and 
eighties, when education took a back-seat on the national 
agenda. Yet the seeds for improvement lie in the needs 
for improvement. The question of just what are America's 
educational needs must be addressed before changes can be 
made. There is general consensus among those who study 
science education that universal science literacy is 
needed, but any realistic plan will be rooted is what this 
goal means, why this goal and not other goals, the history 
of reaching for such goals, and the relationship of this 
goal to American society. Questions such as what degrees 
of accomplishment are desired and tested, who is to be 
involved and how, how long it's going to take, and how 
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much it is going to cost are questions that must be 
grounded in the bigger issues and bigger picture. 
The manufacturing sector of the American economy was, 
and largely still is, organized with a few highly trained 
managers supervising production personnel whose most 
prized quality is punctuality. The research, development 
and management of new products is carried out far from the 
production-floor people, usually by a few highly trained, 
scientifically literate people. "American enterprise has 
been organized on the principle that most workers do not 
need to know much, or be able to do much, beyond what's 
necessary to perform narrowly defined tasks" (Marshall and 
Tucker, 1992, p. 53). The American educational system 
"has been going about the mission that has been appointed 
it: training an old-fashioned, mass-production work 
force" (Turner, 1986, p. 47). If American colleges do not 
produce enough scientifically literate people to fill the 
relatively few R&D and supervisory jobs, then scientists 
are imported from abroad. (Suro, 1989; Mydens, 1990). 
Unfortunately, it will probably become more and more 
difficult to rely upon such foreign brainpower to make up 
for our domestic shortcomings. Dr. John A. Armstrong, a 
physicist and director of research at IBM, addressed the 
issue in the July 9, 1989 New York Times upon his 
appointment as Vice President for science and technology: 
I don't think people have any idea how much we are 
living on borrowed time. Despite all these 
5 
discussions about technological competitiveness and 
who should be investing in what industries, there's a 
good chance that if we are not careful, in 10 to 15 
years it will have all come and gone, because we were 
not able to gather the technical manpower. So I 
can't think of a more pressing national issue than 
the desperate lack of interest, and excitement, in 
science on the part of children... A very large 
faction of the highly trained technical talent we 
hire in science and engineering has come to our 
country, finished off their education and then stayed 
here... [But] it's getting more attractive than it 
was 10 or 15 years ago to do science in Europe, and 
its a lot harder to entice European scientists to 
stay here than it was seven or eight years ago. And 
ten years from now it will be even harder to attract 
Asian scientists and engineers to stay here. So, we 
need to grow our own. If we don't, the rest of this 
is going to be meaningless. (p. F5) 
Although the argument that the American economy needs 
more home-grown scientists and engineers is logically 
convincing and embraced for many political reasons by many 
constituencies ("Training for jobs", 1994), it is belied 
by the actual low employment statistics of graduating 
scientists (Browne, 1992; Kilborn, 1993a, 1993b). If 
American business needs them, then why can't graduating 
scientists and engineers readily find jobs? Perhaps 
because of temporary lulls in the national economy. 
Perhaps because the defense industries are shrinking after 
the end of the cold war (Browne, 1994; Lewin, 1994). 
Perhaps because the majority of American manufacturers, 
unlike IBM, are still organized according to the old 
assumption that production personnel need not be 
scientifically literate (Marshall & Tucker, 1992). 
Perhaps because American manufacturers are in reality not 
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performing so poorly compared to their global competitors 
(Nasar, 1993). But perhaps the question contains a 
misleading assumption. The "highly trained technical 
talent" that Mr. Armstrong referred to might well be an 
elite necessary to the manufacturing sector of an economy, 
but the American economy is rapidly turning away from 
manufacturing and becoming increasingly focused on the 
service sector. Even if the majority of today's 
businesses are still organized around the old ethic of 
punctuality and mass-production, the direction of change 
is clear. The lack of jobs for graduating scientists and 
engineers might well be a reflection of this structural 
change within the American economy. Rather than a cadre 
of scientific and technical elites, a service economy 
needs general scientific literacy spread throughout its 
workers. "This case is becoming more compelling still as 
jobs become less secure, the service sector expands, the 
life-cycle of vocational skills diminishes, and the market 
puts an ever greater premium on the ability to deal with 
people and process information" ("Training for jobs," 
1994, p. 26). 
It seems as though science education can have two 
goals: training workers for specific scientific and 
technical jobs, and raising the general level of 
scientific and technical literacy. It is becoming 
increasingly obvious that widespread scientific literacy 
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in the workforce is as necessary as a cadre of practicing 
scientists for a national economy to compete globally 
(Benavot, 1992; NSTA Reports, December 1991/January 1992, 
p. 1). And this scientific literacy must extend to the 
high school graduate entering the work force directly. 
"The economic future of the United States depends mainly 
on the skills of the front-line work force, the people 
whose jobs will not require a baccalaureate degree. 
Success, then, depends on developing a program to prepare 
close to three quarters of our work force to take on tasks 
in restructured workplaces that, up to now, have been 
assigned mainly to the college educated" (Marshall and 
Tucker, 1992, p. 54). 
There is considerable debate about just what 
constitutes scientific literacy, stretching from E.D. 
Hirsch's voluminous prescriptions (Hirsch, 1993) to 
Shamos's point that the relevance of science to the masses 
is in the joy of intellectual sport: "Students have the 
most to gain... if they study science for the aesthetic 
and intellectual values it bestows... Is it not more 
desirable to nurture an appreciation of science?" (Shamos, 
1987). The most frequent definition of scientific 
literacy is functional: "to be able to use information 
obtained by others, to benefit from the reading of 
textbooks and other references that present information in 
abstract form,... and a means of communication that enable 
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him to interpret the information as though he had obtained 
it himself" (Karplus and Thier, 1967, p. 24). The 
essential agreement of all parties to the debate is that 
some form of knowledge of science would be advantageous 
for the majority of people and for American society as a 
whole. 
It is in this arena of more or less universal 
scientific literacy that American education is so lacking. 
This lack is measured against the ideal, rather than as a 
comparison with other countries, where it is not at all 
clear that universal scientific literacy is common. More 
scientifically literate business managers would have much 
to contribute to national competitiveness (Schulhof, 
1992). The Supreme Court ruled in June, 1993, that 
American judges will henceforth have to insure that "any 
and all scientific evidence admitted is not only relevant, 
but reliable" (as quoted in Greenhouse, 1993; also see 
Angier, 1993). The legal profession, contributing a 
strong note to the tenor of society, must now be 
scientifically literate. 
It is to some degree self-evident that increased 
scientific literacy among professionals and managers would 
be desirable. However, our increasingly service-oriented 
economy cannot stay healthy by relying solely upon the 
traditional upper classes. Both a service economy and a 
global economy dictate sin organizational scheme for 
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business that places decision making on the shop floor. 
"Take General Motor's new Saturn automobile plant in 
Tennessee, where Mr. Alexander [the Education Secretary 
under President Bush] is from.' There, the headlight 
assembly team helps decide who new members will be, ' he 
said. 'They don't want any new team member who doesn't 
know math, reading skills, who doesn't understand spatial 
relationships, who doesn't have good team skills, because 
a team member without those skills can't make a 
defect-free headlight, and because if they can't do that 
people will buy Toyotas and they won't have jobs' " 
(Chira, 1991). It would seem that science literacy would 
also be useful in such workplaces. 
Even if the workplace is seem as including tasks that 
are inherently technological or scientific, such as making 
a headlight or repairing a computer, it does not 
automatically follow that scientific literacy is a 
relevant, worthwhile skill. If the workplace is imagined 
as static, with workers performing the same tasks year 
after year, then rote learning and skill training, even 
highly technical, can produce adequate workers. For 
example, the highly developed apprenticeship system of 
Germany is often admired in this country, but it assumes a 
static economy. 
Apprenticeships are inflexible and antiquated, good 
at turning out skilled car workers but bad at 
producing software programmers or television 
producers. One result is that Germany has one of the 
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least developed service sectors in Western Europe... 
The system produces narrow specialists, intent on 
making their careers as machine engineers or 
production managers, whereas modern manufacturing 
techniques demand flexible generalists, capable of 
turning their hands to a wide range of jobs. In 
addition, it allows almost no room for training, 
assuming that workers will remain in their same jobs 
throughout their lives” ("Training for jobs," 1994, 
p. 26). 
Of course, stasis no longer exists. The rapid growth 
of the service sector of the economy and the changes in 
technology and market conditions resulting from a global 
economy dictate a work environment that is in constant 
change. As a result, the work force, down to the 
janitorial staff, must be capable of "selecting equipment 
and tools, applying technology to specific tasks, and 
maintaining and troubleshooting technologies;... Thinking 
creatively, making decisions, solving problems, seeing 
things in the mind's eye, knowing how to learn, and 
reasoning" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1991, p.vii). By 
looking in this way at existing needs, an operational 
definition of scientific literacy can be deduced, starting 
the cascade of goals-within-goals that eventually ends in 
the schools at the scale of courses and even lessons. 
The point being made at this time is that there seems 
to be a clear need for increased scientific literacy at 
all levels of the economy, however you might define 
scientific literacy. Our economy will struggle in the 
face of foreign competition, an increasing service sector. 
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and a rapidly changing manufacturing environment without a 
workforce that is scientifically literate at all levels. 
On one hand, American public schools should maintain their 
traditional efforts to increase their output of scientific 
adepts, if not for specific jobs in science, then for the 
effect of such high science literacy on the upper echelons 
of the workforce. But far more difficult, it must 
increase the average science achievement of all students 
in order to address the need at all economic levels. 
Suddenly, the challenge facing science educators 
becomes enormous. Minor repairs or a shifting of 
resources within the present system will not have the 
dramatic effects that are needed for attaining a desirable 
degree of universal scientific literacy. Possible 
solutions must begin by looking at the very foundations of 
American education. 
B. The Goal of American Secondary Education Is Unique 
Educational systems rely for their success on a 
context of social, political and economic institutions, as 
well as philosophical underpinnings, and the 
transportability of any particular practice from one 
national context to another is a thorny issue. 
Ultimately, the solutions to the problems of the American 
educational system will come from its own uniqueness, not 
from its similarities to others. An American definition 
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of universal scientific literacy and the accompanying 
institutions and strategies necessary to implement the 
goal may well be very different from those in Germany or 
Japan. The siren song of high test scores rising from 
foreign shores should not entice us in the same direction. 
Analyses of American students' scientific ineptitude is 
particularly galling when compared to third world 
countries whose resources are clearly so much less than 
ours. If they can do it, why can't we? The answer is 
that America is a unique country, and its secondary school 
system is too. Certainly every country, and therefore its 
educational system, is unique in its own way. But when it 
comes to educational systems, the American model tends to 
be different whereas the others tend to be idiosyncratic 
of regionally followed paradigms. The British educational 
model is the most widespread, including most countries of 
the former British Commonwealth, as evidenced by the 
growing export of the British GSCS and A-Level exams 
("Empire building," 1993). The rigor and discipline of 
educational systems in the Far East is quite foreign to 
most American, as well as European-based, educators. The 
Arab paradigm of education is another pattern followed by 
many countries. 
It is at the secondary level that American schools 
are so distinct from those in the rest of the world. At 
the elementary level, the comparison is far less distinct. 
13 
I was educated during my secondary school years in an 
international school in Switzerland that offered the 
Swiss, French, British, American and International 
Baccalaureate programs. There were 82 nationalities 
represented among the ever-changing student body, 
affording an excellent glimpse into the world’s schools. 
With some limitations, students were able to take classes 
in any of the programs, affording an excellent comparative 
view. Clearly, the American program was fundamentally 
different from all the others. Not only do American 
secondary schools attempt to educate all students equally, 
but they also attempt a peculiarly American task in the 
classroom: American teachers attempt to elicit the unique 
capabilities of each student by having each student find 
significant, personal meaning in what they learn. This 
paradigm of education is well expressed by D. Bob Gowin, 
an eminent researcher in educational theory and practice: 
The notion of meaning is a major plank in the 
[typically American] theory of educating. To teach 
is to try deliberately to change the meaning of 
students' experience, and students must grasp the 
meaning before they deliberately learn something new. 
Learning is never entirely cognitive. Feelings 
accompany any thinking that moves to reorganize 
meaning. In educating we are concerned to integrate 
thinking, feeling, and acting. (Gowin, 1981, p. 42) 
To integrate thinking, feeling, and acting for the 
student is to strive towards inculcating significant, 
personal meaning. Gowin clearly wishes students to feel 
good about their learning, and good enough to change their 
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behavior. In a nutshell, American secondary teachers want 
their students to enjoy learning. The source of this 
focus is the uniquely American ideal of a society of 
individuals, not of groups (Ellington, 1990; Schlesinger, 
1992). In America, the ideal is that you are judged as an 
individual, regardless of the various groups with which 
you could be identified. It is the individual who must 
succeed, and success is defined as the happiness and 
wealth of the individual. The education that an American 
needs is therefore focused on eliciting and developing the 
uniqueness of each individual, rather than on preparing 
each child to be part of a group identity. Each student 
must strive towards personal, individual meaning because 
it will be the source of future happiness, whose pursuit 
we are guaranteed in our Constitution, and wealth. It is 
only in the United States that the pre-eminent college 
entrance exam, the SAT, is an APTITUDE test, whose purpose 
is to correlate the innate and personal aptitudes of 
students with future success in higher education. Its 
recent change in name to the Scholastic ACHIEVEMENT Test 
does not reflect any diversion from this basic purpose. 
The American Bill of Rights codifies an ideal that is most 
exemplified in the world by Americans. 
There are, of course, gross deficiencies relative to 
the ideal of the individual in American society today, 
this list of "-ism's" seeming to grow all the time. 
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However, the point is that these deficiencies are defined 
and measured precisely in terms of the ideal. Neither has 
two hundred years of national experience left it 
untouched. We now recognize that there is a common good 
that sometimes conflicts with individual proclivities. 
The compassion for others necessary to a healthy society 
must be institutionalized to some degree. Institutions 
are groups, and they cannot help but deal with their 
clients as defined groups. The many anti-discrimination 
and affirmative action laws of the ninteen sixties and 
seventies required statistics for giving money to 
minorities or monitoring how minorities were being 
treated: 
In 1964,... the architecture of civil-rights laws 
began to be erected, and many of the new laws - 
particularly the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - required 
highly detailed information about minority 
participation which could be gathered only by the 
decennial census, the nation’s supreme instrument for 
gathering demographic statistics. The expectation 
that the race question would wither away surrendered 
to the realization that race data were fundamental to 
monitoring and enforcing desegregation. The census 
soon acquired a political importance that it has 
never had in the past. (Wright, 1994, p. 50) 
Prior to the 1970 census, Americans did not 
categorize themselves rigidly into racial or ethnic 
categories, and their tendency to do so now has little to 
do with "making any kind of biological assessment" 
(Wright, 1994, p. 53). The scientific question of race is 
far, far more complicated than the threadbare divisions of 
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Mongoloid, Negroid, and Caucasoid. The question of 
ethnicity is even more complicated. In America today, 
there are very few people with pure race or ethnic blood. 
"Whatever the word 'race' may mean elsewhere in the world, 
or to the world of science, it is clear that in America 
the categories are arbitrary, confused, and hopelessly 
intermingled" (Wright, 1994, p. 53). Which of the few 
categories on the census to check off is a matter of self¬ 
perception, not biology or history. A good point can be 
made that the increasing racial and ethnic polarization of 
American society originates at least in part with the 
statistical requirement that every person declare an 
identity with one group or another. There is no category 
for Mixed precisely because then a majority of people 
would legitimately check such an option and the 
statistical base would be ruined. The irony is that the 
effort to equalize individuals depends upon imposing a 
categorization that creates polarized groups. Congress is 
already beginning to plan for the 2000 census, and the 
effects of such categorizing are central issues. It can 
only be hoped that the politicians will produce a solution 
that remains true to the American ideal of the individual. 
In contrast, a society that stresses group identity, 
as are those whose educational achievements we often envy, 
stresses something different. At the secondary level, a 
gross generalization can be made that the rest of the 
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world stresses different paradigms of education from 
America's, all of which reflect a different premise for 
social organization. Their common premise is that society 
is built of groups, and an individual's identity is that 
of the group. The regional conflicts presently flaring 
around the world almost all illustrate the premise, as do 
so many of the social welfare programs of most European 
countries (Cohen, 1993; Belt, 1993). " 'To be average is 
good in Sweden,' explains ethnologist Ake Daun. 'To be 
different is bad' " (Belt, 1993, p. 22) Once the group 
has become the unit of social organization, prescriptions 
must be established for individuals to belong to a group. 
Creative, independent problem solving, intellectual 
initiative, and a questioning attitude are not the 
hallmarks of group cohesion and become either neglected or 
even discouraged. Japanese society is legendary for its 
emphasis on group identity. In Japan, there is a sizable 
population of third-generation Koreans who are still 
denied citizenship because of the group affiliation of 
their ancestors. The Japanese educational system cannot 
help but reflect the group orientation of society. 
"Tosiyasu L. Kunii, one of Japan's most prolific and 
outspoken computer scientists, says there is a reason that 
Japanese companies do not design successful computer 
operating systems or original microprocessors. Japan's 
education system, he says, churns out uncreative 
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graduates" (Pollack, 1994). "A major reason for the 
historic lack of attention in Japan to students with 
special needs is the pervasive belief in a lack of 
individual differences" (Ellington, 1990, p. 408). 
Groups are built around commonality, and thus 
dedication to a common task becomes the path of success. 
The individual’s enjoyment of or satisfaction in the 
common task is of minor importance compared to its 
importance for binding the group together. As a Spanish 
economist was quoted in The New York Times as saying: "In 
the United States, work is regarded as a path to 
fulfillment... Here, it is regarded more as a divine 
malediction, and social security is what makes it 
bearable" (Cohen, 1993, August 9, p. A3). 
The premise that society is built of groups produces 
an educational paradigm best called the classical or 
traditional model of education. The two different social 
premises, one of the individual and the other of the 
group, are directly linked to "the history of educational 
theory, [which] is marked by opposition between the idea 
that education is development from within and that it is 
formation from without" (Dewey, 1938, p. 17). Dewey 
begins his book Experience and Education with this 
insight, and continues on to describe how the traditional 
model of education epitomizes the group approach of 
education from without, while the progressive model 
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epitomizes the focus on the individual and development 
from within. Dewey provides three characterizations for 
traditional education: 
The subject-matter of education consists of bodies of 
information and of skills that have been worked out 
in the past; therefore, the chief business of the 
school is to transmit them to the new generation... 
Moral training consists in forming habits of action 
in conformity with these rules and standards. 
Finally, the general pattern of school 
organization... constitutes the school a kind of 
institution sharply marked off from other social 
institutions. (Dewey, 1938, p. 17, 18) 
Writing from a more contemporary and practical 
perspective, Gowin (1981) also describes the traditional 
or, as he calls it, the classical view of education: 
Classical views of education... want the student to 
change, especially in respect to the sorts of 
products the student submits to the educational 
establishment for evaluation. They want better term 
papers, neater handwriting, better composition. They 
su ose that by getting these, they get better 
comprehension, greater knowledge, increased 
understanding. Evidence for these changes is found 
in the product submitted: examination books, papers, 
scores on achievement tests, class rank, prizes 
garnered. Such documents of achievement are taken to 
mean that an educative process has ha ened and that 
it is the cause of increase in information, 
knowledge, skill, understanding. One need not know 
how the process itself works as long as one has 
absolutely impeccable standards and absolutely 
reliable expert judges. (Gowin, 1981, p.39) 
Within this traditional view of education, it is 
frequently more efficient for the student to rote learn 
and mechanically produce documents than it is to discover 
a personal connection with the knowledge. The usefulness 
or meaningfulness of the specified products to the 
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individual student is not the central issue. "Japanese 
education is, first and foremost, rote memorization. That 
explains why they are 'so good at math,' but it also 
explains why they are not so good at putting ideas into 
their own words, at taking material apart to understand 
its components, at putting parts together to make (or 
remake) the whole, or at thinking creatively" (Nordquist, 
1993, p. 66). 
Science education, with its plethora of factual 
information, is easily shaped within the classical 
paradigm and thus fits well into a group orientation for 
society. Taught as information to be memorized, 
"mathematics and science instruction... have become 
ubiquitous elements in the school curricula of developing 
countries, taking up a third or more of the total time 
allocated to all school subjects" (Benovot, 1992, p. 155). 
In the classical paradigm, intellectualism is an end 
in itself, and needs no justification to the rest of 
society. The outward appearances, or rituals, of 
intellectualism are more important than any inner, 
personal transformations that the specific knowledge may 
induce. Certainly a deep, personal satisfaction can be 
engendered through the accomplishment of intellectual work 
as it can for any type of work, but the content of the 
work is not the source. It is a love of learning, but of 
learning anything; such is classical intellectualism. 
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Nordquist (1993) describes a conversation with a Japanese 
high school social studies teacher who was planning on 
having his students memorize, verbatim, the Japanese 
constitution. In answer to her persistent questions about 
the usefulness of such an accomplishment, the teacher is 
perplexed that there need be a reason for the task beyond, 
"Because then they will know every word of it!" (p. 64). 
A classical society confers considerable status to 
intellectuals, regardless of the subject of their 
cogitations or whether they reflect inner wisdom. 
Teachers have high social status because they are seen as 
intellectuals. Many college graduates become teachers not 
through altruism to help children, as do many American 
teachers, but as entry into the attractive social niche of 
an intellectual. 
Because of its social organization around groups, the 
rest of the world concentrates on teaching content 
information of facts, figures and formulas because of its 
socializing effect. Students are expected to learn in 
order that they may produce a product, and the description 
of that product is set by the national government as 
objectively as possible so that government-hired experts 
can judge them. Under such a system, it is virtually 
impossible to escape rote learning. It is immaterial 
whether the information is understood meaningfully, or 
that students can use it creatively (Feynman, 1985, p. 211 
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- 219). An excellent illustration of the difference 
between an American and classical paradigm of education is 
the British system, which could be characterized as a 
classical system that is attempting to switch to the 
American paradigm. In Britain, education legislation in 
1988 and 1993 has set the system into motion towards 
"teaching core subjects and producing productive workers" 
(Mao Zepettan, 1993, p. 59), the decidedly clear 
assumption being that what is learned is to be inherently 
worthwhile. At present, the upheavals in the British 
system surround the student exams set by the national 
government. On one side is the central bureaucracy that 
is establishing exams in the classical paradigm, and on 
the other the teachers, "complaining that an over-complex 
national curriculum and unwieldy tests are turning into a 
nightmare" (Mao Zepatten, 1993, p. 59). "The government 
will plough ahead with tests this year, despite a boycott 
by teachers, who say they are too narrow and onerous... 
The tests will be simplified. Only the core subjects... 
will be tested. Testing will be revised so to add less to 
teachers' workloads. External examiners will be used 
more" (Testing, testing, 1993, p. 73). 
If a classical paradigm focuses on memorization of 
information, an American paradigm focuses, however hazily, 
on general principles, laws, themes, organizers that can 
be applied to a wide variety of information by a person 
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who understands them. Let us call such general ideas 
concepts, as opposed to content information. Concepts are 
the generic ideas that are the keys to personal meaning 
and creative problem solving. "The essence of the 
importance of science, both for interest in theory and for 
technological purposes, lies in its application [of 
general principles] to concrete detail, and every such 
application evokes a novel problem for research" 
(Whitehead, 1929, p. 37). 
Concepts are not omitted in the classical paradigm. 
They are indeed taught, but just as so much more content. 
Concepts are not keys unless they are recognized as such 
by the possessor. The often quoted oral exams that many 
European students must take are Olympic tests of rote 
learning. The application, analysis, synthesis and 
evaluation that they apparently require is based on a 
volume of rote learning that is unimaginable to most 
American educators. Even the "proper" analyses are rote 
learned. The student who is able to cope with such rote 
demands learns to use basic, widely applicable concepts 
for creative problem solving serendipitously, as a 
by-product, as a survival technique. Some personal 
meaning is produced, but it is ancillary to the pursued 
content and is bought at a cost that few American students 
would consider worthwhile. 
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The great advantage of the classical emphasis on 
content is that the tasks of educators and learners are 
easily defined, straight-forward to carry out, and easily 
evaluated. This objective structure is an enormous 
advantage when compared to the American paradigm. The 
problem with setting individual meaning as the goal is 
that the educators' and learners' tasks are not easily 
defined, therefore difficult to carry out and almost 
impossible to evaluate. No educational system throughout 
history has managed to teach meaningful understanding to a 
majority of its youth. It is certainly a most chimerical 
component of the American dream. 
In pursuit of such a unique but diffuse goal, 
American teachers have few curricular or instructional 
tools designed for the task. The available books and 
pedagogical techniques are designed for a classical 
education. So what we have in an American science 
classroom is a teacher attempting to fashion a product 
with little idea of what the product should look like, 
using tools designed to fashion an unwanted product. It 
is little wonder that neither classical nor personally 
meaningful learning come out well from such schizophrenia. 
C. American Education Cannot Emulate Others' Wavs 
The basic contradictions that characterize the 
American classroom were academic as long as the need to 
25 
deliver large numbers of well-educated students did not 
exist. But now that America must compete within a global 
economy, the need exists. The schizophrenia of the 
American classroom needs to be resolved, one way or the 
other. 
Many a pundit would have American schools emulate the 
rest of the world's emphasis on classical learning. The 
siren song of clear goals, reliable methods and objective 
evaluation is loud and beckoning. The Core Knowledge 
movement spearheaded by E.D. Hirsch Jr. is the best 
organized example of such a direction (Hirsch Jr., 1993; 
Core Knowledge Foundation, 1993). Their emphasis has been 
almost exclusively at the elementary level (K-6) where, 
considering the developmental level of the students, its 
success is understandable. It appeals to the desire of 
such young students for concrete, unequivocal answers and 
clearly stipulated lists of objectives to be attained. 
Its success can also be attributed to the effect of 
coordinating multiple, successive years of curriculum, 
regardless of that curriculum's intrinsic value. The 
educational power of clear objectives and multi-year 
coordination is certainly considerable and is a lesson 
American education could benefit from greatly. However, 
these two conditions are not sufficient to ensure a 
successful K-12 program in the long term. Hirsch's 
weakness is that he does not distinguish between content 
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and concept: "Any school that aspires to become 'world 
class' will need therefore to decide upon a SPECIFIC 
(emphasis Hirsch's) multiyear sequence of content and 
skills" (Hirsch, 1993b). A careful reading of the Core 
Knowledge Sequence: Grades 1-6 (Core Knowledge Foundation/ 
1993) finds that concepts are mixed in with his lists of 
content with no distinction between the two. Neither are 
the listed concepts organized in any manner that 
corresponds to how students develop cognitively or learn 
intellectually. Furthermore, even though Hirsch states 
that there should be a sequence of skills as well as 
content, he has yet to describe just what those skills 
are, distinct from the content. 
Hirsch and others who advocate a return to a strict 
classical model are right that American education could 
institute programs to show significant results, and, 
within this narrow context, they are right to resent 
educators' lack of enthusiasm. But it would never work in 
the long run. It is critically important to understand 
the difference in underlying assumptions between the 
American system and the rest of the world's so that, in 
attempting to improve our admittedly limping system, we do 
not jump from the frying pan to the fire. 
Americans are essentially anti-intellectual; as a 
society, they do not revere learning for its own sake. 
The best encapsulation I have seen of this attitude was on 
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bumper sticker: "My kid can whip your honor student." In 
a competitive sense, Americans are embarrassed when 
international comparisons of students' scientific 
knowledge show, for example, that few Americans can 
iterate the celestial causes of the seasons. But if the 
causes of the seasons were made a national educational 
priority, many an American would say, "Why? So what's so 
important about the seasons?" Americans are suspicious of 
intellectualism, the keystone presumption of a classical 
learning system. American parents would revolt if their 
children began coming home with tomes of arcane knowledge 
whose digestion required quitting after-school sports and 
activities. Americans want to know what good the 
knowledge is: What's the fun in it, or. What is it going 
to do for my future earning power? Even if Americans could 
be made to accept initially a classical educational 
system, they would soon object to its necessary 
implication of elitism. In a society that embraces 
classical education, only a minority of students is able 
to flourish in a system that is demanding of time and 
concentration. The family must be in full support of the 
student, who must be motivated by external penalities and 
rewards such as family opprobrium, entry to a prestigious 
university, or eventual social status. One often quoted 
difference between American and foreign societies, 
especially Japanese, is that Americans attribute scholarly 
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success to innate intelligence or talent, whereas others 
attribute it to hard work and perseverance (Stevenson and 
Stigler, 1992). The consequent pressure on foreign 
students to dedicate themselves to school work is such 
that little time or energy remains to be spent otherwise 
by the successful. Under such conditions, it is the 
children of the social elite that succeed, with little 
chance for the lower social classes. The demands on time 
and effort for most students are so extreme that it is 
useless, and expensive, for society to give the laggards 
continued chances past their mid-adolescence: If they 
haven't made it by then, they'll never make it. Students 
are separated into different schools at about the end of 
the equivalent of American middle school. Which track 
they follow will dictate much of what happens in the rest 
of their lives. Such tracking is a major contributor to 
the forming of a classist society, with an intellectual 
elite at the top. Americans would never permit such a 
situation to become institutionalized. Americans will not 
support intellectualism, they will not support an elitist 
system, or a system that requires a mid-adolescent to make 
irreversible life decisions. Once Americans understood 
the implications of instituting a classical educational 
system, they would judge it worse than the present system. 
Many of the answers proffered to American educational 
problems are, at their core, based upon emulating a 
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classical form of education. The calls for increasing the 
school day (Barrett, 1990) are in this category. Their 
premise is that students are learning content information. 
It is entirely logical that more time spent on the task 
will produce more product because the efficiency of the 
task is not really in question. The 243 compulsory school 
days in Japan and the 226-240 days in Germany correlate 
well with the renown of their workforces. One answer, 
frequently proffered, to American educational problems is 
that American society must change so that all American 
families will revere education, actively support their 
children's intellectual efforts, and emphasize 
perseverance as the road to success. Frequently mentioned 
are the examples of immigrants who bring with them such 
family values and whose children consequently thrive in 
American schools (Caplan et al., 1992). Although it is 
true that American schools reflect the society at large, 
which indeed does lack reverence for education, it would 
be foolish to predicate fundamental and significant 
improvement of American education on hopes of such social 
changes. In any case, it may be that as Asian societies 
evolve economically in a direction similar to America's, 
their social problems will begin to resemble the type and 
magnitude of those now in America ("Fings ain't wot they 
used to be", 1994). Contrarily, and more realistically, a 
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re-designed and re-invigorated educational system should 
contribute to bringing about the social changes. 
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CHAPTER II 
A MODEL FOR AMERICAN SCIENCE EDUCATION 
The systemic changing of American education 
("Systemic Change," 1993, p. 1) must be built upon the 
ethos of the individual. Rather than emulating the 
societies or educational systems of the rest of the world, 
which would essentially be looking backwards, America 
needs to create a pedagogy that teaches the vast majority 
of today’s students to understand individually and 
meaningfully the material before them. Such is the goal 
that America must set to be true to its ideals. My 
personal confidence in America is that it has always faced 
such trend-setting tasks with determination and success. 
The current challenge before the American educational 
system is to invent the means of passing the American 
ethos of the individual from whole generation to whole 
generation. How America deals with this challenge is 
vitally important to the rest of the world, because in a 
short quarter-decade, there will be eight billion humans 
inhabiting this planet. 
The only way to meet the challenge of the 
multiplication of needs is to substantially enhance 
the contributions of science and technology to 
development and to enhance the cooperation between 
the science-rich and the science-poor. Both new ways 
of doing things and the rapid spread of good ideas 
are urgently required. All major developmental goals 
- economic growth, environmental protection, improved 
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health, better farming, population management - 
depend on the ability of countries to absorb and use 
science and technology. (Ausubel, J.H., 1993, p. 17) 
A clear pre-requisite of this ability is an 
educational system that produces a scientifically literate 
population that can absorb the science and technology. In 
the end, it is still people who tell the machines what to 
do. Just as the world is streaming into a global economy, 
a never-before-seen phenomenon, so its educational systems 
are streaming into the uncharted waters of producing 
scientific literacy, defined as the ability to practice 
flexible, inquiry-based, problem solving, throughout a 
population. 
To succeed in this challenge, it is imperative to 
begin with a model of science education. Among 
education's greatest failures is the paucity of theory to 
guide inquiry, discussion, development and implementation. 
With regard to curriculum and instruction, the scale of 
the individual teacher is primarily the level at which 
such decisions are taken in America, and this freedom is 
one of the major attractions of a profession that 
otherwise compares poorly with other professions (Cellis, 
1993b). Yet the vast majority of American science 
teachers have a healthy disdain for educational theory, 
and rarely base their choice of curriculum or instruction 
on guiding principles. Efforts to discuss underlying 
theory are frequently interpreted by teachers as a 
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disguised threat of impending incursions, if not 
constraints, in a cherished arena of responsibility. 
American teachers would be aghast if subjected to the 
predicament of British teachers who are attempting to 
modify their educational reforms so that they can INCREASE 
the percentage of teaching time left to their own 
discretion to between 10 and 25 percent (Victory from the 
Jaws of Defeat, 1993, p. 53). 
True. Theory, ALL theory, by its very nature, is 
constraining. Possibilities are eliminated and directions 
are indicated. There is a lingo attached, just as there 
is to any cohesive domain of knowledge and endeavor 
(Miller, 1981). Educational theory is no exception. It 
does impose constraints, but constraints already bind this 
arena. I cannot conceive of a teacher who could honestly 
say that his/her curricular/instructional arena were not 
laced with constraints, particularly if counting such 
essential constraints as the amount of private time that 
can be dedicated. Rather, the question is a comparison of 
constraints, and, by extension, opportunities. In order 
to compare, however, there must be an external standard 
recognized by all according to which judgements can be 
made. These external standards are, by definition, 
educational theory, "proceeding from a level deeper and 
more inclusive than is presented by the practices and 
ideas of the contending parties" (Dewey, 1938, p. 5). 
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That teachers generally know little of educational 
theory is a major obstacle to change initiatives and even 
more so to institutionalizing change as a constant process 
inherent in education, as it is in other professions. As 
the father of the progressive education movement in this 
country, John Dewey was well aware of the need for theory, 
or, as he called it, philosophy, to guide change. The 
proposals for change in science education being presented 
in this paper are very much a continuation of the argument 
started by Dewey of traditional versus progressive 
education (plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose), and 
his opinions on the matter are as relevant today as they 
were sixty years ago: 
The traditional school could get along without any 
consistently developed philosophy of education. 
About all it required in that line was a set of 
abstract words like culture, discipline, our great 
cultural heritage, etc., actual guidance being 
derived not from them but from custom and established 
routines. Just because progressive schools cannot 
rely upon established traditions and 
institutionalized habits, they must either proceed 
more or less haphazardly or be directed by ideas 
which, when they are made articulate and coherent, 
form a philosophy of education. Revolt against the 
kind of organization characteristic of the 
traditional school constitutes a demand for a kind of 
organization based upon ideas. I think that only 
slight acquaintance with the history of education is 
needed to prove that educational reformers and 
innovators alone have felt the need for a philosophy 
of education. Those who adhered to the established 
system needed merely a few fine-sounding words to 
justify existing practices. The real work was done 
by habits which were so fixed as to be institutional. 
(1938, p.28, 29) 
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The need to base science education upon an 
EDUCATIONAL theory is not obvious to all. Many science 
teachers assume that the theory(ies) that guide science 
education are the theories of science; scientific method 
is the most frequent candidate. The logic is that the 
best way for students to learn science is for them to 
mimic what a scientist does, and controlled scientific 
investigation is an easy stereotype for a job description. 
From this approach, the teacher need only check that 
curricular and instructional planning is forcing students 
to repeatedly cycle through the stages of scientific 
method. However, the investigative skill described by the 
scientific method does not capture even the lion's share 
of what it means to be a scientifically literate person 
today. Education for scientific literacy deals with a way 
of thinking, not just experimental procedure. When it 
comes to guiding theory, science teachers must give up the 
simplicity and comfort of this tightly prescribed 
procedure for the uncertainty of what is known about the 
human intellect. 
What we know about the mind is generally studied in 
the fields of developmental, cognitive, and educational 
psychology, logic and reasoning, philosophy and 
epistemology. Once these fields become the source of 
knowledge and theory, a cross-over from science per se and 
into education has been made. If theory is going to 
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support the development of science education then it needs 
to be educational theory. Although the following 
discussion of educational theory may seem pedantic, I feel 
that it is necessary to begin with a clear understanding 
of the foundations of any attempt to build a unique 
pedagogy for our unique country. Theory is the rudder 
that steers effort as change is initiated and developed. 
The problems in American education are fundamentally 
process problems, not people problems. The reality of 
American science classrooms is that there is little or no 
underlying theory guiding the vast majority of teachers' 
decisions, and the result is curricular anarchy and 
churning with little headway being made. 
A. Six Educational Models and Theories That Can Be 
Amalgamated Into a Coherent Model of Science Education 
In attempting to construct a theory of science 
education, I amalgamated six theories or approaches to 
science education. These seemed to be the major players 
in the history of science education over the past forty 
years or so. After describing each of the six 
contributors to the Amalgamated Model, I will diagram four 
stages in the development of science education in which 
they or their parts will be recognizable. The final, 
complete diagram of the Model then becomes the combination 
of the four stages. 
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The six theories or approaches to science education 
combined into the Amalgamated Model are: 
1. Outcome-Based Education 
This approach to science education (Spady & Marshall, 
1991; Brandt, 1992/93; "The Challenge," 1994) emphasizes 
that ALL students should be given equal access to 
educational opportunity and expected, as a minimum, to 
strive towards the same, high standards of achievement. 
Thus outcome-based education contradicts the idea that 
intelligence, particularly in science, is innate and only 
bestowed upon the few at birth. The outcomes that are 
central to this approach are expressed as student-centered 
goals, in that they are clear directions that learning 
should follow, but different levels of understanding and 
mastery are possible. Minimum levels of understanding, or 
progress towards the goals, can be defined to establish 
standards. Furthermore, the goals should be stated in 
such a way that they can be translated into concrete 
objectives for which curricular, instructional and 
evaluative materials can be designed. It is emphasized 
within the model that the goals are student focused, 
rather than focused on teacher, administrator, or school 
behaviors or roles. 
The distinction between goal and objective is 
important within the outcome-based model. Without the 
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distinction, the model degenerates to something resembling 
the voluminous performance objectives of performance-based 
education (see below). The best relevant analogy of 
student learning is of a trip, or voyage in which a 
heading of, say, due East, is established as the goal. 
Yet, you never reach East, and do not expect to either. 
You can go further and further East, but you never arrive. 
There are concrete milestones along the way that ascertain 
how far one has voyaged towards the goal. These 
milestones are the analog of objectives. The many 
different, different paths that stretch East can be 
compared, and evaluated, on how far East they extend from 
the beginning point. They can also be compared according 
to the total path length. Meaning, analogously, that 
students can also learn by taking circuitous routes 
towards the goal, as long as headway is made and a bearing 
is always maintained on the goal. 
The two linked goals of science education that have 
been derived to guide the development of the Amalgamated 
Model (1. Students should understand the basic concepts of 
the life and physical sciences, as evidenced by their 
ability to; 2. Carry out flexible, inquiry-based problem 
solving) were designed according to these criteria. The 
first goal establishes a direction. The second goal 
emphasizes objectives in the sense that tangible 
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destinations or accomplishments in the direction of the 
goal can be observed. 
Outcome-based education incorporates a particular 
philosophy of education, and one of its major 
contributions to a model of science education is its 
explication of a philosophy in operative terms. 
Outcome-based education is itself seen as an amalgam or 
culmination of various preceeding philosophies and 
approaches (King & Evans, 1991) and therefore is well 
suited for an amalgamated model that also includes them. 
There are several implications of outcome-based education 
that can be perceived as threats to the ingrained habits 
of some practitioners. There is the postulate that 
organizations must be goal oriented in order to flourish. 
The flipside to goal orientation is a second postulate of 
accountability, and finally, there is a third postulate 
that education includes a process of continual 
professional improvement. Rarely are all three of these 
postulates evident in the beliefs or operations of 
American schools today, but considerable lip service is 
accorded them in any case. 
2. Individualized/Interdisciplinary Education 
At one time this approach was known as progressive 
education and spawned many "alternative" schools in the 
sixties and seventies. Perhaps its best practitioner was 
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A. S. Neil, of Summerhill fame (Neil, 1960). With its 
roots deep in Rousseau and Dewey, the focus is on the 
student as a unique individual. The faith is that the 
student’s own inclinations and intitiatives will lead to 
new intellectual vistas. Therefore this approach includes 
focus on the central role of student self-esteem and 
motivation, with the philosophy that ultimately the 
responsibility for learning rests with the student. 
The substantial movement towards interdisciplinary 
education is attempting to provide many possible avenues 
for a student to understand material by drawing 
connections among various applications. Individualized 
education emphasizes the multi-cultural, gender and 
modality dimensions (Barbe, Swassing, & Milone, 1979; 
Kavale & Forness, 1987) of the learning experience because 
they influence how the individual student fits into the 
learning environment. The Science-Technology-Society 
movement is also based on appealing to the individuality 
of each student within his/her social role. Mastery 
Learning, in which students are given specific learning 
outcomes which they may attain in a manner suitable to 
their individual learning styles and paces, is also a 
product of individualized education. 
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3. Performance-Based Education 
Performance-based education is associated in many 
teachers' minds with the movement in the late sixties and 
early seventies towards the detailing of specific 
behavioral objectives for every unit being taught (Mager, 
1962). Besides beginning the emphasis on outcomes, one of 
the great contributions of this approach is the detailing 
of different levels of understanding ascertained from the 
tangible responses and behaviors of students, as so 
elegantly codified by Bloom (1956). The difference 
between outcome-based education and performance-based 
education is primarily a matter of scale. Harking back to 
the voyage analogy used in describing outcome-based goals, 
outcome-based education focuses on the milestones. The 
achilles heel of performance-based education is that the 
sum of tangible destinations did not always, or even 
often, add up to a clear direction, or goal. It was a 
matter of not being able to see the forest for the trees. 
4. Cognitive Science 
The term "cognitive science" is used as a catch-all 
term to include developmental psychology such as Piaget's, 
cognitive and educational psychology such as Ausubel's 
(1978) and Novak's (1977), the study of logic and 
reasoning such as Toulmin's (1972), and information 
processing theory (Newell et al, 1972; Searle, 1990). 
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"Beginning in the 1950's,... in what has since come to be 
known as the 'cognitive revolution' " (Kihlstrom, 1987, p. 
1445), this approach to education is based upon objective 
descriptions of how the human mind functions in the 
learning process, attempting to establish common patterns. 
Cognitive science developed into a delineated field over 
the past twenty-five years, greatly accelerated by work in 
the computer sciences, and coalescing from parts of 
anthropology, neurobiology, linguistics, and philosophy, 
in particular epistemology. 
5. Process Learning Theory 
Sometimes referred to as the "hands-on" approach, its 
motto is learning through doing, and, in science 
education, can usually be recognized by the central role 
of the scientific method. Perhaps its most exemplary 
practice was as experiential education, which stretched to 
the Outward Bound approach (Kraft and Sakofs, 1986; Kraft 
and Kielsmeier, 1986). This category includes the 
approaches that emphasize critical thinking or thinking 
skills (Raths et al, 1986). Some adherents of this 
approach advocate teaching thinking skills per se, 
separate from the subject classes. 
6. Constructivism 
Constructivism combines elements of the 
individualized approach, learning theory and process 
learning, has been proposed "as a means of connecting all 
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current lines of research prevalent in science education" 
(Yager, 1991, p. 53). One of the major research areas 
associated with constructivism is the study of 
misconceptions. Constructivism is a synthesis, and the 
amalgamated model I have sketched, could, with latitude, 
be said to resemble constructivism. However, 
constructivism purposefully omits the behavioral approach 
of performance-based education, which has a legitimate, if 
unfashionable, contribution to make to a conversation on 
science education. Neither is it explicitly connected 
with an overriding goal orientation such as contributed by 
outcome based education. 
As powerful a theoretical edifice as constructivism 
is, for many practitioners it is not understood as a 
synthesis, but as another name for "hands-on" learning. 
Some practitioners distort it to mean that students should 
mimic and study the historical development of scientific 
ideas. 
B. Four Distinctions That Summarize the Amalgamated Model 
I combined these six theories or approaches into a 
coherent and synergistic model. The present incarnation 
is the result of many years of study and classroom 
experimentation, and will certainly continue to change 
with age. Indeed, room-for-growth was a major criterion 
of design. Also, complex problems require complex 
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solutions, even though simplicity is always persued. The 
state of American science education today is complex and 
the Amalgamated Model is also complex. 
There are two complimentary ways in which the 
Amalgamated Model can be approached and explained. Both 
explain the connections and major structural units that 
emerge from combining the six approaches to science 
education that were just presented. The first is a 
discourse, the second is a mapping and diagraming. 
In the discourse, four distinctions are clarified. 
These four distinctions can be considered to be the 
backbone, or summary, of the Amalgamated Model, and they 
are: 
1) Intellectual - Affective - Motor/Sensorial 
outcomes. 
These are student learning outcomes, and 
therefore implicit in this first distinction 
is the focus of the Amalgamated Model on the 
student. It is model concerned with learning 
and teaching. The teacher-student interaction is 
considered to be the keystone of change. 
2) Curriculum - Instruction - Evaluation. These 
three categories of the teaching endeavor have 
become widely accepted. Curriculum deals with 
what is to be learned, instruction deals with 
how it is to be learned, and evaluation deals 
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with the degree to which it was learned. 
3) Concept - Content - Process. Concepts are the 
generic, key ideas which are used, by definition, 
for problem solving. Content is the wealth of 
specific factual information to which all 
concepts apply, and Process skills are the means 
by which concepts are applied to specific 
content. 
4) Generality - Complexity - Abstractness. Concepts 
are learned and organized intellectually 
according to these three properties. 
The discourse emphasizes the girl's and woman's 
perspective on science education as an issue that should 
perhaps be a litmus test for models of science education. 
The second way in which the Amalgamated Model can be 
understood is through an historical development of science 
education. Four stages of development have been outlined 
and mapped in the following diagrams, starting with the 
post-sputnik era in the late 1950's, early 1960's. The 
Amalgamated Model is then presented as the fifth stage. 
(See figures 2.1 - 2.5.) The four distinctions, presented 
most clearly in diagram 2.4, form the structural levels of 
the final, all-inclusive diagram of the Amalgamated Model. 
In developing this final diagram, each of the four 
successive stages adds to or changes the previous stage. 
These additions or changes should be the focus and 
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therefore they are emphasized in the diagrams, while those 
parts that remained essentially unchanged but present were 
drawn lightly. 
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Figure 2.5 An Amalgamated Model of Science Education 
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C. The Distinctions among 
the Three Categories of Learning Outcomes 
The discourse explanation of the Amalgamated Model is 
organized around the four sets of distinctions previously 
listed. The first set of distinctions is between 
intellectual outcomes on one side and affective and 
motor/sensorial outcomes on the other. They are the 
reflection of the "thinking, feeling, and acting" that 
Gowin (1981, p. 42) considered central to the American 
ideal of meaning. The focus of the Amalgamated Model is 
the intellectual, or formal or mastery, category of 
outcomes, just as it is in the classical model. But 
within the Amalgamated Model, positive outcomes must also 
exist in the affective and motor categories, even as these 
categories are considered as supports to the former, as 
means towards an end. The philosophy is that the first, 
but not sole, purpose of education is to train the 
intellect. "Education is the acquisition of the art of 
the utilization of knowledge" (Whitehead, 1929, p. 6). 
And science has a particular burden to carry when it comes 
to intellectual outcomes. More than the other three 
academic areas (English, math, social studies) taught in 
our schools, science is the training of the intellect; 
"the method of intelligence [is] exemplified in science" 
(Dewey, 1938, p. 81). 
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Paradoxically, intellectual excellence cannot bo 
taught by uniquely focusing on intellectual outcomes. The 
motor and affective realms may be means towards an end, 
but they are necessary and indispensable. If the motor 
category of outcomes is broadened to include all the five 
senses, then they become the "doors of perception," to 
borrow a phrase from Alduous Huxley. The motor/sensorial 
category constitutes the input and output of information 
to and from the intellect. As for the affective category, 
it is vitally important to the issue of student 
motivation. Ausubel used the term "learning set" (Ausubel 
et al., 1978, p. 41) to describe the student's desire to 
learn, and, along with the inherent meaningfulness of the 
material to be learned, considered it to be one of the two 
essential pre-requisites for meaningful learning. 
Whitehead (1929) said it succinctly: "There can be no 
mental development without interest. Interest is the sine 
qua non for attention and apprehension. You may endeavor 
to excite interest by means of birch rods, or you may coax 
it by the incitement of pleasurable activity. But without 
interest there will be no progress" (p. 48). The 
Amalgamated Model prominently includes the ability to 
accommodate curriculum and instruction even to the level 
of individual students in order to elicit the interest 
that is clearly so necessary to achieve intellectual 
outcomes. 
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It is easy to give lip service to the importance of 
motivation, but it is a term too broad to be of much use 
in guiding a teacher. Teachers need at least the 
next-scale-down analysis to be acceptably clear on what 
types of affective outcomes might be implied specifically 
by the acceptance of intellectual outcomes as predominant, 
if dependant. What would be the attributes of a person 
motivated towards intellectual excellence? Since it is 
really through the outcome-based theories that cultural 
and economic needs of society are expressed, an 
instructive answer to this question comes from the 
corporate world. Raul Alvarado (1988), a project manager 
with Rockwell International, in commenting on the book 
"The Overachievers," by Peter Engel, who was president of 
Helena Rubenstein, said, "The task of locating, 
recognizing, and hiring an overachiever is the most 
important thing that industry can do" (p. 14). Such 
overachievers would be a good composite of what American 
industry might consider to be the zenith of motivation. 
The eight characteristics of such exemplary motivation 
would be: "Intelligence,... [although] excess intelligence 
can act as a neutralizing force to [motivation];... 
Energy [or Perseverance], a purely physical force 
necessary to carry out the desires generated by 
[motivation];... Diplomacy, when dealing with 
organizations and attempting to motivate people;... 
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Courage and Persuasiveness;... Sense of Humor;... 
Optimism;... [and finally] Creativity" (p.14). This list 
of eight traits should help teachers in encouraging 
certain attitudes and behaviors among their students in 
order to develop motivation as an affective outcome. 
Motivation, interest, enthusiasm, enjoyment; these 
are all emotionally charged states of mind, or attitudes, 
in the affeective realm. It is unlikely that these 
attitudes will exist or grow in an antiseptic and platonic 
classroom environment. Such affective outcomes aree 
inherently emotional, and the science classroom must be an 
arena where emotion is evident, despite the requirements 
of scientific objectivity and dispassionate observation. 
Teachers must be perceived by students as emotionally 
involved and interesteed in science themselves, and they 
must strivee to elicit positive emotions from their 
students. 
D. How the Amalgamated Model Addresses the Gender Issue 
To leave the issue of motivation and interest at this 
point would be to omit another important insight from 
Whitehead into the affective outcomes of science 
education. Although the following discussion and 
extension of this insight might seem like a too-long 
detour from the explication of the Amalgamated Model, it 
leads to a vitally important issue that any model of 
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science education must address: The issue of gender. How 
does the model propose to attain parity of interest and 
involvement in science between boys and girls? 
The vast majority of science educators seem to assume 
that the best approach to creating student interest is to 
emphasize the earning power associated with science and 
technology once students enter the job market. As my own 
teaching experience has shown, such appeals to students 
rarely bear fruit. They violate a fundamental precept of 
education set down at length by John Dewey in his book 
Experience and Education (1938): "There is an intimate 
and necessary relation between the processes of actual 
experience and education" (p. 20). Dewey would say that 
the sources of interest for a student are within that 
student's experience. Being part of the full-time 
workforce is not part of most students' experience, 
especially those in middle school, who are the most 
impressionable and the most in need of being impressed. 
It is little wonder that appeals based on earning power 
fall on deaf ears. So how does a teacher appeal to 
student interest? Here again we turn to Whitehead, who 
would say, "the natural mode by which living organisms are 
excited towards self-development is enjoyment (p. 48).... 
Joy is the normal healthy spur for the 'elan vital' .... We 
should seek to arrange the development of character along 
a path of natural activity, in itself pleasurable" (1929, 
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p. 49). So the basis for instigating interest and 
motivation is that science is fun. The fun that young 
children display in their insatiable curiosity about the 
natural world is their source of interest in science. As 
regards the affective goal of students' being interested 
and motivated, the teacher's task becomes two-fold: to 
maintain and encourage the students' natural curiosity 
throughout the twelve years of schooling, and to 
demonstrably enjoy science him/herself. 
The several times that I have suggested to fellow 
science teachers that their appeals for student interest 
be based on its enjoyment have been met with silence, even 
derision. I seem to detect embarrassment that there could 
be a clear emotional component to science, that it would 
not be dignified, that the fun would be bought at the 
expense of rigor. Because the methods of science attempt 
to erase the emotional, the assumption is that this 
erasure should also be applied to its practice and 
learning. Yet it does not take many biographies of 
scientists to conclude that the practice of science is a 
deeply emotional, enjoyable, and exhilarating endeavor. 
There is no reason that the learning of science cannot 
also be emotional and enjoyable. 
The acceptance and inclusion of science's emotional 
component is far more profound that a tactic to induce 
student interest. It is the foundation upon which to 
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build an educational program that appeals equally to girls 
as well as boys. 
So long as sex and gender are fundamental aspects of 
our personal experience, so long as they are deeply 
rooted features of our society, educational theory - 
and educational practice, too - must be gender 
sensitive.... We must constantly be aware of the 
workings of sex and gender because in this historical 
and cultural moment, paradoxically they sometimes 
make a big difference even if sometimes they make no 
difference at all." (Martin, 1985, p. 195). 
Most science teachers do not see the paradox. They 
agree that sex and gender make no difference at all to 
science without seeing the other side of the paradox 
wherein it makes all the difference in the world. When it 
comes to the METHODS of science, it indeed makes no 
difference, but it is a fallacy to therefore assume that 
gender makes no difference to the PRACTICE, and learning, 
of science. Unfortunately, just such an assumption is 
made by many of the efforts to increase girl students' 
interest in science. These efforts have been based on 
convincing girls that gender makes no difference. It is 
true that girls can succeed at the same tasks as boys, but 
it does not follow within the reality of our genderized 
society that girls will find appealing the same rationales 
for or approaches to the tasks, or that they aspire to the 
same ambitions. The role models of successful women 
scientists that seem to be the bread-and-butter of present 
gender-sensitive science materials are virtually all 
examples of women who survive in a man's world using men's 
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rules. We seem to be merely attempting to add girls to 
the rosters of science classes without accommodating the 
science program in any significant way. Scientists and 
science educators should recognize that "a simple additive 
solution to the problem of the inclusion of women will not 
work" (Martin, 1985, p. 182). They need to recognize the 
positive effects that a woman's view could bring to the 
quintessentially male practice of science and of science 
education. The question is. If the woman's view is not 
the acceptance of male-dominated credos of scientific 
practice, then what is it? The answer is within the 
affective goals of science. The answer and its source 
need very careful explanation if it is not to become one 
more additive solution, wherein a couple of affective 
goals are appended (e.g. Students will appreciate the 
affects of science and technology on the natural 
environment) to the "real" goals. 
Fruitful insight into the woman's view and how it 
could "make all the difference" to science education can 
be had in discussing the distinctions between the 
intellectual and affective outcomes of education. The 
beginning point is to recognize that all three categories 
of outcomes, intellectual, affective, and motor/sensorial, 
must be balanced for any one of them to be meaningfully 
attained. The intellectual outcomes cannot be attained 
without satisfactory affective outcomes. Niether can they 
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be attained without satisfactory motor/sensorial outcomes, 
but this connection is widely recognized by today's 
science educators as part of the process learning 
movement. It is the affective outcomes that are given 
scant attention. Saying that the intellectual outcomes 
are the primary goal of science education parrots 
conventional wisdom, but, contrary to such wisdom, it does 
not thereby follow that the affective outcomes can be 
ignored. The irony is that it is THROUGH the affective 
outcomes that the intellectual outcomes will be most 
effectively attained. 
The woman's view affects science education through 
the affective dimension, and thus the conventional 
denigration of the affective outcomes of science education 
constitutes a gender bias. To make any headway in 
resolving the deep issues of this bias it is necessary to 
look deeply into the philosophies of education that we 
have inherited. An historical analysis is particularly 
useful because many of the philosophies so well expounded 
in the past are still loudly apparent in today's 
conversations among science educators. 
The issues of gender can be traced to philosphical 
assumptions about "the ideal of the educated woman," to 
quote from the title of Jane Roland Martin's excellent 
book (1985). Martin proposes a most useful dichotomy for 
society's "tasks, functions, institutions and traits of 
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character" (Martin, 1985, p. 6). On one hand there are 
the "REPRODUCTIVE processes - a category I broadly define 
to include not simply conception and birth but the rearing 
of children to more or less maturity and associated 
activities such as tending the sick, taking care of family 
needs, and running a household (p. 6)....[It includes] 
nurturing capacities and an ethics of care...[and] the 3Cs 
of caring, concern, and connection" (p. 197). Within 
these reproductive processes, emotion and subjectivity are 
central, and it is from this wellspring that enjoyment in 
life is found for both men and women. It is these 
reproductive processes that are associated by educators 
with the affective outcomes. Needless to say, the 
reproductive processes are associated in our society with 
women. For example, 
environmental activism was essentially the invention 
of women. From the earliest days in Boston, when a 
group of Brahmin ladies organized to stop the 
slaughter of birds for their plumage, to Rachel 
Carson and on to current grass-roots actions 
throughout the country, women have been the driving 
force. (Mitchell, 1994) 
Opposed to the reproductive processes of society are 
the "PRODUCTIVE processes - in which category I include 
political and cultural activities as well as economic 
ones" (Martin, 1985, p. 6). The productive processes, and 
the science upon which they so much depend today, are seen 
as the bastion of dispassionate reason, with men fully in 
charge: 
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Recent research on gender and science reveals the 
extent to which the metaphors tied to our cultural 
definitions of masculinity are associated with 
science. The more objective a science, the ’harder' 
it is; the more subjective, the 'softer.' Facts are 
'hard,' feelings 'soft.' Scientists are 'he,' nature 
'she.' Scholars maintain, moreover, that the 
fundamental scientific norm of objectivity is itself 
a reflection of the cultural image of masculinity, 
involving, as it does, a distance or separation 
between the knower and what is known, the setting 
aside of feeling, and the rejection of immediate 
sensory experience. (Martin, 1985, p. 25) 
Clearly, the reproductive processes, what our society 
considers to be the woman's realm, is not much in evidence 
within the conventional view of science. The Renaissance 
Mam did not have an equal partner in the Renaissance 
Woman. In the mid-1700's, Rousseau described in Emile 
(trans. 1974) his ideal educational program for both boys 
and girls. Rouseeau is known for emphasizing that 
education should be student-centered amd trusting of the 
natural instincts of children, the teacher acting as guide 
and facilitator to bring out the best in the student. 
This generally accepted picture is based on his 
prescriptions for Emile, the boy. As such, Rousseau's 
influence can be traced through John Dewey to the 
progressive educational movement that last blossomed in 
the 1960's and early 70's. On the other hand, there is 
little in Rousseau's prescriptions for the education of 
Emile's future wife, Sophie, that would today be termed 
progressive. As Martin says, "the education of Sophie 
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constitutes an anomoly for the standard interpretation of 
Emile” (1985, p. 42). For Rousseau, 
The man should be strong and active; the woman should 
be weak and passive; the one must have both the power 
and the will; it is enough that the other should 
offer little resistance. When this principle is 
admitted, it follows that woman is specially made for 
man's delight.... Her strength is in her charms, 
(trans. 1974, p. 322) 
As much as education was to prepare Emile for the 
productive processes of life, so it was to prepare Sophie 
for the reproductive processes. Rousseau saw it as 
unnatural that these sex roles should be confused, their 
only union being as two polar opposites brought together 
within the marriage unit. Just as it was unnnatural for a 
woman to compete in a man's world, so it was also 
unnatural for a man to strive for less than the paragon of 
rational self-control, to concern himself with the 
reproductive processes. 
The reverberations of Rousseau's philosophy can be 
clearly heard within today's society, including its 
scientific establishment, wherein the men control the 
power of science and technology and it is an unnatural 
place for women. But is the answer to invite Sophie into 
Emile's sanctuary, and provide her with the same education 
focused on the same goals as for Emile? Stating the 
question in the context of our contemporary science 
classrooms. Is the answer to train both Emile and Sophie 
to practice conventional science in preparation for the 
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productive processes, while sweeping under the rug the 
issue of the reproductive processes? Writing only thirty 
years after Rousseau published Emile, Mary Wollstonecraft 
presented (in A Vindication of the Rights of Women) just 
such a solution. She claimed for women the same innate 
mental abilities as for men, and thereby the same 
education. Wollstonecraft's answer is echoed in more than 
a few present-day initiatives for increasing girls' 
science enrollment, as already mentioned. 
The central problem is that "Wollstonecraft agrees 
with Rousseau that woman's nature suits her for the 
traditional female roles" (Martin, 1985, p. 75), while at 
the same time believing "that education for carrying on 
the reproductive processes of society is not necessary, if 
not because of women's instincts, then because those 
processes are the domain of feeling and emotion" (Martin, 
p. 176). Wollstonecraft would be comfortable with the 
plight of many American women today who must do double 
duty of working in a man's world andcoming home to take 
care of the reproductive processes of home and family. To 
Wollstonecraft, the additional effort was insignificant 
since women, as part of their nature, found such 
activities to be natural or instinctive, capable of being 
performed with little rational thought and certainly no 
formal preparation. At least Rousseau recognized the 
importance of the reproductive processes and recommended 
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an appropriate education for Sophie, even if his 
characterization of women and the reproductive processes 
was, in today's terms, so sexist. Equally important, 
Wollstonecraft agrees with Rousseauin excusing men, again 
on the basis of human nature, from any responsibility for 
the reproductive processes. Our present efforts to 
provide girls with the same education and opportunities as 
boys seem to reinforce the social norm wherein girls will 
grow up largely to be responsible for the reproductive 
processes and boys will grow up to be excused from them. 
School girls, today as yesterday, know that they will be 
largely responsible for caring, concern and community 
within whatever family grouping they become part of, and 
an educational program that does not address these 3Cs in 
a substantial, integrated manner, even while offering 
something additional, will be seen for the hard or 
irrelevant bargain that it is. 
The crux of the issue is thus the importance of the 
reproductive processes of society compared to the 
productive. To address this issue, Martin (1985) draws 
our attention to Catherine Beecher, an American writer 
who, in her Treatise on Domestic Economy published in 
1842, was the first to value the reproductive processes on 
a par with the productive. "Beecher's social vision 
greatly magnifies the importance of home and family" 
(Martin, 1985, p. Ill), even if she returns to Rousseau's 
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idea wherein the productive processes are out-of-bounds to 
women. Beecher’s contribution is particularly important 
for the science educator because "she saw that men were 
professionalizing THEIR work and sensed that women must do 
the same" (Martin, p. 117). Beecher contended that the 
dispassionate rationalism of the productive domain was 
equally important to the successful exercise of the 
reproductive processes. The intellect was as necessary as 
the heart for effective caring, concern and community. 
And, of course, education of the intellect in the 
reproductive domain was as necessary as in the productive. 
Science educators should take from Beecher the lesson that 
caring, concern and community can be as much components of 
the intensely intellectual exercise of science as are the 
machines, power, and competition of the productive 
processes. 
Martin next proposes another writer to consider, and 
she is Charlotte Gilman. In her Utopian novel Herland, 
Gilman creates an all-female society to illustrate that 
"if women were allowed to develop their potential 
fully,... the world would be a better place" (Martin, 
1985, p. 140). According to Gilman, when the reproductive 
processes become the primary concern of society, the 
economic, cultural, and political aspects, in other words 
the productive domain, become necessary means towards the 
end. Gilman is saying that a focus on the reproductive 
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processes implies adequate management of the productive. 
Unfortunately, the converse is not true. Our modern 
American society provides too many examples of how a 
focus on the productive can cause the withering of the 
caring, concern and community necessary for a happy, 
joyful life. In the context of the science classroom, 
Gilman's lesson is that the affective goals of caring, 
concern and community, and the accompanying emotion, are 
not only essential, but facilitating to the intellectual 
outcomes, particularly for the girls who have absorbed 
their socially mandated responsibility for them. The 
traditional, narrow emphasis of science educators on the 
intellectual is self-defeating. The smoothest, widest 
road to the primary goal of intellectual outcomes is paved 
with the affective and motor/sensorial outcomes. Teachers 
need to make it explicitly clear to students that the 
destination of the "trip" is the intellectual outcomes, 
but that the full involvement of their bodies, senses and 
emotions is what makes the trip worthwhile: "Hey, it's 
FUN!I It'll make you feel good! And you'll end up in a 
good place to boot!" 
The appeals to girls to become interested in science 
must be perceived as balanced. Appeals to their 
reproductive ambitions, in which the power of science and 
technology to excite and bring comfort and joy to others 
is emphasized, must be just as loud as the appeals to 
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their productive ambitions, such as the earning power of 
an engineer or doctor. Students can listen to whichever 
appeal they find most attractive, and therein find the 
motivation to study science. 
In order for the appeals from the reproductive 
perspective to ring true, they must be much more than 
occasional pep talks during class. The additive solution 
will not work when the vast majority of the educational 
program, unaltered from its conventional form, is imbued 
with the productive perspective. The reproductive per¬ 
spective must be embedded in curriculum and instruction 
so that the appeals are heard as genuine. The 
conventional science program, the flow of 180 consecutive 
lessons, must change accordingly. This realization is all 
that is needed at this point of analyzing the three 
categories of learning outcomes within the amalgamated 
model of science education. Indications of how to 
accomplish such change will flow from the analysis of the 
other three distinctions upon which the amalgamated model 
is built. 
Having so far discussed in detail the relationships 
of school girls and the science program to both the 
productive and reproductive processes, the last remaining 
issue concerning the gender bias of science education is 
the parallel relationships of school boys in science 
classes. Their relationship to the productive processes 
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is the basis of the conventional science program and needs 
no explanation here. But their relationship to the 
reproductive processes needs scrutiny. Rousseau and 
Wollstonecraft agreed that boys should not be instructed 
in these functions, and the same attitude is common within 
the scientific establishment today. Science educators 
have tended to consider caring, concern, community, and 
emotion irrelevant, if not harmful, to their task. With 
the onslaught of publicity on sexism in American society 
and science classrooms, many science educators are at 
least willing to accept the need to cater to girls and 
appeal to them on the basis of reproductive processes. It 
is another matter whether educators would also so appeal 
to the boys. But they must do so in order to truly 
address the sex bias in American science classes. There 
is the practical matter of the integrity of the appeal. 
Any appeal to the girls in a class that is not also 
directed at the boys will automatically be suspect; If 
it's not good enough for them, why should I buy it? More 
analytically, just as girls must have an equal opportunity 
to participate in the productive processes of society, so 
must the boys be shown an equal opportunity for the 
reproductive. There are two reasons. The first is that 
the stereotype of the reproductive processes, the family 
hearth, will increasingly be populated with men. Family 
living and child rearing are not today, if they ever were. 
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solely in the hands of women. Males and females alike 
have responsibility for making the reproductive processes 
of society work well. Thus, men must claim an education 
that does justice to those processes even as they claim 
one that gives the productive processes their due" 
(Martin, 1985, p.186). The more progressive, 
best-practices American corporations are giving ample 
attention to work-family issues because they are coming to 
realize that their employees must live a balanced life in 
order to remain productive and creative. Within the 
business community and the business schools that supply 
their workers, "work-family issues are beginning to 
coalesce, along practical and theoretical lines, into a 
formal area of knowledge" (Noble, 1994). 
The second reason that boys must hear the appeal of 
caring, concern, and community of the reproductive 
processes is that the reproductive processes will be a 
necessary and integral part of the jobs that today's boys 
will be filling tomorrow. In one of Fortune Magazine's 
cover stories for 1993, "How We Will Work in the Year 
2000" (Kiechel III, 1993), four relevant characteristics 
are identified. "Truly understanding the emerging economy 
takes a change of mind-set... from thinking of business as 
making things, or churning out product, to realizing that 
it consists of providing services, even within what has 
traditionally be thought of as manufacturing' (p. 48). 
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The support services provided with the widgets of tomorrow 
will be as important as the widgets themselves. Customers 
wants to feel like they are the supplier's only client, 
that their problems and need are considered as unique. 
The Fortune article makes the point that "perhaps 
paradoxically, a heart... may also be requisite" (p. 46) 
for the emerging jobs. Quoting a business consultant, the 
technical workers of tomorrow "will be paid as much 'for 
their ability to make others feel they care.' How do you 
motivate employees whose specialized skills and ability to 
operate on their own make them virtually the equivalent of 
independent contractors? 'You make them feel like they 
are considered meaningful' says [Consultant Gifford] 
Pinchot' " (p. 46). The article ends by posing three 
questions, left unanswered, upon which the smoothness of 
the transition will depend. One of those questions is, 
"How many Americans have the basic education and the 
flexibility to become technical workers or new-style 
service workers?... The decisions kicked to workers by 
machines will require literacy, numeracy, a capacity for 
critical thinking and for innovation" (p. 52). With such 
a job description focused so clearly on the productive 
processes, with no mention of the need, just previously 
described in the article, to educate for the reproductive 
processes. Fortune magazine seems to have fallen back to 
Wollstonecraft's view, namely that the reproductive 
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processes need not be taught. But we have already argued 
this point, and we can excuse Fortune for not having 
extended their implications to the educational realm. 
And so we return to the paradox: Sex is the 
difference that makes no difference but that makes all the 
difference in the world. Both boys and girls in a science 
class need to hear appeals based on both the reproductive 
and the productive processes. The cold rationalism which 
is science's hallmark must be balanced with the hot 
emotion of excitement and intrigue. Listen to Victoria 
Foe, a world renowned embryologist and a 1993 winner of 
a MacArthur fellowship, describe her work: " 'There's a 
deliciousness and delight to looking at embryos. It's a 
celebratory act, an act of enormous pleasure.... It’s 
analogous to cathedral building of a thousand years ago. 
We are building and building this great edifice. Some of 
us are building arches, some painting murals, some carving 
in stone' " (Angier, 1993b, p. Cl). Besides being an 
excellent scientist, Ms. Foe is heavily involved in art, 
politics, and environmental activism, and these interests 
support and are supported by her intellectual passion for 
science. Students need to see science as the exciting 
endeavor that it is. Victoria Foe should be presented as 
a role model equally to boys and girls, because she 
illustrates so well how science can be part of and 
strengthen both the productive and the reproductive 
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processes. Both boys and girls have innate propensities 
and needs for both the productive and reproductive 
processes, and the teacher needs to appeal from both 
quarters to both sexes. In the end, the association of 
each of the types of processes with a particular sex 
should be seen for the social heritage that it is. 
Because of this heritage, generalizations along the lines 
of "Boys are better at...," and "Girls are better at...," 
form a de facto context for much of American education 
today, regardless of their intrinsic validity. A clear 
focus on parity for the affective outcomes leads to the 
conclusion that they are essentially moot for the educator 
attempting to prepare students today for tomorrow's 
society. This move towards a balancing of two life-views 
for both sexes is happening already within American 
society. Some of the once-pillars of sex role 
stereotypes, such as the Future Homemakers of Society, the 
girl's option in place of the 4-H club, are rapidly moving 
towards this balanced appeal to both boys and girls, with 
considerable success (Miller, 1993). Science educators 
need to avoid a controversy similar to that in the 
business world of whether men and women executives have 
different managerial styles purely on the basis of sex 
(Noble, 1993). The American ideal of focusing on the 
individual leads to the conclusion that teachers need to 
see each student as a mixture of traditionally male and 
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female-defined propensities that should be appealed to in 
balance, regardless of the proportion with which each 
student arrived. 
The intellectual, affective, and motor/sensorial 
learning outcomes must be seen as a balanced triumverate. 
In designing science curriculum, each of the types of 
learning outcomes must be included in order for any one of 
them to be significantly attained by the significant 
majority of students. There are six possible 
interrelationships among these three types of outcomes and 
only one of them (affective on intellectual) has been 
discussed in detail here. Although the others will not be 
so discussed, the conclusion would be the same no matter 
what perspective was chosen: the key to successful 
outcomes is balance. 
E. The Distinctions among 
Curriculum. Instruction, and Evaluation 
The second set of distinctions around which the 
Amalgamated Model is built is that science education is 
woven from the three intertwined threads of curriculum, 
instruction and evaluation. The distinction between 
curriculum and instruction was elucidated by Mauritz 
Johnson in 1967: "Curriculum is a STRUCTURED SERIES OF 
INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES. Curriculum prescribes... the 
RESULTS of instruction... Curriculum indicates WHAT is to 
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be learned, not WHY it is to be learned... [It] has 
reference to what it is intended that students LEARN, not 
what it is intended that they DO" (author's original 
emphasis, p. 130). On the other hand, "decisions 
regarding the learning experiences to be provided are the 
result of instructional planning, not of curriculum 
development" (p. 130). Thus, instruction deals with the 
methods and resources of the student-teacher interface, 
whereas curriculum deals with the directions and goals of 
instruction. 
In brief terms, curriculum describes what is to be 
learned and evaluated, instruction describes how it is to 
be learned, and evaluation ascertains thee degree to which 
thee curriculum was learned. Inadequate learning could 
thus be caused by a poor choice in what was to be learned 
(the curriculum), by a poor choice in how it was to be 
learned (instruction), or by a poor evaluative process 
that was either invalid nor unreliable. 
In 1980, ninety percent of science teachers use a 
textbook ninety-five percent of the time (Harmes and 
Yager, 1981). These percentages have probably decreased 
in the intervening decade, but equally probably, not by 
much. Therefore, for most science teachers and 
administrators, the "curriculum" is the textbook. There 
are more than a few school districts that re-write the 
official science curriculum when a new textbook is 
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purchased, and the writing proceeds with text in hand. 
Under such circumstances, it is particularly important to 
differentiate between curriculum and instruction. With 
such heavy reliance upon a textbook, the distinction 
between what is to be learned and how it is to be learned 
is rarely clear or even made. Few textbooks separate the 
major learning outcomes from the materials and activities 
to be used as vehicles for learning the outcomes. Besides 
a few clearly embellishing or peripheral chapters, the 
assumption throughout the majority of a textbook is that 
all the material is more or less equally important. And 
important for becoming a future scientist, not for 
universal scientific literacy. Similar to almost any 
text's table of contents, most of the science curricula 
committeed to paper by school districts are exhaustive. 
It is almost farcical to consider such a broad and 
detailed description of learning outcomes to be 
descriptive of what is to be learned to a depth that is 
worth the effort. The justification that students are 
only being introduced to material contains a low 
expectation for learning. It expects primarily that 
students will become familiar with the terms. Such a 
performance level is at the beginning of Bloom's taxonomy, 
relies primarily upon memorization, and is unlikely to 
produce progress towards the goals of conceptual 
understanding and flexible, inquiry-based problem solving. 
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What happens in classrooms between teachers and 
students is often seen as a cycle. The cyle runs from 
curriculum to instruction to evaluation and then back to 
curriculum. In this cyclical process, curriculum precedes 
instruction simply because it is more efficient to know 
where you are headed before figuring out how to get there. 
Instruction is followed by evaluation of the learning 
outcomes stipulated by the curriculum (did you get to 
where you wanted to be?), thence returning to re-consider 
the curriculum and instruction in light of the evaluation 
results. Of course, within the actual classroom 
experience all three threads co-exist and the interplay 
among them is complicated. The described cycle is the 
best analytical model for ensuring that the cycle produces 
a spiral that progresses in a recognized direction rather 
than churning and leading nowhere. 
Within the cycle of curriculum - instruction - 
evaluation, it is generally recognized that instructional 
decisions and, to a lesser extent, the evaluative 
decisions, are the choice of individual teachers. In 
order for a teacher to elicit the necessary student 
interest, he or she must be able to accommodate the 
instructional and evaluative methods used to the 
individual student, class, other subject areas, school and 
community. However, the variation in curriculum is far 
less. Curriculum should be seen as at a larger scale. 
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wherein all students are responsible for the same learning 
outcomes. The variations in curriculum result from 
developments and interpretations of learning theory, 
rather than accommodation to local differences. 
Returning to the gender issue, the learning outcomes 
in all three categories (intellectual, affective, 
motor/sensorial) should be the same regardless of sex, but 
the instructional strategies used might well differ in 
emphasizing either the productive or reproductive 
processes. In order for the curriculum, especially the 
intellectual outcomes, to be gender-neutral, it must be 
defined carefully. The traditional definition of the 
science curriculum, with its dispassionate listing of 
topics such as machines, rocks, and space exploration, 
clearly emphasizes the productive processes and is not 
gender-neutral. This traditional curriculum needs to be 
re-defined so that the gender-based components are 
extracted and moved over to the instructional sphere where 
they can be manipulated by teachers to accommodate 
differences in students and environments. The third 
distinction among concept, content and process will 
elucidate how this separation is to happen. At this 
point, it should be taken on faith that a gender-neutral 
curriculum of intellectual learning outcomes can be built. 
The curriculum established by educators needs to 
cover all three types of learning outcomes: intellectual. 
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affective, and motor/sensorial. In defining these 
outcomes, it must be kept in mind that they must be 
evaluated. The performance-based movement of the 1960's 
and early 70's, focused on behavioral objectives, gave us 
valuable insight in defining outcomes so that they could 
be evaluated, particularly intellectual outcomes. Bloom's 
taxonomy of cognitive (intellectual) goals (1965) has 
become a cornerstone of American educational planning. 
Constructivism and the process learning approach have 
contributed insights in assessing the motor/sensorial 
outcomes. In the affective category, outcomes are more 
subjective and difficult to describe, but the task is not 
impossible. Following Bloom's publication of outcomes in 
the cognitive domain, he collaborated with David Krathwohl 
to publish The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, 
Handbook II: Affective Domain (Krathwohl, Bloom, and 
Masia, 1964). Although this taxonomy of objectives is 
rarely referenced or used, it is refreshingly free of the 
emotional and ethical baggage that seem to weigh down many 
conversations in today's educational reform movements that 
concern the affective domain. Even though the taxonomy is 
as objective as it would seem possible to get with 
affective outcomes, it is still clear that the basis of 
the affective outcomes is the interpersonal relationship. 
Affective outcomes are heavily dependent upon the teacher- 
student interaction. There must be a faith that a teacher 
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has the best interests of the student in mind and heart, 
just as this faith must exist between doctor and patient, 
lawyer and client. This relationship must come from an 
honesty of conviction on the part of the teacher. In the 
affective domain, the medium is far more important than 
the message, the tone more important than the words. If 
teachers are to teach affective outcomes, then they must 
be outcomes that the teachers embrace. We must trust that 
the vast majority of our teachers value those outcomes 
that our society as a whole needs its youth to absorb. 
Evaluation of the affective outcomes is best left to the 
teacher and the student. Almost complete teacher 
responsibility for the evaluation of affective outcomes is 
at least tacitly recognized by practitioners and is, I 
suspect, another reason for which the importance of 
affective outcomes has been slighted. There is more than 
a little skepticism among administrators that teachers' 
self-evaluations are self-serving. Be that as it may, a 
balanced emphasis by administrators on the three 
categories of outcomes would produce techniques for 
evaluating the affective that could be reliable enough to 
complete the cycle and be useful in changing the defined 
outcomes and instructional strategies. For example, 
systematic student polling is an option that could be used 
much more extensively in our schools. 
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are 
The key to successful affective outcomes is a 
judicious choice of curriculum, to which all students 
held accountable, and accommodation of instruction and 
evaluation to local differences. Teachers must have the 
ability to accommodate (i.e. modify, adjust, adapt) to 
students and environment, and the degree of accommodation 
is directly related to success in accomplishing the 
affective outcomes. The degree of accommodation can be 
evaluated by an administrator by sampling lessons and 
discussing their choice with the teacher. What need or 
interest of the students or event in the greater 
environment was the basis for choosing a particular 
lesson? Assuming that the teacher is provided with the 
means to carry out such accommodation, then the degree of 
accommodation can be evaluated. Evaluating affective 
outcomes by the degree of accommodation is certainly 
indirect, but within the slippery category of the 
affective, such indirectness is not really a large 
problem. Any teacher reading this dissertation will be 
quick to notice that such accommodation of the educational 
program is all but impossible in today's science 
classrooms. There is little time within a school schedule 
for teachers to develop curriculum, and there are limits 
to the amount of personal time a teacher can contribute. 
This problem of implementing the Amalgamated Model has not 
been ignored. A great deal of work has been put into 
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developing a realistic mechanism for teachers to carry out 
such accommodation. However, any such mechanism or tool 
can only be appreciated in terms of the underlying theory 
that it is meant to serve. Within the Amalgamated Model, 
the importance of the affective outcomes makes the 
teacher's ability to accommodate crucial. 
F. The Distinctions among Concept. Content, and Process 
Science curriculum must be seen as three dimensional 
(3-D), and the distinctions among the three dimensions 
form the third set within the Amalgamated Model. The 
three dimensions are concept, content and process. I 
hasten to explain each of these glib terms. Concepts were 
previously introduced with a list of synonyms such as 
principles, laws or themes. More formally, a concept is a 
general, unitary idea that applies to a large variety of 
specific phenomena, illustrations, questions, or contexts. 
For example, temperature and Doppler effect are concepts. 
Temperature is a property that can be used to describe any 
substance or object and is therefore widely applicable and 
highly general. Doppler effect is a collection of ideas 
that interact to form a unitary whole, much as a scientist 
would think of a system, and it can be used to interpret a 
variety of phenomena. It is not as general as temperature 
since the number of phenomena to which it is relevant are 
fewer. As will be seen later, there are distinctions 
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among concepts. On the other hand, content is the 
information of facts inherent in every specific 
phenomenon. So "50% relative humidity" is a content 
statement, whereas concentration is the corresponding 
concept. Conservation of energy is a concept that applies 
to every imaginable interaction, the directly observable 
characteristics of a particular interaction being the 
content. Blocks on ramps and pendulums are specific 
content choices frequently chosen by science texts to 
illustrate this concept. As will be seen later, concept 
and content are actually the extremes of a continuum along 
which all ideas can be characterized. The examples just 
given are ideas that are quite clearly closer to one 
extreme or the other along the continuum, but there are 
ideas that are not so easily categorized. 
Process skills consist of ways to connect between 
learned concepts and new content experiences. A short 
list of process skills would include observing, 
classifying, comparing, and ordering, as well as 
measurement and instrumentation. A 2-D distinction 
between process skills on one side and content/concept on 
the other has become common since the process learning 
theory became prevalent (Presseisen, 1988). In effect, 
the large majority of science educators today embrace, 
either implicitly or explicitly, a two-dimensional model 
of science education. 
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Looking back at the origins of this 2-D model, the 
direction of the post-sputnik thrust in the 1960's to 
improve science education, which is the primary 
legacy of many of today's older science teachers, was 
in the content dimension, particularly at the 
secondary level. During the 1960's, in response 
to the launching of the Soviet Sputnik, science in 
schools focused on what scientists know. Curriculum 
writers assumed that science would be both inherently 
interesting and appropriate for all if it were 
presented as scientists conceptualize it... Because 
it was believed that students needed to know certain 
information before they could formulate real 
questions or engage in meaningful inquiry, the study 
of science began with an outline of information to 
assimilate. (Yager, 1988, p. 53) 
Great strides were made in moving away from a purely 
didactic presentation of fact. Prose-based explanations, 
everyday illustrations, film media and regular laboratory 
experimentation were welcome innovations. The lab 
exercises were intended for students to repeat 
historically important discoveries or to derive and 
reinforce already learned principles. Thus the seemingly 
process-oriented dimension of the post-sputnik initiatives 
was more a way of illustrating the content that it was a 
way of building process skills. These initiatives built 
the first operational model of science education, and it 
was largely one dimensional. 
The movement away from the 1-D model of content 
mastery that underlay the majority of the science 
curriculum efforts spawned by the post-Sputnik initiatives 
was a major improvement. Unfortunately, the focus on 
process skills has resulted in a de facto 2-D model of 
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science curriculum, with the distinction between concept 
and content rarely made explicit. The two dimensions of 
content and process become the assumed structure of 
science curriculum, an assumption that Presseisen (1988) 
exemplifies in the title of her article, "Teaching 
Thinking AND Content," in which she equates process skills 
with thinking. Advocates of the process dimension see 
their message as an improvement upon a blinkered view of 
just content, and experience has shown them to be correct. 
The 2-D model is indeed better than the 1-D model. 
However, the power of a duality is great and they also see 
themselves in opposition to a undifferentiated content 
dimension. As more than a few teachers have voiced to me, 
they perceive the introduction of a conceptual dimension 
of science education not as a shift in the paradigm of 
science curriculum but as a tactic in the perceived 
conflict between teaching content and teaching process. 
Advocating concepts is not a back-door strategy to 
advocate content at the expense of process. Besides 
missing the point of there being three dimensions to 
science education, the supposed opposition between the two 
interdependent dimensions of content and process is false. 
There is no conflict, no actual duality. Both are 
necessary to effective science education. Even assuming a 
dual nature of science education, "the question is not 
whether we should focus on the process or content but on 
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how to relate content and process for the creation of 
meaningful learning" (Presseisen, 1988, p. 7). The 
purpose of making science curriculum three dimensional is 
to foster truly better understanding of content; more 
important, of ANY content. A process-focused 
instructional approach will be the most effective for 
students to learn content that is conceptually organized 
according to how they learn. 
Of the distinctions that summarize the Amalgamated 
Model, the distinction between concept and content is 
perhaps the most difficult for science teachers to accept. 
In my experience with many teachers, they generally agree 
that concepts are more important than content, but have 
little idea of what the difference is between the two. 
They will sincerely profess that they teach concepts, but 
when their curricula are analyzed, there is little 
difference accorded the two. Concepts are certainly 
presented, but they are taught as just so much more 
information, and the distinction is lost. Science 
textbook publishers have capitalized on the fad of being 
pro-concept by using the term indiscriminately throughout 
their publications. There is a strong belief among 
science educators that the canon presented in science 
textbooks is inviolable and of roughly equal importance 
throughout. Science teachers’ guilt feelings at not 
having covered the whole text by the end of the school 
88 
ear have not seemed to diminish even as the textbooks 
iave become impossibly long. it is anathema to many of 
hem to consider defining a structure of general, 
underlying principles that will then be the focus of 
curriculum. In presenting an example at different times 
of such a structure to three different science department 
:hairs (two at the middle school level, one at the high 
school level), they reacted similarly: it was "too 
abstract." Their comments were clearly meant as a 
:riticism, even though the concepts that I was proposing 
o teach were the object/substance concept and the concept 
of property. The object concept is the concept that 
Piaget demonstrated that infants form, and it is difficult 
to imagine a more concrete idea. Likewise, the concept of 
property (or characteristic) is highly concrete. It is 
the direct result of, and description of, sensory input. 
Further conversation with all three made clear that their 
understanding of "abstract" meant "not hands-on." They 
were thinking in terms of a two dimensional model of 
science curriculum, and within such a model, the emphasis 
as perceived by many of the more innovative teachers needs 
to be shifted to the process side. One of the department 
chairs happened to be a biology teacher, and he 
illustrated his remarks with the view that biology texts 
are entirely too abstract with all the vocabulary. Yet 
the vocabulary in an introductory biology text is more 
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often than not referring to highly concrete things. What 
he seemed to be objecting to is the quantity of content 
information, with the assumption that any idea that is not 
somehow tied to hands-on manipulation is abstract. With 
such a mind-set, it is extremely difficult to get someone 
to understand the importance of concepts as an 
intellectual structure for problem solving. 
At the elementary and middle school levels, the 
progression from a post-sputnik 1-D model to a 2-D, 
content-process model is similar to what it was at the 
secondary and high school levels. In looking at the 
various post-sputnik efforts at the elementary level, you 
would 
find that there are significant differences in 
emphasis on the three elements - concepts, phenomena 
[i.e. content], processes - which make up the science 
course. Thus the ESS [Elementary Science Study] 
stresses the child's involvement with the phenomena 
and is confident he will thereby gain practice with 
the processes and achieve understanding of valuable 
concepts even though these are not made explicit. 
The SCIS [Science Curriculum Improvement Study] 
stresses the concepts and phenomena, with process 
learnings an implicit by-product of the children's 
experimentation, discussion, and analyses. The AAAS 
[American Association for the Advancement of Science] 
stresses the child's practice with the processes and 
uses the phenomena only as vehicles and the concepts 
as tools." (Karplus, 1967, p. 8) 
Although SCIS, in various modified forms, is still 
used in many elementary schools, the impact of most of the 
other post-sputnik initiatives is now barely discernible. 
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The projects for improving science curricula... 
during the 1960's... were designed to represent 
better the 'structure' of particular disciplines... 
But because they did not address the needs of the 
adolescent, they were... unable to penetrate the 
market and become established as alternatives to 
existing junior-high-school materials. (National 
Research Council, 1990, p.8). 
Using golden hindsight, the curriculum designers of 
the post-sputnik efforts should not be blamed for their 
lack of insight on pedagogy; they did not have available 
an adequate theory of learning from which to build their 
curricula. Benjamin Bloom writes in 1956, the year before 
the first sputnik was launched, as a preface to his 
taxonomy of educational objectives in the cognitive 
domain: 
Members of the taxonomy group spent considerable time 
in attempting to find a psychological theory which 
would provide a sound basis for ordering the 
categories of the taxonomy. We reviewed theories of 
personality and learning but were unable to find a 
single view which, in our opinion, accounted for the 
variety of behaviors represented in the educational 
objectives we attempted to classify.... What is 
needed is some larger synthetic theory of learning 
than at present seems to be available. We are of the 
opinion that our method of ordering educational 
outcomes will make it possible to define the range of 
phenomena for which such a theory must account, (p. 
17-18). 
Neither should educators of the 1970's and 1980's, 
who added the second dimension of process skills largely 
because of the advent of Piagetian and associated learning 
theories, be blamed for not including the third dimension. 
Learning theory that explicates the conceptual dimension 
91 
is fairly new. However, as the next discussion of the 
distinctions among concept, content and process as well as 
Appendices B through F attempt to bring out, this theory 
is now sufficiently developed to so expand models of 
science education. 
In looking at the elementary science programs, it was 
noted that the SCIS (Science Curriculum Improvement Study) 
program has been proven by the test of time. There are 
certainly many possible explanations for why SCIS alone 
has survived, but it is interesting that it is the only 
one that was clearly three-dimensional in its formulation. 
In developing the SCIS program of elementary science in 
the 1960's, Robert Karplus considered its explicit 
distinction between concept and content to be "one of 
[its] distinguishing characteristics" (Karplus, 1967, p. 
16). He uses the distinction as the basis for 
instructional design, wherein each unit begins with 
invention of a concept and then extends to its discovery 
in unfamiliar contexts: 
The distinction between invention and discovery has 
been very useful in the construction of new units 
because it pin-points the fact that some things can 
be discovered but others cannot. The latter are the 
man-made concepts, such as color, size, material, 
system, interaction, position, and energy, in terms 
of which scientists think about natural phenomena. 
The former are the outcomes of specific experiments 
or observations such as the color of a piece of 
brass, the materials of the parts of a pencil, the 
ability of certain objects to interact with a compass 
needle, and so on. To make discoveries, however, the 
observer has to have certain concepts clearly in 
mind. In the construction of a unit, therefore, the 
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authors have to decide what mental operations, what 
discoveries, should be triggered by the children's 
experimental work. They must then plan the unit so 
that the necessary concepts are either available from 
previous units or are "invented" in earlier parts of 
the unit under consideration. (Karplus, 1967, p. 41) 
Robert Karplus was a physicist who had little 
background in learning theories or pedagogy. It is 
remarkable that he was able to analyze the process of 
scientific thinking so well and see its essential, 3-D 
nature. 
Although Karplus, in the 1960's, recognized the 
importance of the 3-D model of science curriculum, he, and 
the SCIS curriculum, were, and are, the exception. The 
distinction between concept and content is rarely made 
explicit in today's efforts to improve science education. 
Yet, unless the distinction and all of its implications 
are woven throughout these efforts, their fabric will 
disintegrate once the glue of attention and money are 
applied elsewhere, as happened to most of the post-sputnik 
initiatives. 
Each of the three dimensions of science education has 
curricular, instructional and evaluative facets, and the 
vast majority of the present contributions to science 
education improvement apply to either the content or 
process dimension. Most of these contributions now have 
national support and a momentum in their development and 
dissemination. On the other hand, the reformulation of 
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science curriculum into three dimensions, with the concept 
dimension built upon learning theory, is barely moving. 
For example, the National Research Council's efforts from 
1992 to 1994 to establish a national framework for science 
curriculum began with the November 1992, National Science 
Education Standards: A Sampler. Appendix B (p. B-l - B-3) 
of this document addressed The Psychology of Learning 
Science and was meant to elucidate this part of their 
project's underpinnings. Besides discussing the 
importance of cultural context and social interactions, it 
devotes but half a page to Alternative Frameworks. They 
state that students bring misconceptions to a classroom 
and that these are difficult to change. As little as this 
is, the entire appendix on the Psychology of Learning was 
dropped from subsequent drafts (February 1993, July 1993). 
It seems as though the body of theoretical and research 
knowledge on the process of intellectual learning is being 
ignored by those attempting to establish standards for 
intellectual learning. The National Research Council did 
establish regional committees of educators to comment on 
their drafts. As part of one such committee, I attempted 
to point out the necessity for a firm theoretical and 
research foundation in learning theory. Without it, there 
was little chance of attaining the lofty goals listed at 
the front of the documents. After submitting two written 
critiques with no response, I attempted to contact the 
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relevant committee chairs directly. After several months 
of frustrating contact, it became clear that there was 
little interest. 
Efforts to improve science education ignore the 
relevant theory and research at their own peril. If it 
continues, it will cripple improvements in science 
education since curriculum based on learning theory is a 
critical ingredient of the type and level of understanding 
now needed by our society. It is also necessary because 
present curricula are so lacking. For example. Wise and 
Okey (1983) carried out a meta-analysis of 160 studies, 
encompassing 400 effect sizes, of the effects of 12 
teaching strategies on science achievement, including 
Audio-Visual, Inquiry-Discovery, and Manipulative. "The 
overall mean effect size on all outcome variables in this 
analysis is 0.34 (for all teaching strategies)... The 
average impact of using the teaching strategies analyzed 
in this report, therefore, was to increase achievement by 
about one-third of a standard deviation. In terms of 
percentiles, the mean effect of using the teaching 
strategies was to increase scores by about 13 percentile 
ranks" (p. 429). Such an average effect size is paltry, 
particularly in light of the Hawthorne effect, which 
states that any experiment in which the students are aware 
of being participants will create an effect merely because 
of the increased attention they receive. The effect sizes 
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for Manipulative (i.e. hands-on) of 0.56 and 
Inquiry-Discovery of 0.32 would indicate considerable 
caution in dedicating reform efforts in science 
instruction to these techniques alone. On the other hand, 
there is strong anecdotal evidence of increased student 
achievement when these and other instructional techniques 
and innovations are combined with a curriculum based on 
learning theory (Neve, Hart and Thomas, 1988). "The 
theoretical significance of cognitive concepts... in 
psychological theory parallels the seminal role of valence 
in chemistry, gene in biology, or energy in physics" 
(Kagan, 1966, p. 97). This statement is fantastic in 
light of the historical impact of the three examples Kagan 
cites. Yet, I am ever more convinced of its accuracy as 
my own efforts to act on it continue. Without intending 
to over-stress a clearly sufficient statement, it is 
compelling to point out that the American political, 
social, and economic sectors are now stridently vocal 
about the need for just such a significant surge in 
educational practice. 
Today, many popular and well-supported efforts, such 
as the NSTA's Scope, Sequence and Coordination, Volume I: 
The Content Core (1992) and E. D. Hirsch's core knowledge 
sequence (Core Knowledge Foundation, 1993) attempt to 
define content without distinguishing between concept and 
content. The proposal that science education embrace a 
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model that makes this distinction is radical and profound 
enough that its historical and philosophical credentials 
should be inspected. Such a search leads to the 
conclusion that the distinction between concept and 
content is virtually the same as the distinction between 
liberal and vocational education, a not too surprising 
destination in light of the vocational beginnings of 
science education. 
A good place to begin is with Alfred North Whitehead, 
the eminent British mathematician and later Harvard 
professor of philosophy, who, writing in the early part of 
this century, addressed the problem of defining curriculum 
as follows: 
It is useless to approach the problem by the way of 
enumeration of subjects which every one ought to have 
mastered. There are too many of them, all with 
excellent title-deeds. Perhaps, after all, this 
plethora of material is fortunate; for the world is 
made interesting by the delightful ignorance of 
important truths. (Whitehead, 1929, p. 46). 
In contrast to so many of today's science educators, 
Whitehead and other educational philosophers clearly 
understood the distinction between concept and content, as 
expressed in our present-day terms, and recognized its 
pedagogical implications. The distinction was, and is, 
the root of the argument between those advocating a 
liberal education and those advocating a vocational focus. 
These roots were firmly planted by John Henry Newman 
almost a century before Whitehead, who clearly defined the 
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difference between liberal and useful (i.e. vocational) 
knowledge and who saw science as the epitome of liberal 
knowledge. The present emphasis of science education on 
applications and technological usefulness contrasts 
starkly with the first centuries of scientific thought, in 
which it was often considered to be the zenith of 
intellectual thought. Let Newman speak for himself: 
Knowledge is called by the name of Science or 
Philosophy, when it is acted upon, informed, or if I 
may use a strong figure, impregnated with Reason... 
Prior to its being a power, it is a good; that it is, 
not only an instrument, but an end... In one case it 
is called Useful Knowledge, in the other Liberal. 
The same person may cultivate it in both ways at 
once; but... here I do but say that there are two 
ways of using Knowledge... The end of one is to be 
philosophical, of the other to be mechanical; the one 
rises toward general ideas, the other is exhausted 
upon what is particular and external. Let me not be 
thought to deny the necessity, or to decry the 
benefit, of such attention to what is particular and 
practical, as belongs to the useful or mechanical 
arts; life could not go on without them; we owe our 
daily welfare to them... I only say that... when I 
speak of Knowledge, I mean something intellectual, 
something which grasps what it perceives through the 
senses; something which takes a view of things; which 
sees more than the senses convey; which reasons upon 
what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it 
with an idea... It is of the nature of science from 
the first, and in this consists its dignity— This 
is how it comes to be an end in itself; this is why 
it admits of being called Liberal. (Newman, 1958, p. 
84, 85) 
Part of Newman's legacy is a clear imbalance between 
the importance accorded the Useful (i.e. content) 
knowledge and the Liberal (i.e. concept) knowledge, with 
the preference on the side of the Liberal. Engineering 
schools in universities would have been considered an 
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abomination. The distinction as well as the imbalance 
crossed the ocean to America and was voiced by the 
influential Robert M. Hutchins, who had become president 
of the University of Chicago at thirty years old: "There 
is a conflict between one aim of the university, the 
pursuit of truth for its own sake, and another which it 
professes too, the preparation of men and women for their 
life work" (Hutchins, 1936, p. 33). Robert Hutchins 
championed liberal education at the university level as 
the learning of general principles or concepts "and that 
the collection of information, historical or current, had 
no place in [the university] except as such data may 
illustrate or confirm principles or assist in their 
development" (Hutchins, 1936, p. 109). Hutchins was 
strident, to the point of eliminating the University 
football team, and he was referring specifically to 
university education, but his point is applicable to 
school science education today. Hutchins felt that the 
vocational focus could not help but deal in the trivial 
simply because of the essentially infinite number of 
choices, a situation particularly applicable to science. 
The argument between advocates of liberal and useful, 
or vocational, education also embroiled John Dewey, who is 
often considered to have been the progenitor of our modern 
American educational system. Dewey taught at the 
University of Chicago under Hutchins and left because of 
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their differences over the relative importance of Liberal 
and Useful knowledge. When John Dewey summarized much of 
his educational thought in 1938 in Experience and 
Education, he was reacting to many of the conventional 
educators of the time, including John Hutchins, who saw 
his progressive ideas, that stressed a focus on the 
student, as an embrace of the Useful and a renunciation of 
the Liberal. A careful reading of Dewey's ideas, however, 
shows that he was very much concerned about the underlying 
intellectual structure of ideas that the teacher was to 
lead the student in extracting and then applying to his or 
her experience. Dewey considered that "the problem of 
selection and organization of subject-matter for study and 
learning is fundamental" (Dewey, 1938, p. 78). Whatever 
learning was anticipated from a lesson, "it is...essential 
that the new objects or events be related intellectually 
to those of earlier experiences" (p. 75). Ideas common to 
different experiences are, by definition, concepts. 
The classical argument of vocational versus liberal 
education resounds today within the science community as 
the argument of content versus concept. A 3-D model of 
science curriculum rises above the argument, seeing the 
two aspects as equally necessary, as are process skills. 
The argument of Useful versus Liberal, concept versus 
content, is moot within the model. The two sides of the 
argument have coalesced. 
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How has the Amalgamated Model fused these two sides? 
The vocational goal of science education consists of 
preparing citizens to carry out socially useful tasks, so, 
it would seem, they need to be taught the specific content 
that they will need for these tasks. Yet today's, and 
tomorrow's, world economy and rapid rate of technological 
change dictate that specific tasks useful for society 
today might well not be tomorrow. Society's tasks, 
particularly in fields related to science and technology, 
are evolving rapidly. Obviously, then, it is impossible 
to predict the specific tasks for which students should be 
prepared. No credible science educator would question 
this rate of change and the implied futility of narrow 
vocational preparation, but many of them would counter 
that there is a body of basic content information that 
underlies the physical and life sciences, contained in 
most school science textbooks, that is largely immune to 
the rapid changes at the leading edge. Their view is 
correct as far as it goes. Students do need to understand 
the basics, but the view fails to see that students must 
also be trained to deal with change in the application of 
the basics. The vocational goal of science education can 
no longer be construed as only imparting basic content 
information. It must include the ability to apply the 
concepts to unfamiliar content, an ability frequently 
referred to as "life-long learning." As President Clinton 
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said in a speech on February 22, 1994, "Our people will 
have to keep learning all their lives... We have to have 
rigorous academics and practical learning... We have the 
opportunity to do something that Americans have resisted 
for too long - which is to merge instead of keep divided 
our notion of vocational education and academic education" 
(New York Times, February 23, 1994, p. B7). The goal must 
now include preparing workers to deal with constant 
changes in what is considered useful content knowledge in 
the workplace. Furthermore, the changes that occur in the 
workplace ideally originate with the workers themselves. 
So vocational education not only needs to train workers to 
cope with change, but to originate change. A single- 
minded emphasis on teaching a body of scientific 
information that is presented as an unchanging foundation 
does nothing to prepare students to handle change, much 
less originate it or enjoy it. 
Within the 3-D model of science curriculum, success 
at dealing with change is defined as the ability to apply 
concepts to a wide variety of content. A careful analysis 
of the canon of basic scientific knowledge would reveal a 
hodge-podge of concepts and content. Re-organizing the 
canon into explicitly identified concepts that are then 
illustrated by their application to specific phenomena and 
situations (the "workplace" referred to by President 
Clinton) would preserve the vast majority of the 
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textbook's material, while addressing the goal of 
preparing students to deal with the inevitable changes 
that they will encounter in the workplace. Of course, it 
is possible to emphasize content that vocationally 
directed students might anticipate using in their first 
years in the work force. The foundation presented to 
students consists of the concepts, which can only be 
learned by intellectually swimming in the flux of both old 
and new applications. The concepts become the 
intellectual learning goals. Such goals are precisely 
those taken by the liberal educator. The scientifically 
literate citizen of today understands the basic concepts 
of science and is able to apply them to his or her 
everyday life and enjoy the insights they provide on the 
natural world that we all live in. Such is flexible, 
inquiry-based problem solving. Within the 3-D model of 
science curriculum, both the liberal educator and the 
vocational educator would embrace the same educational 
program. 
The discussion so far has focused almost exclusively 
on the concept and content dimensions of curriculum, but 
what about the third dimension of process skills? The 
process dimension grew from a post-sputnik emphasis on 
scientific method and the training of future scientists. 
With such a powerful and recent legacy, the process 
dimension is very often equated with scientific method by 
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many secondary science teachers and with hands-on 
manipulation by many elementary level teachers. The 
process dimension contains both of these facets, as well 
as others. It is the straighest avenue to the 
indispensible affective goals. It is the most productive 
for vocational training. 
It has been left to last because it is the automatic 
and necessary result of the other two dimensions. All of 
the myriad of process skills are fundamentally the same in 
one respect: they are all methods of combining concept 
with content. Just as the third side of a triangle is 
defined once the first two sides have been established, so 
the process skills are defined as the necessary means of 
bridging from concept to content. 
Even though a process must be involved in combining 
content with concept, a judicious choice and manipulation 
of this third dimension is still required. All three 
sides of the triangle must be equally strong and given 
equal weight by a teacher in order to achieve optimum 
learning. A lopsided focus on one at the expense of the 
other two is unlikely to be effective. For example, 
modality teaching, in which instruction is modified 
according to whether students learn best aurally, visually 
or kinesthetically, emphasizes process. However, when it 
becomes the major focus of improving learning, "neither 
modality assessment nor modality instruction [are] 
104 
efficacious" (Kavale and Forness, 1987, p. 228; see also 
Dunn, 1990; Kavale and Forness, 1990). 
A description of a balance among the three dimensions 
was given by Professor Frederick Turner (1986) in an essay 
on re-organizing the academic curriculum: 
So we need to teach our students in a "top-to-bottom" 
fashion how the grand principles work; and perhaps we 
should be prepared to abandon, sometimes, the minute 
processes of research by which we discovered those 
principles, at least until the student's general 
understanding is strong enough for him or her to ask 
intelligent questions. If the big principles really 
are as good as we believe, they will imply the 
minutiae of experimental and mathematical procedure, 
much as a motor command implies its implementation by 
the nervous system and muscles. If a student has a 
sound understanding of the principles of evolution, 
the beauty of the idea will encourage enough 
observation of nature to suggest how it was 
originally proved. 
At this point an important distinction must be 
made. I am not advocating courses in research 
methods as such - "teaching students how to learn," 
as it is often termed. The brain is hungry not for 
method but for content, especially content which 
contains generalizations that are powerful, precise, 
and explicit. Our memories are addressed and 
referenced not by an abstract methodological grid but 
by significant fragments of their own content. Thus 
our core courses should deal with the WHY of the 
WORLD, not the HOW of RESEARCH (original emphasis), 
because the how of research is generated by the why 
of the world. (p. 51) 
The easiest way of seeing the natural and necessary 
three-part symmetry of concept, content, and process is to 
look at attempts to teach process skills without a 
conceptual dimension. A fellow science teacher of mine in 
a middle school would start the school year with a unit on 
process skills. One lesson on inference consisted of 
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giving students closed coffee cans with three objects 
inside: an acorn, a large paper clip and a piece of cloth. 
The task was for students to infer what these objects were 
by manipulating the can without opening it. It's hard to 
see how this experience would stretch students much beyond 
their natural ability to make guesses (whether it is 
called inference or not) unless they were given some sort 
of conceptual framework within which to think. If the 
experience had been preceded with discussion of what a 
physical property is and a quick outlining of the 
properties of size, composition, and shape, then students 
would have used inference to apply these four concepts to 
the coffee can. There is no other way than inference for 
students to connect these concepts with the particular 
content. It is a matter of opinion whether students need 
to know explicitly that what they are exercising is their 
ability to infer. Inference is not a skill that is 
purposefully "turned on" when a need for it is 
recognized; it is a skill that must be used under certain 
intellectual demands, whether or not it is, 
meta-cognitively, recognized as such by the inferer. 
However, attempting to teach inference explicitly as a 
skill without it being embedded within a concept-content 
linkage is like teaching someone to build a house by 
concentrating on the technique of hammering. 
106 
This "mystery can" demonstration was presented as an 
exemplary lesson by the Massachusetts Department of 
Education at a December, 1993 regional forum for science 
teachers to discuss the impending state curriculum 
standards for science. All participants were given 
mystery cans and role played the activity. It was then 
explained that the point of the lesson for students would 
be that science frequently deals with things that are 
hidden and difficult to see or experience directly. All 
this for that? Either the point is trivial (just think of 
the young child who delights in opening boxes), or the 
demonstration is an answer in need of a question. Just 
what is the general idea that a student is supposed to 
come away with? 
Teaching inference, or whatever, with the coffee cans 
of mystery objects is fairly benign, but the next activity 
that was taught by my middle school colleague in this unit 
had some disturbing results. The activity consisted of a 
syphon demonstration where a gallon jar of water 
containing purple potassium permanganate was hidden inside 
a box, so that all that students saw were two rubber 
tubes, one coming out the top of the box with a funnel 
attached, the other coming out the side of the box and 
stretching to a sink. The demonstration consisted of 
pouring a small quantity of clear water into the funnel 
and then watching purple water run out the tube to the 
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sink; and keep running and running and running. Twelve 
year old students were to infer what was in the box. 
There is not much distance between inference and magic, 
and this demonstration is perilously close to being magic. 
The problem is that the students had virtually no 
conceptual framework within which to understand a syphon, 
even when the box was opened and the mystery supposedly 
explained. A syphon might be mechanically simple, but it 
is conceptually complicated and abstract, even to physics 
students in their senior school year. A syphon seems 
magical, even under glaring lights. Science educators 
need to expunge the impression of science as magic, not 
present fertile ground for it to take root. 
These examples of mis-guided process-skills lessons 
are unfortunately not unique. An analysis of these 
curricula according to the 3-D model of concept-content- 
process would identify many more. Elementary teachers are 
particularly enamored of these lessons because they are 
entertaining, indeed intriguing, to students, just as 
magic shows are, particularly when the magician tells you 
in the end how the trick was done. The student enthusiasm 
is easily and generally interpreted to mean student 
motivation and the motivational benefits of such 
activities are usually given as their justification. But 
motivation implies a movement towards a goal. Do these 
activities motivate students to learn science, in the 
108 
sense that it is an intellectual effort directed at 
learning flexible, inquiry-based problem solving? What 
could be generalized from the experience that could then 
be applied to questions in different content areas? It is 
rare that these issues are considered by teachers, much 
less made explicit for the students. Certainly the 
evidence from conventional science education indicates 
that not much flexible, inquiry-based problem solving is 
learned. Enthusiasm and play are not the same as 
motivation and enjoyment. Enthusiasm and play must be 
tempered with challenge, perseverance, and finally success 
to produce motivation and enjoyment. It is through this 
tempering process that intellectual strength, momentum and 
self-esteem are built. From such mis-guided process 
lessons it is much more likely that students get the 
subliminal message that science consists of playing with 
neat toys. There is no reason that the toy-value of an 
activity cannot be preserved while including a conceptual 
dimension that will clarify the direction in which the 
enthusiasm is to lead. 
The central issue is that inducing excitement among 
students is indeed vitally necessary, but it is not 
sufficient in and of itself to produce the type of 
learning that is desirable. The affective goals are as 
important as the intellectual ones. In the previous 
discussion of how the Amalgamated Model addresses the 
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gender issue (starting at page 57), considerable emphasis 
was placed on the necessity for excitement, fun, and 
emotion. The present critique of justifying an unbalanced 
focus on process skills with the excitement they can 
engender in students does not mean that excitement per se 
is being denigrated. But excitement, fun, and emotion are 
the means towards the end of the essentially intellectual 
goal of having students learn flexible, inquiry-based 
problem solving. Excitement, and the lessons that produce 
it, must be preserved, while adding to them the concept 
and content dimensions. 
Mis-guided process lessons offer an attractive 
alternative to those that focus solely on content 
information, which usually fail to induce much excitement 
on the part of students. However, both types of lessons 
are equally impotent, if not counter-productive, at 
producing the understanding needed to build scientific 
literacy. For example, many elementary teachers, 
particularly in the lower grades, include lessons on 
categorization in their science program. All manner of 
collections, from bottle tops to shoes, are assembled and 
categorized. When categorizing objects, the concept of 
property as well as the various properties such as color, 
shape, and size are implicit in the task. Why not make 
them explicit, and have students recognize that such 
concepts are the underlying ideas that allow them to 
110 
categorize anything? These concepts are separate from the 
content that is chosen in which to practice the skill. So 
shoes, trees or clouds can be chosen as subjects, but the 
relevant concepts remain the same. My experience in 
teaching elementary children is that unless you make the 
concept explicit, it is not often generalized by the 
students themselves and even more rarely do they use it 
spontaneously to interpret their environments. Again, the 
fun and enthusiasm of the categorizing activities needs to 
be preserved, while the added conceptual dimension will 
provide students with the intellectual power to interpret 
their multifarious environments. Ultimately, it is the 
feeling of such intellectual power that translates 
enthusiasm into enjoyment. 
An emphasis on process skills is indeed the best 
instructional strategy to learn a concept, but unless the 
concept is enunciated, how can it be learned? Casey 
Stengel's remark, "If you don't know where you're going, 
you probably won't get there," summarizes the quandary. 
In illustration, a sixth grade teacher came to me recently 
to borrow safety goggles, aprons, thermometers, pan 
balances and graduated cylinders. She returned three days 
later with glowing reports of how her students had been 
enthralled at play-acting scientists. She wanted to 
continue with the unit on "science skills" and was looking 
for more, different instruments. I didn't have stop 
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watches or microscopes to lend/ but X managed to scrounge 
up an old set of hydrometers. She was disappointed. She 
wanted lots more instruments that her students could, in 
my words, play with. There was no conceptual or even 
content dimension to this unit. The teacher gave the 
students the run of the classroom and had them measure any 
and everything they could. The teacher's rationale for 
the unit was that students were experiencing what 
scientists actually do. Whether or not one agrees with 
such a job description for scientists, the students were 
certainly having fun. Unfortunately, a one dimensional 
focus on such fun is penny wise but pound foolish. Such 
play-acting will not induce the long-lasting attraction to 
science that could be produced by adding the concept and 
content dimensions and the potency of intellectual power. 
With the impression that science is playing with 
instruments in a laboratory, many of these students will 
certainly be disillusioned as they progress through 
secondary science classes and find that their path is not 
marked by ever more astonishing instrument-toys. 
In the end, any effective lesson must have all three 
dimensions. Omitting either the concept or content 
dimension will produce a still-born lesson. If both 
concept and content are incorporated, then a process 
dimension is automatically included. It also deserves 
equal consideration and planning so that an optimum 
112 
linking of concept with content is effected and because 
the affective goals are so readily addressed through the 
process dimension. A review of the history of American 
pedagogy would show that the roots of hands-on, process 
learning stretch across the Atlantic to Europe back in the 
late 1700's, early 1800's, when Johann Pestalozzi took 
Rousseau's ideas and implemented them in schools (Smith, 
1979). The intervening centuries are replete with calls 
for emphasizing the hands-on, process approach. Perhaps 
the lesson is that it is a necessary component, but it is 
by no means sufficient. 
Given unlimited space and patience on the part of the 
reader, it would be possible to take each of the many 
process skills, from observation to measurement to 
communication, and show how they are each a natural 
outcome of combining concept and content. Without such 
liberty, the exercise will not be carried out here and the 
conclusion will have to be taken at least partially on 
faith. The large number of process skills and their 
imprecise definitions are symptomatic of their essential 
character of being the links between concept and content. 
The intellectual skills involved in such linkage are based 
on cognitive instincts, are interconnected, and produce a 
smooth ability akin to the motor skills of a master 
tradesman or athlete. They develop naturally through the 
effort to link concept with content, producing an ability 
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that is comfortable and idiosyncratic to an individual. 
Different aspects of this intellectual ability can much 
better be strengthened through the appropriate choice of 
linkage task than by a direct focus on an artificially 
delineated process skill. 
Once science educators were to accept a 3-D model of 
science curriculum, many of the implementation problems 
that rose on the horizon in discussing the previous three 
distinctions of the Amalgamated Model would evaporate. 
The conceptual framework consists of ideas that, in 
science, are gender-neutral. All students are expected to 
learn the concept(s), regardless of sex, cultural, or 
socio-economic status, or background or interest. When it 
comes to the content, different students can concentrate 
on different applications because it is precisely such 
variety that produces the learning of the concept. The 
choice of content becomes an instructional issue, moving 
out of the curricular sphere. The intellectual learning 
goals are the concepts, which must be learned through 
application to content, and since there are effectively an 
infinite number of content possibilities, and it is 
impossible to predict which will be more useful in the 
students' future, the choice of content can be made at the 
teacher-student scale in consideration of the students' 
present interests and needs. Thus the content can and 
should be accommodated to the student, class, school and 
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community on a dynamic, real-time basis. Gender, racial, 
basic skill level, and all the other differences among 
students can and should be reflected not only in the 
choice of instructional technique, but also in the choice 
of content. Moving content from the curricular to the 
instructional category is the theoretical underpinning for 
true teacher empowerment, giving teachers control over 
decisions that will affect student learning in a 
significant manner. 
When I have presented this novel idea of 
distinguishing between concept and content and moving 
content to the instructional category, many teachers and 
administrators have balked. They are loath to entrust 
their colleagues with such power. They worry that 
teachers in successive years will teach the same content 
and they are not easily convinced that coordinating 
concepts constitutes sufficient coordination. Old habits 
die hard. They also worry that colleagues will make poor 
choices of content. When I ask teachers to make a list of 
content topics they consider important, the lists are 
quite different. Ensuing arguments as to what content 
topics are most important are never resolved simply 
because there is no answer to the question. The only 
resolution that has a hope of moving the argument ahead is 
to trust teachers to make content decisions that will 
further student learning of the concepts. In many 
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regards, it does not matter what choices the teacher 
makes. The fun of teaching and learning springs from the 
reproductive aspects of the classroom, where personal 
involvement in the material is critical. When teachers 
and students are dealing with content that they have 
chosen it is because they wanted to deal with it, and this 
desire is the spark that ignites the material. Without 
the power to make significant choices about what students 
are to learn about, the teacher cannot systematically 
strive toward affective goals. 
G. Implementation of the Amalgamated Model 
As stated earlier, a mechanism must be provided 
teachers for manipulating and finding appropriate lesson 
materials. What is clear is that this mechanism must 
somehow classify lesson materials according to both 
concept and content. Process skills are not a necessary 
classification since they are implied in the linkage of 
concept and content and because they should be learned as 
a holistic ability that forms a smooth and comfortable 
intellectual "motion." The Amalgamated Model has been 
discussed in enough detail at this point that the shape of 
its implementation is taking form. 
At the classroom level, there are two necessary 
components to a mechanism that allows teachers to practice 
according to the Amalgamated Model. The first is a set of 
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standards that concisely and precisely defines just what 
the concepts are that students need to understand. The 
second is a tool that allows teachers to design lessons 
that accommodate the interests and differences among the 
students. 
National, state or district standards should define 
what concepts students should understand. Such a 
conceptual structure addresses the intellectual or mastery 
category of outcomes and must be based upon how children 
learn intellectually. The basis of choice for the 
concepts is different from that for the content. The 
basis for the former is learning theory, while the basis 
for the latter is accommodation to the student and other 
local contexts. The delineation and organization of 
concepts cannot be accomplished by the vast majority of 
practicing teachers. They are practitioners who are 
expert in the process of instruction which relates to the 
choice of content. Asking them to become expert in the 
cognitive psychology and epistemology of concepts is 
unrealistic as well as unfair. There are educational 
researchers who specialize in such fields and they are the 
ones whose expertise is needed. Certainly there should be 
a feedback loop from the practitioners who use the 
materials so that the researchers stay grounded in the 
reality of classroom learning, but within this 
partnership, it is not the job of the practitioner to 
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construct the theoretical model. It should be much the 
same relationship as between scientists and engineers, 
wherein the former build the theoretical models and the 
latter use the models to design things. 
As logical as it might sound to seek expertise from 
those who have it, it is a logic that escapes the 
Massachusetts effort to define a state-wide curriculum 
framework for science by the spring of 1994. The 
committee established to define these standards does not 
include a member who is expert in the psychology of 
concepts. The chair of the committee is a medical doctor 
who one year prior was doing laboratory research in 
Alzheimer's disease, with only a passing interest in 
school education. Both he and the rest of the committee 
are volunteers, and as such do not have the time to absorb 
and then apply an entire field of study. Their efforts 
are well-meaning and within their time constraints they 
are performing Herculean efforts, but they do not have the 
knowledge resources to reach the lofty goals that were 
established at the beginning of the state-wide initiative. 
Their approach is the only realistic one given their 
situation: They cut-and-paste from what other states are 
doing. They are like engineers who are building something 
without underlying principles to guide their efforts. The 
result will look good, but whether it will work is another 
matter. 
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If the psychology of concepts is incorporated into 
the Amalgamated Model, what does it have to contribute? 
In a nutshell, it has established what a concept is, and 
is not, and has established three characteristics of all 
concepts: Generality, complexity and abstractness. The 
relationships among these three characteristics form the 
last distinction that summarizes the Amalgamated Model. 
With these three characteristics, concepts can be 
organized into a structure that reflects what cognitive 
psychology knows about how humans learn. Additionally, 
cognitive psychologists agree on what it means to 
understand an individual concept, and on the descriptions 
of various levels of understanding. Thus evaluation of 
student learning of an intellectual curriculum made up of 
concepts can be objective. 
Most important, such a conceptual structure is not 
linear. A myriad of paths, or syllabi, lead to the top of 
the conceptual structure built according to generality, 
complexity and abstractness. Rather than being 
constraining to a teacher, the structure challenges a 
teacher to guide students along an optimum path. And each 
step can be firmly taken because the structure is sparse. 
There are relatively few concepts, certainly compared to 
the conventional mix of concept/content presented in most 
science textbooks. A teacher can concentrate on one or 
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two concepts for an entire year, giving the student a 
secure footing for the next step. 
If the conceptual structure is imagined as a 
mountain, then content information is the land surrounding 
the mountain. Almost any particular content can be viewed 
from the mountain, and different steps on the mountain 
provide different views of the same content. The 
teacher's goal is to have students understand the concepts 
so that they can appreciate whatever content area they may 
choose or happen to view, either at the moment or in the 
future. Thus the first necessary component to 
implementing the Amalgamated Model is this conceptual 
"mountain" up which teachers guide their students. The 
conceptual mountain would not be any more static than a 
real mountain, in that time and experience will see 
changes. But the rate of change will be slow just by the 
nature of concepts. 
In order for students to carry out flexible, inquiry- 
based problem solving with a concept, the teacher needs to 
give students practice in applying the concept to a wide 
variety of content areas. The chosen areas should reflect 
the unique and ever-changing interests and needs of 
different students, teachers, schools, and communities. 
So teachers need an efficient tool to design lessons that 
accommodate to such differences. This tool is the second 
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component necessary to the implementation of the 
Amalgamated Model. 
The tool consists of providing teachers with 
resources and classroom-ready (but NOT teacher-proof; see 
Appendix H, page 3) lessons that are catalogued and 
accessed according to educational criteria derived from 
the Amalgamated Model. These criteria describe the 
materials and processes that are the fluid of interaction 
between teacher and student. They do not describe the 
student per se (e.g. preferred modality of instruction or 
type of intelligence a la Gardner (1991)), even though 
they describe student performance levels. Performance 
criteria such as reading ability directly influence the 
communication pathways and materials. The level of 
understanding criterion is Bloom's taxonomy of 
intellectual skills. It was derived precisely by 
classifying a large sample of classroom performance 
objectives that described observable behaviors that each 
required corresponding classroom materials and procedures. 
Thus the student performance levels have an objective 
reflection in the materials and processes of a classroom. 
The use of such educational criteria is a major 
difference from all other databases or repositories of 
materials for teachers. Starting over seven years ago, I 
attempted to define these educational criteria. At first 
I thought the exercise would be futile because there would 
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turn out to be an infinite number of criteria or that 
consensus among teachers would be impossible. Both 
presumptions turned out to be wrong. In interviews with 
over two hundred teachers, I found a consensus on a 
manageable number of criteria that could be grouped into 
six major categories, each split into at most three levels 
of nested sub-categories: 
1. Educational Criteria for Cataloguing Curricular 
Materials 
(see Appendix H for a complete listing of all the 
various levels of the educational criteria.) 
A. LANGUAGE, in which the lesson/resource is 
written; 
B. CONCEPT, that students are learning; 
C. CONTENT AREA, in which the concept is being 
applied; 
D. CONTEXT, such as season or physical geography; 
E. STUDENT PERFORMANCE LEVEL, such as grade level or 
reading ability; 
F. CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT, such as activity format, 
group size, or time duration. 
The conventional approach to cataloguing educational 
materials uses a modification of a library system. 
However, this approach is fundamentally flawed from a 
teacher's perspective. The Dewey decimal. Cutter, and 
Library of Congress cataloguing systems catalogue 
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according to content, as well as author and title (Bliss, 
1933; Kelley, 1937; Dewey, 1967). Within a purely 
classical, didactic model of education, where the student 
is imagined as an empty vessel to be filled with 
knowledge, such cataloguing is useful to the teacher. But 
when a teacher is attempting to get students to learn a 
particular concept and wants to choose corresponding 
materials that accommodate in several dimensions to local 
needs, only one of which is content, then the cataloguing 
becomes inadequate. Either the search for appropriate 
materials is like looking for a needle in a haystack, or a 
considerable effort is needed to take what is readily 
available and modify it to the specific educatonal need. 
The problem is not addressed merely by changing 
media. The CD-ROM science materials that are fast 
becoming the rage are catalogued, even through hyper-text, 
according to content. There is not much difference 
between a printed encyclopedia and a CD-ROM disk when it 
comes down to the actual materials. The toy value of a 
CD-ROM will quickly wear off when a student is given 
assignments similar to those requested when books were the 
medium of choice. One Biology teacher with whom I taught 
went to great extremes to purchase a CD-ROM system for his 
classroom because he saw it as a more efficient way to 
pump content knowledge into students. As he explained, it 
was a lot easier than keeping a slide collection in order. 
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Students who use CD-ROM systems in the school library are 
still confronted with printed and graphic materials that 
are very similar, if not identical, to what they would 
have found in print, and they are still confronted with 
the same intellectual challenge of what to make of it all. 
At a larger scale, Edunetics Educational Systems 
Corporation (Arlington, Virginia) offers large school 
systems a networked computerized distribution system for 
classroom materials. However, these materials are again 
catalogued according to a table of contents very similar 
to just about every introductory physical science or life 
science textbook. Edunetics is not in the business of 
educating students but in the business of selling a 
product to teachers (or former teachers) who will, like 
all consumers, buy what they are familiar with. It would 
be commercial suicide for a company to offer a product 
that was at the cutting edge of educational theory because 
the vast majority of their customers would not feel a need 
for such products (otherwise they would not be cutting 
edge). Neither do teachers look towards the commercial 
sector for the professional leadership to change their 
practices. The ABACUS product also offers large school 
systems a networked computer repository of materials, but 
it has actually taken a step back in educational theory 
and embraced the performance objectives approach. It 
catalogues its materials according to minutely detailed 
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performance objectives like, "Measure lengths to nearest 
millimeter." 
I have found in developing the educational criteria 
that more than a few educators are anxious to use such 
performance objectives as a major criterion. However, I 
have not been able to find a suitable niche for it. I 
think the reason is that the choosing strategy a teacher 
uses among the existing criteria is a superb characterizer 
of just what student performance is desired, far better 
than can be characterized in a simple statement. The fact 
that Bloom's taxonomy was derived from a large sampling of 
behavioral objectives means that there are an infinite 
number of possible behaviors that could move in six 
possible intellectual directions. The message is to 
concentrate on the directions and stop thinking that any 
particular behavior is heads and shoulders superior to any 
other. Keeping the nose so close to the ground makes it 
difficult to see where to go. Just as there are an 
infinite number of possible performance objectives, so 
there are an essentially infinite number of ways of 
combining the educational criteria. It is the criteria 
that matter, not the particular steps we happen to take 
among them. 
There are even larger-scaled approaches to 
distributing educational materials, such as the British 
NERIS (National Educational Resources Information Service) 
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system, that provides materials through computer modem 
link to schools and colleges throughout the United Kingdom 
(NERIS, 1988). Its cataloguing includes Media and Age 
criteria with their Interest Area (i.e. Content) category, 
but these are the only three criteria used. Many systems 
are now being built around the word search capability of 
computers, so a teacher can, for example, enter the word 
"whale" and be confronted with a list of materials that 
all contain the word "whale," regardless of all other 
educational criteria. Using this word-search capability 
to search for concept words would be disingenuous since 
many lessons that focus on a particular concept do not use 
the name of the concept. 
Moving up to an even larger scale, the global 
information highway that is growing rapidly out of the 
Internet is frequently mentioned as the source of the 
future for educational materials and resources. Yet its 
materials are presented with not much more thought for 
cataloguing than is seen with smaller scale media. At 
this point on the Internet, 
information exists as a kind of undifferentiated 
mass... Data networks contain facts by the billions; 
they do not provide meanings... In a world of 
information glut it becomes progressively harder to 
sift the useful from the useless, the important from 
the trivial, the true from the false... The implicit 
premise of open, interactive systems is that users 
are competent to navigate cyberspace by themselves. 
This premise is demonstrably wrong... Even more 
important is the implicit epistemology of the 
Information Superhighway. It repudiates any 
suggestion of a hierarchy... In such a world, the 
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database itself supplies no standards for judging one 
piece of information superior to or more useful than 
another. Indeed, in such a world, standards cease to 
matter. Information itself becomes background noise, 
like the constantly running tap that television has 
become" (Mcgrath, 1994). 
All such systems of providing teachers and students 
with materials are a solution for a problem that has never 
existed in twentieth century education. Teachers never 
lacked for raw material with which to inundate their 
students, and students have been drowning in these 
undifferentiated masses of information for many years. A 
cataloguing system built from a librarian's perspective or 
the perspective that the user is already competent will 
never serve science teachers in a substantial way because 
science education and archiving are fundamentally 
different uses of knowledge. In science education today, 
the critical part is for students to do something with the 
material so that it is assimilated into their intellectual 
framework. If the goal is for students to carry out 
flexible problem solving, then the materials must be 
catalogued according to the concept that is the 
intellectual key they are learning to use. Changing the 
medium does not fundamentally change the learning process 
unless the underlying model of education is changed. It 
is a change in the model that should then indicate changes 
in the medium, not visa versa. It is naive to think that 
all the new computerized media will fundamentally change 
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student learning performance on the sheer strength of its 
technological glitz. It is highly unlikely that 
educational software will ever compare for visceral 
excitement with computer games (Brody, 1993), and even if 
it did, it would not obviate the arduous intellectual work 
necessary for an individual to build a conceptual 
structure. There is no quick fix or magic pill for 
learning flexible, inquiry-based problem solving. 
Within the Amalgamated Model, materials must be 
catalogued according to the concept that they are intended 
to teach. The other criteria are necessary for 
accommodating the lesson to the specific needs and 
interests judged relevant by the teacher. 
The storage medium for these materials must be easy 
to access, enormous and continually changing to reflect 
the changing world. In this regard, the NERIS system is 
well conceived. Computers are the only medium that can 
easily cross-index a large number of materials according 
to educational criteria. So the tool is a computer 
database that indexes stored lessons and resources 
according to concept and content, as well as the four 
other educational criteria: language, context, student 
performance level, and classroom management. Following 
branching menus, a teacher may specify the lesson desired. 
For example, perhaps Jose and a group of friends are 
interested in archeology. So the teacher wants a lesson 
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that applies the concept being taught, say composition, to 
archeology; that perhaps uses Puerto Rico as the context; 
whose reading level is at grade level; and that is a group 
activity lasting a full period. After the teacher 
specifies the lesson, the computer searches its collection 
and presents a list of matching lessons. The teacher 
might choose the lesson, for example, dealing with ancient 
fish skeletons found in Puerto Rico, whose differing 
compositions indicate how the surrounding oceans changed 
composition. In all likelihood, the teacher knows little 
about fish skeletons, but she is able to apply the concept 
of composition better than the students merely because she 
is a mature thinker. She can act as their guide and coach 
in attempting to understand the application and, equally 
important, her own enjoyment at learning something 
wondrous will be infectious. 
At the beginning of assembling the educational 
criteria, a particularly thorny issue that came up 
frequently with teachers was how to code for the 
difficulty of the lesson. Most science teachers have an 
intuitive grasp of what lessons are hard and which are 
easy. Yet an explicit scale that went from hard to easy 
was almost universally picked out by teachers as too vague 
or subjective. They needed some such criterion, but were 
not comfortable with its explicit statement. After many, 
many conversations with many, many teachers, the solution 
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was to rate lessons according to Bloom's taxonomy. One of 
the educational criteria (within Student Performance 
Level) used to catalogue and access lessons would be 
Bloom's taxonomy (1956) of increasing cognitive 
difficulty, ranging from regurgitation of information to 
evaluation. Students could be assigned lessons that 
demanded greater or less intellectual skill according to 
the difficulty of applying the concept to content. 
The actual difficulty of a lesson depends upon many 
factors, only one of which, albeit a major one, is the 
level of intellectual skill. Giving an oral presentation 
is difficult for most students, whatever the material. A 
choice of content area that is very unfamiliar makes a 
lesson difficult. Howard Gardner's (1991) proposal that 
there are seven types of intelligence is another framework 
within which the difficulty of a lesson is reflected in 
the choice of application and lesson format. The 
disadvantage to using Bloom's taxonomy is that it is a 
linear progression of intellectual challenges that is 
frequently interpreted to imply an instructional 
progression. The interpretation that students should 
first learn the lower order skills before progressing to 
the next higher is erroneous. There are indications that 
starting at the top of the progression would be a better 
instructional strategy: If you want to teach students 
application, then make them analyze, synthesize and 
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evaluate. The cataloguing of lessons does not imply any 
instructional strategy for how to design an optimum 
syllabus. It is up to the creativity of the teacher, 
hopefully with significant help from in-service 
professional development, to plain a path along which to 
lead students up the conceptual structure. 
Although the educational criteria and a computerized 
database of correspondingly catalogued lessons were 
designed for teacher use, they could also be used directly 
by students. My own experience in using such a database 
in class was that students greatly enjoyed specifying 
lessons for themselves. For evaluation, I told them which 
level of understanding in Bloom's taxonomy I wanted for 
the concept in question and let them choose the 
application that they wanted for their "test." They could 
manipulate the content and context criteria and the 
activity format. 
This cataloguing and accessing of lessons and 
resources will finally allow science teachers to share 
expertise conveniently, regularly, and to their individual 
advantage. The database would ideally reside at an area 
college, and would be accessed through modem, either from 
the school or teacher's home. Teachers could submit 
materials to the database as easily as accessing them. 
The influx of new lessons to one college would be 
channeled to the databases at other colleges. There would 
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need to be some sort of quality control to ensure lessons 
and materials were well cfonceived and formulated (see 
Appendix H, page 512). Not only could teachers submit 
materials, but so could professors, businesses, and other 
interested parties. New scientific and social 
developments could be quickly translated and disseminated 
as classroom-ready materials, targeted to fit seamlessly 
(since the concepts would correspond) into individual 
class curricula. School systems could choose to use the 
database as their official curriculum, reducing the 
expenditures for texts and providing funds for a site 
license, payable to a non-profit organization that would 
maintain the network. The major expense of this 
organization would be the royalties paid teachers for 
their lessons used by school systems, automatically 
tracked by computer. Individual teachers who wished to 
use the database but whose schools' would not subscribe 
would have free access. 
Every creative field combines structure and freedom. 
For teaching science, the conceptual syllabus is the 
structure, the educational criteria are the dimensions of 
freedom. In combining these two, teaching becomes truly 
creative. Science education, separate from science per 
se, would perhaps contain what Freeman Dyson (1988), the 
eminent physicist, described as the salient features of 
the great domains of the human intellect: 
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Science and religion are two human enterprises 
sharing many common features. They share these 
features with other enterprises such as art, 
literature, and music. The most salient features of 
all these enterprises are discipline and diversity. 
Dicipline to submerge the individual fantasy in a 
greater whole. Diversity to give scope to the 
infinte variety of human souls and temperaments. 
Without discipline there can be no greatness. 
Without diversity there can be no freedom. (p. 5, 6) 
2. The Organizational Aspects of Implementation 
The major sources of argument today on who should 
control education are centered on the curriculum. As 
Johnson (Johnson, 1967) described in his article, 
curriculum only specifies WHAT the outcomes are to be. It 
does not specify WHY the outcomes were chosen. The Why's 
are values-laden decisions that must reflect what society 
as a whole and subject specialists in particular 
understand the purposes of education to be and what the 
learners' needs and interests are (Tyler, 1949). For 
example, if society feels that the reproductive processes 
be given equal weight for both girls and boys in school, 
then this desire needs to be reflected in the specified 
learning outcomes. Therefore, before a curriculum can be 
established, a philosophy from which they are to take 
their direction has to be enunciated. In establishing an 
educational philosophy, educators have a particular 
responsibility to ensure that the conversation be 
informed. As Martin (1985, p. 176) points out 
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Fresh, creative thinking... is to be desired, but it 
is not to be confused with de novo thinking. If it 
does not derive from discipleship, neither will it 
emerge without acquaintanceship, especially when the 
assumptions with which we approach our problem are so 
deeply entrenched in the culture that we do not even 
recognize their existence. Those who do not know the 
past run the risk not only of repeating its mistakes 
but of taking as givens their society's most 
fundamental yet not necessarily valid - educational 
assumptions. 
Parents, politicians, business people, subject 
specialists, students, and other interested parties 
reflecting society's needs and perceptions should be 
involved in establishing the philosophy, but the agenda 
for discussion should ultimately be the responsibility of 
educators. As a professional, it is the educator's 
responsibility to study or at least be aware of all the 
various perspectives on the purposes of education, both 
historical and contemporary, to analyze, synthesize and 
evaluate those perspectives, and to facilitate the 
conversations among society's representatives, ensuring 
that their efforts are informed and coherent. It is 
unlikely that many teachers will have studied the 
philosophical aspects of education, and neither should 
they be expected to be experts in this one field of 
education. The term educator includes many other 
specialists than just teachers, as the terms doctor and 
lawyer include many specialists. Martin's charge that 
our actions be informed by discipleship applies to 
educators, too, and among education researchers and 
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theorists are specialists in the purposes of education. 
The chasm that presently separates practitioners from 
educational researchers and theorists needs to be bridged 
in order for educators, jointly, to lead the discussion on 
a philosophy of education. The scholarship of the 
theorist and the experience of the practitioner are both 
needed for educators to present a professionally organized 
agenda to society's representatives, subject specialists 
and the learners. 
Once a philosophy has been established, it then 
becomes the province of the educators to establish a 
corresponding educational program. The first step of this 
process is to establish learning outcomes; in other words, 
the curriculum. The learning outcomes that are 
established by educators should each be directly and 
explicitly related to the philosophy. These ramifications 
of the philosophy would then feed back to society’s 
on-going conversation on what the philosophy should be. 
Again, educational practitioners, theorists and 
researchers need to be involved in curriculum 
development, as do university science professors. None of 
them on their own has the expertise to translate a 
philosophy into a workable curriculum. 
It is important to note that the subject specialists 
are closely involved in the discussion of philosophy and 
in curriculum development, but they do not dominate the 
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development of the curriculum. In the post-sputnik 
development of science curriculum, it was subject 
specialists from universities that largely dictated the 
curriculum. The test of time has often shown most of 
these efforts to have been inadequate. One reason is 
that, although university professors are most conversant 
among educators with scientific information, they are 
frequently the least acquainted with science pedagogy. 
Tyler also proposed a reason in 1949 that, if it had been 
heeded, would have produced a different product twenty 
years later: 
Probably the inadequacy of many previous lists of 
objectives suggested by subject specialists grows out 
of the fact that these specialists have not been 
asked the right questions. It seems quite clear 
that...[they] thought they were answering the 
question: What should be the elementary instruction 
for students who are later to carry on much more 
advanced work in the field?... This is obviously not 
the question that subject specialists should 
generally be asked regarding the secondary school 
curriculum. The question they should be asked runs 
something like this: What can your subject contribute 
to the education of young people who are not going to 
be specialists in your field; What can your subject 
contribute to the layman, the garden variety of 
citizen? (p. 26) 
As for the organizational scale at which to establish 
a philosophy and curriculum, the school level is probably 
the smallest, although it is not the optimum scale. 
Curriculum must increasingly be seen as K-12, or even 
K-16, and ideally planning should be coordinated at these 
large scales. The type of learning that is increasingly 
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being asked for by our society can only take place over 
many years of orchestrated activities. Educators must 
organize the most student time they can in the vertical 
sequence of grades to give themselves the educational time 
to make significant progress in student learning of the 
curriculum. One of the strengths of E. D. Hirsch's 
program. The Common Core of Knowledge, is its vertical 
integration of curriculum. Considering the practical 
difficulties of getting K-12 coordination in most school 
districts, it is probably more realistic to attempt 
spanning a two-school progression within the elementary- 
middle school-high school sequence. 
Over the course of six years teaching in both a 
medium-sized school district and a fairly small 
rural/suburban one, I accepted at face value the often- 
stated principle that grass-roots changes were encouraged 
and I attempted to change the science curricula in any way 
I could other than just in my own classroom. Over the 
same time span I took several university courses in 
leadership, innovation dissemination and managing change 
in schools. As projects for the courses as well as for my 
own experience, I attempted almost every possible strategy 
for inducing change, even having my teaching assignments 
moved from the high school to elementary schools to middle 
school so that I was acquainted with virtually all the 
staff and de facto, classroom curricula. Massachusetts 
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was over the same time period fundamentally re-thinking 
State science education standards and programs, as were 
several organizations at the national level. Their calls 
for vision and fundamental change were appealing and 
encouraging. 
The experience was sobering. I certainly have come 
to see the call for grass-roots change as hollow. The 
administrators and policy makers I dealt with, not only in 
my school districts, but also at the State and National 
levels, as has already beeen described, were to a person 
unable to respond to a substantial, grass-roots proposal 
for change. My phone logs show almost all out-going 
calls, and my correspondence was virtually all one-way. I 
could not get anybody to even read brief summaries. The 
response to the Amalgamated Model from those people upon 
whom I would physically impose myself was usually a 
combination of admiration and enthusiasm, at least to my 
face. Yet not once did the promises of support and 
communication materialize. 
At the district level, in one case, the situation 
became bizarre. I organized a de-facto K-12 science 
curriculum coordinating committee (all administrators 
being invited and fully informed of all developments) with 
at least one representative from each grade level. Each 
representative was responsible for communicating with two 
or three collegues who were also teaching science. Thus 
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all 48 teachers in the district who had any responsibility 
for science teaching were involved. Prior to this 
coordinating effort, the high school science department, 
of which I was then a part, had spent three years writing 
the student learning goals that are essentially those of 
the Amalgamated Model (see Appendix A). The K-12 
coodination meetings began with discussion of learning 
goals, and decided to adopt the high school's. The result 
of many subsequent months of meetings, supported by the 
administration, was a forty-two thousand dollar grant 
proposal, a significant amount for staff development in a 
small school district. 
Of course, achieving consensus across the k-12 
spectrum is virtually impossible. When it became clear 
that the grant would force significant change in their 
classrooms, two of the 48 staff objected to the grant. 
One of them was the high school science department chair. 
Having been involved in the planning process from the 
beginning, there was little concrete ground upon which to 
object. The objection became the student learning goals. 
Even though his own department had brought them to the 
coordination effort, he maintained that they were no 
longer acceptable and that the high school science 
department would need to review them. The rest of the 
high school science department was either incredulous or 
ambivalent, but the department chair did not see his 
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position as representative. The administrators of the 
district, two of whom were present at the final meeting at 
which this bizarre objection was made, allowed the 
objection to stand. Without complete, 100% consensus, 
they would not act. Forty six out of 48 was not enough. 
The grant application sat unsigned on the superintendent's 
desk, with no response, until the deadline had passed. 
The resulting cynicism of the 46 staff will reverberate 
for many years. 
The stories at the building level of attempting to 
induce change are legion. As simple as it may seem, one 
of the major, necessary ingredients for change that is 
often missing is a perceived need to change. For whatever 
reasons, many, many science teachers and administrators do 
not feel that the need to change justifies the effort to 
change. Without a need to change, change will not occur. 
The other missing ingredient is the leadership expertise 
to motivate and organize the change process. 
H. The Distinctions that Differentiate Concepts: 
Generality. Complexity, and Abstractness 
The final, fourth set of distinctions comes from a 
close examination of the conceptual dimension of science 
curriculum and is critical to the delineation and 
organization of concepts into a structure that is 
pedagogically useful. All other components of the 
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Amalgamated Model are taken from previous models, theories 
or contributions by others. This final distinction and 
the conceptual structure that it produces are new. 
To begin, not all concepts are the same; distinctions 
among them exist. There are superficial differences such 
as some having two-word and some single-word names. Going 
deeper, there are hierarchical relationships among them. 
Most people agree that some are more abstract than others. 
Because of these hierarchical distinctions, a structure 
automatically exists among concepts that are taught. Even 
if no conceptual structure were considered or intended, 
one exists, and therefore it should no longer be ignored 
as one of the key factors in educational planning. 
In order to control and change the conceptual 
structure of a curriculum, it is necessary to know the 
characteristics whose values vary from concept to concept. 
These characteristics of concepts should be derived from 
what is known about children’s cognitive processes and 
about the cognitive processes involved in problem solving 
since concepts are, by definition, the units, or currency, 
with which the intellect learns and reasons. The 
psychology of intellectual learning, the fourth theory or 
approach included in the Amalgamated Model as LEARNING 
THEORY, provides an adequate foundation from which to 
begin. 
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An in-depth synthesis of learning theory is necessary 
in order to identify characteristics that the majority of 
its practitioners would agree to. I carried out such a 
task (Appendices B - G) by concentrating on six eminent 
authors of learning theory who seemed to be a good 
representative sample of the field. I found general 
agreement that there were three characteristics of 
concepts derivable from the patterns of how students learn 
intellectually: generality, complexity, and abstractness. 
These are three characteristics that can describe the 
changes in conceptual understanding that occur as a child 
ages or as a particular concept is learned to greater and 
greater depth. They are also the characteristics that 
describe how concepts are used in problem solving. Thus 
the fourth and last distinction I am making to elucidate 
the Amalgamated Model is that concepts can be 
distinguished and structured according to their 
generality, complexity and abstractness. 
If the Amalgamated Model is used to begin the 
development of a new American pedagogy for science, then 
the place to begin, after learning goals have been 
established, is with curriculum. Within curriculum, you 
would begin with the concepts since the content and 
process dimensions are primarily instructional provinces: 
"Concepts and generalizations are not learned directly but 
rather through numerous encounters with specific 
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manifestations [i.e. content], the selection of which is 
an instructional, rather than curricular, function" 
(Johnson, 1967, p. 131). The first task is to identify 
and delineate the concepts of science. The characteristic 
of generality is the tool for carrying out this task. 
Using the term "idea" to mean any type of intellectual 
mental construct, all ideas can be placed on a continuum 
of generality. Some ideas are highly general, meaning 
they apply to a very wide and large number of specific 
instances and phenomena. These ideas are frequently 
called concepts, principles or laws. From a pedagogical 
perspective, there is no other difference between these 
terms other than that they are highly genral ideas. For 
example, the object concept (What is a thing? What is a 
system?) is very general. At the other end of the 
continuum are ideas that are highly specific in that they 
refer to only a small, or even single, instance. The idea 
of plant is quite general, tree is less general, pine tree 
is fairly specific, and a particular pine tree in my yard 
is a single instance. At this end of the generality 
continuum the ideas are called information, facts or 
content. It is a smooth continuum, and the transition 
from content to concept is imprecise. 
I realize that this continuum seems to contradict 
modeling content and concept as two separate dimensions of 
science curriculum. In the end, the dimensions are not 
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totally independent variables. The three dimensions are a 
modeling of a complex, social, and personal endeavor that 
cannot be totally captured in quantitative, independent 
variables. Comparing concept and content according to a 
common attribute does not detract from the power of using 
them as different dimensions of curriculum. 
In theory, it is possible to build an infinite 
structure of "concepts" by sub-dividing and sub-dividing 
into more and more specific layers. The judgement of what 
level of generality to use is predicated on pedagogic 
usefulness. Over the past seven years I have tried many 
and various possibilities in the classroom. Most 
important, I have learned from this intense experience 
that the task is feasible. It is possible to delineate 
concepts that are general enough to be used for flexible 
inquiry and yet well enough delineated that they form a 
solid basis for instruction and evaluation. 
A focus on generality can help greatly in resolving 
the seemingly interminable argument among educators of 
whether to concentrate the science curriculum on teaching 
content or concept. Arguments among science educators of 
content versus concept are fruitless because the premise 
of an either-or distinction is erroneous. Educators 
understand content to mean the information of facts, 
figures and formulas, and understand concepts to be 
universal ideas. Educators are identifying with these two 
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extremes and ignoring the continuum that connects them. 
If they were to recognize that a continuum exists, they 
would find that their mutual positions are actually not at 
the extremes. Few educators on the content side of the 
argument advocate the extreme position of purveying pure, 
unadulterated information. Likewise, educators on the 
concept side recognize that concepts have to be learned 
through the specifics of particular content information. 
Very few arguments juxtapose teaching the facts of, say, 
Saturn's orbital motion versus teaching the common 
characteristics of all motion. The argument is one of 
degree of generality between much closer concepts. 
The issue is, how general should the concepts be that 
are taught and how do their respective generalities relate 
to each other? Educators can focus discussion on an 
objective attribute of concepts rather than resorting to 
value judgements on the relative worth of content versus 
concept. Once a difference of opinion is recognized as a 
difference of degree, and the attribute along which the 
degrees exist is well defined, then compromise and 
resolution are possible. 
To build a science curriculum whose goal is flexible, 
inquiry-based problem solving, the task is to define an 
overall structure of concepts that is organized according 
to the three characteristics. A full discussion of the 
various necessary strategies for constructing such a 
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conceptual structure, and how it meshes with content 
knowledge and process skills is presented in Appendices B 
— G. 
In any case, when such a conceptual structure is 
built and compared to the conventional science curriculum, 
great differences are clear. Such great differences are a 
hopeful sign that the Amalgamated Model might be useful 
for changing American pedagogy, since great changes from 
the status quo are clearly needed. The differences 
indicate that classical curricula have little relationship 
to how humans learn concepts or, thereby, how concepts 
themselves are structured. According to the Amalgamated 
Model of science education, it is little wonder that few 
students meaningfully learn concepts, as evidenced by 
their ability to carry out flexible, inquiry-based problem 
solving, using classical materials, which seemingly ignore 
how the intellect functions. It needs to be remembered 
that a classical education is predicated on rote learning. 
Rote learning is a low-level skill that relies upon 
"storage" rather than "processing" of ideas. When 
memorizing material, its generality, complexity and 
abstractness are largely irrelevant, as are any higher 
intellectual capabilities. With no need to structure 
curriculum according to how children learn, educators 
become the purveyors of information structured logically, 
not psychologically. It is the structure that a mature 
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scientist would find the most efficient to describe 
his/her discipline’s knowledge, and hence the reliance 
upon its mathematical, highly efficient expression. It is 
the approach of an archivist wishing an efficient method 
of referencing what has already been learned. (See Linke 
and Venz, 1978, p. 185, for a chart presentation of a 
classical development of the "basic principles of 
structure of matter, changes of state and solubility." 
See p. 186 for a chart of "basic principles of 
electricity.") Perhaps this approach is a remnant of the 
attitude of past centuries in which children were 
considered merely small versions of adults, their unique 
characteristics ignored and suppressed. In today's 
context, there is no reason to believe that the logical 
cataloging and referencing used by mature scientists and 




AN INVESTIGATION OF THE AMALGAMATED MODEL 
A. The Greatest Discrepancy between the Amalgamated Model 
and Conventional Curricula 
The first impression from looking at a curriculum 
organized according to the Amalgamated Model is that it 
predicts that many concepts could be learned significantly 
younger than is presently assumed and that some are not 
learnable until well after they are presently taught. The 
greatest difference between classical curricula and a 
curriculum organized according to the Amalgamated Model 
seems to be in the placement and development of the 
concepts associated with energy: conservation and 
degradation of energy, the energy forms, work, heat, 
power, efficiency, and dynamic equilibrium. 
Establishing the greatest discrepency between the 
Amalgamated Model and conventional curricula is not 
actually a straight forward process. Identifying 
conservation of energy as this greatest discrepency 
included a considerable dose of judgement and opinion. 
The fundamental problem is that conventional curricula are 
one or two dimensional while the Amalgamated Model is 
three dimensional, and it is virtually impossible to make 
a purely rational comparison across such dimensional 
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differences. For example, a case could be made for the 
greatest discrepency being with the nature of matter basic 
concept that is largely ignored conventionally. I am sure 
that my choice of conservation of energy is colored by my 
long experience developing and teaching energy curricula 
as well as my work for more than a few years in the 
alternative energies business. In any case, I am 
convinced that the discrepency in treatment of 
conservation of energy is the difference that is key to 
making the most significant improvements in science 
education. 
The conservative perspective is that the 
investigation discussed here seeks to establish whether 
the Amalgamated Model is a useful framework for research 
and development in science curriculum, and energy concepts 
happen to be the focus of investigation. The 
investigation is carried out with the idea that the 
procedures and conclusions are applicable beyond energy 
concepts. 
If the treatment of energy concepts is not the 
greatest difference, then at least it is an important 
difference. The Amalgamated Model predicts that energy 
concepts are available to children at a much younger age 
than is commonly assumed. "To some, this may appear to be 
a trivial finding but given the prevailing narrow 
interpretations of Piagetian work in science education. 
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’formal' science concepts dealing with matter and energy 
were widely considered to be beyond the learning 
capability of primary grade children" (Novak & Musonda, 
1991, p. 119). According to the Amalgamated Model, both 
these concepts of matter and energy should be accessible 
to children at much younger ages than classically 
believed. With regards to energy, the specific concept 
that should be the starting point is conservation of 
energy, not work. Conservation of energy is of pivotal 
importance and should be a major, emphasized topic, 
although it would be hard to conclude as much from its 
placement and development in classical curricula. 
Energy as a conserved quantity is fundamental to a 
physicist's view of physical systems. However, we 
might ask ourselves whether it is important that we 
teach secondary school students to think in terms of 
energy relationships. Our answer to this is 
definitely yes - though we acknowledge the 
difficulties involved. It can be argued that energy 
conservation is not just an issue for experts: it is 
a way of thinking about aspects of daily life which 
is important to individuals, as well as to society as 
a whole. (Driver & Warrington, 1985, p. 175) 
In present American curricula, taken from the 
classical mold, an in-depth development of conservation of 
energy is tacked onto the end of mechanics within the 
physics curriculum, generally taken by juniors or seniors 
who choose to take an additional science class beyond 
graduation requirements. This development bears little 
resemblance to the development suggested by a conceptual 
structure organized according to learning theory as 
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embedded within the Amalgamated Model. Furthermore, only 
a small fraction of the student population ever takes 
physics, so few of them have a chance to learn 
conservation of energy. Many introductory science 
curricula, taken by younger students usually in the middle 
school, also address the concept, but in a manner that 
borrows directly from the development used in physics. 
The discordant conceptual organization can be handled by 
some of the elite seniors who take physics, but this lack 
becomes lethal to the meaningful understanding of younger 
students. They memorize it, but they cannot apply it to 
unfamiliar situations. Many of these introductory science 
courses emphasize energy resources and uses, with 
virtually no reference to the underlying, fundamental 
energy concepts. 
As the review of literature in the next section 
attempts to show, the conventional curricula do a poor job 
of teaching students to understand the energy concepts. 
At the same time, energy concepts have a reputation for 
being difficult to learn: "The difficulty students have 
understanding this principle [of conservation of energy] 
has been known for quite a while" (Maloney, 1985, p. 262). 
It is an interesting question whether this perceived, 
innate difficulty of conservation of energy is actually a 
reflection of poor understanding produced by ineffective 
curriculum (assuming that an average level of instruction 
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is adequate) or whether the concept itself is innately 
difficult. "In a Piagetian sense, misconceptions can 
either result from deficiencies of curricula and 
methodologies that do not provide the students with 
suitable experiences to assimilate the new concept or from 
lack of reasoning abilities that are necessary to 
assimilate the new concept" (Renner, Abraham, et al., 
1990, p. 36). One of the most eminent researchers in the 
education of energy concepts believes that it is an innate 
difficulty: "The IDEA (original emphasis) of energy 
conservation seems to evolve very late, if at all, in the 
course of children's cognitive development" (Duit, 1981, 
p.292). Both innate difficulty and poor curriculum, as 
well as other factors, certainly affect student learning. 
The Amalgamated Model would contradict the classical 
assumption that the problem lies primarily with the innate 
difficulty of the concept. The model predicts that poor 
understanding results primarily from a poor curricular 
structure, masking the inherent availability of the 
concept to even quite young students. Conservation of 
energy is analyzed to be a highly general (Appendix C, ?) 
and simple (p. 401) concept. Along the abstractness 
continuum, it is abstract because it is a pattern that, 
rather than being directly observed, is deduced from 
observations. However, its degree of connectedness to 
concrete observations and concepts is very high because 
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almost any observation of a process illustrates the 
concept. This high degree of connectedness to the 
concrete puts conservation of energy just up the continuum 
from the directly observable and concrete concepts. 
The review of literature will also show that, besides 
indicating a significantly different development of the 
energy concepts from classical physics, learning theory, 
as synthesized within the Amalgamated Model, also predicts 
that the concept can be meaningfully learned by children 
considerably younger than the juniors and seniors who 
presently take physics. It indicates that by fourth 
grade, students are capable of understanding it. Learning 
theory also indicates that these young children should 
even develop an intuitive concept of conservation of 
energy, independent of instruction, but congruent with the 
development indicated by the conceptual structure. 
Great progress towards the development of a uniquely 
American pedagogical system of teaching students to 
meaningfully understand scientific concepts could be made 
if it were established at what approximate age children 
were able to explicitly learn conservation of energy, and 
if this learning were patterned as predicted by learning 
theory embedded within the Amalgamated Model. If indeed 
it does transpire that young children can develop a 
meaningful understanding of the concept in this manner, a 
curriculum that utilized this knowledge would be a 
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significant improvement over conventional curricula in 
terms of attaining the uniquely American goal of our 
public schools, at least in the physical sciences where 
the concept is so important. 
Such an improvement could be an eventual consequence 
of research that investigated this application of learning 
theory to the particular concept of conservation of 
energy, as I proposed to carry out for this research 
project. Positive results of such research could be a 
signal that perhaps the Amalgamated Model and learning 
theory were robust enough to form the foundation for a new 
American pedagogy. When the Amalgamated Model is laid on 
top of classical curricula, as a template, there is little 
that shows through. It is a hopeful sign, considering the 
consensus that radical changes from classical science 
education are needed in America. 
B. A Review of Prior Literature 
Although there is not an abundance of research 
investigating students' understanding of energy (as 
conservation of energy will henceforth be abbreviated), 
what has been done gives a clear picture: Across the age 
levels and classical curriculum programs, students do not 
acquire an understanding of energy that they use in 
interpreting their environments. Most of the research has 
been carried out abroad, in the supposed dominions of 
154 
excellent science education. For example, 28 academically 
able British boys, between the ages of 13 and 18 yrs, all 
of whom eventually passed their A-Level physics exams, and 
all of whom had been instructed in the relevant material, 
were interviewed about their interpretations of energy 
conservation tasks (Driver & Warrington, 1985). "The 
results of the interviews with these students not only 
illustrate some of the problems they had in understanding 
and using the concepts of work and energy, but also 
indicate that the concept of conservation of energy was 
rarely used spontaneously by students in analyzing a 
problem or explaining a presented situation" (p. 171). 
Another study involved testing the understanding of 
Philippine and German students who had been instructed in 
conservation of energy and comparing their understanding 
to a group of Swiss students who had not been instructed 
(Duit, 1984). The instruction the Philippine and German 
students received was the classical formulation via the 
concept of work. Following the European system, these 
students also received instruction over several years 
since they were required to take physics every year 
starting in seventh grade. In summary, "the findings... 
indicate that physics instruction has not been very 
successful with regard to the learning of the energy 
concept" (Duit, 1984, p. 64). 
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American students do not have much more insight than 
their foreign colleagues. Freshmen engineering majors at 
the University of Massachusetts, who would be in the upper 
echelons of high school physics students from the previous 
year, were interviewed about their understanding of energy 
concepts (Clement, 1987). The results indicate that 
students use their colloquial understandings of energy, 
with very little effect due to their physics instruction. 
The above three studies overtly asked the subjects 
about energy concepts. In other words, it was clear to 
the subjects that they were being examined about these 
concepts, and thus it could be expected that they would 
consciously use any knowledge they associated with the 
words. There were many studies done, primarily about ten 
years ago, that investigated students' comprehension of 
terms associated with energy. (Watts, 1983; Lijnse, 1990). 
These studies produced the knowledge that terms like 
energy, work and force are fairly common in everyday 
vocabulary and consequently each contains a fairly wide 
variety of associated meanings for students, only some of 
which would qualify as scientifically clear or precise. 
This research knowledge elicited several positions, 
ranging from calls to change, reduce or standardize the 
vocabulary (Taber, 1989), to highly focused studies to 
detail the complexities of intended and unintended 
meanings. 
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Another approach to the study of student reasoning 
was the recognition that students' ideas associated with 
particular vocabulary terms were not necessarily the same 
as their understanding of the particular concept in 
question. Classical assumptions about learning are 
evident in all the above studies, particularly the Driver 
and Warrington study, and Duit's study. What they 
primarily looked for was correct usage of terminology; in 
their cases, work, energy, force, and power. However, it 
is possible for students to understand concepts, even if 
they are mislabelled or not labelled at all in their 
minds. Concepts may or may not have a conscious label in 
a person's mind; in other words the concept might be 
understood only shallowly, as might be described by 
Klausmeier's (Klausmeier et al.,1974) concrete or identity 
levels of concept attainment. At these shallow levels of 
attainment, the connection between label and concept is 
tenuous. The term that the student is being asked about 
might be associated with a wide variety of ideas, as could 
be diagrammed in a concept map (Novak & Gowin, 1984) 
representing the student's conceptual structure. Only 
some, if any, of these ideas would show up in a concept 
map of the scientist's formal understanding. 
Furthermore, at shallow levels of concept attainment, 
the relative weights of the connections among the 
constituent ideas are shaky, some even disappearing upon 
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closer scrutiny or in different contexts. Documenting 
these various combinations and possibilities is useful, 
but equally useful is the observation that a consistent 
thread through the research is variation. The plethora of 
misconceptions, or alternate conceptions, (see, for 
example, the proceedings of the conference on Students' 
Misconceptions in Science and Mathematics, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, June 20-22, 1983; Clement, 1982; Linke 
& Venz, 1978 and 1979; Peterson, Treagust & Garnett, 1986; 
Philips, 1991) and the ebb and flow of their development 
is testimony to the loosely knit but far-flung maps that 
characterize shallow understanding, easily accessed by 
inquiries about vocabulary. Engel-Clough and Driver 
(1986) investigated how consistently students used their 
conceptual frameworks across different contexts, and found 
little consistency, as would be expected if student 
frameworks are fluid. 
Often lost in the middle of this flux is the 
possibility that there could also be ideas embedded in a 
person's "map" that are not labelled and of which the 
person is not consciously, or metacognitively, aware. If 
the dictum that "the most important single factor 
influencing learning is what the learner already knows" 
(Ausubel et al., 1978, p. iv), has any validity, then it 
becomes important to look at the linkage between what 
students TELL us they understand and what they ACTUALLY 
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understand. (Note: Precisely such a question was a major 
impetus behind Piaget's development of the Interview About 
Instances technique of clinical interviewing.) Education 
should start with the actual understandings, rather than 
the understandings that happen to be associated with the 
term in question at test time. The task is to map the 
development of concepts without the intervening static of 
ambiguous word meanings making an already difficult task 
even more difficult. 
Thus it is necessary to define and describe what 
ideas are being looked for independent of the vocabulary 
used by students or subjects. The Amalgamated Model 
predicts that the most general, superordinate concept that 
would begin a person's understanding of energy is 
conservation of energy. A very detailed analysis of the 
conservation of energy concept is presented in the 
upcoming HYPOTHESIS section. In brief, conservation of 
energy involves the transfer of a quality between two 
interacting entities such that the amount one gains equals 
the amount the other loses. The conserved transfer of an 
abstract quantity is closely analogous to the conserved 
transfer of a material substance. Therefore, in looking 
for conservation of energy ideas among subjects, their use 
of such analogies is significant. Unlike a material 
substance, the energy quality, in all its various forms, 
is quite abstract. Therefore, an investigator should also 
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be looking for subjects' attempts to describe such 
abstraction when describing the conserved quality 
transferred between interacting entities. 
David P. Maloney (1985) tested college freshmen, 
evenly divided between non-science and science majors, 
about their understanding of conservation of mechanical 
energy using five paper-and-pencil task sets that 
presented five permutations of carts going up or down 
ramps, including two that collided with blocks. He was 
investigating how the subjects manipulated the variables 
(mass, height, speed) to predict which of a pair of 
diagrammed situations went higher, faster or further. 
And, of course, the subjects were not informed that 
conservation of mechanical energy was the salient concept. 
Maloney concluded that virtually all "the subjects in 
this study very definitely used identifiable strategies in 
responding to the task sets. Second, clear patterns were 
found in terms of the rules used for the various tasks" 
(Maloney, 1985, p. 277). In relation to the present 
research, what is interesting is that very few subjects 
focused on only one of the available variables, even when 
it was only the height of a block on a ramp that dictated 
its speed at the bottom. A very large majority of both 
the non-science and science majors knew what "package" of 
the variables needed to be manipulated, even if they were 
not sure of the precise proportionalities among the 
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variables within the package. They seemed to attribute to 
the entities a quality that was described by these 
packages of variables in a diffuse, unspecified, but 
nevertheless unitary, manner. This data is interesting 
because the learning theory embedded within the 
Amalgamated Model predicts that, in the conceptual 
development of the various energy forms, they are FIRST 
thought of as unitary qualities without a conscious 
delineation of the component factors (see Appendix E, p. 
401). When Maloney changes the sequence of the five 
tasks, the subjects would use different strategies for 
balancing the relative contributions of the two variables 
to the quality, indicating that "the subjects were, in a 
noticeable percentage of the cases, not firmly committed 
to the rule they employed" (p. 274). Even though they 
would change rules, they would not change the choice of 
variables to combine. The data shows that both science 
majors (70% of whom had taken high school physics) and 
non-majors (42.5% of whom had taken physics) "behaved 
similarly in that both groups were affected by sequencing" 
(p. 274). Both groups would change the balance of the two 
factors contributing to the energy quality, yet neither 
changed the package of variables that defined the quality. 
It would seem as though the science majors had not picked 
up much from their high school physics classes, which it 
could be safely assumed, on average, followed a 
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conventional curriculum that began by building equations 
for kinetic and gravitational potential energy with the 
emphasis on the rules for combining the variables. 
Whereas Maloney investigated subjects' ideas about 
mechanical energy, Gaalen L. Erickson investigated ideas 
about thermal energy (Erickson, 1979). She presented four 
different tasks to ten Canadian children, all of them 12 
years old. She does not describe the extent of their 
prior science education, but it can be assumed that they 
received at least some classical instruction in energy 
topics. However, Erickson did not cue her subjects to use 
their knowledge or vocabulary associated with energy. 
Rather, "no rigid schedule of questions was used... 
Having established some avenue of inquiry or interest, 
open-ended questions were posed, using the child's 
language where appropriate" (p. 222). None of the four 
tasks presented to the subjects clearly demonstrated 
conservation of energy. The first was a standard liquid 
expansion apparatus. The second task "consisted of 
placing a number of different materials (various metal 
cubes, sugar, butter, and a moth ball) on a hot plate and 
observing the results" (p. 222). Neither of these tasks 
contained a clear interaction between distinct entities or 
a clear transformation of energy from one form to another. 
(The increasing gravitational potential energy of a rising 
water column is less than obvious, and the energy involved 
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in a phase change is one of the more difficult forms to 
understand.) The third task involved a plastic container 
with a bisecting, removable barrier that separated water 
of different temperatures that could then be mixed. 
Again, the mixing process is not an obvious interaction 
since the initial two water "entities" on either side of 
the barrier seem to lose their identities as they mix. 
Furthermore, the concept of entropy (the second law of 
thermodynamics) is more useful in analyzing such mixing 
than is conservation of energy. The fourth task involved 
conduction of heat through various metal rods "along which 
were placed a set of wax beads holding drawing pins" (p. 
222) to gauge the progress of heat conducting through the 
rods. With the focus on the rods (the source of heat was 
not mentioned), there is again no clear interaction 
between entities. Also, heat conduction does not involve 
ideas of conservation, wherein the amount of a quality 
lost by one entity equals the amount gained by another. 
Erickson's data consisted of transcripts, 
inventories, and summations of the subjects' ideas, making 
it possible to look for nascent conservation of energy 
ideas even though Erickson herself did not explicitly so 
do. Despite being presented with four tasks in which 
conservation of energy was not readily in evidence, the 
ten subjects used this concept as a major framework for 
their explanations. The data provide a picture of "the 
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very pervasive belief that heat (and 'cold' for those 
children who used that notion) was a type of substance 
like air, which is capable of flowing into or out of 
objects" (p. 227). Most of the children "attributed to 
heat an additive-subtractive property where the 
temperature of the object could be changed by adding or 
subtracting heat from the object" (p. 225). The subjects' 
attempts to express the abstract nature of this additive- 
subtractive property produced terms such as air, bubbles, 
and fumes. It would seem as though Erickson recorded her 
subjects' understanding that there is a conserved, 
abstract quantity (i.e. additive-subtractive property) 
that is central to phenomena that are energy related. 
Two other examples of investigations of whether or 
not students use energy concepts if there is no overt 
signal to do so dealt with heat conduction (Engel-Clough 
and Driver, 1985) and the phase changes of water (Osborne 
and Cosgrove, 1983). All the students had been previously 
instructed in the topics in the course of the schooling. 
Unfortunately, the Engle-Clough and Driver study does not 
provide transcipts of the students' responses and it is 
impossible to tell if they used the nascent conservation 
of energy ideas that Erickson had recorded. Osborne and 
Cosgrove did provide transcripts, but they were heavily 
edited with the almost exclusive focus on the students' 
understanding of the kinetic theory of matter. 
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Gair and Stancliffe (1988) carried out an interesting 
study of uninstructed, 11-year old, British children's 
ideas about force and energy in interviews about selected 
toys. They chose to study these two concepts at the same 
time because "it appeared then that these two words force 
and energy had familiar meanings which were close enough 
to influence the way the children would use them to 
interpret the world around them" (p. 168). Although the 
major focus of their investigation was still on correct 
usage of terminology, they were on the lookout for 
underlying understandings. They found that they could 
divide the students into two categories of roughly the 
same number of students each: "One group of pupils were 
interpreting the instances by using everyday meanings of 
the words, and were not influenced by any recognition of a 
science meaning" (p. 178). However, "the other group of 
pupils, whilst expressing no deeper understanding of the 
terms in the initial stages of the interview, had the 
ability to look at instances and develop their ideas as 
they went along..., culminating in the generation of a 
framework having greater congruence with the accepted 
'scientific' notions of force and energy" (p. 178). It is 
unlikely that these pupils actually "developed their ideas 
as they went along," since such an interpretation would 
imply a fantastic self-learning ability within the short 
time period of the interview. Much more likely is that 
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the pupils had already developed the concepts and that 
they were observed making the connections between the 
labels and their previously un-labelled concepts. Here, 
then, is an indication that young, uninstructed children 
might indeed form intuitive and unlabelled concepts of 
energy. 
Gair and Stancliffe's finding that energy and forcer 
concepts are associated in uninstructed students' minds 
presents the possibility of looking for understandings of 
conservation of energy in the research on students' 
understandings of forces. Of particular interest would be 
research focused on Newton's third law in which 
interactions between systems are pivotal, as they are in 
the energy concepts. David E. Brown (1988) carried out 
research on this concept with American high school senior 
students who were studying physics. Even though his 
research demonstrated that, after instruction in Newton's 
third law, students barely understood it, his interview 
transcripts make excellent reading when analyzed from the 
energy perspective. If the reader ignores the labels 
(energy, force, work, motion, etc.) used by the students, 
and, after reading the transcripts, asks which concepts 
would best describe the ideas being used by the students, 
it would be energy concepts. Brown recognizes this 
possibility and presents three reasons why it is 
unsatisfactory. But his reasons are poor in that they use 
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esoteric arguments, such as students* possible confusion 
with energy and momentum changes caused by changes in the 
frame of reference. Using the Amalgamated Model and its 
learning theory to interpret the transcripts, it would 
seem that the students are using energy concepts 
structured according to what learning theory would 
predict, not according to what classical curricula would 
indicate. Although Brown does not describe the energy 
curriculum to which these students were exposed, I happen 
to know (being familiar with the teachers involved in the 
study) that it was a classical curriculum. Thus, these 
students are in all likelihood using energy concepts that 
they formed themselves independent of instruction. 
If it is assumed that uninstructed children do form 
conservation of energy ideas, and that these concepts are 
structured as predicted by the learning theory in the 
Amalgamated Model (a conserved, abstract quantity flowing 
between interacting entities), then it would be 
interesting to look at research on a non-classical 
curriculum that followed to some degree this structure. 
Within the context of the Amalgamated Model, it would be 
expected that instruction that conforms to how concepts 
are intuitively learned would be effective, as opposed to 
classical instruction which has been shown to be 
ineffective. Andrew 0. Urevbu (1984) carried out research 
on teaching concepts of energy to Nigerian children in the 
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7-11 age range. The curriculum with which the students 
were instructed was experimental, and was divided into 
three consecutive stages. The first two stages 
corresponded very well to the conceptual structure 
predicted by learning theory. The third stage switched to 
the classical development focused on the work concept. 
The results showed that the first two stages were 
successfully learned by all students, although the first 
and second graders were unable to generalize well. When 
students were tested on the third stage, in which they had 
to manipulate the work formula in a rote manner, only the 
oldest students were able to succeed. Thus Urevbu's 
research seems to support the contention that the learning 
theory embedded within the Amalgamated Model predicts a 
conceptual structure that corresponds to the natural 
development of the concept, as well as that young children 
are able to learn it. 
Another perspective from which to investigate the 
learning of conservation of energy is to define the 
pre-requisite concepts upon which it is built, again, 
according to learning theory, and then to investigate 
whether they are understood by children before 
conservation of energy is. If conservation of energy is 
defined as the idea that an abstract quality is conserved 
during an interaction between two entities, then there are 
three major pre-requisite concepts (which are grouped 
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together as the basic concept of nature of matter within 
the Amalgamated Model) that children must understand: 
1) Thing/substance/particle/system, or, more succinctly, 
entity. Children must be able to divide the world 
around them into distinct entities that keep their 
identities even though their properties might change. 
2) Property. This concept includes those ideas that 
describe entities and that have values or degrees. 
3) Process/happening/event, or more formally, interaction. 
A process always involves entities whose properties 
change values over time. Children must be able to link 
the changes in two entities as being related to each 
other and thus forming a delineated interaction. 
Pella and Ziegler (1967) carried out a research 
project with American elementary grade students to 
investigate the use of static and dynamic mechanical 
models in teaching aspects of the theoretical concept of 
the particle nature of matter, combining the concepts, 
listed above, of entity and property. Besides their 
conclusion on the relative merits of static and dynamic 
models, they also concluded that "children in grades 2-6 
who had not learned to use the particle theory of matter 
to explain natural physical phenomena within present 
educational programs can learn to use this theoretical 
model as a result of appropriate instruction" (p. 45). 
Furthermore, "within the limits of this study, grade level 
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is not a factor of concern in teaching the use of the 
particle model of matter in explaining physical phenomena" 
(p.45). In other words, it seems that second graders are 
capable of learning this concept, fitting well with 
Urevbu's data that showed that third grade was the 
beginning of generalized learning of the conservation of 
energy concept by Nigerian pupils. 
Combining both the conservation of energy concept and 
its pre-requisite, the nature of matter, Novak and Musonda 
(1991) reported on a 12-year longitudinal study in which 
they provided first and second grade American students 
with a sequence of 28 audio-tutorial mini-lessons, each 
lasting no more than a half hour. The lessons are 
remarkably congruent with what the Amalgamated Model would 
prescribe. Eighteen of the lessons dealt with the first 
basic concept of the nature of matter (e.g. classification 
of objects by their size, shape and weight; things are 
made of parts (p. 121)), while ten of them dealt with 
conservation of energy (e.g. Electric energy is involved 
in many kinds of changes; All animals use energy from food 
to change (p. 121)). The students were then followed 
through their senior high school year, their conceptual 
understanding being tested every other year. The 
instruction turned out to be very effective: "Highly 
significant differences in the frequency of valid and 
invalid notions were observed, with instructed students 
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showing more valid conceptions and fewer invalid 
conceptions (than uninstructed students). In general, 
there was a significant increase in valid notions from 
grades two to twelve and a decline in invalid notions" 
(Novak & Musonda, 1991, p. 146). "The remarkable finding 
of this study is that a relatively few hours of high 
quality science instruction in grades one and two 
apparently served as a kind of advance organizer for many 
students for later instruction in science" (Novak & 
Musonda, 1991, p.148). Thus Novak and Musonda have 
demonstrated that these concepts, structured according to 
the learning theory of the Amalgamated Model, can be 
taught to young children, and that the education is very 
effective, both points being in clear contrast to 
classical curricula. 
As stated at the beginning of this literature review, 
there has not been extensive research on the pedagogy of 
energy concepts. In summary, what research has been done 
indicates that the classical curricula for teaching 
conservation of energy are ineffective in teaching 
students these concepts as measured by their own criteria: 
students' ability to use and apply the terminology 
correctly. The research also shows some indication that 
children intuitively form un-labelled energy concepts, 
without the aid of instruction, according to the pattern 
predicted by learning theory as synthesized in the 
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Amalgamated Model. There is also some indication that 
energy concepts patterned according to the Amalgamated 
Model could be learned by children as young as third 
grade, perhaps even first grade. Furthermore, the 
research indicates that such early instruction could be 
very effective in helping students form valid scientific 
concepts, not just those specific to the basic concept of 
conservation of energy, throughout their school careers. 
C. Hypothesis 
As mentioned in the review of literature, it is 
difficult to make deductions about children's 
understandings of abstract concepts such as conservation 
of energy if we discount their vocabulary. I therefore 
proposed to present children with small demonstrations of 
"toys" and then ask them to explain what they had 
observed, in a classic Piagetian interview about 
instances. The question then became: Just what do 
children understand who successfully analyze the instances 
compared to those who cannot? There is lots of room for 
argument about whether the children who do respond 
positively are, thereby, conserving energy. This question 
induces a second, equally puzzling question: What 
behaviors, responses or interpretations on the part of a 
child WOULD constitute an operational understanding of 
what scientists commonly recognize as the principle of 
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conservation of energy? To address these questions, it is 
necessary to describe the relevant understandings in terms 
independent of the energy vocabulary. Such a description 
can be derived from the pre-requisite ideas upon which 
conservation of energy is built. 
The approach of looking at pre-requisite concepts is 
powerful in attempting to map conceptual frameworks and it 
was the primary approach used in the interpretation of 
data produced by this investigation. Any concept that is 
not directly observable, such as conservation of energy, 
has an inherent problem with validity when understandings 
independent of vocabulary are being investigated. Using 
the Amalgamated Model and its associated learning theory, 
it is possible to define the pre-requisite ideas necessary 
to build the concept in question in terms independent of 
the concept itself. Because concepts are learned by 
combining previously learned concepts or sensory 
observations, it is less equivocal looking at 
pre-requisites than at the understanding itself. 
Nevertheless, it is true that a collection of 
pre-requisites does not automatically mean that they will 
coalesce into the product. This developmental step needs 
to take place, too. It could be that the pre-requisites 
are necessary, but that they are not sufficient to 
guarantee germination of the intended progeny. 
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The analogy of a seed is useful. A seed is a 
necessary pre-requisite for growing a plant, but the seed 
will remain dormant unless other conditions also exist. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to predict what plant will 
emerge from a particular seed without experimentation. In 
the same way, the pre-requisite ideas for the concept of 
conservation of energy may be present, but not yet 
germinated into a unitary concept in its own right, used 
as a whole during problem solving. And the pre-requisites 
may also be found to be pre-requisites for some other 
concept, say, conservation of momentum. Since there was 
little past experimentation that focused on describing 
pre-requisites and mapping their development, considerable 
caution was called for in making conclusions to this 
investigation. 
The investigation I carried out was based on 
characterizing pre-requisite ideas, and therefore it was 
necessary to hypothesize what those pre-requisites were. 
A theory of conceptual frameworks then became necessary 
too, and the learning theory used within the Amalgamated 
Model provided candidates (see Appendices B - G): nature 
of matter is the basic concept that preceeds conservation 
of energy. The three major conceptual attributes of 
nature of matter, thing/substance, property, and process, 
were described on page 169. The most complex concepts of 
nature of matter whose understanding requires all three of 
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these attributes are proportionality and causality. Thus 
the immediately precursor, closest pre-requisite ideas for 
conservation of energy are causality and proportionality. 
An understanding of conservation of energy should be able 
to be characterized as an understanding of proportional 
causality. 
Causality is a pivotal concept in the study of logic 
and reasoning. "A cause-effect relationship is one in 
which two phenomena (objects, events) are observed 
interacting in some process, and it is assumed that one of 
them causes the other" (Fryar et al., 1989, p. 61). An 
example of simple causality could be turning on a light 
switch; flipping the switch causes the light to go on. 
Another example is opening an electric door by stepping on 
the mat. Thus one of the pre-requisite ideas for 
conservation of energy is the observation of causality - 
the energy quality in one thing, or system, causes a 
change in the energy quality of another thing or system 
during an interaction. 
The two above examples of simple causality were 
purposefully chosen to illustrate that another pre¬ 
requisite idea is necessary, and that is the idea of 
proportionality (Karplus, 1975). Neither flipping a light 
switch nor stepping on an electric door mat is a 
proportional causality. In its simplest form, 
proportionality is the understanding that there is a 
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correspondence between the values, intensities or amounts 
of the properties on the two sides of the interaction. It 
does not matter how hard you flip a light switch, the 
light shines with the same intensity. Neither does it 
matter how hard or quickly you step on the mat, the door 
always opens at the same speed. Proportional causality 
means that the degrees of change in each of two properties 
are linked. So if the light is on a dimmer switch, the 
degree of turn on the switch corresponds to the brightness 
of the light. Or, an increase in the distance a rubber 
band is stretched is linked to an increase in the distance 
it will fly. Of course, conservation of energy is a 
proportional causality because the amount of energy 
received by one system during an interaction is equal to 
the amount lost by another. 
In the precise definition of causality quoted above, 
two ideas beyond cause-effect are assumed. In the 
learning theory of the Amalgamated Model, the procedure 
for establishing pre-requisites is to only look at the 
next scale down, even though each of the pre-requisites 
itself has its own component pre-requisites, which could 
have their own, ad infinitum (see Appendix C). A strict 
adherence to analyzing only at the next scale down would 
mean that proportional causality would be a sufficient 
characterization of the pre-requisite for conservation of 
energy. However, for the sake of clarity, two 
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pre-requisite ideas of a causality should be described and 
included in the conceptual characterization of 
conservation of energy. 
The first idea is that of a process. A process is an 
action, event, happening, phenomenon. All processes 
involve entities whose properties change values over time. 
Energy is only conserved during a process and so a child 
must be able to understand a proportional causality 
inherent to an observed process. When testing for the 
existence of proportional causality within a child's 
cognitive structure, it is best to begin with the simplest 
and most observable processes. 
To understand proportional causality, a child must 
begin with the understanding that things or entities 
continue to exist even when they are not being observed 
directly. Furthermore, the child must be able to identify 
the two or more entities that are involved in a process 
while excluding the surrounding entities that are not 
involved. 
A child is also required to understand what a 
property is in the sense that it is a quality inherent to 
a thing or substance. Highly concrete properties such as 
shape, color and volume are fairly easy to test children 
about because the children can be observed pointing to the 
attribute. Energy is also a property inherent in a thing 
(or system), but it is more abstract since it cannot be 
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pointed to. Yet with careful listening, it should be 
possible to deduce whether a child thinks of an energy 
quality as inherent to a thing. The only way to observe 
the energy quality is to see it change value during a 
process. Thus a child's understanding of conservation of 
energy could be investigated by delving into their ability 
to attribute to entities abstract properties that change 
during a process. 
The second pre-requisite idea of a causality is the 
idea of INTERaction, with the emphasis on the prefix 
inter-. There are, of course, relatively simple processes 
in which the interacting entities are easily 
distinguishable and their respective changes easily 
observed, and then there are subtle, complex processes 
that are difficult to analyze. It is easy to come up with 
processes in which nothing appears to be happening, a 
common example being a person holding an object in an 
outstretched hand. An increase in the mass of an object I 
hold on my outstretched hand causes a proportional 
increase in how "strongly" I support it. But no process 
is evident to the observer of the person and object. It 
is a proportional causality and it is a process, but 
nothing appears to be happening. Or consider a water 
faucet. The further I turn the faucet, the greater the 
flow, and the flowing water is an easily observed process. 
But there is not a clear interaction between the faucet 
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and the water, just as there is not between a dimmer 
switch and a light. A stretched rubber band being 
released also illustrates a proportional causality during 
a process that is not clearly interactive. The flying 
rubber band seems to be acting on itself. In other words, 
there are not two clearly distinguishable systems acting 
upon each other, a change in one's properties reflected in 
changes in the other's. A stretched bow shooting an arrow 
would be a modification of the flying rubber band in which 
a clear interaction would be occurring. 
Although the pre-requisite ideas for conservation of 
energy could be technically described as proportional 
causality, it would be more complete, although admittedly 
verbose, to describe them as proportional causality during 
an interactive process. Such is a very careful 
characterization of what children would need to understand 
in conceptual terms if they can successfully analyze 
simple instances that a scientist would consider to 
illustrate conservation of energy. Therefore, the 
hypothesis for the investigation was expressed in terms of 
this understanding. 
1. Hypothesis Statement 
The hypothesis is stated as a directed hypothesis 
because it states the relationship that is expected to 
emerge from this investigation. As such, it is the most 
179 
easily understood form in terms of the preceeding and 
supporting theory. The directed hypothesis would be: 
The ability of children aged five to twelve to 
conserve discontinuous quantity, discontinuous 
substance, weight, and volume, as assessed using 
classical Piagetian clinical interviews about 
instances, will correlate significantly with their 
ability to understand proportional causality during 
interactive processes that an adult would consider 
illustrations of energy being transferred and 
transformed, as also assessed in clinical interviews 
about instances. 
The hypothesis was couched in terms of Piagetian 
stages because Piagetian developmental theory describes a 
yardstick of cognitive development, particularly in regard 
to conservation concepts. On this yardstick, the sequence 
of stages is invariant, even though the chronological ages 
at which individual children progress from stage to stage 
does vary. Freyberg (1966) demonstrated that students' 
school achievement correlated significantly better with 
their stages of Piagetian development than with their 
chronological ages. Thus the reliability of links between 
the Piagetian stages and the developmental stages of the 
proportional causality concept should be greater than that 
of the links made with just chronological age, 
particularly for a small sample of subjects. 
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The other reason that the hypothesis avoided 
correlations with chronological age was to address the 
argument that any relationships found could be due to 
maturation affecting both Piagetian development and the 
development of understanding of conservation of energy, 
which would therefore only appear to be linked. This 
investigation was clearly focused on the cognitive, 
intellectual development of children. Within this domain, 
what does maturation mean? The characterization of 
concepts within the Amalgamated Model according to 
generality, complexity and abstractness is essentially an 
attempt to describe intellectual maturation. It is in the 
context of such a description that this investigation was 
attempting to map a particular branch of intellectual 
maturation. Establishing the relationships between the 
Piagetian conservation tasks and the various conservation 
of energy tasks was an attempt to map this branch of 
intellectual maturation. Physical and emotional 
maturation, as well as the physical environment, certainly 
do affect intellectual maturation, but these effects were 
incidental to this investigation, which was conducted 
entirely within the intellectual domain and disregarded 
the forces driving the maturation. 
By correlating children's understanding of 
proportional causality with their understanding of 
Piagetian conservation, as described by the four listed 
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conceptual abilities on the Piagetian yardstick, it was 
possible to judge the degree of overlap between these two 
understandings. Since a correlation describes the degree 
to which a variation in one variable can predict the 
variation in another, there would be no significant 
correlation if one were a perfect pre-requisite for the 
other. If a complete understanding of Piagetian 
conservation were necessary before conservation of energy 
ideas could form, then there would be no linkage between 
the variations in understanding of the two. Thus the 
correlation is a measurement of the overlap, or strength 
of linkage, between the two understandings, which could be 
interpreted as the degree to which one evolves out of the 
other. 
2. Limitations 
The population to which the hypothesis supposedly 
applies is all the children of the world. The hypothesis 
concerns children's understanding of proportional 
causality, a concept that could be induced from 
observations of any environment. Piaget's developmental 
stages have been tested with children from many different 
corners of the world. These studies show that the 
sequence of the stages is invariant among children, even 
though the chronological ages at which they are attained 
does vary among cultures (Dasen, 1972). 
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Clearly, there is no practical way to test a random 
sample of all children of the world between the ages of 
five and twelve. The population that was tested 
encompassed children that belonged to a particular school 
district in Western Massachusetts. It would of course be 
unreasonable to make any global generalizations from 
results from such a constrained sample population. 
A further limitation on the scope of permissible 
generalization was the small sample, only 48 subjects. 
Each of the clinical interviews that was the means of data 
collection lasted about a half hour and subsequent data 
analysis was time consuming. It was therefore impractical 
to test a great many subjects. With such small sampling 
of such a constrained population, any generalizations made 
from this investigation must await further research with 
other populations of children. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The subjects for this investigation were forty eight 
children between and including the ages of five to twelve. 
They were tested for their understanding of proportional 
causality as well as their Piagetian stage of development 
in their general ability to conserve. There was no 
treatment since the Piagetian conservation abilities have 
been shown to be acquired by children regardless of formal 
instruction, and it was hypothesized that proportional 
causality was similarly acquired as a concept. The 
subjects were tested by means of clinical interviews about 
instances. The interviews, each lasting about a half 
hour, were audio tape recorded for later analysis. The 
Piagetian conservation abilities constitute ranked 
categories into which each of the tested subjects could be 
placed. The questions and responses on the proportional 
causality concept were also divided into ranked categories 
that reflected increasing ability and sophistication of 
the subject to use it. These rankings were established 
according to increasing specificity (i.e. according to 
generality), complexity, and abstractness. These rank 
data could then be analyzed to see if there were any 
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correlation between the acquisition of the Piagetian 
conservation concepts and proportional causality. 
A. Subjects 
The subjects were drawn from the Belchertown School 
District, a rural/suburban, middle-class, almost entirely 
white community located in Western Massachusetts. The 
subjects were interviewed at home with the idea that a 
school setting might induce artificial answers that 
children might feel were "school-like." I therefore 
carried out the interviews over the summer at the homes of 
the subjects. 
A random sample of sixty four possible subjects were 
drawn, eight at each age level between five and twelve 
years old, using linear systematic sampling from 
alphabetized lists of students in each grade. The hope 
was that thirty two subjects (four for each grade level) 
would volunteer from the initial pool of sixty four. 
Letters requesting participation, accompanied by letters 
of support from the school principals, were mailed home. 
Parents were asked to return a tear-off interest form to 
their child's teacher. 
Only four responses were returned to school through 
the children, probably because it was early June and the 
end of the school year was near. Therefore, I telephoned 
the parents of the remaining possible subjects to see if 
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they were interested. I continued telephoning until I had 
commitments from four subjects in each of the eight grade 
levels. Fifteen subjects that I telephoned were 
unavailable either because they would be gone all summer, 
had left town even though they were on the school’s rolls, 
or because they did not answer their phones after three 
attempts. Three subjects' parents declined to participate 
because they were just not interested. I ended up with 
thirty eight volunteers, some subjects returning calls 
after I had already collected enough subjects for a 
particular age group. I did not attempt calling twenty 
six subjects out of the original pool of sixty four. 
As I carried out the interviews over the summer, two 
factors conspired to change the number of subjects. There 
were four "no shows;" appointments were made but they 
were not at home. The second, unforeseen factor was the 
popularity of the interview with the children. At many 
homes, siblings and friends were curious and wanted to be 
interviewed as well. In this manner I acquired an 
additional fourteen subjects. I therefore ended up with a 
total of forty eight subjects, spread over the ages of 
four to twelve in the following distribution: 
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Table 4.1 Age Distribution of Subjects 
AGE : 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
SUBJECTS : 1 3 8 4 7 6 10 3 6 
Although this distribution of ages was quite uneven. 
the hypothesis being tested did not consider age as an 
influence variable for reasons already given. The spread 
of ages was intended to effect a spread of Piagetian 
levels of understanding. The spread of Piagetian levels, 
however, also turned out to be uneven. As will be 
detailed in the up-coming Measurements section, the 
Piagetian conservation abilities of the subjects were 
placed on an eight-step ranking, wherein a ranking of 0 
indicated no ability to conserve and a ranking of 8 
indicated a successful interpretation of all the Piagetian 
conservation tasks presented. The distribution of the 
subjects' Piagetian rankings was: 
Table 4.2 Distribution of Piagetian Rankings of Subjects 
PIAGETIAN RANKING: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SUBJECTS: 10 1 2 0 5 3 7 3 17 
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The most striking aspect of this distribution is the 
disproportionate number of subjects at either end of the 
scale. This pattern was not indicated in the distribution 
of ages. It would seem to support the contention within 
Piagetian theory that stages of cognitive development 
always occur in the same sequence with every child, but 
the ages at which children progress through the stages can 
vary considerably. The barbell distribution of the 
Piagetian ranks also supports the contention within 
Piagetian theory that the transition between stages of 
development is relatively rapid. The ability to conserve 
is considered to be a distinction between the Piagetian 
pre-operational stage and concrete operational stage. 
Therefore, this ability would be acquired during the 
transition between these two stages and the number of 
children that would be in the relatively rapid transition 
process would be considerably fewer than the sum of those 
in the stages on either side. The final analysis of data 
was first carried out for all the subjects, including the 
fourteen non-randomly selected ones. It was also carried 
out with only the thirty four randomly selected subjects. 
Since there was no significant difference between these 
two analyses, the data and analysis presented here cover 
all forty eight subjects. 
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B. Measurements 
The measurements used were clinical interviews about 
concrete, observable instances presented to each subject. 
There were six different instances presented to each 
subject. The first four were the classical Piagetian 
instances used to investigate the four stages of 
conservation listed in the hypothesis. The second two 
instances investigated proportional causality concepts. 
The interviews were conducted, audio tape recorded, and 
analyzed by me. I analyzed the tapes twice. The first 
time, I listened to them all, extracting example quotes 
that exemplified different levels of understanding of the 
proportional causality concepts. I also gave each subject 
preliminary rankings on their understanding of these 
concepts. On the basis of this information, I slightly 
modified the ranking criteria for the proportional 
causality understandings. I then listened to all the tapes 
again, ranking each subject again without looking at the 
preliminary rankings I had given. Of the 192 rankings (4 
x 48), 22 were changed on the second review of the data. 
When the data analysis was carried out, the preliminary 
data was analyzed as well as the final data with the 22 
changes. The second analysis using the modified data 
turned out to be more conservative in its results and 
therefore this analysis was presented. The prototype of 
the investigation of the two instances of proportional 
189 
causality was developed by myself and three other graduate 
students for a class in Piagetian psychology at the 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst (Leighton et al., 
1988). The other three graduate students did not have 
science backgrounds, and in some cases found it difficult 
to carry out the interviews because they did not know how 
to identify and pursue interesting responses by the 
subjects. However, once transcripts of the interviews had 
been produced and the detailed criteria for analysis had 
been established, we found a high degree of reliability 
among the four of us in interpreting and categorizing 
subject responses. Thus reliability was judged not to be 
a problem in this research project with a sole 
investigator carrying out all stages of the research. 
1. Piagetian Interviews 
a. Conservation of Discontinuous Quantity 
Children were presented with two identical glasses 
containing equal amounts of water. The child was asked if 
there was indeed an equal amount in each glass. If the 
response was No, then the child was asked to pour water 
back and forth between the glasses until satisfied that 
such was the case. The experimenter (E) then poured water 
from one of the glasses into a differently shaped glass. 
The child was then asked if there was still the same 
amount of water in the two glasses or if it was different. 
If the child responded that it was different, then the 
190 
child was asked which contained more. (The term 
"discontinuous" means that the child was asked to make the 
judgement when presented with both the original and final 
forms of the instance and not some representation of the 
intermediate steps of the transformation or asked to 
maintain a memory of the original form.) 
b. Conservation of Discontinuous Substance 
Children were presented with two identical clay balls 
and again asked to verify that there was the same amount 
of clay in each ball. Then, E squashed one of the balls 
into a pancake. The child was then asked if the two clay 
objects still had the same amount of clay or if they were 
different. 
c. Conservation of Weight 
The child was again presented with two identical clay 
balls, which the experimenter placed on a two-pan balance 
to demonstrate that they did indeed weigh the same. Then 
one ball was removed from the balance and squashed into a 
pancake. The child was then asked to predict what would 
happen if the squashed ball were placed back on its pan; 
would it balance again or would they now weigh 
differently? 
191 
d. Conservation of Volume 
Two identical clay balls were each placed in two 
identical glasses, each containing an equal amount of 
water. The child was asked to notice that each ball 
displaced an equal amount of water, as verified by an 
equal increase in water height. E then removed one of the 
balls from its glass of water and squashed it into a 
pancake shape. The child was then asked to predict what 
would happen when the squashed ball was returned to its 
glass. Would the water level rise to equal the other 
glass, or would it be different? 
2. Proportional Causality (Energy Conservation) 
Interviews 
Two demonstrations were developed. The first, 
referred to as the CANDLES demonstration, used two candles 
that heated two small, identical metal pans of water. The 
second, split into two instances referred to as the RAMPS 
and the BALLS demonstrations, used two balls of the same 
size but different mass that were rolled down a ramp. At 
the bottom of the ramp, the balls rolled into an opaque 
box, which then slid backwards. 
The order in which questions are listed below was 
hypothesized to be in an ascending order of cognitive 
maturity, the purpose being to replicate a continuum of 
conceptual understanding similar to that produced by the 
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Piagetian tests. Since the four Piagetian tests were 
sequenced according to cognitive maturity, it should have 
been possible to correlate subjects' responses on the 
Piagetian tests with their answers on the proportional 
causality questions. 
a. Candles Demonstration - Equipment 
The following items were used: 
1) Two fabricated candles that were identical in all 
respects except that one had a small and one has a large 
wick. This difference in wicking was designed to produce 
discernably different flame sizes on otherwise identical 
candles. Each candle had a rubber band wrapped around it 
about two-thirds of the way down. The difference in the 
wick sizes was barely perceptible, particularly if they 
were charred. None of the subjects noticed a difference 
even though they were shown the un-lit candles and asked 
to compare them. 
2) Two small, open, identical metal pans (capacity of 
about 1-2 cups) with handles. The pans were 
differentiated with different colors applied to the 
handles. Each pan was wrapped in foil-backed plastic 
bubble insulation to prevent heat losses. 
3) Two wire stands used to support the pans over the 
candles in order to heat water. 
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b. Candles Demonstration - Diagram 




Figure 4.1 Equipment Set-up for Candles Demonstration 
c. Candles Demonstration - Script 
(E = Experimenter; S = Subject; prefix "C" = Candle) 
E shows S the two candles and secures agreement that 
the two candles are identical except for the wicks. The 
two candles must be of the same overall length. E 
specifically secures agreement that the rubber bands on 
each candle are equi-distant from the top. If S is unsure 
of this last assertion, then E gives S the two candles and 
asks S to adjust the rubber bands until satisfied that 
indeed they are equally placed. 
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E lights the candles, the large-wicked candle first 
immediately followed by the small-wicked one. The reason 
for this order is that it takes a bit of time for the 
candles to, literally, warm up and get to the stage where 
the flame sizes are clearly different. E secures 
agreement from S that indeed one flame is appreciably 
bigger than the other. 
i. Question CA E: Think of this as a kind of race. 
If I leave the candles burning, will they burn down to the 
rubber bands at the same time, or will one of them reach 
its rubber band first? 
E leaves both candles burning briefly, and then blows 
them out, explaining it is dangerous to leave candles 
burning. The important point is to blow out the candles 
before any discernable difference has occurred in the 
length of candle consumed. To double check S's responses, 
the following question is asked: 
E: If I wait to blow out each candle until it has burned 
down to its rubber band, will I blow out the candles at 
the same time, or will I blow out one of them first? If 
S answers correctly that the candle with the large flame 
will reach its rubber band first, then S is asked to 
explain why. Finally, if S adheres to his/her response, 
the conclusion is summarized by E as follows: 
E: So to reach the rubber bands, this candle (pointing to 
the appropriate candle) will burn for a longer time? 
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In preparation for the next question, E takes the two 
metal pans and gives them to S along with a glass of 
water. E asks S to fill the pans from the glass of water 
so that each is about half full of water and so that there 
is the same amount of water in each. During and 
immediately after the pouring, S should be asked to 
confirm that the water in both pans is the same 
temperature, testing with a finger if necessary. E takes 
the two pans of water, places them on the wire stands, and 
places a candle under each pan. The subject's perspective 
on the pans should be such that the water inside them 
cannot be directly observed. E then explains that s/he is 
going to light the candles again and heat the pans of 
waters with them. E also explains that the pans are 
insulated so that they will not lose any heat. While 
giving this explanation, E lights the two candles in the 
same way as for question CA. E then takes the 
small-flamed candle and raises it towards the pan bottom, 
explaining to S that s/he is attempting to get the flames 
so that their tips are the same distance below the pan 
bottoms. E asks S to look closely and verify when these 
distances are the same. The purpose is to prevent S from 
focusing on the height of the pan above the flame as a 
factor in the next question. E then asks: 
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ii« Question CB E: Can you tell me which pan will 
get hot faster, or will they get hot at the same time? 
Again, E only leaves the candles burning briefly, 
blowing them out before any obvious change in water 
temperature can occur. S is again asked to explain 
whatever answer is given. To double check S's response 
the following question is asked: 
E: So even though this one (pointing to pan that S 
previously indicated) will get hot faster, will this one 
(pointing to other pan) get hot at all? During 
preliminary testing, there were a significant number of 
five to six year old children who responded that the pan 
over the small flame would never get hot. Even if this 
response is made, the next question (Question CC) should 
still be asked to double check S's response. If S answers 
correctly that the pan over the large flame will heat 
faster, then E presents a counter-argument: 
E: But parts of the big flame are further below the pan 
than on the little flame. See how all parts of the little 
flame are close under the pan? Do you still think that 
the big flame will heat the water faster? 
iii. Question CC. E again lights the two candles under 
the two pans of water while asking, E: If I place each pan 
over its candle until each candle has burned all the way 
down to its rubber band, will the water in the two pans be 
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just as hot as each other or will one be hotter than the 
other? 
Again, E blows out the candles before there is a 
discernable difference in their length. The complexity of 
this question causes many subjects to hesitate and even 
ask for the question to be repeated. In that case, E may 
re-phrase the question as follows: 
E: Let's say I leave both candles burning and put a 
thermometer in each pan to measure the temperature. When 
the first candle reaches its rubber band. I'll blow out 
its flame and record its temperature. Let's say it turned 
out to be 85 degrees, like this. (E sketches a pan 
holding water and labels it with a large 85. The flames 
are not sketched.) I'll then wait for the second candle 
to burn down to its rubber band and when it does. I'll 
record its temperature, too. (E sketches another pan with 
water, drawing a blank box with a question mark in the 
analogous position to the 85 on the first sketch.) Will 
this second temperature be 85 too, or will it be 
different? Again, S is asked to explain any answers 
given. 
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d. Ramp and Balls Demonstrations - Equipment 
The following equipment is used for both the ramp 
demonstration (b) and balls demonstration (c). 
1) Two balls of ALMOST the same size, but of different 
mass and color and luster. I used a small rubber ball, 
painted dull black, and a glass marble, slightly bigger, 
painted glossy white. The size difference is such that if 
you compare the balls by holding them between thumb and 
forefinger there is no discernable difference. Likewise, 
if you look at the balls separately, the difference is too 
small to distinguish. However, if you inspect the two 
balls in your palm, the difference is apparent but small, 
while the difference in weight is substantial. 
2) A ramp, about a foot long, with two side-by-side 
tracks down which the balls could be rolled, either 
individually or simultaneously. 
3) A long, rectangular cardboard box (that might, for 
example, fit a toothpaste tube or stapler) that is only 
open at the mouth, this open end being large enough for 
the balls to roll into easily. The box must be deep (or 
long) enough so that when a ball enters it, the ball does 
not bounce back out. 
4) A piece of poster board ruled with lines about a 
centimeter apart so that the sliding of the box can be 
measured. 
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5) Two cut-out paper arrows, colored to correspond to the 
two colors of the balls. 
e. Ramp and Balls Demonstrations - Diagram 
Figure 4.2 Equipment Set-up for Ramp and Balls 
Demonstration. 
f. Ramp (R) and Balls (B) Demonstrations - Script 
E explains to S that s/he is going to roll a ball 
down the hill, (E should not refer to the ramp as a ramp, 
as this word might not be in some children's vocabulary) 
and that the ball will be caught by the box. The lighter 
ball is used so that there is a smooth transition to the 
next demonstration in which it will be used first. 
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i. Question RA (R means this question refers to the 
Ramps demonstration, and A means it is hypothesized to be 
the cognitively easiest question.) E rolls the ball down 
the hill into the box, making the ball slide backwards 
along the ruled lines on the poster board. E then asks S 
to describe what happened, asking: 
E: So why did the box move backwards? E should NOT ask 
"Why does THE BALL move the box backwards?" S must be 
left to attribute the phenomenon to as wide a set of 
possibilities as possible, including a causality other 
than the ball. 
In preparation for the next question, E explains to S 
that s/he has another ball that is the same size as the 
one they have been using. E shows the two balls to S by 
holding them between thumb and forefinger in each hand, 
disguising the fact that they are slightly different 
sizes, and gets agreement that indeed they are the same 
size. E asks S to return the box to its original position 
and explains that s/he is going to roll both balls, one 
after the other, as previously done. This time S is to 
mark the final position of the box with the paper arrow 
that corresponds to the ball's color. S is directed to 
place the arrow at the mouth of the box if S attempts to 
do otherwise. (The mouth is the visual interface in the 
interaction between the ball and box.) 
201 
E rolls the lighter ball and asks S to mark the final 
position of the box. Once the final position has been 
marked, E instructs S to return the box to its original 
position. E then takes the second, heavier ball and 
repeats the same process of rolling it down the hill. S 
is again asked to mark the final position of the box using 
the color coded second arrow. E verifies that S has 
noticed that the box has slid a greater distance. 
ii. Question BB (Question BB is asked BEFORE 
question BA because question BA would preempt or negate 
the validity of question BB. However, the questions are 
labelled according to the depth of understanding that they 
are supposedly asking for. Question BA is projected to 
elicit a more shallow understanding than question BB.) 
E: Can you explain why the box slid a greater distance 
the second time? The balls are rolled in the 
light-to-heavy sequence described above so that the 
motions of the box are sequenced in an increasing pattern. 
My experience from teaching, albeit unsubstantiated by 
rigorous data, is that children have an easier time 
conceptualizing an increasing pattern than a decreasing 
one. To verify the conceptual solidity of S's response, a 
counter-argument is posed: 
E: What do you think of the idea that this ball is made 
out of wood and this one is made out of plastic, and wood 
always hits harder (or "is stronger" or whatever 
202 
terminology is used by S)? If S asserts that the 
difference in sliding distances is attributable to the 
difference in speed of the balls, then they can be rolled 
simultaneously down the parallel tracks on the hill to 
demonstrate that their speeds are identical. The easiest 
way to release the two balls simultaneously is to hold 
them at the top of the ramp with a stiff piece of 
cardboard, then lifting the cardboard cleanly. The box 
that was used to catch the balls can be placed across the 
bottom of the ramp so that the balls collide with its 
side. If the balls are released simultaneously, then they 
will collide with the box simultaneously. Once S agrees 
that the balls do indeed go at the same speed, then the 
question can be repeated. 
iii. Question BA If S is not able to respond 
correctly to Question BB, then E gives S the balls and 
asks S to repeat the full demonstration him/herself, 
placing the balls on the hill and letting them go. E then 
re-asks question BB. Because S can now handle and feel 
the balls, there is a more concrete basis than in Question 
BB for explaining the phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER V 
OBSERVATIONS AND DATA 
The four Piagetian tests produced rank data: either 
the subject was or was not able to respond correctly to 
the task, and once, within the hierarchical sequence of 
tasks, a subject had failed on a task, then the subject 
was not able to successfully answer any of the subsequent 
tasks. Of the 48 subjects, only three violated this 
pattern, failing on one or more of the initial questions 
and then correctly answering one of the later questions. 
However, all three of them were questioned further during 
the clinical interviews, including counter arguments, to 
test the solidity of their responses. Under this further 
questioning, it was evident that they had been largely 
guessing on the later responses. 
Each of the three energy conservation demonstrations 
was specifically designed to rank each subject's responses 
on a continuum of increasing conceptual difficulty, as 
established according to increasing specificity, 
complexity, and abstractness. A major effort of this 
research was to devise such a scale for the concept of 
conservation of energy (or, more academically, 
proportional causality during an interactive process). 
The first stage of data analysis was thus to establish the 
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degree to which the three energy demonstrations did indeed 
form a continuum, similar to that of the Piagetian 
conservation tasks. 
Before presenting the various definitions of the 
rankings of understanding predicted for the two energy 
conservation demonstrations, there is a subtle but 
important point to consider that affects the analysis of 
the data. Just what type of data do such continua of 
conceptual understanding produce? My conclusion is that 
they are rank data. They are not categorical data because 
the "categories" of conceptual understanding are on a 
continuum of increasing understanding and categorical 
data, by definition, are not on a continuum. Neither are 
they continuous data because the present state of 
cognitive theory does not resolve whether or not the 
development of conceptual understanding proceeds smoothly. 
In other words, it might not be theoretically correct that 
any possible fractional value of understanding is 
possible. Furthermore, the numbered values assigned to 
these scales in this investigation are arbitrary and do 
not signify any relative magnitudes. Thus the "distance" 
in understanding between two adjacent numbered values 
could be quite different from the "distance" between two 
other adjacent values. The only function of the numbered 
continua is to denote relative position on a continuum, 
and thus they are rank data. 
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A. Definitions and Illustrations of the Data Values 
1. Piagetian Tasks 
0 - S did not respond correctly to the first Piagetian 
task. Conservation of Discontinuous Quantity, in which 
water was poured into a differently shaped glass. 
1 - in transition between 0 and 2. S responded correctly 
to the first Piagetian task, but not very solidly. S/he 
changed opinion easily with additional questioning, or 
s/he indicated explicitly that s/he was unsure. 
2 - S responded correctly to the first Piagetian task, 
affirming that the amount of water did not change when 
poured to a differently shaped glass. This task is more 
concrete than the next, in which clay balls are 
squashed, because children more often experience that 
liquids change shape without changing volume than they 
experience the same with solids. 
3 - in transition between 2 and 4. 
4 - S responded correctly to the second Piagetian task, 
affirming that the squashed clay ball contained the same 
amount of clay as the round one. 
5 - in transition between 4 and 6. 
6 - S responded correctly to the third Piagetian task, 
affirming that the squashed clay ball would weigh the 
same as the round one. 
7 - in transition between 6 and 8. 
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8 - S responded correctly to the fourth Piagetian task, 
affirming that the squashed clay ball would raise the 
water level the same as the round one. 
2. Candles Demonstration 
(After each sample response given below, the subject's 
Piagetian rank, from 0 to 8, is also given.) 
0 - S did not respond correctly to either question CA 
(flames reaching rubber band) or CB (flames heating pans 
of water), or CC (water temperature after flames reach 
rubber bands). S had no or little idea of a 
relationship between the candle wax and flame or water 
temperature and flame. Two subjects would not even 
admit that the candles would burn down at all. In 
response to question CA, S would frequently respond that 
the flames would reach their respective rubber bands at 
the same time, since there was no proportional 
relationship between the flame and how fast the candle 
was consumed: "It doesn't matter if the flame is high or 
low, it still burns the same amount of heat." (Piaget 
rank: 8) "Because the little flame and the big flame, 
no matter how big they are, or how small, but they have 
to be the same, no matter how big or small they are they 
can get down the same." (Piaget rank: 8) I pursued 
this last subject's interjected clause that the flames 
had to be the same, finding that s/he had "misspoke" and 
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was indeed convinced that the size of the flames was 
immaterial. Another subject maintained that the two 
flames would reach their rubber bands at the same time 
because, "You lit them at the same time so they'll have 
the same time to reach the rubber bands." (Piaget rank: 
8) 
The most common response of the subjects that got 
question CB (flames heating water) wrong was that the 
pans of water would heat equally. Subjects gave much the 
same reasons as they did for why the flames would reach 
their rubber bands at the same time. 
Another typical response to question CA (flames to 
rubber bands) was that the small flame would reach its 
rubber band first: "The short one. Because it has a 
shorter way to go." (Piaget rank: 8) "Because it's so 
down, it'll probably go down. 'Cause that one's so high, 
it should probably go away - maybe like one hour after 
that one to get there." (Piaget rank: 6) 
It seemed that for all the subjects that chose the 
small flame as the "winner", they imagined that the 
flames were objects that were going to race down the 
candle as though it were a track, with no causal link 
between the wax and flame. These subjects seemed to 
conceive of each flame's starting position as roughly 
its center, judging therefore that the big flame was 
starting the race behind the small flame. One subject 
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did respond apparently correctly, asserting that the big 
flame would reach its rubber band first. The 
uncertainty in his voice, however, led me to question 
him further. He explained that he had chosen the large 
flame because, "It has a bigger flame. It would reach 
more to the rubber band coming down." Instead of 
imagining a causality between the flame and the candle 
wax, this subject seems to be comparing the lengths of 
the flames to the length of the candle between the top 
and the rubber band. Since the large flame, if 
superimposed upon the candle, would reach further to the 
rubber band, then it must be the one that would reach 
its rubber band first. Another subject illustrated this 
idea very well by responding, when asked to explain why 
he had chosen the large flame, "It's a lot longer so 
it'll touch it quicker. Just like I couldn't touch the 
ceiling and you could." (Piaget rank: 8) 
This idea of superimposed lengths also showed up in 
response to question CB (flames heating water), where it 
was used to rationalize why the small flame would heat 
the water faster: "Because it's up higher." I would 
then reiterate and re-indicate that the flame tips were 
both just touching the pan bottoms, and then ask the 
subjects if they still held by their answers. As this 
particular subject responded, he did hold to his answer 
because, "the flame and candle are all closer." 
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1 - in transition between 0 and 2. S is hesitant, appears 
to be guessing, or is easily dissuaded in giving a 
correct answer to either question CA or CB. S might 
give a correct answer and stick by the answer after 
being prodded, but is unable to give any explanation for 
the answer. 
2 - S responds correctly to either question CA or CB, but 
not to both and not to CC. Of the 48 subjects, 15 
(Candle rankings of 1 or 2) answered only one of these 
questions correctly. Of these 15, 8 (53%) answered CA 
correctly but not CB, and 7 (47%) followed the reverse 
pattern, getting CB correct but not CA. This difference 
is not significant, considering the number of subjects, 
and thus no conclusion is possible about the relative 
difficulty of these two questions. 
Of the subjects who answered CA correctly but not CB, 
they affirmed correctly that the big flame would reach 
its rubber band first. S was able to link the directly 
observable, and thus concrete, size of the flame to the 
directly observable and concrete length of the candle by 
imagining a causality between the two. Unlike any of 
the Piagetian tasks, in which the static, initial and 
final states of a transformation are observed, this task 
involved observation of an on-going process, and in this 
process the length of the candle changed over time and 
the flame was the agent of this change. S was being 
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asked whether the change in the candle length was 
proportional to the size of the flame. The flame size 
was a convenient method of "freezing" the time 
dependence of the combustion process. The apparently 
static flame size disguised the dynamic process of heat 
being emitted by the flame. 
Examples of responses are: "This one reaches faster 
because it's more fire." (Piaget rank: 6) "If the 
flame's bigger, it'll burn quicker." (Piaget rank: 6) 
"The big flame will reach the rubber band first because 
it has more heat to it. The more heat would melt the wax 
faster." (Piaget rank: 8) This last response is 
interesting because the subject is not seeing the 
proportionality as between the flame and the reduction 
of the candle length (i.e. apparent consumption of wax, 
which appears to dissapear as it is consumed by the 
flame) but as between the flame and the melting of wax, 
still a correct proportional causality. 
Of the subjects who answered CB correctly but not CA, 
typically S affirmed that the large flame would heat 
water faster. "Because it's a bigger flame and it'll 
heat up more." (Piaget rank: 8) "Because it has more 
flame." (Piaget rank: 1) "Probably the, hmmm,... little 
flame,... No, probably the big flame, 'cause the big 
flame is more heater, has more heat, than the little 
one, so that'll probably boil before." (Piaget rank: 6) 
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In question CB, the concrete, observable size of the 
flame was being linked to the temperature of the water. 
The initial design of this investigation hypothesized 
that water temperature would be a more abstract property 
than the candle length for all children, since it was 
not visually observable to the subject, and thus 
question CB would supposedly be a more difficult 
question that CA for all subjects. The results did not 
support this hypothesis. It seemed as though the common 
experience, albeit non-visual, of sensing different 
temperatures, particularly of water, made the properties 
of temperature and perceived length equivalent in terms 
of abstractness. Similarly, the complexity of the two 
demonstrations was posited to be equivalent in that 
there were two clearly and directly interacting entities 
in both (flame-candle, flame-water) and both 
interactions were only apparently dynamic on one side. 
The question then became, why were 27% (13 out of 48) of 
the subjects able to correctly analyze one demonstration 
and not the other if the two were equivalent? Certainly 
further research is needed to give any kind of 
definitive answer, but it could be that children's 
differing life experiences produce differing degrees of 
familiarity and thus concreteness to flames consuming a 
visible fuel and flames heating substances. For 
example, children living in homes with gas stoves might 
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be more familiar with flames heating substances than 
those living with electric stoves. (Data on the 
subject's home environments was not collected.) As a 
teacher of seventh graders (who are, on average, just 
older than the oldest subjects interviewed during this 
investigation), I have remarked how few students (a 
definite minority) have "played" with matches, lighters, 
candles or some other fuel-consuming fire. Children who 
are presented with flames, like on a birthday cake, seem 
to focus on the flame and don't seem to notice the 
changes in the fuel as it is consumed. 
3 - in transition between 2 and 4. S answers both 
question CA and question CB correctly, but hesitates or 
otherwise demonstrates uncertainty on one of them. "A 
bigger flame doesn't make it a hotter flame. If it was 
hotter, the water'd get hotter too." (Piaget rank: 8) 
This subject answered CA correctly, and does seem to 
have some concept of a causality between the flame and 
the water temperature, but does not see a 
proportionality between a flame's size and its ability 
to heat water. 
4 - Answered both questions CA (flames reaching rubber 
bands) and CB (flames heating pans of water) correctly, 
but not CC. 
5 - in transition between 4 and 6, judged from response to 
question CC (water temperatures after flames reach 
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rubber bands). The one response given this rank was: 
"They would heat up to the same because it will only be 
able to heat up to a certain point and then the other 
one will catch up to it." (Piaget rank: 8) This 
subject correctly responded to the two questions CA and 
CB, and seemed able to balance the effect of the flame 
sizes but cannot jump mentally from the wax to the water 
without going through the intermediate step of the 
flame. 
6 - Answered CA, CB and CC correctly. S affirmed that the 
two pans of water would reach the same temperature as 
long as both candles burned down to their respective 
rubber bands. This question was considerably more 
complex than the previous questions in that the subject 
needed to connect the change in length of the candle to 
the change in temperature of the water, a disconnected 
interaction that added to complexity because the 
intermediate flame must have been considered to some 
degree and both sides of the interaction were apparently 
dynamic. (Note: the pans were insulated to remove the 
complexity of differing heat losses over differing 
times.) None of the tested subjects were able to 
respond correctly to this question. Those who responded 
at all seemed to interpret the question as being the 
same as CB: "Which flame would heat its pan of water 
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faster?" None of the subjects seemed able to bridge 
between the candle and the water. 
3. Ramp Demonstration 
0 - S did not attribute the movement of the box to the 
ball, or did not give any response. S did not seem to 
conceive of an interaction between the ball and box. 
None of the subjects tested fell into this ranking 
because they all attributed the box motion to the ball 
to some degree. 
1 - in transition between 0 and 2. 
2 - S correctly attributed the box's motion to the ball, 
responding in simple, specific terms that focused on 
concrete properties such as shape, size, weight, or 
speed. Weight was considered to be concrete in this 
demonstration when it was being conceived as a property 
associated with any physical object. In the next 
demonstration, weight was considered to be abstract 
because the difference in weight of the two apparently 
identical balls could not be observed directly and the 
balls could only be imagined with different weights if 
they were imagined with different densities. 
S may also have given a simple description of the 
collision, with prominence for the ball in his/her 
description. "Because it hits and it bounces back." 
(Piaget rank: 0). "The ball rolls into the box, hits 
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the back and kind of pushes the back that-a-way." 
(Piaget rank: 2) "It like hits here (pointing to the 
box lip) and trips and then like bounces." (Piaget 
rank: 6) "Because it's high and rolls down." (Piaget 
rank: 2) 
3 - in transition between 2 and 4. For example, the box 
moved because the ball "goes so fast it pushes the whole 
box because it's heavier than the box." I then asked 
this subject, "What if the ball were not heavier than 
the box?" S responded, "It would stay the same. It 
wouldn't push the box." (Piaget rank: 8) This subject 
had some idea of an internal attribute of the ball being 
proportional to the motion of the box, but in a 
dichotomous, black-and-white way, indicating that the 
proportionality was formative. 
4 - S attributed the box's motion to the ball, but 
attributed it to an internal, abstract property of the 
ball using words such as power, strength, force, 
inertia, pressure, and motion (if additional questioning 
ascertained that motion did not just mean speed). S's 
explanation illustrated an understanding of causality 
between this internal, abstract property and the motion 
of the box. S may also have given a mechanistic 
description of the collision that was complex and 
generalized, with an enunciated causality between the 
ball's attributes and the box's motion. 
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4. Balls Demonstration 
0 - S did not attribute the difference in box motion to 
differences between the balls, or did not give any 
response. Various characteristics of the ramp, box or 
the sliding surface may have been invoked. How hard the 
balls were pushed when released or the timing of the 
release may also have been mentioned. "Because they are 
going at different times." (Piaget rank: 2) 
1 - in transition between 0 and 2. 
2 - S correctly attributed the difference in box motion to 
differences in the balls, focusing on surface, concrete 
properties such as their texture, speed or size (even 
though S has previously agreed that the balls are the 
same size. Two subjects did indeed respond that the 
balls must be different sizes). S may also have focused 
on collision mechanics in which the ball properties that 
were mentioned were likewise concrete. "Because one 
isn't as round as the other" (said even after S handled 
the balls). (Piaget rank: 6) If S attributed the 
difference to the composition of the balls, then further 
questioning ascertained that S understood composition to 
be a concrete property. "Metal balls can always push 
further than wooden balls." (Piaget rank: 0) S seems to 
think of composition as a static property influencing 
the collision regardless of associated dimensional or 
weight differences. Subjects were classified with this 
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ranking if they correctly identified weight as the 
distinguishing property of the balls after being given 
the balls and performing the demonstration themselves. 
Being able to directly sense the weight difference was 
considered to make it a concrete property. An 
interesting response of this rank was a subject (Piaget 
rank: 1) who quickly responded to the question with, 
"Because it's heavier; No, I'm joking. Hmmm..., Did 
you start from way up here? (indicating top of ramp). 
Hmmm..., I don't know." I then attempted to get S to 
talk about his response that one ball is heavier, but S 
insisted that it was a joke. I asked, "Why can't that 
be the answer?" "Because they're the same size!" I 
then gave S the two balls, one in each hand. S 
inspected them closely, and noticed that one was 
slightly smaller than the other. S triumphantly 
announced that this difference in size must be 
responsible for the difference in box motion. 
3 - in transition between 2 and 4. "One isn't as round as 
the other." I then demonstrated that the balls were 
equally round. "One could maybe be heavier than the 
other." (Piaget rank: 8) 
4 - S correctly attributed the difference in box motion to 
an internal, abstract property of the balls, such as 
weight, toughness, density or power. If S attributed 
the difference to composition, then further questioning 
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ascertained that S understood a difference in 
composition to imply a difference in weight of the 
balls. S understood the proportional nature of the 
interaction between the balls and box, being able to 
imagine a change in an abstract property of the balls as 
responsible for the change in the distance the box 
slides. 
B. Quantitative Data 
Each of the taped interviews with the forty eight 
subjects was reviewed twice and the following data values 
for each were established according to the preceding 
criteria. Subjects marked with an * were chosen 
non-randomly, as explained previously in the SUBJECTS 
section. 
Table 5.1 Quantitative Data 
NAME PIAGET CANDLES RAMP BALLS 






JON F * 
JAY F 






























































Continued, next page 
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Table 5.1 Continued 
NAME PIAGET CANDLES RAMP BALLS 
JUSTIN K 7 2 2 2 
BEN O'C 0 0 2 2 
JESSICA J * 8 0 2 2 
DAN J 8 2 4 2 
MIKE J * 0 0 2 4 
CHRIS J * 0 0 2 0 
MICHELLE J * 4 0 2 4 
JOSHUA H * 8 0 2 3 
BRIAN F 8 0 4 2 
BEN H 8 6 4 4 
NATALIE L * 8 2 2 4 
JONATHAN L * 4 0 2 2 
OMAR A 4 0 2 3 
REBECCA W 8 4 4 4 
HEATHER W * 8 4 2 2 
LESLIE C 8 0 4 4 
JARED K 0 1 2 4 
MATT B 8 2 2 4 
LAURA M 8 2 2 2 
NICK G 8 0 2 2 
SEAN G 6 2 2 4 
DOUG R 5 1 2 2 
ASHLEY M 6 2 2 2 
MICHAEL GR * 4 0 2 0 
MATT G 6 0 2 2 
ALYSSA K 8 3 2 2 
PATRICK B 8 0 2 3 
KRISTEN K 5 0 4 4 
BRIANA S 0 0 2 4 
JACKIE L 8 0 4 4 
JENNY K * 8 0 4 0 
JEFFREY K 2 0 2 2 
RAYMOND G 7 0 3 4 
MICHAEL H 6 4 4 2 
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CHAPTER VI 
DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The data were first carefully inspected to see if a 
pattern existed whereby subjects were disproportionately 
choosing the first or the second option presented in 
response to a question, a possible indication that they 
were guessing completely, with no idea of a correct 
response. This inspection focused on the energy 
conservation tasks since the Piagetian task questions were 
taken from previous studies that had verified their 
reliability and validity, as previously explained. The 
data inspection was carried out even though the interview 
format of collecting data, in which subjects were asked to 
explain their responses, made it unlikely that guessing 
would go undetected. Furthermore, the intermediate, odd 
values of each continuum were assigned if there were any 
suspicion that the subject was guessing, among other 
reasons. Of 144 (3 x 48 subjects) ratings assigned for 
the energy conservation tasks, only 13 were of these 
intermediate, odd values. Considering that there were 
other reasons than possible guessing for assigning such 
values, it seemed unlikely that such guessing was a factor 
that needed to be considered in the analysis. 
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Nevertheless, being as prudent as possible, the data 
from each of the energy conservation questions was 
inspected. The RAMPS and BALLS questions (RA, BA, BB) did 
not present options from which subjects could choose, 
instead asking for their interpretation of what they had 
observed. The three CANDLES questions (CA, CB, CC) each 
presented subjects with a choice between equality (the 
same will happen to both candles or pans) or difference. 
The questions were worded so that the equality option was 
presented first in questions CA and CC, and the difference 
option was presented first in question CB. Because of 
this reversal of the pattern of options, the pattern of 
choices was symmetrical: on question CA, 35 subjects 
chose the first option and the remaining 13 chose the 
second, while on question CB, 13 chose the first option 
and 35 chose the second. Virtually all subjects chose the 
second option to question CC, meaning they did not 
successfully interpret the situation. Since the most 
likely behavior in complete guessing is to choose the 
first option, it seemed reasonable that guessing was not a 
major issue for this question. 
The data can be inspected to find large-scale 
relationships between the Piagetian understandings and the 
understanding of conservation of energy. Even though the 
data are rank data, they can be artifically dichotomized 
and then compared in layman's terms. The Piaget data are 
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quite easy to dichotomize because of the pattern of 
distribution (see Table 4.2, p. ?): Most of the subjects 
are at either one end of the continuum or the other. 
There are 17 subjects who scored 8 on the Piaget ranking 
scale and who could therefore be considered to understand 
Piagetian conservation. The delineation of which subjects 
adequately understand Piagetian conservation could be 
justifiably increased to include the Piaget rankings of 6 
and 7, thereby including a total of 27 subjects. 
The energy ranking data are more difficult to 
dichotomize. It is necessary to draw a dotted line 
somewhere in the rankings above which a subject is 
considered to "get" or understand conservation of energy 
and below which understanding is considered inadequate. 
The decision is largely subjective. As will be seen in 
the next section that analyzes the data with the help of a 
scattergram, the RAMPS ranking was found to measure an 
understanding that precedes that measured by the CANDLES 
ranking, and the BALLS ranking was found to be largely 
meaningless. The RAMPS demonstration was also designed to 
investigate a pre-requisite understanding (i.e. the idea 
that a thing can be described with an abstract property). 
The CANDLES ranking is thus the arena in which to draw the 
dotted line. The CANDLES ranking of 2 indicated that the 
subject understood the relationship either between the 
candle flame and length of the candle stem or between the 
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candle flame and the temperature of the water being 
heated. The CANDLES ranking of 4 indicated that the 
subject understood both of these relationships, while a 
ranking of 3 indicated that the subject was in transition 
on the way to a ranking of 4. To delineate which subjects 
did or did not understand conservation of energy, a 
conservative dotted line would include CANDLES rankings of 
3 or above. A more generous, yet justifiable delineation 
would include CANDLES rankings of 2 or above. 
Starting with the largest scale delineations, there 
were 27 subjects with a PIAGET ranking of 6 or above. Of 
these, 15 had a CANDLES ranking of 2 or above. So about 
* 
half of the subjects who understood Piagetian conservation 
also understood conservation of energy. From the other 
perspective, there were 17 subjects with a CANDLES ranking 
of 2 or above. Of these, 15 had a PIAGET ranking of 6, 7, 
or 8. So the large majority of the subjects who 
understood coonservation of energy also understood 
Piagetian conservation. These results seems to indicate 
that Piagetian conservation is indeed a pre-requisite for 
conservation of energy. They also indicate that 
conservation of energy is closely linked to Piagetian 
conservation. If conservation of energy develops from 
Piagetian conservation, then there is a process of 
development or mutation from one to the other, and this 
process necessarily takes time. About half the subjects 
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who understood Piagetian conservation were at the stage 
where this understanding had not yet developed into 
conservation of energy. With the other half, more or 
less, Piagetian conservation had developed into 
conservation of energy. Thus theree seem to be two, 
large-scale patterns discernable in the data: About half 
of the subjects who understand Piagetian conservation also 
understand conservation of energy; most subjects who 
understand conservation of energy understand Piagetian 
conservation. 
Zooming to a reduced scale, it is interesting to see 
if these two patterns are still evident. Just looking at 
the 17 subjects who scored 8 on the PIAGET ranking, only 
5, about a third, had a CANDLES ranking of 3 or better. 
It would be expected that a smaller fraction of the 
subjects would demonstrate a more advanced understanding 
of conservation of energy. However, the one-third overlap 
between the two rankings is still a significant indicator 
that conservation of energy does grow out of Piagetian 
conservation. From the other perspective, of the 6 
subjects who had a CANDLES ranking of 3 or higher, 5 had a 
PIAGET ranking of 8 (and the sixth had a PIAGET ranking of 
6). Thus the pattern that Piagetian understanding is a 
pre-requisite for conservation of energy is still strong. 
The easiest way to imagine what this data means is to 
imagine that the subject starts down a straight path of 
225 
conceptual development that is called the Piagetian path. 
The further the subject walks down this path, the greater 
is the understanding of conservation as applied to 
concrete properties. Somewhere along this path, a 
parallel path appears, this parallel path being 
conservation of energy. The two paths run parallel, or 
overlap, for a distance before the Piagetian path peters 
out and the energy path continues on. In proceeding down 
the Piagetian path, some subjects quickly jump over to the 
energy path once it appears. Other subjects continue down 
the Piagetian path and only jump over later (if at all, 
although the present data do not shed light on this 
matter). If you focus on the area where the paths 
overlap, you would expect the number of subjects along the 
conservation of energy path to increase as more and more 
of them jump over from the Piagetian path. So the 
variation along the Piagetian path should correspond to a 
variation along the energy path. Measuring the 
correlations between these two variations should therefore 
provide a good indication of the degree of overlap between 
the two understandings. 
A. Data Analysis Using a Scattergram 
The first stage of quantitative data analysis was to 
use a scattergram to look at the general trends of how the 
Piagetian ranks correlate with the three energy ranks. 
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The order of the energy tasks has been changed from the 
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Figure 6.1 Scattergram of data 
The first trend that the scattergram illustrates is 
that the RAMP and CANDLES demonstrations seem to correlate 
with the Piagetian ones, but that the BALLS demonstration 
does not. The later analysis of correlation coefficients 
will corroborate this visual impression and it will be 
discussed at that time. 
The second trend apparent in the scattergram is that 
the CANDLES demonstration is cognitively more difficult 
than the RAMP demonstration, in that a greater depth of 
Piagetian understanding is generally needed. There are 
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only two subjects who scored less than 2 on the RAMP 
demonstration, whereas there are 31 who scored less than 2 
on the CANDLES demonstration. Even those these two values 
of 2 do not mean the same (since they are rank data), the 
rough comparison is meaningful. In attempting to 
construct a continuum of tasks testing an increasing depth 
of understanding of conservation of energy, the ramp 
demonstration would preceed the candles demonstration. 
There is not sufficient data to establish that these two 
tasks, as broken down into four and six rankings 
respectively, are an perfect sequence, in which the last 
ranking (#4) of the RAMP demonstration precedes the first 
ranking of the CANDLES demonstration. It is actually more 
likely that there is some meshing or overlap, and the 
scattergram does give such an impression. 
Another conclusion that can be made from the diagonal 
pattern of the scattergram (again, ignoring the BALLS 
demonstration) is that the Piagetian understanding 
precedes the understanding of conservation of energy. 
Subjects who had a high ranking for the RAMP and CANDLES 
demonstrations also had high Piagetian rankings, but no 
subject with low Piagetian ranking had a high ranking on 
the two energy demonstrations. This conclusion supports 
the theory and model within which this investigation was 
conducted. The reverse possibility, that the energy 
understanding precedes Piagetian understanding, would 
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imply that children understand proportional causality 
before they understand the various Piagetian conservation 
ideas, an unlikely possibility within the Amalgamated 
Model. 
B. Correlations Among the Four Demonstrations 
The scattergram gives a subjective analysis of the 
data, but a statistical analysis is more precise and 
productive. The second stage of data analysis correlates 
each of the three energy demonstration ranks (Candles, 
Ramp, and Balls), and the Piagetian rank with each of the 
other three, creating a matrix of bi-variate correlations 
of rank data. The proper statistical procedure is thus 
the Spearman correlation and the results are presented in 
Table 6.1 below. The correlation coefficients give a good 
indication of the relationships among the Piagetian rank 
and the energy ranks. The significance of each 
correlation coefficient was also calculated. The 
calculation of the significance factor accounts for the 
uneven distribution of subjects across the eight Piagetian 
stages. 
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Table 6.1 Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
PIAGET CANDLES RAMP BALLS 

























This matrix is symmetrical about the diagonal because 
the correlation coefficients are measuring the degree to 
which the variation in one variable indicates the 
variation in another. Although this mathematical symmetry 
gives no indication of the possible direction of 
correlation (i.e. a before-after relationship), the 
scattergram established that the Piagetian understandings 
precede the conservation of energy understandings. The 
issue then arises whether the Piagetian understandings 
CAUSE the understanding of conservation of energy or 
whether it is merely a correlation, with the possibility 
that a third causal agent is responsible for both changes 
that then only appear to be linked. This issue of 
causality versus correlation becomes thorny in the realm 
of cognitive psychology. A causality is usually 
distinguished from a correlation in that two changes in 
properties can be connected through casual links that are 
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each based on independent principles and laws that 
accurately predict the subsequent link. Cognitive 
psychology, and even more neurobiology, is a long way from 
establishing such principles and laws, and therefore 
strict causality is a moot issue. On the other hand, the 
correlations that are generated do have a strong flavor of 
casuality because they are directional; there is a before- 
after relationship that is also a criterion of a 
causality. A pure correlation, as indicated in the 
symmetry of the above chart of correlation coefficients, 
can be interpreted in either direction. In any case, the 
conservative approach to data analysis is to use 
correlational statistics that make no assumptions about 
direction. 
If the understandings being tested by the Piagetian 
tasks and the energy demonstrations were the same, then 
the correlations between them would be extremely high. 
Since understanding evolves out of previous understanding, 
then the overlap of these evolutionary steps is indicated 
by the degree of correlation between them. Thus the 
correlations can be used to gauge the overlap of each of 
the understandings tested by the energy demonstrations 
with the understandings tested by the Piagetian 
demonstrations. If there is no overlap between two 
understandings, for example if one is an absolute 
pre-requisite for the other, then the correlation between 
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them will be insignificantly low. For example, Piagetian 
understandings might be a pre-requisite for understanding 
moments of inertia, but the variation in subjects' 
understanding of moments of inertia would have little 
correlation with the variation in their understanding of 
Piagetian conservation tasks. 
As stated at the beginning of Chapter V: 
OBSERVATIONS AND DATA, the first goal of this 
investigation was to establish a continuum scale of 
conceptual understanding of the conservation of energy 
concept, defined as proportional causality during an 
interactive process. Looking across the first row of the 
above chart at the correlations of the Piagetian rank with 
the three energy demonstrations shows the highest 
correlation, with a high degree of significance (.001, 
meaning that there is a one in thousand possibility that 
the result is spurious), with the RAMP demonstration. 
(The level of statistical significance generally accepted 
by educational researchers as a basis for judging a 
hypothesis is .05; see Clowes and Davis, 1982.) 19% of 
the variation (the square of the coefficient) of students' 
understanding of this demonstration can be explained by 
their understanding of the Piagetian demonstrations. 
Certainly this correlation is low enough to conclude that 
the two understandings are not the same; the 
demonstrations are testing different understandings. 
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However, within the context of this research, with its 
myriad uncontrollable variables, a 19% explanatory level 
is high enough that it would seem to lead to the 
conclusion that there is a real overlap between the two. 
In other words, it would seem as though the understanding 
of the RAMPS demonstration grows out of the understanding 
of Piagetian conservation tasks. 
Again looking across the top row of the chart of 
correlations, the next highest correlation, also highly 
significant, with the Piagetian tests is the CANDLES 
demonstration. Squaring the correlation coefficient of 
.3696 gives an explanatory level of 14%. This overlap is 
not as great as it is for the RAMPS demonstration, 
indicating that the CANDLES demonstration is testing an 
understanding that is more removed from that being tested 
by the Piagetian tasks, and thus more difficult 
conceptually. The understandings being tested by the RAMP 
and CANDLES demonstrations are also quite different from 
each other, as indicated by the low correlation between 
them (.2 at level of significance of .085). 
What could be different between the two 
understandings being tested by the RAMPS and CANDLES 
demonstrations? In the RAMPS demonstration, subjects were 
asked to explain why the box moved when the moving ball 
entered it. They were being tested on their understanding 
of causality and interaction. They did not need to know 
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much if anything about proportionality to see a causal 
link between the ball's motion and the box's motion. On 
the other hand, the CANDLES demonstration required a focus 
on the proportionality of a causality. Thus the 
difference is that the CANDLES demonstration is a more 
complex task. 
The distinction between simple casuality and 
proportional causality is a cornerstone of this 
investigation. The manner in which these two 
demonstrations elucidate these understandings is 
important. Conservation of energy can only be observed 
during an interaction. All interactions occur between two 
or more entities, or systems. During any interaction, 
properties of the interacting systems change. The first 
step to understanding an interaction, and thus 
understanding conservation of energy, would seem to be to 
identify the entities or systems that are interacting. In 
the RAMPS demonstration, subjects were asked, "Why did the 
box move?" rather than, "Why did the ball move the box?" 
in order to establish whether they could identify the ball 
as one of the interacting things, even though it was 
hidden from view inside the box when the collision 
interaction actually occured. (Subjects who understood to 
this level were given the ranking of 2 in the RAMPS 
demonstration). The second step in understanding an 
interaction is to identify the properties of the 
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interacting things that change during the interaction. A 
RAMPS ranking of 4 was given if a subject imagined some 
internal, abstract property of the ball as responsible for 
the box's motion. Those subjects who only invoked 
concrete, easily observable properties of the ball such as 
size or speed were judged to be focusing on just the ball 
as an entity, as a causal agent. They were not considered 
to understand that properties of interacting systems 
change. Although this is a conservative judgement, it is 
difficult to indicate or identify an entity without 
mentioning at least some of its concrete properties, and 
the property words being used could be only labels akin to 
a name in the subject's mind. Furthermore, in 
investigating conservation of energy, the various energy 
forms are internal, abstract properties of entities and it 
is the ability to imagine properties at this more abstract 
level that is of interest. This ability also forms a 
distinct incremental step along a continuum of conceptual 
understanding built according to increasing abstractness. 
The third step in understanding an interaction is to see 
that the changes in the properties of the interacting 
entities are proportional. The CANDLES demonstration 
investigates the understanding of proportionality. Of 
course, an understanding of properties, as investigated 
with the RAMPS demonstration, is a necessary 
pre-requisite. For example, at the moment when subjects 
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were asked to predict how the flames would heat the two 
pans of water, they actually could not see the water in 
the pans, in the same way that they could not see the ball 
inside the box when it collided during the RAMPS 
demonstration. Subjects who could not imagine the hidden 
ball interacting with the box would be unlikely to imagine 
the flame interacting with the hidden water. As a pre¬ 
requisite there is little overlap, in that a variation in 
a subject's understanding of one (i.e. causality) does not 
lead to a variation in an understanding in the other (i.e. 
proportionality). Such is the definition of a low 
correlation, and thus the low correlation between the RAMP 
and CANDLES demonstrations is explained. 
The correlations that were surprising were those 
associated with the BALLS demonstration. The scattergram 
of the data presented at the beginning of this analysis 
gave the visual impression that there was little if any 
relationship between this demonstration's rankings and the 
Piagetian rankings. As can be seen from the chart of 
correlation coefficients, the BALLS demonstration does not 
correlate to any significant degree with any of the other 
demonstrations. In designing the three energy 
demonstrations, this one was hypothesized to be furthest 
up the continuum of conceptual difficulty for two reasons. 
The first was that it is complex, in that subjects must 
supposedly understand a proportional causality in which 
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variation is occurring on both sides of the interaction. 
As described before, in the CANDLES demonstration the 
static size of the flame is "freezing" the process of 
thermal energy emission so that the subject need only 
conceptualize a variation on one side of the interaction. 
In the BALLS demonstration, some variation in the balls 
must be linked to the variation in sliding distance of the 
box. The second reason for its supposed difficulty is its 
abstractness. The variation in the balls' weight is 
hidden, and imagining the variation requires some idea of 
density. No significant correlation was expected between 
the BALLS demonstration and the Piaget demonstrations 
because it was supposedly testing an understanding 
sufficiently removed from them that there would not be a 
significant overlap. Likewise, no significant correlation 
with the RAMPS demonstration was expected (even though 
superficially they seem to be very similar) because the 
understandings being investigated were far apart on a 
continuum of conceptual difficulty. Yet, if all such 
hypothesizing had been on target, there should have been a 
significant correlation between the CANDLES and BALLS 
demonstrations because of the overlap in understandings. 
Yet of the 48 subjects tested, 22 of them had no problem 
identifying weight difference as the cause of the box's 
sliding variation, and there was little correlation 
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between their ability to so answer and their responses on 
any of the other demonstrations. 
How to explain such a finding? A solid answer must 
await further research, but it might be that in actuality 
the BALLS demonstration is highly general, in that it 
applies to a great many situations that are very familiar 
even to young children. This high generality compensated 
for its supposed complexity and abstractness. It seems 
reasonable that the vast majority of children have many, 
many experiences with collisions from a very early age. 
Anyone with young children is familiar with their tendency 
to explore their environments by throwing things, and the 
resulting collisions seem to be a source of entertainment. 
Children have things thrown at them as well, particularly 
if they have siblings. The experience that heavy things, 
regardless of size, inflict more damage during a collision 
than light things would constitute a highly general idea 
since it would thus be based on many experiences and 
observations. A subject being asked to interpret the 
BALLS demonstration might well not need to hypothesize or 
generalize, but merely describe a well learned pattern of 
observations. Perhaps the BALLS demonstration is akin to 
investigating children’s ideas about gravity by asking 
them to predict what would happen if you let go of an item 
held above the floor. They would correctly describe the 
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phenomenon from experience, but it would indicate little 
about their understanding of gravity. 
The second stage of data analysis consisted of a 
multiple regression to ascertain the total correlation 
between the energy demonstrations and the Piagetian tasks. 
This calculation was intended to demonstrate the degree of 
linkage, or overlap, between the understandings being 
tested by these two sets of demonstrations. 
Unfortunately, the data generated by this investigation, 
as discussed at the beginning of the DATA section above, 
are rank data and thus non-parametric. Strictly speaking, 
a multiple regression analysis can only be applied to 
parametric data, and the correlations generated with rank 
data will not be entirely accurate. However, as the 
results in Table 6.2 below show, the difference is slight. 
Table 6.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Dependent variable: PIAGET RANK 
Influence Spearman Multiple Adjusted 
Variable Correlation Correlation (R) R squared Sig 
1. RAMP .4394 .44914 .18437 .0014 
2. CANDLES .3696 .52882 .24764 .0006 
3. BALLS .2047 .55021 .25519 .0011 
The degree of inaccuracy introduced by using a 
multiple regression on non-parametric data can be gauged 
by comparing the Spearman correlation, which is 
non-parametrie, with the multiple regression correlation 
of the first step. Being the first step of the 
regression, it is actually just a bi-variate correlation 
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between the Piaget and RAMP demonstrations. As can be 
seen, the difference between the non-parametric and 
parametric calculations of this correlation (.44914 vs. 
.4394) is insignificant. The adjusted R-squared value 
given in the table above includes a compensation for the 
number of influence variables used in a multiple 
regression. It adjusts for the effect of adding 
additional variables into the regression and getting an 
increased correlation merely because of more influence 
variables being considered. 
When the regression analysis includes both the RAMP 
and CANDLES demonstrations, the adjusted R-square becomes 
.24764, indicating that 25% of the variation in the 
subject's understanding of these two demonstrations can be 
linked to the variation in their understanding of the 
Piagetian tasks. The BALLS demonstration does not add 
significantly to the multiple regression correlation, as 
would be expected from its low bi-variate correlations. 
The 25% linkage between the Piaget demonstrations on one 
hand and the RAMP and CANDLES demonstrations on the other 
hand would seem to be a significant finding, particularly 
in light of the fact that the understandings represented 
by each are expected to be on a continuum. As such, their 
overlap would not be complete and their linkage would not 
be expected to be 100%. It would therefore seem 
justified, for at least the 48 subjects tested, to accept 
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the hypothesis of this investigation: The ability of 
children aged five to twelve to conserve discontinuous 
quantity, discontinuous substance, weight, and volume, as 
assessed using classical Piagetian clinical interviews 
about instances, will correlate positively with their 
ability to understand proportional causality during 
interactive processes that an adult would consider 
illustrations of energy being transferred and transformed, 
as assessed in clinical interviews about instances. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RECOMMENDATIONS, DISCUSSION, AND SUMMARY 
The introductory chapters of this dissertation began 
discussion at the national level and then reduced focus to 
smaller and smaller scales. This final chapter will 
reverse the direction and start discussion at the smallest 
scale by resuming the discussion from where the conclusion 
of the previous investigation left off. It will begin by 
discussing methodological details of the investigation, 
and progress to the largest scale of the national 
implications of the investigation's results. 
A. Possible Modifications of the Investigative Procedure 
There are five possible modifications of the 
experimental method that could result in more robust data. 
The first three recommendations concern the CANDLES 
demonstration. The fourth concerns a replacement for the 
BALLS demonstration, and the fifth is an overall 
recommendation on replacing clinical interviews. 
In the CANDLES demonstration, all conditions were 
equal except flame size of the two candles, yet it was 
necessary to distinguish between the two candles orally in 
order for the audio tapes to be of maximum utility. The 
only way to distinguish between the two candles in 
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discussion with the subject was to refer to "the candle 
with the big flame" or "the one with the small flame." 
The use of the big - small terms might have had some 
influence on subjects' thinking since they are value terms 
and subjects were being asked to contrast how the changing 
values of properties were related. To dispose of this 
possibility, the candles could be made of different 
colored waxes, and then they could be referred to 
accordingly. 
The second modification of the CANDLES demonstration 
would be to cover the two pans of water while they were 
being heated. The pans had been insulated to prevent 
subjects from feeling the need to consider heat losses 
from the water to the environment, and covering the pans 
would probably augment this isolation of the system. The 
subjects should still be involved in pouring the water 
into the pans and thereby observing the water directly. 
However, the change in water temperature cannot be 
observed directly and therefore is a hidden, inferred, and 
therefore abstract, change. The amount of water that was 
put in each pan during the interviews only filled them 
about half full, and the perspective was such that 
subjects sitting opposite the pans could not see the water 
anyway. Putting covers on the pans should not change this 
degree of abstraction. However, the covers might give a 
strong implication to subjects that "no heat escapes" from 
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the water in the pans, thus helping them to concentrate on 
the interaction between the flame and water. 
The third modification of the CANDLES demonstration 
would be to add an instance at the beginning. Namely, 
start with a single, thin birthday candle that, when lit, 
quickly and visibly burns down. The subject would be 
asked, "Why does the candle get shorter?" This instance 
should test an understanding very similar to the RAMPS 
understanding. What is being asked about is the causality 
between the flame and the candle wax, just as the RAMPS 
demonstration asks about the causality between the ball 
and box. A proportionality is not being investigated. 
The causality between the flame and candle is somewhat 
more abstract than between the ball and box because there 
is no apparent change in the flame to correspond with the 
change in the length of the candle stem. Nevertheless, 
the two understandings should be close enough that a high 
correlation between the two would be anticipated. The 
analytical methods developed for this investigation 
predict that there would be a high correlation 
coefficient, approaching one, between two instances 
testing the same or very similar understandings. Yet the 
investigation that was carried out did not test this 
particular question. 
The fourth modification is that a replacement for the 
BALLS demonstration is needed. What is needed is a 
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clearly interactive process that contains a proportional 
causality in which there is a variation of property values 
on both sides of the interaction, but one of the 
variations is hidden. The process should also be 
unfamiliar so that children cannot respond purely from 
rote memory of experience, as seemed to have occured in 
the BALLS demonstration. Perhaps a bow and arrow 
demonstration would be suitable. There is a clear 
interaction between the drawn bow and the projected arrow. 
There is a proportionality between the elastic energy 
contained in the bow and the distance the arrow flies. To 
hide a variation in the bow's elastic energy, two 
identical bows could be obtained and one of them somehow 
modified to increase its spring constant, or coefficient 
of elasticity. When drawn to the same extension, the 
modified bow would send the arrow visibly further than the 
unmodified bow. Using the same theme, other possibilites 
exist, too. Keeping the basic idea of working with a 
process in which elastic energy is converted into kinetic 
energy, a spring-loaded toy that shot a projectile could 
probably be modified so that two different springs, 
usually hidden inside the toy, could be used. However, 
spring-loaded toys are directly familiar to many children 
and the danger would exist that they would respond from 
rote memory of personal experience. Bows and arrows are 
also familiar to children, but generally from a distance 
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through pictures or movies. Not many children have much 
direct experience with archery. 
The last modification pertains to older subjects, 
from about nine years old, who can write. The 
recommendation would be to replace the clinical interview 
with a presentation in front of a large group, on the 
order of a class of students, who would then respond in 
writing. Much more data could be acquired in this manner 
with little sacrifice of reliability. I attempted a 
prototype of this approach with 120 seventh graders and 30 
eighth graders. It was successful enough to be warrant 
pursuing. The large amounts of data acquired in this way 
would make the statistical analysis much more compelling. 
B. Discussion of the Experimental Method and Analysis 
The investigation that was carried out proposes an 
objective method of mapping conceptual development, or 
intellectual maturation. It is based on three premises: 
that future understanding grows from past understanding, 
that intellectual maturation can be described in terms of 
a growing conceptual structure, and that this growth can 
be described with the three parameters of generality, 
complexity, and abstractness. 
Describing continua of increasing understanding using 
these three parameters borrows the Piagetian emphasis on 
sequencing of understandings. The investigative method 
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proposes using the Piagetian understandings and sequences 
as the root-stock, so to speak. The understandings that 
grow from this root-stock will overlap it to some degree, 
and the overlap can be measured using the correlational 
statistics presented in this investigation. The 
statistical approach depends upon defining numerical 
rankings of understandings that, compared according to 
generality, complexity, and abstractness, are of 
increasing difficulty. Although this investigation 
demonstrated how this statistical approach could be used, 
a much larger body of data would be needed to ascertain 
just how rankings from two different understandings (e.g. 
as in the Piagetian conservation and conservation of 
energy understandings) meshed. 
The degree of overlap and meshing of rankings from 
two different understandings would also depend upon the 
"spacing" between the defined numerical ranks. As rank 
data, there is no assumption about how much difference in 
understanding, or difference in difficulty, there is 
between adjacent values. These differences can be 
described and anticipated using the three parameters, but 
experimental data is needed to guide the application of 
these parameters to particular understandings. Different 
spacing between defined rankings of two understandings 
will produce a difference in the values of the 
correlational coefficients. For example, the Piagetian 
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rankings could be made more fine-grained by using 
teechniques where the modification of the the clay ball is 
done in three successive and increasingly radical steps, 
the subjects being asked the appropriate conservation 
question after each modification (Stuck and Wyne, 1970). 
Rankings that reflect only slight differences in 
understanding might well be washed out in the expected 
variations among individuals’ idiosyncratic details of 
conceptual growth. In such a case, the correlational 
coefficients produced from a large number of subjects 
would produce no pattern of decreasing values (assuming 
that some overlap were present and the coefficients were 
of a reasonable value). Conversely, rankings that reflect 
large differences in understanding might stretch so far 
before or beyond the understandings with which they are 
being correlated that no significant correlation would be 
found. In such large-scale views, the sequential links of 
understanding - engendering - understanding cannot be 
delineated and the correlational coefficients would be 
very low. 
The three parameters of generality, complexity, and 
abstractness can be used to choose adjacent understandings 
where one would be expected to grow from the other. The 
conceptual structure of physical science concepts 
presented in Appendix G is just such an effort. The 
theory associated with these parameters can also be used 
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to choose and design instances for each of the adjacent 
understandings that can be compared, numerically ranked, 
and then presented to subjects. The experimental results 
will tell much about how these three parameters interact 
within the human intellect. For example, the BALLS 
demonstration was anticipated to be more difficult than 
the CANDLES or RAMP demonstrations because of its high 
complexity and abstractness, but the investigation showed 
this hypothesis to be wrong. Returning to theory to 
explain the experimental finding, its high generality was 
probably responsible for the result. Perhaps generality 
is a more powerful parameter than the other two in 
dictating the growth of a person's conceptual structure. 
It would then be possible to design another experiment in 
which this new hypothesis could be tested. In order to 
choose and design processes to present to subjects for 
such additional experimentation, the theory presented as 
part of the Amalgamated Model in Appendices B through F 
would identify and characterize the criterial attributes 
of the pertinent concepts, allowing an objective analysis 
and design of instances as was carried out in this 
investigation. 
As just described, a continuum of instances could be 
experimentally verified as testing increasing 
understanding of a particular concept through the 
technique of measuring its overlap with a preceding 
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conceptual understanding and measuring the conceptual 
distance of each instance from this preceding 
understanding. Once such a continuum of instances were 
established, it could be used for two other purposes. It 
could be used on its own to test degrees of understanding 
of the concept, becoming the basis for controlled 
experiments on the efficacy of curricular or instructional 
treatments. It could also be used as the basis for 
correlation with understandings that it itself engenders, 
extending in a leap-frog fashion further into the 
conceptual structure and providing a means of mapping the 
conceptual structure. 
If such mapping were to become an accepted technique 
of investigation, there would be a question of how 
reliable each mapped step would be. The analysis of the 
data produced by the investigation reported herein judged 
that an explanatory level, calculated with a multiple 
regression, of 25% between the two understandings 
constituted a significant overlap. Is this judgement 
justified? Is this degree of overlap sufficient to 
conclude that one understanding grows out of the other? 
Even if other understandings contribute to the growth, is 
a 25% multiple regression correlation enough to link two 
understandings? Certainly a mid-range correlation is 
expected between linked but sequential understandings, 
since a too-high correlation means that the two 
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understandings are the same, and a too-low correlation 
means that the two understandings are not directly linked. 
A great deal of additional experimentation is needed to 
establish what levels of correlation are to be expected. 
Some kinds of standards or benchmarks, or at least a body 
of prior experimental results, are needed in order to 
produce more reliable interpretations of the statistical 
results and a reliable conceptual map. 
Any effort to map a conceptual structure much beyond 
Piagetian understandings would quickly confront the issue 
of natural, or uninstructed, acquisition of concepts 
versus instructed acquisition. Certainly the majority of 
the concepts and sequences investigated by Piaget are 
acquired independent of instruction, and as such they are 
excellent conceptual "root-stock," as already described. 
However, in the course of the investigation of 
conservation of energy, I had occasion to test several 
adults. I found that some of them did not have a very 
deep understanding of conservation of energy. Thus there 
is a strong possibility that conservation of energy might 
not be understood even rudimentarily by some adults unless 
they have been educated accordingly. Furthermore, most of 
the concepts in physical science delineated in Appendix G 
could not be realistically expected to be acquired without 
some instruction. 
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At the smallest scale, the first implication is that 
the understanding of conservation of energy of the 
subjects tested in this investigation should be compared 
with the understanding of adults. The purpose would be to 
discover what level of natural understanding could be 
expected. It should be possible to establish a standard 
by testing adults who have not received corresponding 
instruction at any time or who received minimal 
instruction many years prior and have little memory of it. 
An important question elicited by this issue is 
whether differences in curriculum and instruction produce 
differences in the actual conceptual structure, or whether 
the educational differences only produce differences in 
how quickly or easily similar or near-equal conceptual 
structures are intellectually built by individuals. Of 
course, a combination of the two is also possible. The 
answer must await considerable experimentation. However, 
it is unlikely that substantially different conceptual 
structures, as analyzed according to generality, 
complexity, and abstractness, are created by different 
individuals for a myriad of reasons contained throughout 
Appendices B through F. 
Whichever possibility turns out to be the case, 
investigations of conceptual structure will necessarily 
have to consider the educational experience of the 
subjects. Subjects who have learned a particular concept 
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well enough to carry out flexible, inquiry-based problem 
solving would be considered to understand it deeply, and 
the overlap of their understanding with their 
understanding of preceding concepts could be measured, as 
could their understanding of the concept itself as 
previously described. 
Once investigation enters the realm of concepts that 
must be overtly learned, the effect of different 
curricular and instructional treatments can be measured. 
The first step would be to ascertain whether subjects who 
learned flexible, inquiry-based problem solving under very 
different curricular and instructional regimens had built 
different conceptual structures. Even if substantially 
different structures do exist and do equally support 
problem solving ability, partial or shallow understanding 
could then be investigated using the instances that were 
shown to mirror the deep understanding of the accomplished 
students. 
C. Implications for American Science Education 
In comparing the structure of physical science 
concepts predicted by the Amalgamated Model with the 
conceptual structure inherent in conventional physical 
science curricula, the greatest divergence was in the 
placement and treatment of the conservation of energy 
concept. As the point of greatest divergence, it would 
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constitute the most arduous test of the Amalgamated Model. 
Thus the investigation that was reported in this 
dissertation focused on children's understanding of 
conservation of energy. The Amalgamated Model predicted 
that this concept could be learned at an early age and was 
closely associated with the classical Piagetian 
conservation concepts. It also predicted that its high 
generality would make it a very useful tool for flexible, 
inquiry-based problem solving. Conventional curricula 
assume that conservation of energy is an inherently 
difficult concept that requires a fair degree of 
intellectual sophistication to understand. Furthermore, 
it is usually presented as one more law of mechanics, 
wherein Newton's laws are given the greatest emphasis. 
The investigation of children's understanding 
verified to some degree that conservation of energy is a 
concept available to young children and that it is closely 
associated with the classical Piagetian conservation 
concepts. This result should be interpreted to mean that 
so far the Amalgamated Model has been shown not to be 
incorrect. Whether it can be accepted as a viable 
predictor of overall conceptual growth and understanding 
is another matter that must await considerable more 
research as described at length above. Yet at least the 
first step in this direction has been positive. 
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Perhaps of greater significance than the actual 
investigation of conservation of energy is the formulation 
of a quantitative method of characterizing and mapping 
conceptual structures and growth. It is a short step from 
such characterizing and mapping to the designing of 
curriculum, instruction and evaluation to enhance the 
learning of concepts. For the large majority of physical 
science concepts that cannot be acquired spontaneously or 
naturally and must be learned through instruction, the 
ability to carry out flexible inquiry-based problem 
solving is considered emblematic of a desirable conceptual 
structure and understanding. Therefore, curriculum and 
instruction that are designed according to such conceptual 
structures should be quite effective at inducing the 
ability. 
The Amalgamated Model was formulated as a basis for 
improving science education in America. The goal of this 
improvement was defined as the ability of all students to 
carry out flexible, inquiry-based problem solving. One of 
the two components needed for an effective science program 
aimed at such a goal was considered to be a conceptual 
structure that mirrored how students learn intellectually. 
In light of the investigation described herein, the 
Amalgamated Model should be considered a serious candidate 
for developing such a conceptual structure. 
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Included within the Amalgamated Model was also the 
second component: a means of accommodating curriculum to 
learning theory, and a means of accommodating instruction 
and evaluation to the student, classroom, teacher, school 
sind community. The impediments to instituting this second 
component are primarily organizational. On both counts 
the Amalgamated Model could provide the vehicle for moving 
science education towards the goals from which our country 
could so benefit. 
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APPENDIX A 
STUDENT LEARNING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
FOR K-12 SCIENCE EDUCATION 
Goals are clear directions. They are inherently 
open-ended. There is no ultimate accomplishment beyond 
which improvement is impossible or trivial. Goals are 
directions just as, say. East is a direction, and, just as 
it is impossible to reach East, so it is impossible to 
reach a goal. It is the voyage that counts, not the 
destination. How clearly the desired direction appears to 
the voyagers can be judged by how clearly progress from 
milestone to milestone can be measured. The more clearly 
the path is marked, the more clearly do students see the 
direction. The milestones are generally known as 
objectives, and thus the objectives embody the goals, and 
the goals are only as good as the sum of the objectives. 
The following two goals provide direction for 
intellectual outcomes. Goals in the affective and 
motor/sensory categories can and should also be defined 
similarly. However, the goals in these two categories are 
the means, necessary and essential, but nevertheless 
means, towards the ends of the intellectual goals. What 
is essential is that explicit goals in these categories 
exist; it is not essential what they are. Local 
257 
communities have a sizable responsibility for defining 
these goals and ensuring a balance between the 
intellectual, motor/sensory, and affective goals of 
science education. 
1) STUDENTS WILL UNDERSTAND THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE 
PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 
as evidenced by their ability to 
2) DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBLE, INQUIRY-BASED, PROBLEM SOLVING. 
A. Student Performance Objectives Associated with Each of 
the Student Learning Goals 
Objectives are concrete destinations for learning. 
They are the observable milestones that lead in the 
direction of the goals. As such, some are further along 
than others. Some of the milestone behaviors are closer 
to the beginning, and some are far in the distance for 
most students. I attempted to list the objectives in an 
ascending pattern, so that behavior more or less builds on 
behavior. More experienced and older students would be 
demonstrating behaviors (i.e. attaining objectives) 
further along towards the goal. As with actual 
milestones, a large part of their meaning is derived from 
the context of surrounding objectives and the goals. The 
objectives should be judged as a whole, as a coherent 
mapping of a journey in a direction. 
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GOAL 1: STUDENTS WILL UNDERSTAND THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE 
BIOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES. 
The following abilities are specific to the 
meaningful, as opposed to rote, understanding of concepts. 
The student will be able to: 
1) Identify which of the basic concepts would be most 
productive for addressing a particular question. 
2) Identify if, and compare to what degree, each of the 
basic concepts would contribute productive insights 
when applied to a particular question or part of a 
question. 
3) Choose the most appropriate sub-concept(s), 
principle(s) or idea(s) to a particular question at 
one of the levels of understanding outlined by Bloom's 
Taxonomy. 
4) Using a pre-determined sequence, apply the appropriate 
basic concept, sub-concept(s), principled) or idea(s) 
to address a particular question at one of the levels 
of understanding, realizing that there are many 
possible, alternate pathways. 
5) Productively apply the basic concepts to a wide 
variety of phenomena, familiar as well as unfamiliar. 
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GOAL 2: STUDENTS WILL DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBLE, INQUIRY-BASED, 
PROBLEM SOLVING. 
The specific competencies indicated by the three key words 
will be demonstrated if students can: 
FLEXIBLE: 
1) Apply problem solving to a wide variety of phenomena, 
familiar as well as unfamiliar. 
2) Access information from standard sources 
(instructions, texts, books, lectures, libraries, 
periodicals, computer databases, A-V media, 
interviews), judge for relevance and appropriate depth 
of development, and draw reasonable conclusions. 
3) Express the answer to a question at varying levels of 
sophistication. 
4) Recall the standard core of factual knowledge in each 
of the disciplines of science (earth science, biology, 
chemistry, physics) that forms the common reference 
and context for discussion in today's society. 
INQUIRY-BASED: 
5) demonstrate scientific curiosity by initiating 
rational questions in any of the scientific 
disciplines. 
6) Formulate questions in a coherent manner that 
incorporates an indication of the direction, manner 
and/or field of inquiry. 
7) Investigate phenomena through free-form exploration 
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and trial-and-error. 
8) Carry out a controlled, laboratory investigation 
using classical scientific methodology and 
manipulating equipment appropriately. 
PROBLEM SOLVING: 
As problem solving is the most complex, all-inclusive 
thinking skill, students will demonstrate problem solving 
if they can carry out the component skills and strategies 
as listed below, can choose which ones to use and when to 
use them, and apply them in a pre- determined sequence to 
arrive at a solution. The skills are listed in an order 
below that encompasses the general intellectual skills of 
information, comprehension, application, analysis, 
synthesis and evaluation (i.e. Bloom's Taxonomy). 
Instructionally, these skills will be taught and learned, 
regardless of their listed order, as the context dictates. 
9) Observe, record and classify observations. 
10) Compare observations by detailing similarities, 
differences, and by interpreting and establishing 
analogies. 
11) Comprehend ideas, as evidenced by the ability to 
summarize them in writing, orally, through pictures 
and diagrams, graphically and mathematically. 
12) Apply the basic concepts of physical and biological 
science to a wide variety of phenomena in a wide 
variety of contexts. 
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13) Identify assumptions, limitations and connections to 
other ideas when considering a particular application 
of a basic concept. 
14) Identify cause-and-effeet relationships and temporal 
sequences within a process. 
15) Analyze a question by dividing it into parts, each 
of which can be fruitfully addressed by the 
application of a basic concept, and, through such 
consideration of the parts, make deductions about the 
original question. 
16) Synthesize several aspects of a question into a 
unifying explanation, (i.e. demonstrate the skill of 
induction.) 
17) Develop hypotheses and predictions, develop 
experiments to test them, and analyze and synthesize 
the results to evaluate the hypothesis. 
18) Evaluate conclusions as to their correctness. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCEPTS TO SCIENCE CURRICULUM 
"A fundamental tenet of developing effective teaching 
methods is that instruction SHOULD reflect what is known 
about learning" (Jones et al, 1987, p. 3). Not only does 
this fundamental tenet apply to instruction, but it is 
equally true for curriculum. If science curriculum should 
be designed according to how students learn, then the 
first step is to understand how students learn. Such a 
pursuit leads to the field that investigates intellectual 
learning, i.e. educational cognitive psychology. This 
field is dynamic and contentious at its cutting edge, yet 
there is broad agreement among its experts about some 
fundamentals of the field. It is vitally important to 
identify these areas of broad agreement in order to use 
them as a basis for curriculum design in science. 
First, the analysis will elaborate on why effective 
science curriculum needs to be based upon a psychological 
theory of intellectual learning, succinctly referred to as 
learning theory. This appendix will establish the context 
for such a study, discussing the reasons for the chosen 
directions of inquiry. The writings of six major learning 
theorists are then synthesized in appendices C through F, 
finding clear agreement that concepts are the units 
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manipulated by the mind during intellectual learning. Of 
greatest interest to these theorists is the 
inter-organization and intra-structure of concepts, both 
critically important to curriculum design. Since 
"cognitive structure itself tends to be hierarchically 
organized with respect to level of abstraction, 
generality, and inclusiveness of ideas" (Ausubel et al., 
1978, p. 58), three attributes of concepts are derived: 
generality in Appendix C, complexity in Appendices D and 
E, and abstractness in Appendix F. Various concepts from 
the physical sciences are analyzed and rated according to 
each of these three attributes. The analyses can become 
quite convoluted, and therefore it is probably a good idea 
for the reader to refer ahead to Appendix G, where a 
summarizing structure is presented in a chart. In this 
chart the three attributes together are used to rate and 
organize physical science concepts into a structure useful 
to the curriculum designer, constructing a conceptual 
structure for the physical sciences. Concept maps are 
also used to describe some of the concepts that are 
analyzed, particularly those that are somewhat novel to 
science curriculum. 
Throughout the analysis, several terms will be used 
to refer to types of mental constructs used 
intellectually. Idea refers to any type of intellectual 
mental construct. Terms such as fact, concept and 
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principle refer to types of ideas and will be defined when 
appropriate. 
A. Curriculum Should Reflect Learning Theory 
It would seem patronizing to propose that curriculum 
should reflect learning theory if the present state of 
science curriculum did not ignore it so blatantly. This 
said, it should also be pointed out that when it comes to 
instruction, there is recognition that learning theory is 
important. Excellent examples are Hunter's (1982) theory 
of Mastery Teaching, or the substantial body of research 
dealing with students' scientific misconceptions. The 
emphasis of the science education reform movement on 
process skills and hands-on involvement is a direct 
application of learning theory to instruction. But on the 
curriculum side very little is happening, and since 
curriculum necessarily precedes instruction, the efforts 
at improving instruction are severely limited in their 
effectiveness. 
As science educators, scientists, government and 
business leaders, and other concerned persons are 
again considering the reformulation of science 
education,... one theme frequently emphasized is that 
students need to acquire a thorough knowledge of 
fundamental scientific ideas from their science 
learning experiences in elementary and secondary 
schools. The degree of agreement on high school 
graduates' need for science knowledge is high, at 
least in principle. Nevertheless the thoughtful 
people and groups making general pronouncements have 
rarely given sufficient attention to either the 
nature of the knowledge students need or the design 
of science instruction that will help the students 
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acquire that knowledge. (Klopfer, Champagne and 
Chaiklin, 1992, p. 597) 
The nature of knowledge is the province of learning 
theory, and its place in education is in curriculum. It 
becomes vitally important that the difference between 
curriculum and instruction be understood so that a 
necessary, presently missing ingredient of the present 
reform efforts be added. The explanation of the 
Amalgamated Model in Chapter Two of this dissertation 
dealt at length with the distinctions among curriculum, 
instruction, and evaluation. 
In summary, curriculum is a structured series of 
intended learning outcomes. Curriculum prescribes (or 
at least anticipates) the results of instruction. It 
does not prescribe the means, i.e., the activities, 
materials, or even the instructional content, to be 
used in achieving the results. In specifying 
outcomes to be sought, curriculum is concerned with 
ends, but at the level of attainable learning 
products, not at the more remote level at which these 
ends are justified. In other words, curriculum 
indicates what is to be learned, not why it is to be 
learned... Curriculum has reference to what it is 
intended that students learn, not what it is intended 
that they do (p. 130)... The order of learning 
experiences also is influenced by curriculum. A 
curriculum is not a random series of items, but a 
structured one, even if only to the extent of 
indicating that the order in which certain outcomes 
are achieved is immaterial (p. 131). (Johnson, M.J., 
1967) 
Thus curriculum consists of WHAT is to be learned, an 
educational philosophy tells WHY the curriculum is to be 
learned, and instruction is HOW it is to be learned. 
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The necessity for designing curriculum according to 
learning theory arises from the goal of science education. 
Simply stated, "We should be teaching students how to 
think; instead we are primarily teaching them what to 
think" (Lochhead, 1979, p. 1). This widely accepted 
statement, by emphasizing the how over the what, seems to 
denigrate the importance of curriculum and focus on 
instruction as the venue for improvement of science 
education. Such an interpretation, also widely accepted, 
is lethal to improvements of science education. The 
WHAT-to-think in science is interpreted to mean a long 
list of facts, figures and formulas. Close inspection of 
the science curriculum is avoided because of a pervasive 
feeling that science curriculum is already over¬ 
prescribed. Since there is already more than enough from 
which to choose, why develop more? The mind-set of too 
many traditional science teachers is that the conventional 
science curriculum, particularly in the physical sciences, 
is a body of immutable knowledge that can only be added 
to. To them, much of it has become dogma, expected to be 
learned by neophytes, with the emphasis on understanding 
it in its present form. Certainly they want their 
students to learn how to think, but think about and with 
the same material as before. 
The fallacy begins to emerge. The how-to-think 
depends upon the what-to-think, simply because it is 
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impossible to think without thinking about something. But 
the conventional science curriculum is so alien to even 
the most basic principles of learning theory and the 
structure of knowledge that it forces all but the most 
persevering and intellectual of students into a rote 
learning mode. The rebellion against the what-to-learn is 
really a rebellion again the rote learning of information. 
Emphasizing HOW-to-think means attempting to teach 
students to do more with the curriculum than memorize it. 
Attempts at higher-order understanding will ultimately 
fail if the curriculum is not conducive to such 
understanding. How-to-think will not happen unless we 
start with the what-to-think. 
A curriculum based on learning theory becomes a 
necessity when the goal becomes teaching the HOW of 
thinking. Unfortunately, "no curriculum theorist in the 
past has shown the relevance of learning theory to the 
design of curriculum" (Novak, 1977, p. 134). This 
statement is certainly true when it comes to science 
curriculum. It is time to recognize that the conventional 
curriculum in the physical sciences is a product of 
history and personality largely predicated on the 
vocational training of laboratory technicians at the 
beginning of the century. The knowledge implied in a 
science curriculum needs to be analyzed and structured 
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according to how school-age children learn and understand 
any intellectual material. 
Scientific thinking is the HOW-to-think, and can be 
summarized in two student learning goals: 1) conceptual 
understanding, as evidenced by the student's ability to 
demonstrate, 2) flexible, inquiry-based problem solving. 
(These learning goals, and the performance objectives that 
define each, are presented in Appendix A.) In other 
words, teaching students how to apply generalized concepts 
to answer questions that naturally arise in their unique 
environments is, behaviorally, teaching them the HOW of 
using their intellects. When teaching someone how to use 
anything, from a car to a computer to a mind, it is 
obviously necessary to teach according to how it 
functions. When the goal is HOW to think, then HOW the 
intellect functions becomes of paramount importance. In 
pursuit of the goals above, learning theory becomes 
critical to an effective curriculum: 
If we can come to understand human learning processes 
better and if we learn to apply this knowledge in the 
design of new instructional programs, education can 
be quantitatively and qualitatively much better than 
it has been.... My argument has been that theory 
development relevant to school learning is 
possible,... and that progress in understanding 
educational processes similar to the progress we have 
observed in science and associated technologies can 
be made. (Novak, 1977. p. 190, 191) 
Even Piaget's theory of intellectual development, 
known for being aloof from its educational applications, 
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addresses the need for learning theory when the goal 
becomes meaningful thinking. 
For Piaget, the term 'learning' may be used in two 
senses. Learning in the narrow sense involves the 
acquisition of new information or new responses 
restricted to a specific situation.... By contrast, 
learning in the broad sense, or development, involves 
the acquisition of general thought structures which 
apply to many situations.... Piaget proposes that, 
of the two processes, development (learning in the 
wider sense) is the more fundamental (p. 208, 
209).... When the requisite cognitive structure is 
present, he [the student] can learn from the world 
and come to understand reality; when the structure 
is absent, new experience has only superficial 
effects. (Ginsburg and Opper, 1988, p. 210) 
A focus of learning theory is precisely the nature of 
these cognitive structures which are required for learning 
how to think. Ginsburg and Opper (1988), using Piagetian 
theory to summarize other researchers' evaluations of 
science curricula, state "that many learning problems may 
be due to a mismatch between the conceptual level of the 
majority of pupils and the concepts being presented" (p. 
249). The characteristics and structure of the developing 
intellect of a student must undergird the curriculum of 
ideas with which the student is presented. Such a 
foundation will maximize the chances that the student will 
learn the ideas well enough to be able to use them for 
flexible, inquiry-based problem solving. 
Before continuing to a survey of the six learning 
theorists, a caveat is in order. Basing curriculum on 
learning theory is a necessary condition for teaching 
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students how to think, but it is not sufficient. 
"Cognitive process instruction is ... only one part of a 
complete education and although there are reasons for 
believing it to be an important part, any program that 
ignores other aspects is probably doomed to failure" 
(Lochhead, 1979, p.3). David Ausubel, whose learning 
theory is the most important to curriculum design, also 
states that 
an adequate theory of learning is not a sufficient 
condition for the improvement of instruction. Valid 
principles of teaching are necessarily based on 
relevant principles of learning, but, as we know, 
they are not direct and simple application of these 
principles. Laws of classroom learning merely 
provide general direction for discovering effective 
teaching principles; they do not identify these 
principles. The formulation of teaching principle 
requires much supplementary research that takes 
account of practical problems and new instructional 
variables not implicit in the learning principles 
themselves. (Ausubel, Novak, and Hanesian, 1978, p. 
15) 
Increased content mastery by teachers and effective 
instructional strategies, such as those dealing with 
student misconceptions, cooperative learning or Madeline 
Hunter's Mastery Teaching (Hunter, 1982), are needed and 
will contribute significantly to student success. More 
interdisciplinary and multi-cultural curricula will be 
important too, as will other contributions to the total 
picture of providing a complete science education. 
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B. Functionalist Learning Theories Are the Foundation for 
Science Curriculum 
Once it is agreed that learning theory must undergird 
science curriculum, the next step is to look at learning 
theories. Very broadly, cognitive scientists can be 
divided into reductionists, who attempt to identify the 
neurobiology of the thinking and learning process, and 
functionalists, who work with useful analogies, as long as 
they do not contradict what is known about neurobiology. 
Reductionism is still in its scientific infancy and does 
not presently provide many useful connections to the 
educational field, although there are tantalizing findings 
that will be discussed when discussing the property of 
abstractness. (For an excellent synthesis of reductionist 
theories, see Consciousness Explained, by Daniel C. 
Dennett, Boston: Little, Brown. 1991.) Thus any useful 
learning theory, in the near to mid-term, will be 
functionalist, and all the learning theories upon which 
this paper is based are functionalist. Functionalism is 
open to the criticism of being only a model, and a model 
based on analogies that could break down at any moment. 
This inescapable criticism dictates that any work based 
upon a functionalist model must constantly check for 
usefulness. Do the conclusions of such educational 
research actually check out with how real students in real 
environments actually think and learn? As Barbel 
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Inhelder, Jean Piaget's close associate, stated in the 
foreword to Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Development 
(Ginsburg & Opper, 1988), "The empirical is never 
separated from the theoretical" (p. iv). 
Since the keystone to an analysis of intellectual 
learning is the idea of a concept, a decidedly 
functionalist construct, the question naturally arises as 
to just how one checks empirically whether or not a child 
uses a concept. Concepts are within a person's mind and 
therefore impossible to sense directly. The technique 
that comes closest to discovering the conceptual structure 
within a student's mind is Novak's concept mapping (Novak 
& Gowin, 1984). But even with concept mapping, what is 
being observed is the student's behavior, and it is still 
necessary to infer the existence of a concept in the 
student's mind. Gagne (1985) discussed this issue in 
relation to a girl attempting to identify a wooden block 
that did not fit the same category as all the other 
visible blocks that had been laid out before her: "Does 
she actually think these things? It is difficult to 
obtain evidence as proof. But so far as the ultimately 
correct performance is concerned, the child behaves as .if 
she says to herself, 'It's the odd one.' To be able to 
state that a child uses a concept, one has only to 
demonstrate that such an 'as if' clause is true" (p. 97). 
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This basis of legitimacy is clearly observational; 
the student's behavior must be matched to the concept 
being taught in order to infer learning. The popularity of 
Piagetian theory among educators stems largely from its 
usefulness in interpreting students' behavior as they 
grapple with concepts, and the people most practiced in 
such observation are teachers. Therefore the usefulness of 
a functionalist learning theory is best judged by 
teachers. 
As a teacher, I have included in this paper many 
observations of my own students. Virtually every one of 
the assertions made in this paper concerning the 
identification and structuring of concepts in the physical 
sciences have been tested by the performance of my 
students over twelve years of teaching. Many of the 
insights presented in this paper have been contributed by 
my students, whose frustrations, which they unhesitatingly 
communicated, and successes were, and continue to be, the 
basis of development. 
C. Behaviorism is Minimally Useful to Science Curriculum 
Before discussing the learning theories used in this 
dissertation, there is one theory NOT used that needs to 
be addressed. Behaviorism, or stimulus-organism-response 
(S-O-R) theory, has contributed immensely to education by 
instilling a focus on student behaviors that could be 
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objectively observed and measured. But in its 
unadulterated form, it overtly avoids any model of 
internal, cognitive functions. Behaviorism's view of the 
human mind is that no model is possible, or necessary. 
For the curriculum designer, the lack of a functionalist 
model of the mind renders behaviorism impotent. Efforts 
to use the theory to increase student learning will 
ultimately be frustrated in reaching the goals of 
conceptual understanding and problem solving, as well as 
their own goals. "If the goal is to get students to 
replicate a certain behavior, this method [behaviorism] 
works well; but if understanding, synthesis, eventual 
application, and the ability to use information in new 
situations is our goal in education, a behaviorist 
approach is not successful" (Yager, 1991, p. 54). "The 
ultimate irony is that by overemphasizing objectively 
measured products (and ignoring the process by which they 
are obtained) some schools have managed to decrease their 
effectiveness as measured by the same 'objective' 
standards (SAT exams) they stress" (Lochhead, 1979, p. 2). 
Behaviorism, no matter how it is modified, is 
inadequate for furthering the goals of intellectual 
learning without the premise that a student possesses an 
intellect that can be characterized independently from the 
student's observable behavior. If the goal is to train 
the intellect to think, such a model of the intellect is 
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necessary. "The S-O-R model of a generation ago regarded 
0 as the black box switch that connected behavior with a 
stimulus source. The 0 is viewed today as a set of 
concepts or mediators" (Kagan, 1966, p. 97). 
D. The Advent of Learning Theory in American 
Science Education 
Learning theories based on conceptual understanding 
were in their infancy in the 1960's. In 1969 the 
University of Wisconsin Research and Development Center 
for Cognitive Learning produced an exhaustive bibliography 
of concept learning from 1950 to 1967 (Klausmeier et al.). 
A careful perusal of the thousands of references leaves 
the decided impression that the roots of conceptually 
based learning theory are in the psychiatric treatment of 
mental disorders. Extracting from the complete list all 
those that had any relevance to a theory of intellectual 
learning or to science education produces 130 references. 
Most of their dates of publication are in the mid-1960's. 
The important educational learning theorists of today 
follow this timeline, publishing their major contributions 
to educational learning theory in the early to mid-1970's. 
The earliest seems to have been Robert Gagne who, in 1965, 
published the first edition of his book The Conditions of 
Learning. Thus the comprehensive learning theories such 
276 
as Ausubel's assimilation theory, did not appear until a 
bit over a decade ago. 
In the early 1970's, another theory of learning 
emerged that was based on the rapidly developing computer 
sciences and that has been somewhat of a bridge between 
the reductionist and functionalist approaches. This 
theory is information processing theory (see Newell & 
Simon, 1972). It is "a model of cognition that accepts 
the idea that information exists, and that it gets 
processed in the brain (i.e. is coded, transformed, 
stored, retrieved, etc.), [and] is justified in assuming, 
for convenience, that it passes from one set of neural 
components to another" (Carroll, John B., 1976). The 
manner in which the information is processed is likened to 
how it is processed by computers. Information is received 
through the senses, after which it is registered and 
passed on to several levels of memory storage usually 
characterized as to the duration (short-term, 
intermediate-term, long-term) during which the information 
resides there before being passed along to the next level, 
processed, or retrieved to consciousness (Kihlstrom, 
1987). Lately, within information processing theory, "the 
concept of working memory has increasingly replaced the 
older concept of short-term memory (p. 556)... The 
coordination of resources is the prime function of working 
memory, with memory storage being only one of many 
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potential demands that are likely to be made on the 
system" (p. 557), (Baddeley, 1992). Such an executive 
process, whether considered as part of working memory or 
as one or more separately functioning entities, is another 
major component of information processing theory. It is 
the executive process that sets the whole system in 
operation and controls the ebb and flow of information. 
The analogy between such an executive process and the 
central processing unit of a computer is obvious. 
Information processing theory has become a very 
useful framework for investigating and discussing 
traditional cognitive psychology topics such as attention, 
active learning, comprehension, reasoning, as understood 
in the measurement of intelligence, memory, forgetting, 
and metacognition. It is also one of the more useful 
frameworks for discussing cognitive organization and 
meaningfulness. In this regard, it is an excellent 
context in which to investigate conceptual structures 
since, within information processing theory, sensory 
inputs are coded and remembered as concepts. Much 
information processing theory per se is concentrated at 
the larger scale of mapping the flow of information, only 
recently addressing how it is structured in memory and as 
it is used. Writing in 1987, John Kihlstrom (p. 1450) 
described the advent of such issues of structure to 
cognitive science: 
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In principle, declarative knowledge [general and 
specific factual information] is available to 
phenomenal awareness, and can be known directly 
through introspection. Traditional information 
processing analyses seem to imply that conscious 
access to declarative knowledge is a matter of 
activation... There is the further implication that 
declarative knowledge structures activated at sub¬ 
threshold levels are essentially latent. However, it 
is now clear that procedural knowledge [the other of 
the two types of knowledge: it is the repertoire of 
skills, rules, and strategies that operate on 
declarative knowledge] can interact with, and 
utilize, declarative knowledge that is not itself 
accessible to conscious awareness. The phenomena of 
subliminal perception and implicit memory, then, 
suggest a category of preconscious, declarative 
knowledge structures. Unlike automatized procedural 
knowledge, these percepts and memories would be 
available to awareness under ordinary circumstances. 
Although activated to some degree by current or prior 
perceptual inputs, and thus able to influence ongoing 
experience, thought, and action, they do not cross 
the threshold required for representation in working 
memory, and thus for conscious awareness. 
An analysis of the conceptual dimension of science 
education begins with a focus on these "preconscious, 
declarative knowledge" structures. Kihlstrom tells us 
that these structures are available to our conscious minds 
for analysis, even though they are usually unconscious 
contributors to everyone's cognitive processes. Being 
available to our conscious minds, they can be the subjects 
of rational study and characterization. The goal is to 
establish a model for such structures within the domain of 
science concepts, while maintaining the context of the 
larger, enveloping theory of information processing. For 
example, one of the six theorists, Robert Gagne, mentioned 
above, whose writings will contribute greatly to a 
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synthesis of relevant learning theory, uses information 
processing theory as a context and devotes an entire 
chapter of his seminal book (Gagne, 1985) to its 
description. 
Probably the theory that finally drove educational 
behaviorism into retreat from the public schoolroom was 
Jean Piaget's theory of intellectual development. 
Imported from Europe, it was slow in coming to this 
country, probably because of behaviorism's American origin 
and thus strength. Writing in 1969, the Chairman of the 
Department of Psychology at Boise State College said, 
I had heard of Piaget, of course, for many years; but 
earlier those who referred to him at all always did 
so with more than a modicum of condescending 
tolerance. Recently, however, I have detected a 
cognitive trend in the literature: more American 
psychologists have been directing their search for a 
theoretical model away from the laboratory rat and 
toward the electronic computer. I also discovered 
that many more writers are interested in Piaget and 
that most of their references to him are suffused 
with respect. (Phillips, 1969, p. vii, viii). 
Piaget's theory of intellectual development filled a 
need felt by many educators, particularly science 
teachers, for an explanation of what they observed 
happening with their students. It was largely because of 
Piaget's influence that process skills became an important 
part of science education, expanding the one dimensional 
model of science education to two dimensions. Piaget's 
focus, as a genetic epistemologist, was the developmental 
growth of knowledge rather than the characterization of 
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knowledge itself. Although he did not use concept as a 
central construct in his theory, his developmental 
approach can be easily interpreted accordingly. Consider, 
for example, his definition of the semiotic function, 
which in his theory heralds the capacity for thought: 
"This refers to the fact that from 2 to 4 years the child 
begins to develop the ability to make something - a mental 
symbol, a word, or an object - stand for or represent 
something else which is not present" (Ginsburg and Opper, 
1988, p. 70). From the perspective of a theory of 
conceptual framework, the importance of the semiotic 
function is that it is the capability to form a concept. 
E. Six Learning Theorists Provide a Base for a 
Three Dimensional Science Curriculum 
Yet, other than Piaget, there was, and is, 
significant American research on learning theory also 
taking place. In many regards it is unfortunate that 
these domestic contributions have been so overshadowed in 
American schools by Piagetian theory. They contribute 
just as much to a firm foundation upon which to base 
science curriculum. In any case, there are five American 
theorists as well as Jean Piaget to provide the 
foundation. These five are: David P. Ausubel, Joseph D. 
Novak, Robert M. Gagne, Herbert J. Klausmeier, and 
Benjamin S. Bloom. 
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The work of Piaget, Ausubel, and Gagne is most useful 
in defining concepts and structures of concepts. Their 
theories, as well as others, have come to be known as 
cumulative learning theory. Their central thesis is that 
complex abilities can be analyzed into simpler 
components (or) pre-requisites, that are 
combined during acquisition of the complex 
ability. Since each prerequisite task can also 
be analyzed into its component abilities, and 
since each complex task can be combined with 
others to produce a still higher level of 
performance, it is possible to specify a 
hierarchy of tasks that cumulate through 
successive layers of positive transfer to 
greater and greater levels of cognitive 
competence. With respect to cognitive 
development, cumulative learning theory suggests 
that small changes in ability cumulate across 
tasks and over time to create an apparently 
large and qualitative shift in competence. 
(Resnick & Glaser, 1976, p. 207). 
The remaining two theorists. Bloom and Klausmeier, 
are most useful in describing the different levels, or 
depths, at which particular concepts can be understood. 
Bloom stresses in the preface to his taxonomy that it is 
NOT a learning theory. "Our method of ordering 
educational outcomes will make it possible to define the 
range of phenomena for which such a theory must account" 
(Bloom, 1956, p. 17-18). The taxonomy is empirically 
derived from the accumulated experience of approximately 
fifty eminent educators of the time who classified already 
existing performance objectives. (Note: Bloom is actually 
the editor, not author, of the taxonomy.) Looked at from 
the perspective of classic scientific method, the taxonomy 
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is data waiting for a theoretical explanation, which could 
then be used to formulate and test educational hypotheses: 
Educational objectives must be related to a 
psychology of learning... The use of a 
psychology of learning enables the faculty to 
determine the appropriate placement of 
objectives in the learning sequence, helps them 
discover the learning conditions under which it 
is possible to attain an objective, and provide 
a way of determining the appropriate 
interrelationships among the objectives. 
(Bloom, 1956, p. 27) 
Reflecting the fact that Bloom's taxonomy is not a 
learning theory, it's greatest usefulness is to check 
whether the learning theory otherwise used is being 
correctly applied. Bloom's taxonomy has withstood the 
test of time, and, as data, it can be considered reliable. 
Thus the conclusions drawn from other sources should 
account for the taxonomy. 
Klausmeier's work also emphasizes the different 
levels at which a particular concept can be understood. 
Describing his own model of learning, Klausmeier (1974) 
states that "the model in its totality describes the 
attainment of four levels and use of the same concept 
rather than each of four different kinds of concepts" (p. 
14). Klausmeier's work is a legitimate learning theory 
that primarily deals with the development of a single 
concept, while Bloom's taxonomy describes the behaviors 
that would be reflections of the increased development of 
a single concept. 
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Each of these authors has, of course, written 
extensively on educational psychology. However, a 
comprehensive account of each of their views would make a 
synthesis too cumbersome. Being selective may not do full 
justice to their entire spectra of ideas, but it does 
sharpen a synthesis. There are certainly differences of 
opinion among these six learning theorists as well. These 
differences need to be separated from the areas of 
agreement, which then can be used to form the foundation 
of learning theory upon which to build a science 
curriculum. A foundation composed of the points of 
agreement among six theorists should constitute a model 
acceptably valid and reliable to most educators. In order 
to identify the agreements among these six scientists' 
theories, the seminal publication of each, (except for 
Piaget, for whom translations and interpretations are 
used), was studied, as well as other publications, and 
applicable references were extracted and compared. The 
six seminal publications are: 
1. Piaget: a) Ginsburg, Herbert P., and Opper, Sylvia. 
(1988). Piaget's Theory of Intellectual 
Development. 
b) Maier, Henry W. (1978). Three Theories of 
Child Development. 
2. Ausubel, David P., Novak, Joseph D., and Hanesian, 
Helen. (1978). Educational Psychology - A Cognitive 
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View. 
3. Novak, Joseph D. (1977). A Theory of Education. 
4. Gagne, Robert M. (1985). The Conditions of Learning, 
4th ed. 
5. Klausmeier, Herbert J., Ghatala, Elizabeth S., and 
Frayer, Dorothy A. (1974). Conceptual Learning and 
Development. 
6. Bloom, Benjamin S., ed. (1956). Taxonomy of 
Educational Objectives. Book 1; Cognitive Domain. 
There are, of course, several learning theorists, 
cognitive and educational psychologists, and 
epistemologists who could have been but were not included 
in this synthesis. For example, Jerome Bruner's writings 
could have been included, and Stephen Toulmin's three 
volumes of writings on Human Understanding contain many, 
many insights useful to the educator. However, in 
attempting a synthesis of various writings, there is a 
limit to how much can be included. The six theorists were 
chosen because they broadly represented the various facets 
of the field, and their writings were most directly 
related to education. 
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F. The Importance of Concepts and of Defining Concepts 
The most important agreement among the six theorists 
is that what is learned and used intellectually is what 
are called concepts. "Concepts are the fundamental agents 
of thought for human beings from early childhood through 
adulthood" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 1). Concepts are 
the unit of intellectual exercise and they are the 
material from which the functionalist model of the mind is 
constructed. They are the currency of the intellect. 
They provide the scale at which to analyze intellectual 
learning and develop appropriate curriculum. As Gagne 
explained, "The effect of concept learning is to free the 
individual from control bv specific stimuli (original 
emphasis). This kind of learning, then, is obviously of 
tremendous importance for most kinds of intellectual 
activity engaged in by human beings... The world 
experienced by human beings is largely organized by means 
of concepts. We think of our environment as well as 
ourselves primarily in terms of concepts of objects, 
places and events" (Gagne, 1985, p. 105, 106). 
Even Bloom, who compiled his Taxonomy of Educational 
Objectives - Cognitive Domain in 1956, when behaviorism 
was at its zenith, used the terminology of observable 
student behaviors but primarily dealt with concepts. 
"'Cognitive' is used to include activities such as 
remembering and recalling knowledge, thinking, problem 
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solving, and creating" (p.2). These last three 
categories, thinking, problem solving, and creating, are 
only meaningful if one assumes that there is an internal 
intellect that thinks and learns by manipulating concepts. 
Bloom goes on to state that "this taxonomy is designed to 
be a classification of the student behaviors which 
represent the intended outcomes of the educational 
process... We are not attempting to classify the 
particular subject matter or content. What we are 
classifying is the intended behavior (original emphasis) 
of students - the ways in which individuals are to act, 
think, or feel as the result of participating in some unit 
of instruction" (p. 12). Bloom's taxonomy of knowledge, 
comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis and 
evaluation are all behaviors wherein a person understands 
concepts at increasing depths. This taxonomy meshes with 
Klausmeier's levels of concept attainment, wherein the 
centrality of concepts is overtly recognized, as the title 
to his book testifies. 
The idea of the concept provides a clear direction to 
educational design and planning, providing clear standards 
upon which to judge the merits of different strategies. 
The consequent pedagogic structure that it provides for 
science educators is not constraining. It is a liberation 
from curricular anemia and anarchy. It provides all the 
dimensions of freedom needed to make teaching and learning 
287 
truly creative endeavors, just as music exploded with 
creativity with the invention of the scale. "My argument 
has been that theory development relevant to school 
learning is possible, that David Ausubel's assimilation 
theory provides a workable base for new learning research, 
and that progress in understanding educational processes 
similar to the progress we have observed in science and 
associated technologies is possible" (Novak, 1977. p. 
191). Novak does not exaggerate. Learning theory based 
upon concepts can produce changes in student learning 
similar to the change from horses to space shuttles. 
The crux of the problem for science educators is 
identifying the concepts. It is truly a difficult task. 
To plan curriculum and design instruction,... a 
primary and exceedingly difficult task is to identify 
concepts in any given discipline and to organize them 
into some hierarchical or relational scheme. This 
task requires the best available talent with respect 
to the knowledge of the discipline and also skillful 
guidance by curriculum experts in the process of 
"unpacking" knowledge from a discipline. (Novak, 
1977. p. 142) 
As powerful as the idea of a concept is, it is a 
delicate and deceivingly simple idea. Those who would 
harness concepts to induce improvements in education must 
understand what a concept is, just as a musician must 
fully understand a musical scale. An educator with a 
cursory understanding of the definition of a concept will 
not be able to easily use concepts to unleash his/her own 
creative potential, nor that of the students. On the other 
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hand, neither is a deep understanding of conceptual or 
genetic epistemology necessary, as might be needed by a 
curriculum expert to unpack a particular field of 
knowledge. Unfortunately, there is at present rampant 
confusion among educators about what a concept is. 
"Anyone even slightly familiar with the history of 
psychology knows that most, if not all, psychological 
theories stated in the common language have been vague and 
easily susceptible to misinterpretation. Even today there 
are many fruitless arguments over the meaning of words 
like 'concept'" (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 124). 
In order for the idea of a concept to induce the 
quantum change in science education of which it is 
capable, it is critically important that educators, who 
will carry out the changes, adequately understand the 
meaning of the term concept. 
G. Identifying Concepts of the Life Sciences 
Many examples will be given throughout this 
development of defining concepts. There are several 
reasons for which the majority of them will be from the 
physical sciences, as opposed to the life sciences and 
social sciences. First of all, the social sciences are 
rarely taught in American public schools, and when they 
are, they are taught through social studies departments. 
Secondly, many of the concepts used by the life sciences. 
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for example energy, are, fundamentally, physical science 
concepts that are being applied to a biological content. 
Thirdly, the majority of published research in conceptual 
development has been done with physical science concepts. 
And finally, my own experience in science teaching and 
curriculum development has been in the physical sciences. 
Of profound importance is the present state of 
ignorance, and lack of research, on the conceptual 
structure of the life sciences. In a private conversation 
with Dr. Jose Mestre, a cognitive scientist with the 
Scientific Reasoning Institute at the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst, he expressed the possibility 
that the life sciences might be more akin to a language, 
consisting of a very large vocabulary and factual content, 
with relatively few generic concepts of its own. A 
professor of epidemiology expressed the opinion to me that 
the dearth of hard causalities, as opposed to relational 
correlations, caused the life sciences to have a 
conceptual structure that is more vague, nonsystematic and 
less integrated than that in the physical sciences. 
Several biology teachers have told me that they feel there 
is only one basic concept, evolution, that originates with 
the life sciences. The five members of a high school 
science department in which I taught, three of them 
biologists, worked for a year on formulating departmental 
goals, a major task being the identification of the 
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concepts to be taught. We were only able to come up with 
about a dozen concepts in the life sciences, and were 
unable to make much progress in organizing them into a 
structure. 
An excellent analysis of life science curriculum and 
instruction is the National Research Council's 1990 report 
Fulfilling the Promise - Biology Education in the Nation's 
Schools. In this report a frequent refrain is that "the 
central concepts and principles that every high-school 
student should know must be identified, and the curriculum 
pared down of everything that does not explicate and 
illuminate the relatively few concepts" (p. 105). This 
report frequently states the necessity of emphasizing 
concepts, but gives only minor help in identifying them: 
Biology is a mature discipline underpinned by basic 
explanatory concepts about how matter is organized in 
cells and organisms, how genetic information is 
encoded and transmitted across generations, how parts 
of organisms are related functionally, how organisms 
interact with each other and with the environment, 
and how different kinds of organisms change over time 
(p. 10).... The [middle-school life science program] 
should include conceptual strands to reinforce ideas 
of relationships, community, ethics, one's place in 
the universe, and understanding of self (p. 19).... 
[The high school biology program] should include an 
understanding of basic concepts in cell and molecular 
biology, evolution, energy and metabolism, heredity, 
development and reproduction, and ecology (p. 21),... 
the skills of measuring and the limits of 
measurement, becoming acquainted with the practice of 
reasoning from observation and with the meaning of 
causation, developing a feeling for the scales of 
size and time that lie beyond direct human sensory 
experience, and understanding the role of chance in 
natural phenomena, (p. 26) 
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It seems clear that even for the 40-odd eminent 
biologists and educators who researched the report there 
is little clear direction on how to define and assemble 
the conceptual structure, as would be useful to the 
classroom teacher, that they so explicitly advocate. 
Using this report as a starting point, the Biological 
Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS) published in 1993 a guide 
for developing secondary and post-secondary biology 
curricula called Developing Scientific Literacy. This 
guide makes considerable headway in identifying the 
essential concepts of biology, listing and explaining six 
major ones and twenty sub-concepts. I hope that the 
following discussion on defining and structuring concepts 
for the physical sciences will be useful in further 
defining and in particular structuring the life science 
concepts. 
H. A Model for Defining Concepts 
There are two necessary parts to the definition of a 
concept: what it is, and what it is not. A concept is a 
type of idea that exists within an intellectual context 
that includes other types of ideas. Describing what a 
concept is not is equivalent to describing the types of 
ideas that surround concepts. There are two types of such 
surrounding ideas: facts and principles, one on each side. 
As will be seen, the six theorists use a diversity of 
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names for these two other types of ideas. However, 
besides the names, there is reasonable consensus as to 
their attributes, particularly insofar as is relevant to 
the science educator. The important point is that both 
facts and principles are defined in terms of the central 
idea of the concept, for which they form the context. 
By looking at the contrast between concepts and 
facts. Appendix C will develop the argument that concepts 
can be described and compared according to their 
generality. Appendices D and E will contrast concepts and 
principles, and in so doing will establish that concepts 
can also be rated according to their respective 
complexities. 
A fundamental issue underneath the characterizing of 
concepts according to generality, complexity, and 
abstractness is that concepts, like everything else, can 
indeed be characterized. "The point is made that one 
attribute of concept is definability" (p. 4). "Concepts 
can be defined in terms of their intrinsic dimensions or 
attributes" (p. 3) (Klausmeier et al., 1969). Concepts 
themselves are a category that has criterial attributes. 
"A formal definition of concept in terms of its defining 
attributes is useful in specifying what concepts are and 
are not, and also in understanding the great variability 
among concepts" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 5). 
Klausmeier proposed eight attributes of concepts: 
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"learnability, usability, validity, generality, power, 
structure, instance perceptability, and instance 
numerousness" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p.5). The fine 
distinctions among the eight are useful for cognitive 
scientists, but not necessarily for science educators. 
For example, validity refers "to the extent that experts 
agree on its definition" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 7). 
This attribute is useful to the cognitive scientist who 
must deal with ill-defined concepts in fields such as 
religion, but it is of only minor important for science 
educators who deal with concepts that are well defined. 
I. The Objectivity of Concepts in the Physical Sciences 
The presumption of high validity for the concepts in 
the physical sciences is important enough to warrant 
further elaboration. It is vitally important that there 
be a wide consensus on a concept's objective reality that 
science educators can discuss and analyze in designing a 
curriculum. Because American education is based upon a 
belief in the uniqueness and individuality of each 
student, many curriculum experts assume that the concepts 
each student forms are also unique. This presumed 
uniqueness is often cited as a source of creativity. 
Therefore, attempts to identify and teach standard 
conceptual structures are seen as somehow subversive. 
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Scientific concepts are, by definition, as objective 
as possible. Hard sciences are defined as those that use 
highly objective concepts, where the certainty of shared 
knowledge is great. In contrast, the soft sciences use 
concepts whose definitions are open to interpretation and 
judgement. For example, the concept of mass used in the 
physical sciences is unequivocally defined, whereas the 
concept of personality used in the social sciences is 
quite contentious. "Concepts may be defined in terms of 
behaviors or operations rather than attributes. This type 
of definition is prevalent in the behavioral sciences 
where many of the phenomena dealt with are internal 
processes that have no readily identifiable attributes" 
(Klausmeier, 1969, p. 4). Although cognitive 
psychologists must account for concepts that lack 
objective criterial attributes, physical science educators 
rarely, if ever, confront them. Thus the physical 
sciences are fortunate to be blessed with a family of 
concepts that can be objectively defined using today's 
expertise. 
Yet it is uncontestable that there are differences 
among people's concepts, including concepts of the 
physical sciences, simply because every person's life 
experiences are unique and therefore the instances used to 
form concepts are unique. However, assuming an equal 
depth of understanding, the differences in understanding 
295 
among people of a particular physical science concept, 
produced by their idiosyncratic experiences, are ancillary 
to its essential meaning that is the focus of science 
education. These ancillary meanings embellish or color 
concepts without fundamentally changing them; the 
criterial attributes do not differ. For example, a person 
who has lived in a rain forest since birth, where there is 
always vegetation in close proximity, will have a 
different color to the concept of distance than will a 
person who has lived on an open plain. Yet both people 
have an objective concept of distance that could equally 
well interpret, say, a mountain environment. Ginsburg and 
Opper (1988), in describing Piaget's theory on how 
children form mental symbols, illustrate this point by 
contrasting what two children understand a bicycle to be: 
Suppose one child uses the word "bicycle." For him, 
a bicycle has two wheels, a seat, and handlebars. A 
bicycle is something that goes delightfully fast, 
and, also, is one kind of vehicle. For another 
child, however, the signified may be somewhat 
different. This child agrees that a bicycle has two 
wheels, a seat, and handlebars, but having often 
fallen from bicycles, he therefore feels that they 
are frightening and dangerous. Further, he has no 
conception of a bicycle as a vehicle. Note that for 
both these children the word "bicycle" evokes some 
common meaning: two wheels, handlebars and so on. 
Both children can therefore easily identify what a 
bicycle is and what it is not. In this "denotative" 
sense, the word does refer to the real object. (p. 
76) 
Thus the two children have formed the same objective, 
essential concept from two different experiences. 
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Ginsburg and Opper continue by describing the difference 
in color between the two children's concepts: 
But the children also disagree as to the word's 
meaning; for one the bicycle is delightful and for 
the other it is frightening. Also, for one child it 
is a member of the class of bicycles which in turn is 
included in the larger class of vehicles. The other 
child, on the other hand, employs no such class 
hierarchy. (p. 76) 
How frightening or delightful the bicycle is not 
objective and is not part of the essential concept, which 
is what matters in physical science. The two children 
also differ in how they relate the bicycle concept to 
their other concepts, but this is a difference in the 
depth of understanding and in the conceptual structure 
rather than in the objective, denotative meaning of the 
concept itself. 
In the physical sciences, we may thus talk about the 
ESSENTIAL criterial attributes of its concepts. Such a 
focus recognizes the uniqueness of concepts held by each 
person, but also establishes an objective reality to a 
concept that is the basis for identifying a common 
conceptual structure shared by the scientific community. 
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APPENDIX C 
THE CRITERIAL ATTRIBUTE OF GENERALITY 
A. Concepts Represent Generic Categories 
Concepts in the sciences are not only objective, but 
they are also generic, and it is these two immensely 
important insights that are the key to significant 
improvements in science education. They are the key 
because they are the ultimate justification for 
establishing concepts as a dimension for science 
education, equal in importance to the content and process 
dimensions. 
Concepts are generic, in that they apply to a very 
large variety of particular content. A concept represents 
a category. All categories contain instances or examples, 
hypothetical or actual. The most succinct definition of a 
concept is given by Ausubel: "For our purposes we shall 
define concepts as objects, events, situations or 
properties that possess common criterial attributes and 
are designated in any given culture by some accepted sign 
or symbol. House, triangle, war, and truth (all original 
emphases) are a few of the culturally accepted concepts we 
use" (Ausubel et al., 1978. p. 89). A concept is defined 
and named according to a generalization about some 
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attribute(s) of its instances, known as the category's 
criterial attributes. 
Concepts may be defined in terms of their intrinsic 
dimensions or attributes. These dimensions or 
attributes are abstracted as being alike or the same 
in otherwise dissimilar objects and thus define the 
concept from an objective point of view. For 
example, the attributes which allow some objects to 
be classified as oranges and others as lemons are 
size, color, shape, and taste. Similarly, the 
attributes useful in defining or putting many objects 
into the two classes squares and equilateral 
triangles are number of sides and length of sides. 
(Klausmeier, 1969, p. 3) 
As an example from the physical sciences, the concept 
of waves covers sound, light, water waves and vibrations. 
All waves involve repetitive motion through a medium, and 
therefore their criterial attributes are speed, frequency, 
wavelength and amplitude. The name of the category is 
what we call the concept. So the wave concept is a 
shorthand way to refer to this combination of criterial 
attributes, and to exclude other attributes such as the 
medium's temperature. "Objects and events may be put into 
the same category on the basis of their criterial 
attributes. The category is usually given a name. In 
turn, the word that represents the category may be defined 
in terms of the criterial attributes of the category" 
(Klausmeier et al., 1969, p. 3). 
One way to understand what something is to look at 
what it is not, and Madeline Hunter (1982) provides such 
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an opportunity. She focuses on critical attributes rather 
than criterial attributes: 
Critical attributes are those attributes which 
differentiate one thing from another. A critical 
attribute of a mammal is that it has mammary glands. 
There are other attributes possessed by mammals such 
as being warm blooded and having an internal 
skeleton, but these attributes do not distinguish 
mammals from birds or reptiles... The power of a 
critical attribute is that, once identified, it can 
be applied to any new situation to confirm or deny 
the applicability of previous knowledge to that new, 
never before encountered situation. (p. Ill) 
Although the critical attribute of a mammal is that 
it has mammary glands, its criterial attributes include 
being warm blooded and having an internal skeleton, as 
well as having mammary glands. A critical attribute is a 
subset of the criterial attributes. 
Klausmeier, quoted previously, approaches 
conceptual learning from a relatively static, short-term 
time scale. In contrast, Piaget approaches the subject 
from a long-term, developmental scale. As Klausmeier 
described, "different from Piaget, we do not attempt to 
describe the... bases of learning concepts across long 
time intervals... We give more emphasis than Piaget to 
conditions of learning concepts... over short time 
intervals than to developmental determinants and functions 
across long time spans" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 3). 
Yet Klausmeier's description, quoted previously, of the 
formation of a concept parallels Piaget's developmental 
theory of how a child first begins to think: 
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Stage 6 [from 18 months to two years], however, forms 
the transition to the next period of development in 
which the infant is able to use mental symbols and 
words to refer to absent objects (p. 61)... [The 
child] is on the threshold of a new period of 
intellectual development in which the acquisition of 
the symbolic function permits the growth of true 
mental activity (p.62). (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988) 
For Piaget, the beginning of thought is when the 
child uses symbols or words that, in the child's 
imagination, have the same attributes as the actual 
object. By interacting with the environment, a child 
collects specific observations that can then be 
manipulated in the mind as literal symbols or 
picturegrams. These picturegrams are the instances of 
which concepts are made. The concepts are formed from the 
commonalities among the picturegrams. It is the growth of 
these concepts, through assimilation and accommodation of 
more instances as they are encountered, that constitutes 
the growth of true mental activity. "The learner is able 
to respond in a single way to a collection of objects as a 
class; this class extends beyond the members that were 
originally present. This second kind of learning is called 
concept learning (p. 90)... This latter learning... 
results in the kind of learning outcome called a concept 
(p. 96)" (Gagne, 1985). "Concept formation is 
characteristic of the preschool child's inductive and 
spontaneous (untutored) acquisition of generic ideas (for 
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instance, 'house', 'dog') from concrete-empirical 
experience" (Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 93). 
Because a concept is a category, its criterial 
attributes are generic at least to some degree; they must 
apply to all instances within the category, regardless of 
other differences. The more generic the concept, the more 
instances it applies to and therefore the more useful it 
will be. The concept of wave is more generic than the 
concept of sound. The wave concept is more powerful 
because it can be used to understand not only sound, in 
which the wave moves through a gas, but also water, or 
liquid, waves, vibrations (in which the wave moves through 
a solid), or light (in which the wave moves through 
itself). 
Looking at how generic a concept is provides a 
distinction between concepts and facts, one of the two 
types of ideas that is not a concept. "Facts are records 
of events... that occur in the world" (Novak, 1977, p. 
18). Facts are not generalized categories; they are the 
instances that inhabit categories. They are the literal 
symbols or picturegrams collected by the Stage 6 child in 
Piaget's theory. For example, the speed of ocean breakers 
is incontrovertibly a fact. Seeing and hearing at 
different times a baseball batter's hit is an observed 
fact. These facts are mentally extracted from the 
physical environment by discriminating them from their 
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context. "Concepts can be seen to require even simpler 
skills called discriminations. The things concepts 
represent have characteristics that may be described (in 
the ultimate sense) in physical terms" (Gagne, 1985, 
p.53). Gagne is expressing the sentiment that the 
instances that make up concepts are records of physical 
objects and events that must be discriminated in order to 
be recorded mentally. 
There are immense curricular ramifications to 
defining concepts as being generic. Because concepts are 
generic, the science curriculum can be divided into the 
two dimensions of concept and content, even while 
recognizing that there is a gray area in between. 
Concepts apply to any specific instances, be they drawn 
from the physical, life or social sciences, from the 
humanities or even vocations. These specific instances 
that illustrate the concepts are, in juxtaposition, the 
content of the curriculum. There are relatively few 
concepts, but there is a constantly expanding plethora of 
content. Creating the dichotomy between concept and 
content allows science curriculum to become standardized 
by focusing on which of the few concepts students are to 
learn and the depth to which they are to learn them. This 
standardization of the conceptual curriculum is balanced 
by the content curriculum that can vary from teacher to 
303 
teacher, even student to student, to accommodate all 
manner and scales of differences. 
B. The Criterial Attribute of Generality 
Facts have been defined in contradistinction to 
concepts by saying they are not generic; they are 
specific. An erroneous implication, of black-and-white 
nature, is that, since facts are specific and concepts are 
generic, then all concepts are equally generic. All 
concepts are not equally generic. Animal is more generic 
than dog, which is more generic than poodle, finally 
arriving at Fifi, the pet, which is a fact, not a concept. 
So the situation is not black and white. There is a 
continuum of values for generic-ness, with facts being one 
extreme of the continuum. 
A continuum of values as just described exists for, 
and necessarily implies, an attribute, and attributes 
belong to "things," understood in its broadest sense. The 
"thing" being described is a concept, any concept. Thus 
concepts are themselves concepts, and as a category, 
concepts have criterial attributes. The attribute being 
described is generic-ness, or, more grammatically, 
universality or generality, the term used in this paper. 
Thus concepts can be rated along a continuum and compared 
according to their universality, the first of the three 
attributes of concepts. 
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At its simplest, generality describes the number of 
instances covered by a particular concept. The number of 
instances covered by a concept is directly related to the 
number of instances perceived by the person who has the 
concept. More dogs are perceived than poodles, and only 
one Fifi is perceived. This simple formulation works fine 
as long as the concept is a person, place or thing. 
However, so many of the concepts of science do not have 
instances so easily identified or counted. How do you 
identify and count the instances of temperature or 
reflection or angular momentum? For such concepts, 
generality is established according to the number of 
questions that the concept is most useful for answering or 
addressing to a depth satisfactory to the questioner. 
This definition is tied directly to the ultimate goal of 
inquiry-based problem solving, but it also has a 
theoretical foundation. Science concepts are in the mind; 
they do not belong to things or phenomena. Concepts 
belong to questions and questions come from a person's 
curiosity. A lesson I use in my classes is to give 
students a list of things (book, telephone, sun, dog, 
tree) and ask them to come up with six questions about 
each, one question for each of the six basic concepts. 
When we say that a particular thing or phenomenon belongs 
to a particular concept, what we really mean is that the 
most common, or the majority of, questions concerning it 
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are best addressed by that particular concept. For 
example, it is difficult to come up with questions about a 
rainbow that are not best addressed by waves, so it is 
easy to just say that rainbows are a waves phenomenon, 
even though the statement is glib. 
For the sciences, the generality of a concept can be 
estimated by assuming that a person of average 
observational and discriminative prowess and curiosity 
observes the natural environment, be it a rainforest, 
desert or metropolis. How many questions is the observer 
likely to come up with that are best addressed by a 
particular concept? For example, questions about length 
will generally be more common than questions about 
permeability. Questions about color and shape (or 
configuration) will probably be equally common. Questions 
concerning energy flows between systems will be more 
common than momentum exchanges between interacting 
systems. Answers that revolve around stored gravitational 
energy will probably be more common than those focused on 
stored elastic energy. A person will notice more material 
objects than instances of waves. Questions about chemical 
bonding, evidenced by changes in composition, will be more 
common than questions about electrical and magnetic 
phenomena. 
It may seem presumptuous to anticipate the 
questions that might be asked by an individual. 
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particularly considering that every person's daily 
occupations, preoccupations and curiosities are unique and 
that there are an infinite number of possible questions. 
In the next section on the basic concepts of science I 
will detail how I investigated the science questions asked 
in a small part of American society and American schools 
today. It could well be that different cultures and 
different times would produce different patterns of 
questioning and therefore different structures of concepts 
according to generality. 
Looking at two of the six theorists' views of 
generality, this attribute encompasses three of 
Klausmeier's (1974) eight attributes of concepts: 
Usability ("Some [concepts] can be used more than others 
in understanding and forming principles and in solving 
problems," p. 6), Power ("the extent to which a particular 
concept facilitates or is essential to the attainment of 
other concepts," p. 8) and Instance Numerousness ("The 
number of instances," p.ll). 
Since Gagne (1985) is strongly tied to a behaviorist 
perspective and avoids the characterization of the 
intellect, and therefore of concepts, in any but 
behaviorist terms, he does not explicitly espouse 
attributes of concepts. However, his explanation of 
concept learning is the behavioral reflection of the 
generality of concepts: "The possession of the capability 
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generated in the learner when a concept is acquired is 
distinguished from all other forms of learning so far 
described by the characteristic of generallability" (p. 
105). 
C. The Six Basic Concepts of the Physical Sciences 
It is very helpful to identify the largest scale 
concepts in the sciences, herein called the basic 
concepts, that are as inclusive as possible of instances; 
in other words, that cover the largest number of questions 
about observations and phenomena. Generality becomes the 
yardstick with which to characterize ideas as basic, 
underlying or fundamental. 
The more fundamental or basic is the idea [a person] 
has learned, almost by definition, the greater will 
be its breadth of applicability to new problems. 
Indeed, this is almost a tautology, for what is meant 
by "fundamental" in this sense is precisely that an 
idea has wide as well as powerful applicability. 
(Bruner, 1960, p.18) 
Considering the physical sciences to be a contiguous 
domain of knowledge, one option for delineating its basic 
concepts would be the following six: nature of matter, 
conservation of energy, waves, chemical bonding, momentum 
and forces, and electricity and magnetism. Likewise 
considering the life sciences to be a contiguous domain, 
the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (1993) proposed 
the following six as its basic concepts: Evolution, 
interaction and interdependence, genetic continuity and 
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reproduction, growth, development, and differentiation, 
energy, matter, and organization, and, finally, 
maintenance of a dynamic equilibrium (p. 107). The 
delineation of these basic concepts is based primarily on 
the practical considerations of identifying intellectual 
tools that are most useful for inquiry-based problem 
solving. As such, there are sure to be alternate 
delineations based upon perceived and changing practical 
needs. They are not based on philosophical arguments of 
which are more important than which. Even though they are 
all referred to as basic concepts, they are ipso facto 
discordant is that they are different tools for answering 
qualitatively different questions. The more different 
they each are, the more they are each a basic concept. 
They each comprise a cluster of understandings that is 
qualitatively different from each of the others, even 
though strong relationships among them exist. 
It might be helpful to discuss the origins of this 
list of six basic concepts for the physical sciences. The 
list developed from efforts to categorize scientific 
questions by forming groups of questions whose answers 
required the application of similar or associated 
concepts. All questions concerning physical phenomena are 
classifiable into one of these six basic concepts. 
Although a synthesis of the tables of contents of a wide 
selection of textbooks are supportive, and most scientists 
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understand the differences among these concepts, the 
assertion that all questions are classifiable within the 
six is primarily based upon my own empirical experience. 
Generality is defined as the proportion of questions, or 
observed phenomena, that illustrate the concept in 
question. What is needed is a method of sampling 
scientific questions as originated by a population of 
people. The source of scientific questions that I have 
used is the popular press, as opposed to scientific 
research journals. Over the past five years I have 
clipped from the daily issues of the New York Times almost 
every article that referred to physical science phenomena. 
I have also clipped many journals such as Time, Newsweek, 
Scientific American, National Geographic, Discover, 
Technology Review, and The Science Teacher. The vast 
majority of articles focus on one or a few questions. 
Other than an occasional article that was solely factual 
information or technological, I have rarely had a problem 
categorizing an article into one of the six basic 
concepts. 
I also wanted to find out if students found these six 
basic concepts to be easy, intuitive classifications for 
their own perceptions of and curiosities about the natural 
world. The introductory unit I have used with many of my 
science classes for the past six years (a total of about 
600 students, in fourth, seventh, eighth and ninth grades. 
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some from a large, inner-city, minority dominated school, 
some from a small, rural, all-white school) consisted of 
classifying questions according to these six basic 
concepts of the physical sciences. None of the students 
had had any relevant instruction in their previous 
academic careers. I first asked students each to write 
six to ten questions that pertained to the physical 
sciences. Any question was acceptable. Questions covered 
every imaginable area, from Why do Arabs wear black, wool 
clothes in the hot desert?, to What makes fire burn?, to 
Why doesn't a motorcycle fall over around a corner? I 
then presented the six concepts in one class period by 
giving examples of questions and picture slides of 
phenomena relevant to each. After combining all student 
questions into a master list of several hundred, students 
were then asked to designate which of the six basic 
concepts would be most useful in answering each question. 
With a little practice (3 or 4 class periods), students 
could correctly classify about 90% of the questions. Many 
of the missed questions were not really scientific. Some 
of them were technological, such as. How do computer work? 
Some were career oriented, such as. What do oceanographers 
do? Occasionally they were unable to classify a question 
such as. What causes the Northern Lights?, due to lack of 
familiarity with the phenomenon. Otherwise, the students 
could classify the questions. Considering how little 
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direct instruction they were given in elucidating the six 
basic concepts, the most likely conclusion is that they 
had already formed their categories without being 
consciously aware of them. The instruction they were 
given only attached names to their already-formed 
concepts. This pattern of learning is well explained in 
Klausmeier's model of conceptual learning and development, 
which distinguishes between the acquisition of a concept 
and the conscious naming of a concept: 
Acquiring and remembering the name of the concept may 
come at any of the four levels [of concept 
attainment]... Having the name of the concept and 
the names of attributes is essential to attaining 
concepts at the formal level... An individual may 
acquire the name at about the same time he first 
attains the concept at lower levels but... this is 
not requisite. For example, a child may acquire a 
concept at all three lower levels but not have the 
concept name. The younger the child is upon 
attaining the concept, the less likely he is to have 
the name for it. (Klausmeier, 1974, p. 13, 14) 
Students need some, even if little, instruction in 
what types of questions each basic concept is best suited 
to address. In other words, they need some direction in 
the proper labelling of the concepts. For example, a 
youth generally perceives questions about light, sound, 
vibrations and water waves to be in different categories, 
as their direct observations would indicate (and as many 
textbooks reinforce). It is not clear to an uninformed 
adolescent that a mirror reflection and an echo are 
conceptually the same. However, they also have the 
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intuition that none of the wave types is a physical object 
and that they all have something in common in their 
opposition to objects. Given some instruction, they are 
usually comfortable with grouping them together under one 
basic concept, particularly after some brief illustrations 
of the commonalities among the phenomena. Once chemical 
bonding is defined to students as the concept that covers 
the changes in composition of materials, they readily 
classify rusting, burning, cooking, explosions and other 
similar phenomena appropriately. The ease with which 
students adopt the waves and chemical bonding categories 
would seem to indicate that these basic concepts were to a 
large extent already formed and the role of instruction is 
primarily to provide a name. Students also generally 
perceive electricity and magnetism to be two separate 
categories. Although they have little objection to 
combining them, they do not generally form a synthesis. 
They do not perceive commonalities between the two, 
primarily because they perceive so few associated 
instances from which to generalize and those that they do 
perceive are largely a matter of magnetic poles or 
electrostatic charges repelling or attracting. 
Each of the basic concepts can be thought of as 
essentially a different perspective on the same reality. 
Combined, the perspectives provide an approximation of 
objective reality. John Henry Newman, writing almost a 
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hundred and fifty years ago on the idea of a University 
(Newman, 1982), talked about the relationships among the 
various sciences. It is interesting to read Newman 
because he is writing at a time when the categories, or 
fields, into which the physical sciences were divided 
greatly resembled the six basic concepts proposed above. 
By substituting "basic concepts" for Newman's "sciences" 
in the following quote, a great deal can be understood 
about the nature of these six basic concepts: 
Then [basic concepts] are the results of mental 
processes about one and the same subject-matter, 
viewed under its various aspects, and are true 
results, as far as they go, yet at the same time 
separate and partial... Viewed together, they 
approximate to a representation or subjective 
reflection of the objective truth, as nearly as is 
possible to the human mind, which advances towards 
the accurate apprehension of that object, in 
proportion to the number of [basic concepts] which it 
has mastered, (p. 35)... In order to ascertain how 
far [each of the basic concepts] do go, that is, how 
far they [each] correspond to the object to which 
they belong, we must compare them with the views 
taken out of that object by other [basic concepts], 
(p. 36) 
A basic concept is thus a perspective from which to 
ask about and thereby understand nature, and together they 
comprise multiple perspectives, each of which complements 
the others. Identifying basic concepts is a matter of 
identifying major perspectives, each of which provides a 
unique insight to an observed phenomenon, and the insights 
are reinforcing and synergistic. A hundred and fifty 
years ago science was still struggling to identify and 
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focus these major perspectives, and it is instructive to 
seek out this history in attempting to identify basic 
concepts. Today, science is highly fragmented and 
sophisticated, making it difficult to see the large-scale, 
underlying foundation of basic perspectives. 
Although the historical approach contributes greatly 
to identifying basic concepts, it is not to imply that 
basic concepts do not change. They do. However, they 
change slowly compared to the changes in the welter of 
more specific knowledge. If ideas are placed along a 
generality continuum, then their rates of change are 
proportional to their generality. An analogy would be how 
the digits on an odometer change, with ideas that are very 
specific and at one end of the continuum changing quickly, 
and the very general ideas at the other end of the 
continuum changing slowly. An example of change in the 
very general, basic concepts might be quantum theory, 
which provides a unique perspective that complements the 
six basic concepts of physical science being proposed 
here. Another example might be the field of chaos theory, 
which is still clarifying its focus but will probably also 
constitute a unique perspective sometime in the future. 
Of the six basic concepts of the physical sciences, 
the most general is the nature of matter. This concept is 
essentially the grammar of science. It begins with the 
idea of the object or entity, referred to as the concept 
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of thing. (Object is not preferred as a term because 
there are some things, such as waves or force fields, that 
are clearly not objects but that are still covered by the 
term thing.) It is the idea of dividing the natural world 
into entities. It is the discrimination of a thing from 
its environs. Such entities are mentally endowed with 
their own identities separate from that of their 
surroundings and are given names in recognition of their 
separate identities. It is emphasized that the 
discriminations are in the eye of the beholder, and can be 
changed at will, particularly when extended to the idea of 
system. 
The second major component of nature of matter is 
property, in that all entities are delineated from their 
environments based on differences in properties, and are 
themselves described by their properties. The concept of 
property accompanies thing because it is the mental tool 
used to make discriminations and delineations as well as 
to describe a delineated object in its own right. 
Property also underlies the process skills associated with 
classification, since "the most common, and most useful, 
systems of classification in the sciences are based on the 
physical properties of objects" (Karplus & Thier, 1967, p. 
133). Similarly, property includes serial ordering and 
measurement and all the process skills associated with 
measurement, since "serial ordering is the arranging of 
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objects in order on the basis of some property" (Karplus 
and Thier, 1967, p. 133). 
Also included in nature of matter is process. A 
process is an event, happening, occurrence or phenomenon, 
motion being the quintessential process. Concomitant with 
the discrimination of a thing from its environs and its 
description is the realization that things can change 
properties (or, more accurately, the measurement of those 
properties) while maintaining their identities. During a 
process, the properties of things change, they do so in a 
temporal sequence, and changes that are related lead to 
the concept of causality. It includes the idea of 
continuity because the changes in the values of properties 
are successive and incremental. 
Robert Karplus, working in the early 1960's to 
develop the post-sputnik elementary science program SCIS 
(Science Curriculum Improvement Study), explicitly 
identified the concepts that he was attempting to have 
children understand. As a physicist, Karplus did not 
depend upon cognitive or developmental psychology to help 
him identify these concepts. Rather, he relied upon his 
own knowledge of physics. Yet the results are remarkably 
similar: 
The program began with a consideration of the 
material objects that are involved in an experiment. 
Such a collection of objects that are of interest at 
one time is called a system. The component parts of 
the system are called objects. Finally, the word 
interaction is used to designate the mutual influence 
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of objects which results in changes in the 
appearances of the system... (p. 12) The central 
objective [of SCIS] is to lead children to approach 
the observation and analysis of natural phenomena by 
thinking in terms of systems of interacting objects 
or components (p. 15). (Karplus and Thier, 1967) 
Considering its generality, it is not surprising that 
nature of matter is also the first concept formed by an 
infant, even though it was originally delineated from the 
practical standpoint of inquiry-based problem solving. 
Piaget called this concept the object concept and 
demonstrated how it is the first stage of thought for an 
infant: "During the sensorimotor period [from birth to 
about 2 years], the infant elaborates several basic 
dimensions of reality, especially the primitive notions of 
the permanent object, space, time, and causality... An 
'object,' according to Piaget, is something which the 
individual conceives of as having a reality of its own, 
and as extending beyond his immediate perception" 
(Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 41). 
The confluence of developmental psychology and 
scientific thinking is not really as surprising as it 
might at first seem. "The impressive methods that science 
has developed - methods that sometimes seem so formidable 
- are in no sense superhuman. They involve only 
improvement - great, to be sure - of procedures of 
observation and analysis that the human race has always 
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used... In short, every man is to some degree a 
scientist" (Weaver, 1962, p. 107). 
A scientist will recognize that nature of matter, 
with its three primary constituents of thing, property, 
and process, undergirds the entire scientific way of 
thinking. "In practice, science works by breaking 
connections, by isolating, by fracturing the world into 
myriad parts like a shattered crystal. What is a 
laboratory bench but an arena for isolating one thing from 
the rest of the world? What is an experiment but an 
attempt to reduce the many variables in experience to 
one?" (Raymo, 1990). For a scientist, the idea of a thing 
as an entity with its own identity is abstracted to 
include waves and such entities as electric and magnetic 
fields. These thing-concepts are described in terms of 
their properties, many of which are abstract, such as the 
various forms of energy or moments of inertia. The core 
of scientific process and of the scientific method is the 
description of a process in terms of how the values of the 
properties of the involved thing-concepts change over 
time. The power and excitement of the scientific method 
is deciphering causalities among the changing properties. 
Thus the nature of matter is the epistemological 
foundation of science. Because science is a point of view 
upon all nature, it is the most universal of the basic 
concepts. All five of the remaining basic concepts of 
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physical science, as well as those of the life sciences, 
pertain to categories of processes. 
The second basic concept gleaned from asking about 
the natural world is conservation of energy, dealing with 
processes in which energy is transferred and transformed 
between objects. "Matter and energy are probably the two 
most basic concepts in natural science" (Harold, 1993, p. 
94). Conservation of energy is less general than nature 
of matter because it is only evident during interactions 
between things, and only a portion of observable things 
are interacting. A detailed analysis of this basic 
concept and its development will be carried out in the 
next section on the criterial attribute of complexity. 
The genesis of conservation of energy among children, and 
its relation to the classical Piagetian conservation tasks 
that are associated with nature of matter, was the 
subject of investigation of my doctoral research as 
documented in the main body of this dissertation. If the 
structuring of science curriculum is to mimic the 
cognitive structuring of concepts according to generality, 
as well as the other two attributes of complexity and 
abstractness, then the implied placement of conservation 
of energy becomes the greatest discrepancy between such a 
curriculum and conventional curricula. As discussed in 
the Review of Literature, the conventional view is that 
concepts associated with energy are difficult to learn for 
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even advanced high school students. This we11-documented 
difficulty could be attributed to either the inherent 
difficulty of the concepts, and/or to the pedagogy of the 
concepts. The presumption has been that the first factor 
was the responsible agent, yet there are good indications 
that it is the poorly designed pedagogy that is the major 
culprit. 
In illustration, a few years ago I organized one of 
my low-performance ninth grade science classes to teach 
the forms of energy and conservation of energy to third 
graders after having taught it to them according to the 
above conceptual scheme. As a final exercise, the third 
graders each brought a toy to school that demonstrated 
some form of energy conversion and presented the toy and 
their analysis of it according to these two concepts to 
the rest of the class. It was clear from their 
presentations that the third graders had grasped the 
concepts at least to the depth of being able to apply 
them. 
In light of such experience, why would the 
conventional view of the difficulty, or accessibility, of 
energy concepts be so different? In looking at the 
conventional pedagogy, the root of the problem is that 
"energy is defined as the capacity to do work. The 
definition of work is harder to come by and more abstract" 
(Harold, 1993, p. 94), but harder and more abstract than 
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what? Professor Harold does not say, and neither is he 
alone in such silence. Conventional energy curricula 
start with work without looking at its conceptual 
antecedents that would, by definition, be easier. They 
also form the groundwork necessary before work can be 
significantly understood. 
That third graders should be able to demonstrably and 
significantly understand conservation of energy is not so 
surprising in light of Piaget's theory. These ages 
coincide with the onset of Piaget's concrete operational 
phase, "the first level of conceptual (logical) thought... 
Concrete operational cognition involves conceptual 
thinking in combination with a concrete image... Two 
essential structures of thinking are capable of being 
applied within this phase: reversibility and 
conservation" (Maiers, 1978, p. 54). Not only is the 
child now capable of conserving length, weight and volume, 
as Piaget demonstrated directly, but the child can also 
conserve energy. "The focus shifts from experience with 
things to conceptions of things" (Maiers, 1978, p. 56), 
and the child is able to conceive of an intangible 
property, such as the forms of energy, belonging to a 
tangible object. Children observe the relationship 
between how much they eat and how energetic they feel, how 
fast a car is going and how bad an accident results, how 
stretched a rubber band is and how far it flies, how hard 
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they throw a ball and how high it goes, how many batteries 
are in the radio and how long it works. From these varied 
experiences, all very concrete, they rationalize that 
there is a something that flows from one object to the 
other and that the proportionality between the two sides 
of the flow is linear; in other words, it is conserved. 
Nicholls and Ogborn (1993) produced an inventory of 
children's ideas when asked about energy that showed that 
"the main structure, common to the younger and the older 
children, is a distinction between SOURCES and USERS or 
CONSUMERS (emphasis in the original) of energy... It 
seems that the strongest basic notion of energy is as a 
source of action" (p. 80, 81). Underlying both of these 
conclusions is the idea of a flow between interacting 
objects. 
As a conceptual analog of Piaget's theory, the basic 
concepts develop over time and the birth of the next 
originates in the preceding ones as well as augmenting and 
completing them: "Each stage is both a culmination of the 
one preceding and a preparation for the one to follow" 
(Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 66). Within Piagetian theory, 
the second structure of thinking, reversibility, (in which 
a child is able to conceive of a transformation process as 
a link between two states of interacting things, thereby 
using this link to mentally reverse the transformation and 
return to the original state) further supports and builds 
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the child's concept of process. It is the most 
sophisticated part of the nature of matter concept, and is 
the foundation upon which conservation of energy is based 
because energy is always perceived to flow during an 
interactive process. Using Piagetian terminology, nature 
of matter assimilates the perception of energy forms as 
properties of the object, and accommodates to the 
perception of energy flow between objects by elaborating 
the causality concept to include proportionality. What is 
fundamental about perceiving energy flow between 
interacting things is its proportional causality, and 
through the perceptions of this causality the process 
concept is reinforced. To extract proportionalities from 
a perceived process, the child must be able to manipulate 
mentally all the sequential events of a process in 
relation to all the others. This mental agility is 
described by reversibility: "It means that individuals 
can be questioned about any one point in the account they 
are relating to someone. They can be interrupted; they 
can interrupt themselves; they can go back to an earlier 
point of their story" (Maiers, 1978, p. 55). 
Reversability describes the realization that a sequence of 
events are related. Within the context of science, it is 
the ability to extract from a multitude of sequentially 
observed property changes candidates for correlation. 
These candidates can be compared by mentally jumping back 
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and forth in the sequence. Thus the concept of 
proportionality, where changes in one property correlate 
with the changes in another, is formed. 
This analysis of the origins of conservation of 
energy also provides its definition in conceptual terms 
independent of energy vocabulary. Combining the various 
steps of the analysis results in a definition of 
conservation of energy as proportional causality during an 
interactive process. Such a definition is powerful 
because it constitutes the independent variables that can 
be manipulated experimentally to investigate children's 
acquisition and depth of understanding of the concept. 
The investigation carried out as part of this dissertation 
was based on such a definition of conservation of energy. 
Before moving on to the next basic concept, it is 
important at this point to address how a child assimilates 
perceptions of motion into his/her conceptual structure. 
This issue is pivotally important for science curriculum 
planning and it will be discussed in detail at a later 
point. Many of the problems with present physical science 
curricula can be traced to a poor understanding of this 
issue. 
The natural world seems in constant motion. How does 
a child incorporate such observations into conceptual 
structure? From all the observed instances of motion, a 
child generalizes two concepts: speed and kinetic energy. 
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Speed is perceived as a characteristic of the object, in 
the same way as its other physical properties, and thus, 
at its genesis, speed is part of the child's ^nature of 
matter basic concept. Speed is directly observable to a 
child, and therefore, to a child, speed is concrete. A 
child does not understand speed as a ratio of distance 
covered and time elapsed any more than he/she understands 
color to be a combination of wavelengths. 
Children not only see motion, they also feel it as 
they interact with their environment. The concept they 
form from these sensations is kinetic energy, even though 
they usually use labels such as force and power. 
Following the conceptual structure of nature of matter, 
they endow objects with an intrinsic property that closely 
resembles what a scientist would call kinetic energy. 
Many of the observed causalities that lead a child to the 
formation of conservation of energy consist of seeing and 
feeling transformations of kinetic energy from or to other 
energy forms. Without taking a formal count, it is 
probably safe to say that the majority of interactions 
noticed by a child involve motion, and therefore their 
concept of kinetic energy. 
The difference between speed and kinetic energy is 
that the latter includes the effect of mass, or weight. 
It is possible to check whether children have formed 
kinetic energy in its own right, separate from speed. If 
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they are shown two different collisions in which speed is 
apparently held constant, do they attribute the difference 
to weight? The investigation carried out for this 
dissertation had children explain why two apparently 
identical balls rolling down a ramp would push a box with 
which they collided to significantly different distances. 
The hypothesis of the investigation was that there would 
be a significant correlation between the children's 
ability to conserve in the classical Piagetian tasks and 
their ability to correctly attribute the difference in the 
collisions to a difference in the weight of the balls. 
The results of the investigation did not find such a 
correlation to be either strong or significant. In other 
words, the ability to explain the difference between the 
collisions had little to do with the ability to conserve. 
However, the correlation between the children's age and 
their ability to interpret these collisions was 0.33 at a 
.011 level of significance. The indication is that a 
child's age has an effect on his/her ability to use 
kinetic energy as a concept separate from speed. 
Beyond nature of matter and conservation of energy, 
the other basic concepts of the physical sciences are 
waves, chemical bonding, momentum and forces and 
electricity and magnetism, in decreasing order of 
generality. The various types of waves can be united 
under the basic concept of waves, which deals with 
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processes in which energy is transferred through a medium. 
Waves includes water waves, sound, light (radiation) and 
vibrations. There are a large number of instances in the 
natural world observable to children of waves, 
particularly when considering that the two senses of sight 
and hearing depend upon waves. Thus waves is the third 
most general of the basic concepts. 
Chemical bonding deals with questions concerned with 
the changes in composition of an object or substance. 
Once it has been developed as an umbrella concept, it 
becomes the fourth most universal of the basic concepts. 
Up to this point, the given order of basic concepts is 
well supported by both the relative number of clippings 
from the popular press and the relative number of 
questions generated by students. 
Momentum and forces deals with processes in which the 
speed of an object changes. Questions best addressed by 
this basic concept focus on the mechanics of an 
interaction rather than the larger-scale, input-output, 
before-after perspective of the prior four basic concepts. 
It is important to note, as will be developed in future 
sections, that force is part of the conservation of energy 
basic concept as the measure of an interaction's 
intensity. Force and interaction are thus an early part 
of a science curriculum that is organized with a 
conceptual structure built according to generality. 
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complexity and abstractness. Many scientists consider 
momentum and forces to be one of the most general basic 
concepts, particularly if assuming that this concept 
includes all mention of force. It can indeed be used to 
analyze any interaction with great detail. Furthermore, 
analyzing the mechanics of an interaction includes its 
larger-scale beginning and end states. However, the level 
of detail it affords is not often needed for scientific 
literacy beyond what the concept of interaction can 
provide. It is an extremely powerful and general tool 
wielded by the mind of someone trained in its use, but 
simpler tools earn yield satisfactory answers too. 
The only basic concept that is less universal than 
momentum and forces is electricity and magnetism. It is 
of such low generality simply because there are few 
readily observable associated phenomena, and students 
rarely produce relevant questions. Those they do produce, 
such as. What creates lightning?, they can usually 
classify easily. Many questions, particularly those 
associated with home appliances and wiring, can be 
adequately dealt with in terms of electrical energy, part 
of conservation of energy. The scientist's knowledge that 
electromagnetic forces are the governing forces of the 
atomic and molecular levels of matter and therefore can be 
used to address an extremely large variety of questions is 
irrelevant in terms of scientific literacy. Such a 
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perspective produces a level of detail that is rarely 
needed. It is appropriate for those students who wish to 
pursue science, spiralling to greater and greater depths 
in their understanding of a particular question. 
D. The Curricular Implications of Generality 
The fact that concepts, being generic, can be rated 
according to the attribute of generality, has clear 
implications for curriculum in the physical sciences. "In 
Ausubel's view, concept development proceeds best when the 
most general, most inclusive elements of a concept are 
introduced first and then the concept is progressively 
differentiated in terms of detail and specificity (Novak, 
1977, p. 86). "Which specific curriculum items are 
selected depends on how fundamental and crucial they are 
to the discipline, how well they explicate its structure, 
how powerful they are in furthering its characteristic 
thought processes and modes of inquiry" (Johnson, 1967, p. 
133). Generality provides a clear method of assigning 
concepts to a continuum between absolutely universal and 
absolutely specific so that a curricular sequence can be 
established. For example, what would be the best way to 
teach about Saturn's orbital motion so that students were 
exercising their problem solving ability? Its periods of 
rotation and revolution are factual, as is its particular 
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perigee and apogee. The topic of planetary motion could 
be construed as a concept, but it has low generality since 
it applies to only a handful of questions about the 
various motions of the planets and their moons. Circular 
motion is a more general concept since it includes 
planetary motion as well as many other instances. 
Repetitive motion is even more universal, including 
circular, elliptical, harmonic and other modes. Further 
up the continuum, motion in general would include 
repetitive as well as rectilinear motion. (Referencing 
the summary chart of concepts at the end of this appendix, 
the distinction between repetitive and rectilinear motion 
would be addressed as part of multi-dimensional motion, 
and motion would be addressed when dealing directly with 
the basic concept of momentum and forces.) Therefore, to 
teach Saturn's orbital motion, it would be best to start 
with categorizing motion as either rectilinear or 
repetitive, discussing the differences, and then focusing 
on circular motion as an example of repetitive motion. 
Planetary motion would then be seen as a type of circular 
motion, and Saturn would be used as the example. 
As another example, consider the respective 
generalities of phase, temperature, texture and mass 
(gravitational). Each of these four attributes applies to 
any physical object and each is a distinct concept. If a 
person uses one set of instances from which to generalize 
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one of these, the same set can be used to generalize any 
of the others. There is little difference in the number 
of questions focused on each. Therefore, these four 
concepts are equally general. For example, if a person is 
distinguishing between an orange and a lemon, "the 
attributes that allow some objects to be classified as 
oranges and others as lemons are size, color, shape, and 
taste" (Klausmeier et al., 1969, p. 3). Adding these two 
lists, all eight of the concepts are equally universal 
because they are all generalized from the same set of 
instances and seem to generate the same levels of inquiry. 
Klopfer, Champagne and Chaiklin (1992) titled an article 
The Ubiquitous Quantities in calling for an emphasis on 
teaching mass, volume, weight, and density so that all 
high school graduates would have a clear understanding of 
them. Their argument for the importance of these concepts 
rests upon their high generality, as the title of their 
article implies. In a curriculum, these concepts, all 
properties of things, could be either introduced as a 
group and taught simultaneously, in contrast to each 
other, or could be taught is many different orders. 
Contrast the dozen concepts just described with 
wavelength and amplitude. Neither of these two concepts 
applies to objects; they apply to waves. The number of 
instances of waves in the observable world, particularly a 
world observed dominantly through sight, is less than for 
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objects, and the number of related questions is also less. 
The concept of matter, including both well-delineated 
objects and substances or materials, is more universal 
than the concept of waves, and therefore concepts 
associated with waves, such as wavelength and amplitude, 
will be less universal than those associated with matter. 
These two properties of waves should therefore be taught 
after the more universal properties associated with 
matter. 
The concept that is more general than any of the 
specific properties just named is the concept of property 
itself, common synonyms being attribute, characteristic, 
feature, quantity, factor, or variable. It is very 
similar, if not identical, to the idea of an adjective. 
Property is one of the most universal concepts of science 
in that all science begins by dividing nature into 
discreet things, and this division is accomplished 
according to differences in their properties. Since all 
properties belong to things, and all things are defined 
according to their properties, property and thing are 
equally universal concepts. 
Thing is presented in a highly abstract form as 
system in many science curricula, even at the elementary 
level. Otherwise, it is rarely mentioned. Of the three 
attributes of concepts, generality, complexity, and 
abstractness, a discussion of thing is best approached 
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from the perspective of abstractness and will be presented 
in that future section. From the perspective of 
generality, thing is highly universal and should therefore 
be taught, in a simple, concrete manner, early in a 
science program. Certainly, students might understand the 
concept at an intuitive level, since it is very similar to 
Piaget’s object concept and Klausmeier's first level of 
concept development: "Concrete Level: Attending to 
things - Discriminating one thing from another - 
Remembering the discriminated thing" (Klausmeier et al., 
1974, p. 13). However, science takes this most elementary 
and universal of concepts and extends and elaborates it, 
eventually metamorphosing it into system. System is an 
important concept to an in-depth understanding of the 
physical sciences, yet it is questionable how much it is 
needed for universal literacy beyond the more intuitive 
concept of thing. It would seem counter-productive to 
introduce it too early, certainly not at the elementary 
level. 
Another example taken from my own experience teaching 
an Earth Science high school class is. How, or even 
should, the concept of relative humidity be taught? 
Relative humidity, usually difficult for students to 
understand, refers to how much water vapor air contains 
compared to how much it could contain. The generality of 
this concept is low because its instances are rather few. 
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particularly from the perspective of an adolescent who has 
few related questions. The curricular implication is that 
students should start with a concept that is more 
universal, one for which instances are likely to have been 
observed by students and that could spark their curiosity. 
By definition, increasing the number of instances means 
finding the concept that is more universal, further up the 
continuum. The more universal concept is relative 
concentration, which can be taught with liquids on a lab 
bench and for which there are more numerous examples in a 
student's environment. Thus the argument of whether or 
how to teach relative humidity is one of ascertaining to 
what degree students already understand relative 
concentration, and then how to teach it with the goal in 
mind of ending with the preferred instances, i.e. relative 
humidity. These issues are objective in that they can be 
answered with reasonable confidence. 
E. Summary 
Concepts represent mental categories of instances 
that have some common attributes. These common attributes 
of the instances are called the criterial attributes of 
the concept since they form the criteria according to 
which the instances have been grouped into the category. 
The concept takes on its own identity as described by its 
criterial attributes. Concepts are necessarily generic to 
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some degree since they must apply to the variety of 
instances from which they were formed, the degree being a 
function of the number of instances. But describing 
concepts as more or less generic automatically implies 
that concepts themselves are a concept and that, as a 
meta-concept, it also has criterial attributes. The 
generic-ness of a concept is described by the criterial 
attribute of generality. Like all attributes, generality 
exists on a continuum. One extreme of the continuum, 
absolutely specific, defines an instance, or fact. The 
continuum of generality gives educators a very potent 
basis for curriculum design. Another of the criterial 
attributes of concept is its validity, the degree to which 
experts agree upon its definition. Fortunately, the 
concepts used in science have a great degree of validity, 
which avoids many arguments. Conversely, validity is of 
little practical use to the science educator in comparing 
and organizing concepts. 
The next step in defining a concept, which will lead 
to the next criterial attribute, is to complete the answer 
to the question. What is NOT a concept? On one side, 
instances or facts make up concepts, and a discussion of 
this aspect led to the criterial attribute of generality. 
In their turn, concepts are the components of principles, 
so the relationship between concepts and principles will 
be discussed next. The investigation of this relationship 
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THE CRITERIAL ATTRIBUTE OF COMPLEXITY 
The first task of this section will be to show that 
the categorical distinction between concepts and 
principles is best explained as differences in the 
complexity of concepts, just as the contrast between facts 
and concepts gave rise to the criterial attribute of 
generality in the last section. Since complexity can in 
general be defined as the number of components, the major 
task is to define the types of components within concepts 
which are to be counted in arriving at a measure of 
complexity. The derivation of this criterial attribute 
will demonstrate it to be more objective than either 
generality or abstractness. It is actually possible to 
establish numerical values for complexity that are 
reasonably valid. 
Before proceeding to identify and count components in 
sample concepts, an important issue must be dealt with. 
Concepts are made up other concepts, which in their turn 
are made up other concepts, eventually arriving at 
component facts. Therefore, for any given concept, a 
level, or scale, at which to count must be established. 
Unfortunately, of the six theorists being synthesized who 
speak most directly to this issue, Gagne and Ausubel 
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disagree on this most important issue, and therefore a 
detailed analysis and resolution of the conflict is 
necessary. 
A. The Difference between Concepts and Principles 
Is One of Complexity 
As far as science curriculum is concerned, there is 
no important difference between a concept and a principle 
(or theory, basic idea, or law) except that it helps 
define the second criterial attribute of science concepts, 
complexity. Yet within learning theory a categorical 
distinction is made by Ausubel and Gagne, but not by the 
other four theorists whose work is being synthesized in 
this paper. The thesis of this paper is identifying the 
commonalities among the six theorists, and as such it is 
important to demonstrate that the distinction made by 
Ausubel and Gagne is best dealt with by a curriculum 
planner as defining the extremes for a continuum that is 
explicitly recognized by the other theorists. 
To begin, consider Ausubel’s distinction between 
concept and principle: 
Principles differ from concepts in that they involve 
meaningful relational combinations of concepts that 
are propositional in nature. In other words, a 
principle, by definition, is a composite idea. 
Although many concepts, especially those of a 
higher-order nature, involve one or more 
relationships between lower-order concepts, any given 
concept is only a unitary, generic idea with a set of 
specifiable criterial attributes. "Velocity," for 
example, [is a concept that] involves a relationship 
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between time and distance, and 'acceleration1 is a 
concept is which force is related to mass (p. 96)... 
Concepts (unitary, generic or categorical ideas) are 
... represented by single symbols (p. 47).... 
(Ausubel et al., 1978). 
To Ausubel, there is a distinction between concepts 
and principles. Concepts are generic, unitary, can be 
specified by their criterial attributes and can be 
represented with a single symbol. Therefore, by logical 
extension, principles are ideas that must not conform to 
at least one of these four criteria. For example, Ausubel 
identifies two principles familiar to teachers: grouping 
and marking (Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 6 -11). To gain 
insight into his distinction, it is productive to see how 
these two principles conform to his definition. Certainly 
they are both generic. They also are represented by 
single symbols, their name-words. But can they be clearly 
specified and delineated with a set of component concepts 
that are their criterial attributes? (As described 
previously, the criterial attributes for a science concept 
are its minimum and objective component concepts.) Both 
can certainly be described in terms of some criterial 
attributes: grouping involves student, number of 
students, ability of student, performance of student, and 
mix (or uniformity) of abilities and performances. 
Marking involves student, assignment, and evaluation. 
Unfortunately, they cannot be SPECIFIED in terms of their 
criterial attributes, and here is the distinction that 
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must make them, according to Ausubel, principles and not 
concepts. For example, some educators would include in 
grouping the age or maturity or cultural background or 
race of the students. Under marking might be included 
expert or bell curve or national average or effort. 
Although any one expert might well have a clear set of 
criterial attributes, the next educator-expert might well 
have a different set. 
The two principles of grouping and marking are not 
specifiable because there are a large number of possible 
component concepts, and a minimum, objective collection 
cannot be identified. In other words, these principles 
are highly complex, to the point where their complexity 
cannot be objectively established. Thus Ausubel's 
distinction of specifiability between principles and 
concepts can be interpreted in terms of complexity of 
component concepts. 
The fourth criterion, according to Ausubel, that 
distinguishes concepts from principles is that concepts 
are unitary. Although Ausubel does not elaborate on 
exactly what he means by unitary, it would seem to mean 
that the essential criterial attributes of the concept are 
well delineated and together form a coherent and complete 
idea that can stand on its own, very similar to the 
concept of system in science. Furthermore, unitary would 
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imply that it can maintain its unique identity while 
contributing to conceptual learning. 
An example of a principle that is not a concept 
because it is not unitary might be another of Ausubel's 
examples: "Green plants manufacture food" (Ausubel et 
al., 1978, p. 127). Each of these four words is itself a 
concept ("green" is technically a fact), and might be 
considered to be the criterial attributes of the 
principle. But the sum of the four does not yield a 
complete and coherent idea encompassing all that is 
involved in the principle. Other component concepts must 
be, and are, necessary to a coherent understanding of the 
principle. For example, light and energy transformation 
are necessary as well. 
Non-unitary could be interpreted to mean, again, 
indeterminately complex. Even Ausubel implicity describes 
this complexity. To Ausubel "principles differ from 
concepts in that they involve meaningful relational 
combinations of concepts that are propositional in nature" 
(Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 96). As propositional learning 
is necessary to learn a proposition, or principle, 
consider Ausubel's description of propositional learning: 
In PROPOSITIONAL LEARNING the meaningful learning 
task is not to learn what words singly, or in 
combination, represent, but rather to learn the 
meaning of new ideas expressed in propositional 
terms. In true propositional learning, in other 
words, the object is not to learn propositions of 
representational equivalence but to learn the meaning 
of verbal propositions that express ideas other than 
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those of representational equivalence. That is, the 
meaning of the proposition is not simply the sum of 
the meanings of the component words. (Ausubel et 
al., 1978, p. 47) 
Ausubel also stipulates that concepts have single 
symbols (which can be words). However, to define a 
category of ideas based solely on the number of words used 
for nomenclature seems to be a petty distinction for 
educators. The principle that "green plants manufacture 
food" could also be labelled as photosynthesis, but the 
change to a single symbol does not change its inherent 
meaning. The use of the name photosynthesis is powerful 
in that it seems to give the proposition "green plants 
manufacture food" a unitary nature. This power of 
language should not be discounted, particularly for ease 
of communication. Neither should it be overemphasized as 
changing the essential nature of the principle as a mental 
construct representing objective reality. If this 
essential nature is interpreted to mean its complexity, 
then the categorical distinctions of being unitary or 
having a single symbol can be more parsimoniously and 
flexibly translated as characterizing the complexity of a 
concept. 
Simpler concepts are usually named because, being 
simple, there is little ambiguity about their meaning and 
communication is expedited. Principles are more likely to 
have longer names or no specific names because of the 
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difficulty in delineating the many component concepts. 
For example, the principle of original horizontality that 
is important in geology is complex. Again, the naming 
criterion seems to translate into degrees of complexity. 
However, there is only a loose connection between the 
length or existence of a name and the complexity of 
scientific concepts. For example, evolution and model are 
complex, not easily specified concepts that have succinct 
names. 
Principles and propositions extend a complexity 
continuum beyond concepts to the realm of implicit and 
subjective meaning contained within propositional 
thoughts. The complexity of the ideational content can 
become so great and yet so indeterminate that, as with 
poetry, every reader sees a different perspective. In 
many regards, the ability to perceive and appreciate such 
complexity is the culmination of conceptual understanding, 
and could well be called creativity. "My view of creative 
behavior is that this behavior occurs when an individual 
makes unique associations across concepts at higher levels 
in a conceptual structure... We see creative behavior as 
a tendency to build hierarchical conceptual structures and 
to seek relationships between higher-order concepts " 
(Novak, 1977. p. 110). 
As stated at the beginning of this section, Gagne 
also makes a distinction between principles and concepts 
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similar to Ausubel's. Just as Ausubel distinguishes 
between principles and concepts, so Gagne distinguishes 
between a rule and a concept: 
The capabilities that make symbol use possible are 
what we mean by intellectual skills (p. 49)... The 
most typical form of an intellectual skill... is 
called a rule (p. 51)... An initial step in the... 
analysis of a rule produces the new category of 
intellectual skill called a concept. The concept is 
a component of a rule and is thus subordinate to it. 
Learning the simplest rule is a matter of combining 
some previously learned concepts in a particular way 
(p. 53). (Gagne, 1985) 
Gagne defines rule as an intellectual skill that 
makes symbol use possible. Since symbols represent 
concepts, then a rule manipulates concepts, but is not 
itself a concept. Such is the definition of a principle 
given by Ausubel. As it turns out, Gagne's rule is 
equivalent to Ausubel's principle. However, as the 
following quote shows, Gagne actually has a more inclusive 
definition for a rule than solely that of Ausubel's 
principle: "In science, the individual learns many rules 
in the form of defined concepts, such as those for force, 
mass, density and energy, and many others that relate 
these concepts, such as F = ma" (Gagne, 1985, p. 119). 
Gagne seems to blur his own distinction, tacitly saying 
that the distinction is one of complexity and that exact 
demarcations are unnecessary. 
Joseph Novak co-authored Ausubel's seminal work on 
learning theory and has continued developing and applying 
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his own ideas to education. It is therefore significant 
that Novak also drops the distinction between concept and 
principle, or, the term he uses, theory: 
Theories serve to link concepts or suggest ways in 
which concepts may be related. Theories are like 
higher-order concepts in that they may suggest order 
or relationships between less inclusive concepts. 
For example, we may speak of the concept of organic 
evolution or the theory of organic evolution, 
referring in either case to the concepts of mutation, 
species, change, and time that together comprise this 
concept or theory." (Novak, 1977, p. 18) 
Checking with Piaget for his opinion of this 
categorical distinction shows that his idea of a schema, 
or scheme, depending upon the translator, is close to the 
broad, inclusive definition of a concept wherein 
principles are the more complex variety. Consider the 
following definitions given by Maier: 
Schema: A Piagetian term with a number of varied 
definitions, a schema is understood in this account 
as 'an instrument of generalization' (Piaget, J., and 
Inhelder, B., 1973, Memory and intelligence. New 
York: Basic Books. P. 362)... Descriptively, a 
schema can be explained as a tool of thinking which, 
in the thinking process, places the subject matter 
into similar classes or obtains a law of reasoning as 
the outcome of thinking. (Maier, 1978, p. 24). 
This definition would apply equally well to 
concepts, where a "law of reasoning" would be a good 
description of a principle. 
For science educators, the focus on concepts 
includes those ideas called principles, theories, or laws. 
No categorical distinction among these terms is necessary. 
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The following quote from an eminent introductory college 
physics text illustrates that to scientists the 
distinctions between these types are of little importance: 
In any sub-field of physics, there are just a few 
fundamental concepts or laws derived from 
experimental measurements. Once one has mastered 
these basic ideas, the applications are usually 
straightforward conceptually, even though the details 
may sometimes become complicated. Consequently, it 
is important to focus one's attention on the basic 
principles and to avoid memorizing a mass of facts 
and formulas" (Kane and Sternheim, 1988, p. xii). 
In this paragraph, the terms concepts, laws, basic 
ideas, and basic principles are used as synonyms, with 
their definition primarily being in opposition to facts 
and formulas. Clearly, though, if all non-fact ideas are 
concepts, there are differences among concepts beyond 
their generality. Thus is reached the point of defining 
the second criterial attribute of concepts important to 
science educators, complexity. Ideas known as principles, 
laws, theories, or propositions are more complex than 
those generally known as concepts. 
B, The Criterial Attribute of Complexity 
The complexity of a concept refers to the number of 
ideas contained within that concept and that are necessary 
for its understanding. In other words, complexity counts 
the number of essential criterial attributes of a concept. 
Gagne states explicitly that "the very important learned 
capability called intellectual skill has a number of 
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forms, some simple and some more complex" (Gagne, 1985, p. 
54). Bloom (1956) explicitly used complexity as the major 
theme for organizing his hierarchy of cognitive behaviors: 
"In order to find a single place for each type of 
behavior, the taxonomy must be organized from simple to 
complex classes of behavior" (p. 16). 
As was mentioned when the criterial attribute of 
generality was developed in the last chapter, Klausmeier 
(1974) listed eight attributes of concept, three of which 
(Usability, Power, and Instance Numerousness) were shown 
to be contained within the criterial attribute of 
generality. From the remaining five, two are contained 
within complexity. Unfortunately, terminology is a 
problem because Klausmeier's attribute of generality 
actually belongs as part of complexity as defined here. 
The two attributes are: Generality ("the number of 
subclasses or subordinate concepts it includes," p. 8), 
and Structure, which describes the links between concepts: 
"Any public concept defined in terms of attributes has a 
structure, a relatedness of the defining attributes" (p. 
8). The links themselves can constitute concepts and, 
like all concepts, can then be defined by their criterial 
attributes, as will be shown shortly. 
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C. The Types of Component Concepts that are Counted 
to Determine Complexity 
There are five types of concepts that can be counted 
when ascertaining the complexity of a particular physical 
science idea: object-concepts, properties, time, 
direction, and link concepts. Time and direction are 
technically properties, but they are different from all 
other properties in that they describe processes, not 
object-concepts. Time describes all processes simply as 
their duration or as the measure of the rate at which 
properties change during the process. Direction is a 
property that describes the process of motion. Both time 
and direction are pivotal criterial attributes of many 
scientific concepts and carry an identity of their own. 
Each of these five types will be developed and elaborated 
in turn, after which they will be used to analyze the 
complexity of various concepts in the physical sciences. 
To begin, there are object-concepts, as was described 
in the discussion of nature of matter in the previous 
chapter on generality. Object-concepts, which can be 
objects or substances, are discriminated from their 
environments and given an identity of their own as 
manifested in their names. Object-concepts can be very 
concrete, such as cars, clouds, or candy. They can be 
less concrete, such as light waves, molecules or galaxies. 
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and even highly abstract, such as an electric field. 
Although these examples, and there are an infinite number 
of possibilities, vary according to their abstractness, 
they are all object-concepts. They are conceived of as 
coherent units that are described by their inherent 
properties. 
Properties are the second type of component concept, 
also called characteristics, factors, attributes, features 
or qualities. Examples would be scale, composition, 
phase, dimensions (lengths, areas, volumes), shape, 
temperature, density, all the energy forms, speed, 
acceleration, charge, and so on. Properties can be direct 
observations, such as color or temperature. They can be 
derived from other properties, as are density, the energy 
forms, electrical conductivity, etc.. 
All properties are seen to be integral to, or within, 
object-concepts in that they are part of the identity of 
the object-concepts. Properties are the object-concept's 
criterial attributes because properties are, by 
definition, how object-concepts are identified and 
described. For example, when a scientist considers a 
wave, there is one object-concept in the scientist's mind, 
and that mental image is configured according to its 
criterial attributes of medium, velocity (speed and 
direction), wavelength and amplitude. Even though a 
property necessarily belongs to an object-concept, it 
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maintains a conceptual identity separate from that of an 
object-concept. All properties have values, and they are 
conceived of with a value, meaning how much or what degree 
of the property the object-concept possesses. Some 
properties, such as number or force magnitude, are almost 
entirely value. A property is imagined as a unitary 
concept with its own identity, separate from any 
particular thing. Even though a property always "belongs" 
to SOME thing, it also belongs to ANY thing, and is thus 
generalized and divorced from any particular thing. 
The third and fourth "types" of concepts that are 
counted, time and direction, are not really types. Time 
starts as a perception of sequenced events, this being the 
form in which young children use it to understand process. 
As such, it is not unitary, is not a bona fide concept, 
and is not counted when calculating complexity. Time, as 
a stand-alone, unitary concept is independent of 
perceptual data, and is understood as the independent 
clock ticking in the background of all phenomena. In this 
abstract, formal sense, it is an important component of 
many concepts in the physical sciences and could actually 
be considered to be the pivotal idea that led Galileo to 
his inertial law (Szamosi, 1986). It is in this form that 
it contributes to the complexity of a concept and in which 
it is itself considered to have a complexity of 1. 
Certainly velocity (as opposed to the perceived and 
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concrete concept of speed) and acceleration involve 
keeping the concept of time current in the mind's eye. 
The concepts of power and dynamic equilibrium, as well as 
the other rate concepts, such as fuel efficiency or flux, 
also require a conscious involvement of time. 
Direction must also be kept in mind for many complex 
concepts. Specifically, direction is the idea of 
one-dimensional direction relative to an origin, indicated 
as either positive or negative. (The ideas of radial 
direction such as "clockwise" or bearings are similar.) 
In a down-to-earth example, direction is the concept that 
seems to be often lacking in a six or seven year old's 
idea of leaf raking. My children were insistent that they 
wanted to help with the raking, and they would get the 
motion figured out pretty fast. But it took some training 
to get them to direct their raking into a pile. 
Two and three dimensional concepts, including most of 
the momentum and forces concepts, are most easily imagined 
as broken down into a series of one-dimensional Cartesian 
components. The concept of velocity combines the 
criterial attributes of speed and direction. Both of 
these must be kept in mind simultaneously to imagine 
velocity. For example, when considering the velocity of a 
trans-Atlantic airplane, its direction is thought of as 
relative to one or more origins, such as New York, London 
or the North Pole. 
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The fifth and last type of component, besides 
object-concepts, properties, time and direction are link 
concepts. Link concepts are abstract links between two 
interacting object-concepts that are delineated and 
embodied with a unified identity. They are here called 
link concepts because they are the embodiment of causal 
links. For example, force, chemical bond and voltage are 
link concepts. Their focus is upon an interaction. The 
interaction is bracketed or outlined by object-concepts, 
and the object-concepts are necessary criterial attributes 
of the link concepts. Without the object-concepts, there 
would be no interaction, and the criterial attributes of 
the interaction are dictated by the criterial attributes 
of the object-concepts. A link concept is a pseudo 
object-concept whose conceptual "silhouette" is dictated 
by the conceptual "outlines" of the surrounding objects. 
Without the surrounding objects, there is no concept. It 
is impossible to imagine a chemical bond without 
simultaneously imagining the atoms involved in the 
bonding. Voltage is a link concept between two charged 
object-concepts. Force is defined as the link between any 
interacting object-concepts. 
Although link concepts are necessarily bracketed by 
object-concepts, the interaction is the focus, to the 
point where the interaction takes on its own identity and 
becomes a unitary concept in its own right. The 
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interaction becomes a pseudo object-concept that is 
delineated, named, separated from its environment of 
object-concepts, and described in terms of its own 
properties. Figuratively speaking, the outline of a link 
concept is formed by the contours of the bracketing 
entities; without the entities, there is no link concept. 
An excellent means of understanding the nature of a 
link concept is to look at the difference between 
proportionality, which is a property concept, and 
causality, a link concept. Proportionality establishes 
that a relationship exists between two property changes, 
in that a change in one is reflected by a change in the 
other. The focus is still upon the two properties and 
therefore it is not a link concept. It is very much like 
the optical illusion where the two facing silhouettes of a 
human face can be either seen as the two faces or as the 
outline of a goblet. Proportionality "sees" the two 
faces, and thus is not a true link concept. Causality, as 
the link concept, is a pure relationship; it is the 
proportionality given its own identity. Causality "sees" 
the goblet rather than the faces. The proportionality has 
taken on its own identity. Two properties can be simply 
proportional, or a causality can exist between them. This 
causality, as a link concept, can be characterized in its 
own right, its most important criterial attribute being 
the proportionalities. 
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D. Calculating the Complexity of Concepts 
Now that the five types of concepts to be delineated 
and counted have been introduced, there are two subtleties 
that need to be made explicit before actually calculating 
complexity. The first subtle aspect of the complexity 
attribute is that it refers to the number of component 
ideas that must be kept in mind SIMULTANEOUSLY by someone 
using the concept. Using the terminology of the 
information processing model of learning, complexity 
refers to the number of ideas that must be kept 
simultaneously in working, or short-term, memory. If a 
particular concept, such as Doppler effect, requires the 
student to hold more in working memory than he/she is 
capable of, then the student will not be able to 
understand the concept. (See Renner, Abraham, Brzybowski 
and Marek (1990), who carried out a study of 257 eighth 
grade students who had been taught the Doppler effect and 
yet "NO student (original emphasis) at any level developed 
a sound understanding of the Doppler Effect Concept.") 
The second subtlety is that complexity counts the 
ESSENTIAL component concepts. In other words, it counts 
the minimum number required to form a coherent whole. As 
a particular concept is understood at greater and greater 
depths, through subordinate learning, it becomes more and 
more complex as it assimilates more component ideas. 
However, an educator attempting to teach a concept is most 
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concerned with the essential, minimum number of component 
concepts. For example, process is calculated to have a 
complexity of 2 because a person must, at the very least, 
keep two concepts in mind: the property value at the 
beginning of the process and its value at the end of the 
process. For example, to understand the concepts of 
melting, evaporation and condensation (as well as the 
other processes of phase change), it is necessary to keep 
in mind simultaneously the beginning and ending phases. 
In a game my six and a half year old son and I play, he 
has no problem identifying the phases of any thing I can 
possibly name, including substances like shaving cream and 
spaghetti sauce. However, he finds it difficult to 
categorize phase changes. The most likely explanation is 
that he cannot yet deal with the additional cognitive 
complexity. 
It is true that at least one object-concept must be 
involved in a process because the changing property must 
belong to some thing or substance. However, the property 
can be kept in mind without the associated thing. In 
teaching students the concept of process, I have always 
marvelled at the ease with which they focus on a property 
divorced from the thing to which it belongs. For example, 
students seem nonchalant about thinking about temperature 
as a divorced property. Neither is it unusual for them to 
be mystified when asked what thing or substance they are 
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referring to when they use phase values of solid, liquid 
and gas. When I force students to identify the thing or 
substance involved in the process and to which the 
changing property belongs, I am in essence adding 
components, or attributes, to their concept of process, 
and increasing its complexity in their cognitive 
structure. Process becomes even more complex when a 
formal idea of time, as an independent clock ticking in 
the background, is added. However, as a point of 
departure, I can begin teaching process knowing that at a 
bare minimum it has a complexity of 2. For the purposes 
of building a conceptual structure that can be used for 
curricular planning, it is these minimum, or departure, 
complexities that are important. 
The six basic concepts of the physical sciences, as 
the highest-order, most general concepts, eventually 
develop into the most complex. Within the mind of a 
scientist, they are the most developed, enveloping 
concepts and, counting all the components, would indeed 
appear highly complex. But in the unsophisticated mind of 
a child or adolescent, a basic concept is only outlined by 
the essential criterial attributes, which in their turn 
might not be well defined at all since they might be based 
on generalizations of direct perceptions. 
In order to rate a concept according to its 
complexity, it is necessary to look at and count its 
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component ideas. As explained already, property concepts 
such as distance or texture are derived directly from 
observed facts or instances, of which there are an 
uncountable number and variety. Since facts are not one 
of the components that is counted for determining 
complexity, these concepts have a complexity of 1. But 
most of the concepts used in physical science could be 
termed as upper-order, meaning that they are based upon 
other concepts. For example, Doppler effect is a fairly 
complex concept. It combines the concepts of wave source, 
source speed, wave speed, and wavelength (or frequency). 
Speed is listed twice because two copies, or versions, of 
it must be kept in mind simultaneously, one belonging to 
the source, the other to the wave. Each of these 
component concepts is itself made up of other concepts. 
Concepts "may be described (in the ultimate sense) in 
physical terms" (Gagne, 1985, p. 53), meaning that 
ultimately all concepts are based upon, and composed of, 
facts. If successive rounds of analysis are continued, 
eventually everything will be defined in terms of simple 
concepts with complexities of 1, and they, in turn, by 
observable facts. 
Since concepts can be made up of other concepts that 
can themselves be made up of concepts, ending eventually 
with a plethora of facts, the question arises. At what 
scale does one delineate and count the components of any 
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particular concept? Clearly one cannot count at the 
lowest scale level of observed facts. If one did, the 
answer would always be indeterminate, since the number of 
instances varies from person to person, and could not even 
be determined for any particular individual. Furthermore, 
if one counted the average number of instances readily 
observable by an average observer, one would have arrived 
at the definition of generality. 
The answer to the question is that one counts at the 
next scale down from the concept in question. To 
calculate the complexity of a particular concept, you 
identify the first-level component concepts that can be 
delineated as unitary wholes and that are intellectually 
manipulated as unitary wholes to form the concept in 
question. These delineated, component concepts will be 
one of the five types described above: object-concepts, 
properties, time, direction, or link concepts. 
Consider some examples. Density might at first 
thought seem to be a property and thus have a complexity 
of 1. But density is not a directly observable property. 
It is not based upon a generalization from many directly 
observed instances. Rather, density is a derived property 
with a complexity of 2, since it contains the two 
attributes of mass and volume, and these two properties 
must be imagined simultaneously. 
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The dimensional properties of distance, area, and 
volume also present interesting examples of calculating 
complexity. The complexity of distance is 1, since it is 
based upon a generalization from instances. The 
complexity of area is 2 and the complexity of volume is 3, 
corresponding to the number of times the concept of 
distance must be combined simultaneously for each. (As 
becomes clear from this analysis, teaching distance, area 
and volume is equivalent to teaching the three dimensions 
of the physical world.) The concept of volume is quite 
different from the concept of size (or scale), which is 
directly observable and is based on how big or small a 
thing is compared to something else, usually our own 
bodies. Size has a complexity of 1. I have found it 
fairly easy to teach size even to fourth graders, but have 
found it much more difficult to teach area and volume to 
ninth graders, let alone fourth graders. My classroom 
experience is that it takes a good four to six weeks for 
ninth graders to be able to apply these two concepts, as 
well as distance, to unanticipated content. My experience 
also indicates that volume seems a bit easier than, or on 
a par with, area, even though volume is, theoretically, 
more complex than area. The explanation is probably that 
volume is more concrete than area, and the additional 
concreteness is a more powerful influence than the 
additional complexity. The difference in abstractness is 
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attributable to two reasons. There is a relationship 
between size and volume, in that both are measures of how 
much space a thing occupies, and the concreteness of size 
is carried over to volume. Secondly, there are many, many 
more times in everyday life in which the size, or volume, 
of a thing is important rather than its area. 
It might at first seem odd that the complexity of 
volume is greater than the complexity of density, of which 
it is a component. It illustrates that complexity must be 
calculated at the next-scale down. For an educator, this 
oddity probably indicates that volume will be more 
difficult than mass for students to manipulate cognitively 
when learning density, and thus warrants the greatest 
attention when being taught. Perhaps at the outset of the 
unit volume should be kept constant and mass changed to 
demonstrate changes in density. 
Doppler effect has been used several times as an 
example, and it has a complexity of 4: wave source, an 
object-concept, source speed, wave speed, and wavelength, 
all properties. The concept of medium in included in the 
concepts of wave source and wave speed, is thus two levels 
of scale below Doppler effect and so it is not counted. 
Medium, if analyzed, depends upon carrying simultaneously 
in mind the two concepts of the wave and of the material 
through which it is propagating, both object-concepts, and 
therefore it has a complexity of 2. The complexity of 
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wake and shock wave are the same as for Doppler effect, 
since the same component concepts are included. The 
differences among these three concepts is only the 
mathematical relationships, or proportionalities, among 
the component concepts. For an educator, the implication 
is that all three of these concepts could be learned 
simultaneously or in any order. 
E. The Conflict between Gagne and Ausubel 
on Calculating Complexity 
The seemingly innocent protocol of counting 
components at the next lower scale embodies a major 
distinction between the learning theories of Gagne on one 
side and Ausubel and Novak on the other. Although the 
thesis is to concentrate on the areas of agreement among 
the six theorists, this particular disagreement cannot be 
avoided. There is consensus that concepts should be 
taught from the least to the most complex, so the focus is 
on what constitutes complexity. A choice between two 
options is necessary, and the choice is reflected in how 
one calculates the complexity of a concept. This choice 
is pivotal to the construction of a conceptual structure 
to guide science curriculum since the two options result 
in radically different conceptual structures. Ausubel's 
theory would dictate counting only at the next scale down, 
as stated above; Gagne would count at the lowest scale. 
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seemingly facts, or even discriminations. (For the sake 
of conciseness, just Ausubel will be named rather than 
both he and Novak, since Novak embraces Ausubel's theory, 
having co-authored his seminal work.) This section will 
contrast the two options using the writings of Gagne and 
Ausubel. The next section will contrast the two options 
with a detailed investigation of the complexity of the 
nature of matter basic concept. 
In order to contrast the two authors' positions by 
looking at their writings, it is necessary to jump ahead 
to a rather obvious point: Once concepts have been rated 
for their complexity, they will be sequenced in a 
curriculum from least to most complex, other factors being 
equal. All six of the theorists unequivocally agree that 
curriculum should proceed from less to more complex. 
Therefore it is possible to infer their opinions of 
complexity by looking at their recommended curricular 
sequences. 
Gagne divides learning into five varieties of 
learning capabilities, of which only two are of interest 
here: intellectual skills and verbal information. (Two 
of the others. Motor Skills and Attitudes, are not germane 
to this paper's curricular focus. The third. Cognitive 
Strategies, "skills that manage ... learning, remembering 
and thinking" (Gagne, 1985, p. 48), is embodied in the 
thesis of using a conceptual structure for flexible. 
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inquiry-based problem solving.) Intellectual skills are 
defined as "the capabilities that make symbol use 
possible" (Gagne, 1985, p. 49), and Gagne explicitly 
describes these capabilities in terms of conceptual 
understanding. When Gagne (1985) recommends a curricular 
sequence for learning an intellectual skill, or concept, 
he is clear that the components should be taught first: 
The psychological organization of intellectual skills 
may be represented as a LEARNING HIERARCHY, often 
composed largely of rules. As previously shown, two 
or more concepts may be prerequisite to (and in this 
sense subordinate to) the learning of a single rule. 
Similarly, two or more rules may be prerequisite to 
the learning of a superordinate rule. Once the 
latter is learned, it may combine with another rule, 
and so on. The entire set of rules, organized in 
this way, forms a learning hierarchy that describes 
an ON-THE-AVERAGE efficient route to the attainment 
of an organized set of intellectual skills that 
represents "understanding" of a topic (p. 128). 
Developmental readiness for learning any new 
intellectual skills is conceived as the presence of 
certain relevant subordinate intellectual skills... 
The learning history of an individual is CUMULATIVE 
in character. The discriminations that are learned 
form the basis upon which concepts are built. 
Concepts contribute positive transfer to the learning 
of rules, and the latter support the learning of more 
complex rules and the capabilities of problem 
solving." (p. 130) 
Thus Gagne feels that higher-order concepts should be 
taught last because they are more complex, as they would 
be if one counted components at the small scale of 
discriminations. Gagne does not consider that individual 
concepts change as they are understood to greater and 
greater depth, increasing in complexity with such 
development. Therefore, he does not include a focus on 
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the minimum, essential criterial attributes of a concept 
as the beginning of learning. Of pivotal importance is 
Gagne's use of the word "prerequisite." Gagne logically 
assumes that concepts are built intellectually in the same 
manner as a brick wall; from the bottom up, piece by 
piece, row by row. Gagne summarizes his view of the 
structure of concepts in a diagram: 
A summary of the interdependence of intellectual 
skills... may be given as follows: 
HIGHER ORDER RULES 
require as prerequisites 
RULES 
that require as prerequisites 
CONCEPTS 
that require as prerequisites 
DISCRIMINATIONS 
that require as prerequisites 
• 
BASIC FORMS OF LEARNING: 
ASSOCIATIONS AND CHAINS. 
(Gagne, 1985, p. 54, 55). 
So the number of "concepts," extending the analogy, 
in the brick wall is the number of bricks. Gagne is 
saying that in order to perceive the brick wall, one must 
first perceive all the component bricks. Harking back to 
the caveat concerning the danger of analogy in 
constructivist models, his assumption would appear to be 
false as regards the learning of concepts. Gagne himself 
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recognizes that the complexity of concepts needs to be 
specified, but does not recognize that he has implicitly 
done so, and done so incorrectly: "Evidently, rules may 
vary in such properties as abstractness and complexity, 
although the dimensions of these characteristics have not 
been specified" (Gagne, 1985. p. 119). 
In contrast to Gagne, Ausubel feels that the primary 
pattern of conceptual development is from the general to 
the particular: 
(The) process of linking new information to 
pre-existing segments of cognitive structure is 
referred to as SUBSUMPTION. Since cognitive 
structure itself tends to be hierarchically organized 
with respect to level of abstraction, generality, and 
inclusiveness of ideas, the emergence of NEW 
propositional meanings most typically reflects a 
SUBORDINATE relationship of the new material to 
existing cognitive structure. This involves the 
subsumption of potentially meaningful propositions 
under more inclusive and general ideas in existing 
cognitive structure, and this in turn results in the 
hierarchical organization of cognitive structure." 
(Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 58). 
The disagreement between Gagne and Ausubel is not 
actually dichotomous, and it can be reconciled. The stage 
labelled HIGHER-ORDER RULES in Gagne's above summary chart 
could be interpreted to be principles that have a large 
number of minimum, criterial attributes, such as Doppler 
effect, and in which this number is the same, or very near 
the same, as in the fully developed concept. The stage 
labelled as RULES could be interpreted to include concepts 
such as the six basic concepts of the physical sciences 
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that have a minimum complexity that is low but that can be 
further developed, becoming highly complex. The 
connection between it and its subordinate level of 
CONCEPTS would then be connected by a two-way arrow, with 
the downward pointing one being predominate, nicely 
summarizing Ausubel's assimilation theory. In other 
words, the higher-order concept can not only be formed, at 
a minimum criterial level, from subordinate concepts, but 
it can also increase in complexity as it spawns and 
assimilates new, subordinate concepts. The lower part of 
Gagne's chart, summarizing how concepts are formed, is an 
excellent illustration of CONCEPT FORMATION, as described 
by Ausubel: 
CONCEPT FORMATION is characteristic of the preschool 
child's inductive and spontaneous (untutored) 
acquisition of generic ideas (for instance, "house, 
"dog") from concrete-empirical experience. It is a 
type of discovery learning involving, at least in a 
primitive form, such underlying psychological 
processes as discriminative analysis, abstraction, 
differentiation, hypothesis generation and testing, 
and generalization... The term "inductive" 
oversimplifies the actual process of concept 
formation. Few problem-solving or concept formation 
situations are approached from scratch - by 
generating new hypotheses solely from the data at 
hand. More typically the learner approaches new 
problems by generating hypotheses derived from 
existing hypotheses in his cognitive structure. 
These latter hypotheses may be influenced, initially 
or later on, by the distinctive features of the 
current problem situation... Characteristically, 
however, older (school age) children, as well as 
adolescents and adults, acquire new concepts through 
a process of CONCEPT ASSIMILATION. That is, they 
learn new conceptual meanings by being presented with 
the criterial attributes of concepts and by relating 
these attributes to relevant established ideas in 
their cognitive structure... Learning the names of 
367 
concept meanings, on the other hand, involves a 
process of representation learning that typically 
follows concept assimilation itself." (Ausubel et 
al., 1978. p. 93,94) 
Ausubel has gone beyond Gagne to recognize that 
concept formation is not the predominate form of learning 
past early childhood. Thus the lower part of Gagne's 
chart is accurate, but is bypassed during most learning of 
interest to science curriculum planners in favor of the 
modified, upper part of the chart as just described. 
Combining these various modifications of Gagne's chart 
would produce the following chart: 
HIGHER ORDER RULES, or PRINCIPLES, 
whose minimum complexity is high, 
require as pre-requisites 
RULES, or CONCEPTS 
that are initially simple, but become 
complex as they spawn and assimilate 
OTHER CONCEPTS 
many of which are simple because 
they are based on 
DISCRIMINATIONS 
that require as prerequisites 
BASIC FORMS OF LEARNING: 
ASSOCIATIONS AND CHAINS. 
Novak bases his THEORY OF EDUCATION (1977) upon the 
educational psychology of David Ausubel, and explains how 
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the process of learning from the general to the particular 
is central to Ausubel's theory: 
The central idea in Ausubel's theory is what he 
describes as MEANINGFUL LEARNING. To Ausubel, 
meaningful learning is a process in which new 
information is related to an existing relevant aspect 
of an individual's knowledge structure (p. 74)... 
Ausubel defines these psychological entities as 
SUBSUMING CONCEPTS in cognitive structure, or more 
simply SUBSUMERS. New meaningful learning results in 
further growth and modification of an existing 
subsumer. Depending upon the experience history of 
the individual, subsumers can be comparatively large 
and well developed, or they may be limited in the 
amount and variety of elements (cell assemblies) they 
contain (p. 75)... In rote learning, new information 
is not associated with existing concepts in cognitive 
structure, and therefore little or no interaction 
occurs between newly acquired information and 
information already stored. (p. 77) 
Ausubel's description of conceptual development 
meshes much better with my own experience as a teacher 
than does Gagne's. Students prefer to work with highly 
general but simple ideas first. The concepts are 
intellectually built from the periphery in as they fill in 
the details as they practice applying them. First the 
general outline is established, in an amorphous, diffuse 
manner, that produces a hollow but nevertheless unitary 
concept. The shell is determined by the essential 
criterial attributes, many perceived directly but not 
necessarily consciously noticed and identified. For 
example, I introduce the concept of nature of matter with 
its three criterial attributes of thing, property and 
process. At this stage, process is only defined with its 
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synonyms of happening, event, occurrence, or phenomenon. 
The conscious recognition of the essential criterial 
attributes of process and their further elaboration are 
added after the students have been able to categorize 
processes, things and properties as part of nature of 
matter. To flesh out the concept of process, I introduce 
it as a combination of the concepts of thing and property, 
in that all processes always involve things whose 
properties change, thus giving it distinction and 
precision. The emphasis of this introduction is on 
property because the essential criterial attributes of 
process are a beginning and an ending property value. If 
students can keep in mind simultaneously the two property 
values, then they have the essence of the process concept. 
The seasons can be described as processes with all sorts 
of beginning/ending property values even if it is somewhat 
unclear what things or substances (e.g.: the air, the 
atmosphere, precipitation) they actually describe. 
Process can then be elaborated by having students 
consciously identify the involved things/substances. It 
can be even further elaborated with the additional concept 
of time or other component ideas. So, in the beginning, 
perceived instances can give rise to amorphous, highly 
general, but simple, concepts just as they can give rise 
to well defined and particular concepts such as 
temperature or number. 
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It would be academically difficult for Gagne to 
dismiss Ausubel outright, and he does not. Gagne includes 
Ausubel's research and conclusions within his own theory, 
but in an odd manner. As previously stated, Gagne divides 
learning into five varieties of learning capabilities, of 
which intellectual skills includes conceptual 
understanding. This capability would thus seem the 
natural forum, within Gagne's theory, to accommodate 
Ausubel, whose approach is clearly conceptual. However, 
Gagne attempts to absorb Ausubel's ideas within the verbal 
information category, also called "declarative knowledge" 
(Gagne, 1985, p. 113) which he describes as follows: "We 
know that individuals have learned some verbal information 
when they are able to 'tell about it' or state it" (Gagne, 
p. 58). Facts, figures and formulas, therefore, are 
verbal information. Gagne says: 
One prominent theory of the learning and retention of 
meaningful facts is that of Ausubel... He proposes 
that meaningful new ideas are learned by being 
subsumed in an already existing cognitive 
structure... which in turn has been established by 
prior learning... The preexisting cognitive 
structure... may be actuated, according to Ausubel, 
by first presenting to the learner an advance 
organizer... When suitably designed, an advance 
organizer may aid in the retention of verbal 
information in the form of facts." (p. 162). 
Gagne (1985) goes on to state that "the [advance 
organizer] technique has also been found to help retention 
and transfer of learning of intellectual skills" (p. 162), 
then referencing corroborating research, but missing its 
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possible impact on his own formulation of intellectual 
skills. Ausubel's theory has, unfortunately, become 
stereotyped over the years as the "advance organizer" 
theory, even though it is only a minor instructional 
application of a very profound and encompassing theory. 
By relying on this stereo-typical view of Ausubel, Gagne 
avoids the fact that Ausubel's theories undermine his 
premises, not just the details of his intellectual skills 
category. Whereas Gagne has separated verbal information 
and intellectual skills into two parallel categories of 
behavior, a premise seemingly based upon behaviorism, none 
of the other five theorists being referenced do so. Bloom 
and Klausmeier explicitly see them as two stages along a 
continuum that describes depth of understanding. Bloom's 
(1956) first of six categories of cognitive skills. 
Knowledge, "includes ... the remembering, either by 
recognition or recall, of ideas, material, or 
phenomena.... The knowledge category differs from the 
others in that remembering is the major psychological 
process involved here, while in the other categories the 
remembering is only one part of a much more complex 
process of relating, judging, and reorganizing" (p. 62). 
Bloom also describes the sub-categories within each of the 
six major ones as establishing a smooth continuum from one 
major category to another, the last sub-category of one 
dovetailing with the first sub-category of the next. From 
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an educator's perspective, it is simpler and more 
representative of classroom experience to use a model 
consisting of just a few parameters that vary on continua 
than to deal with a multitude of distinct categories. 
Klausmeier's model (1974) describes this process of 
development of a single concept by defining four stages of 
concept attainment: concrete, identity, classificatory 
and formal. 
F. The Curricular Implications of Complexity 
The criterial attribute of complexity was derived 
from an analysis of the difference between a concept and 
principle. The conclusion was that a categorical 
differentiation was unnecessary and that a complexity 
continuum, with facts on one end and principles on the 
other, could be established. The purpose of this 
continuum is to design science curriculum and, for this 
purpose, no categorical distinction between a concept and 
principle is necessary. 
There is, however, a characteristic of complex 
concepts and principles that is important instructionally. 
The characteristic is that the minimum complexity of some 
principles, such as Doppler effect, work, and resultant 
force, is very close to their complexity when well 
developed. Furthermore, their complexity is great enough 
that they must be learned from the bottom up, by first 
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learning their component concepts. Gagne would call such 
concepts higher-order rules, as was discussed previously. 
Ausubel would say that they must be learned through the 
process of superordinate learning, or propositional 
learning, in which "established ideas al, a2, and a3 are 
recognized as more specific examples of new idea A and 
become linked to A. Superordinate idea A is defined by a 
new set of criterial attributes that encompass the 
subordinate ideas" (Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 68). On the 
other hand, some concepts that have a simpler minimum 
complexity can be learned either by such superordinate 
learning or through subordinate learning. In subordinate 
learning, new concepts are learned within the context of 
already-established, more general concepts. They could 
even be learned through combinatorial learning, in which 
new concepts are learned within the context of 
already-established concepts that are equally general. 
A highly general concept, such as conservation of 
energy, can be learned as a very simple, unitary concept 
and additional component ideas can be added later through 
subordinate learning. I have frequently encountered 
educators who assume that greater generality, covering a 
greater number of instances, implies greater complexity. 
However, these two attributes are really quite 
independent. There are concepts of low generality that 
are quite simple, for example wavelength or charge. A 
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concept that is highly general yet complex is causality or 
interaction, while angular momentum would be of low 
generality but high complexity. Whatever correlation 
there is between generality and complexity is probably 
negative, in that more general concepts seem to be less 
complex. 
The complexity continuum avoids great confusion in 
terminology for educators because concepts such as 
conservation of energy are frequently referred to as 
principles and principles, understood to be complex 
concepts that must be learned through superordinate 
learning, are referred to as concepts. The complexity 
continuum allows educators to use the two terms 
interchangeably, while focusing on an inherent 
characteristic of the idea in question, regardless of its 
label. A focus on complexity leads directly to curricular 
and instructional issues of how a concept should best be 
taught and learned. The rule-of-thumb is that, all other 
factors being equal, concepts should be taught and learned 
from the simple to the complex. Let the discussion focus 




AN ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS 
ACCORDING TO COMPLEXITY 
The six basic concepts of physical science (nature of 
matter, conservation of energy, waves, chemical bonding, 
momentum and forces, and electricity and magnetism) were 
determined from the perspective of generality. An 
analysis of their complexities, according to the criteria 
derived in the Appendix D, produces the same order in 
which they were arranged according to generality. This 
analysis will be carried out by looking at the essential 
criterial attributes of each of the six basic concepts as 
well as at the many component concepts with which they 
each can eventually be elaborated. As pointed out in the 
previous appendix, an analysis of complexity applies to 
the component concepts at the next scale down, so an in- 
depth analysis consists of repeating rounds done at 
successive levels. The analysis also considers the number 
of essential, component concepts that must be kept in mind 
simultaneously. 
The basic concepts themselves will be analyzed as 
well as two succeeding, lower levels of scale. At each 
level, the ESSENTIAL component concepts will be the focus 
of analysis. The additional, embellishing component 
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concepts that are added with increased learning will be 
considered in those cases in which they constitute 
important concepts in their own right. In this manner, 
the origins of some concepts within prior, more general 
and simple concepts, will be clarified, and a detailed 
conceptual structure will emerge. 
The six basic concepts are evenly split between those 
that require a single object-concept and those that 
require two object-concepts to be kept in mind 
simultaneously. The first three, nature of matter, 
conservation of energy, and waves are fundamentally 
single-body concepts, while chemical bonding, momentum and 
forces, and electricity and magnetism are fundamentally 
two-body concepts. This symmetry may be purely 
coincidental, but it does help in remembering and 
organizing the basic concepts according to complexity. 
In Appendix B, information processing theory was 
discussed briefly as the context within which the model of 
conceptual organization being presented takes place. The 
criterial attribute of complexity is based directly on 
this theory because it presumes a short-term memory 
storage in which concepts are held in consciousness 
simultaneously. Within information processing theory, 
short-term memory is considered to have a maximum capacity 
of 5 to 7 chunks, as they are often referred to. Thus the 
model being presented here establishes complexities that. 
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even for the most complex of the physical science 
concepts, stay within these bounds. Furthermore, the 
limits of both models also mesh, in that the most complex 
of the physical science concepts, occurring within 
electricity and magnetism, would seem to be in the 5 to 7 
chunk range. 
A. The Complexity of the Nature-of-Matter Basic Concept 
The first basic concept, nature of matter, is both 
the most general and least complex. It is the beginning 
of scientific rationalism, yet it has been virtually 
ignored by science curriculum designers. It will thus be 
discussed in detail. Since the object-concept is the 
beginning of the nature of matter concept, and nature of 
matter is the most general of the basic concepts of 
science, then it is fair to say that the object-concept is 
one of the, if not the, deepest conceptual foundations of 
science. All six learning theorists being discussed agree 
that the object-concept is the first concept formed by 
infants. Just because it is naturally formed by infants, 
however, does not mean that it need not be taught. "A 
goal of school science instruction is to develop the 
spontaneous conceptions into a scientific understanding of 
the quantities... It is essential to design school 
science instruction that will better develop students' 
understanding of the fundamental properties of matter" 
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(Klopfer et al., 1992, p. 598). Adults know the 
object-concept, but they know it implicitly, at a 
less-than-formal level, not realizing that they are using 
the concept constantly. One reason that science is such a 
powerful way of thinking is that it builds upon such 
naturally acquired concepts by making them explicit. 
Likewise, the object-concept also needs to be made 
explicit with students, who need to understand at the 
formal level how they are implicitly and constantly 
interpreting their natural environments. The importance 
of this concept to science education cannot be 
exaggerated. Over the past six years I have developed and 
taught a full-year science curriculum at the fourth, 
seventh, and ninth grade levels that is based upon this 
concept, and it has been the key to significant progress 
in conceptual understanding and flexible, inquiry-based 
problem solving. 
Successful teaching of nature of matter will grow 
around successful development of the object-concept. In 
correspondence with how children learn intellectually, 
this development is guided by the three dicta of general- 
to-specific, simple-to-complex, and concrete-to-abstract. 
The interplay and balancing of these three dicta are what 
make science teaching creative and exhilarating. If 
nature of matter is such a basic foundation of science. 
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then its minimum complexity would be relevant to many 
curricular and policy considerations. 
So how is the complexity of nature of matter 
analyzed? It has a complexity of 1 since its only 
essential criterial attribute is that of object or thing; 
in other words, the object-concept. Object IS the 
object-concept, and it will be referred to as such from 
now on. The object-concept does not involve any ideas of 
time or direction, nor does it contain any link concepts. 
So it has a complexity of 1. The object-concept is not 
associated with any particular property. Rather, it is 
associated with any and all properties in the sense that 
objects are distinguished from their environment by 
differences in properties. An object is mentally 
delineated by two operations: "drawing" a fictitious line 
around it to separate it from its environment, and giving 
it a name. "More than half the human cortex is taken up 
with vision, and much of vision and perception is built on 
the ability to distinguish borders and outlines... The 
mind keys on boundaries and literally fills in the blank 
spots" (Hall, 1991, p. 20). Filling in these blanks is a 
later operation that can occur to varying levels of 
sophistication, ultimately producing a very complex 
nature of matter concept. Since its only ESSENTIAL 
attribute is the object-concept, its complexity is 1 at 
this first level of analysis. 
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Even though the only essential criterial attribute of 
nature of matter is the object-concept, its mature form in 
the mind of a scientist contains other criterial 
attributes. It's more complex form would include the 
concepts of property and process at the same, first level 
of analysis. At the next, second level of analysis, 
property would itself contain the sub-concept of 
measurement and a host of properties such as size (or 
scale), shape, the forms of energy, amplitude, 
electronegativity, acceleration, resistance, etc... 
Process would include a formal concept of time, causality 
and model. 
If such are the component parts of the various, 
meshed concepts of a mature nature of matter, there is 
still a question of the natural pattern of their 
development within the cognitive structure of students. 
By calculating complexity by counting the essential 
criterial attributes at the next-scale-down level, you are 
automatically implying a temporal sequence of learning. 
To form a concept, a child must already have its 
ingredients, i.e. understand its essential criterial 
attributes. Complexity counts concepts learned 
previously, so the temporal pattern of learning is of 
great importance. 
Congruent with the above description of its various 
components, Ausubel would maintain that nature of matter 
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evolves as a concept from the simple to the complex, from 
the top down. He would say it is first learned as a 
shell, the object-concept, which then evolves and fills 
with its components. There are nascent concepts that are 
necessarily implied by the object-concept shell, and these 
conceptual primitives may be induced to grow into unitary, 
mature, component concepts, thus developing the meat 
within the shell. They may be explicitly learned by the 
science student to produce a deep, complex understanding 
of the nature of matter, or they may be left dormant. On 
the other hand, Gagne would seem to take the position that 
nature of matter is learned by FIRST learning all of the 
lower-scale concepts and then assembling them into the 
mature concept of nature of matter. 
Is the nature of matter indeed diffuse and 
undifferentiated in the infant's mind, later evolving into 
a mature, complex form from the top down, as maintained by 
Ausubel? Or is it synthesized from lower-order concepts, 
as predicted by Gagne? One possible source of answer is 
to leave cognitive psychology and look at what an 
introspective scientist says. It is hard to believe that 
science would evolve a pattern of thinking that 
contradicted natural, intellectual development. The very 
foundation of scientific rationalism is that it is based 
on the logic of our own intellectual capabilities. So the 
analysis of thinking patterns of expert scientists might 
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provide a view of exaggerated natural intellectual 
patterns. Robert Karplus, a renown physicist who 
developed the SCIS program of elementary science 
education, describes the unit on material objects as 
follows: 
The first chapter bases the introduction of the 
concepts OBJECT and PROPERTY on familiar objects of 
the classroom, home, and playground. The new ideas 
are applied to other objects, to plants and animals 
and their parts, and to collections of buttons and 
wooden blocks that can be sorted according to a 
number of properties such as shape, color, texture, 
size, and so on. In Chapter II, the children's 
comparison of similarly shaped pieces of aluminum, 
brass, pine, walnut, plexiglas, and polystyrene leads 
to the introduction of the concept of material. This 
idea is then applied in additional work with other 
metals, various kinds of wood, rock, liquids, and 
gases. In Chapter III, the comparison signs (> or <) 
and serial ordering are introduced to give a 
semiquantitative aspect to the children's comparison 
of objects. (Karplus and Thier, 1967, p. 43, 45) 
It seems as though Karplus would develop the nature 
of matter from the general to the specific. He begins 
with object and property, and then develops the specific 
property of material, or, as named herein, composition. 
He then introduces the concept of measurement as students 
compare the property values of different objects. Karplus 
developed his conceptual framework from his own intuitions 
as a physicist, although he does list Gagne's The 
Conditions of Learning (1965 edition) in his bibliography. 
At least for Karplus, it would seem that the scientific 
pattern would be from the general to the specific. 
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Returning to the realm of learning theory to address 
the evolution of the nature of matter concept, the 
question to ask focuses on the object-concept, which both 
Gagne and Ausubel agree is the first concept formed by an 
infant: Does the object-concept formed by the infant 
contain the conceptual primitives for property and 
process? Luckily, Piaget did substantial research on the 
object concept and Klausmeier also addressed the issue, 
and they will be used to answer the question. 
Piaget described the beginning of the object-concept 
in the 10-12 month old child: 
By holding an object while he brings it closer to or 
further from the eyes, or by turning it around in the 
hand, he becomes aware that the object remains the 
same even though many visual changes have taken 
place. This discovery leads to the attribution of 
qualities of permanence and substance to objects. 
(Ginsburg and Opper, 1988, p. 55) 
Piaget is emphasizing how a child observes visual 
differences and changes WITHIN or OF an object he is 
manipulating. Klausmeier (1974) also describes the 
beginning of the object-concept, but he emphasizes the 
differences between the object and its environment: 
The discrimination of objects involves attending to 
distinctive features that serve to distinguish the 
objects from one another. Thus, very early the child 
learns to respond to gross differences in such 
features of objects as size, shape, color, and 
texture. As the child matures, he becomes capable of 
making finer discriminations involving these and 
other features. (p.16) 
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Thus the infant can acquire the object-concept 
directly from sensory data. For the infant, particular 
properties are not concepts; they are facts based on 
direct sensory input. For the infant, the object-concept 
is based on direct perception of its properties and the 
realization that the properties (or the perceived values 
of the properties) remain constant over time as well as 
the perception that induced differences in these 
properties occur in reproducible patterns that remain 
invariant over time. The infant perceives the differences 
in properties through watching, tasting, feeling, hearing 
and smelling properties, and generalizes a difference from 
all the sensory data. 
There are two categories of differences that the 
infant notices, differences within the object and 
differences between the object and its environment. The 
first category is emphasized in the above quote from 
Ginsburg and Opper in explaining Piaget's position: The 
infant notices differences WITHIN the object, primarily 
its spatial orientation and apparent size, as it is 
manipulated. However, the infant is able to perceive a 
repeating pattern to these differences, and actually 
induces and practices the repeating pattern as described 
by Piaget's idea of secondary circular reactions, in which 
children purposefully "reproduce interesting events which 
were initially discovered by chance in the external 
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environment" (Ginsburg and Opper, 1988, p. 43). The 
infant perceives that the pattern of changes remains the 
same for the object. The particular mix of sensory inputs 
associated with each object gives rise to property, the 
concept that there are sensory inputs that describe and 
identify the object-concept, and that are the data with 
which it is delineated from its environment. The fact 
that the values of the properties change in a pattern 
gives rise to process, the idea that the values change 
when something happens. 
The second category of differences that the infant 
notices is emphasized in the above quote from Klausmeier: 
The infant notices differences BETWEEN the object and its 
environment. Noticing that the sensory data from the 
object remains constant relative to the ever-changing 
surroundings also gives rise to the attribute of property. 
Noticing how the values change when the object and 
environment interact gives rise to process, as in, for 
example, noticing what happens to a glass when it hits the 
floor. 
The distinction between these two categories of 
differences is the same distinction that Klausmeier (1974) 
makes between his first two levels of understanding of a 
concept, the concrete and identity levels: (His model uses 
four levels, the last two being the classificatory and 
formal levels.) 
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Attainment of a concept at the identity level is 
inferred when the individual cognizes an object as 
the same one previously encountered when observed 
from a different perspective or sensed in a different 
modality. For example, the child's making the same 
response to the family poodle when seen straight on, 
from the side, and from various angles is evidence of 
his having attained the concept of poodle at the 
identity level. Whereas concept attainment at the 
concrete level involves only the discrimination of an 
object from other objects, attainment at the identity 
level involves both discriminating various forms of 
the same object from other objects and also 
generalizing the forms as equivalent, (p. 16,17) 
Klausmeier's first two levels of concept attainment 
thus describe how the object-concept is acquired. The 
generality of the object-concept is implicit in the fact 
that half of his model deals with this concept. 
For the infant, the object-concept is conceived of as 
a delineated entity that is separate from its environment. 
It is isolated as a perceived difference in the value of 
properties as compared to those of the environment, and 
the values change when something happens, either in a 
pattern within itself or when it interacts with the 
environment. By two years old, "the infant is able to use 
mental symbols and words to refer to absent objects (p. 
61)... The concept of the permanent object is fully 
elaborated" (Ginsburg and Opper, 1988, p. 63). Woven into 
the fabric of this complete object-concept is the idea 
that values of the characteristics of an object change 
when it interacts with its environment. This idea comes 
BEFORE a child can explicitly name or describe specific 
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properties, much less describe their measurement, and 
BEFORE the observations of change mature into a concept of 
causality. 
Thus Piaget and Klausmeier would seem to maintain 
that the object-concept contains the seeds of property and 
process, both of which can grow to become criterial 
attributes of the nature of matter basic concept. In 
their turn, they may sprout their own criterial 
attributes. The concept's path of development does not 
seem to build from the ground up, as predicted by Gagne, 
even though such a pattern is the most LOGICAL way to 
analyze the concept as it exists, fully mature, in the 
mind of a scientist. The concept actually develops from 
the top down. The child differentiates and elaborates the 
one essential criterial attribute of the object-concept 
with increasingly more specific (i.e. less general) 
sub-concepts. 
As the branching development of a basic concept 
occurs, not only do the sub-concepts become less general, 
they also become more complex. Property has a complexity 
of 1. Property would produce measurement and the 
individual properties (e.g. shape, texture, weight). 
Measurement would have the same complexity as property 
because it essentially consists of the value of the 
property. As stated earlier, even though all properties 
belong to object-concepts, and all object-concepts have 
388 
properties, each property has its own conceptual identity. 
What is being held in the mind's eye is the actual 
concrete observation of the physical object with the 
particular value of the property it happens to have. A 
shirt is seen as red, a piece of paper is rectangular, the 
water is hot. Measurement is the generalization made from 
the observed values of, in these examples, the properties 
of color, shape and temperature. The cognitive 
underpinning of measurement is serial ordering, the 
ability to place values of a property belonging to several 
different things in proper order. Serial ordering has 
been well investigated by developmental psychologists and 
is considered to be one of the bellwethers of the concrete 
operational stage that begins at about seven or eight 
years old (Ginsburg and Opper, 1988, p. 132 - 139). 
Measurement is generalized from the myriad factual 
observations (i.e. instances) of various values of a 
property, in which there is "more" or "less" of the 
property belonging to the object-concept. 
Even though measurement begins as a generalization 
from observed instances with a complexity of 1, it grows 
into a highly autonomous, complex property. The entire 
field of mathematics is often considered to have begun 
with the concept of measurement, meaning that, 
conceptually, all the many concepts unique to mathematics 
would be attributes of a fully developed concept of 
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measurement. Herein lies the bridge between science and 
mathematics as proposed by this model. More relevant to 
the task of teaching K-12 science, measurement would be 
developed to include concepts such as value and unit. As 
a unitary concept with its own attributes, measurement 
first becomes essential in forming the concept of model, 
as will be seen shortly. 
Property not only produces measurement, it also 
produces the individual property concepts. In observing 
particular instances of things, their property values are 
also perceived. Primarily according to the pattern in 
which the five senses detect each different property, the 
perceived values are grouped into properties. Properties 
that are directly generalized from such instances, such as 
color, temperature, distance (or length), shape, speed, 
location, texture and mass have complexities of 1. 
Properties that are derived from these simplest of 
properties have greater complexities. So area and volume 
are derived from distance, and have complexities of 2 and 
3, respectively. 
The study of dimensions can be anchored not only by 
the concept of distance, but also by shape. Certainly a 
professional study of shape would be greatly facilitated 
by a knowledge of all three dimensional perspectives. But 
turning the sequence around, shape can also be the 
beginning for a study of the dimensions. Shape is 
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directly derived from the ubiquity of examples, just as is 
distance, and its consequent concreteness and simplicity 
provide a firm foundation upon which to build the more 
complex ideas of the dimensions. 
Texture, with values such as rough, smooth, and 
slippery, describes surfaces with repeating bumps or 
ridges that are regularly shaped, sized and spaced. 
Texture can be directly sensed and therefore has a 
complexity of 1. However, beyond this minimum, essential 
complexity (or simplicity), texture can be elaborated so 
that students can objectively describe different textures. 
Shape, in combination with distance, can be combined to 
elaborate the concept of texture. Both the sizes of the 
bumps and ridges (which are things of a particular shape) 
and their spacing are described in terms of distances. So 
texture can be elaborated and measured in terms of shape 
and distance. I have found in teaching seventh and ninth 
graders that this elaboration is fairly easy for them to 
understand and apply, while also preparing the way for an 
understanding of porosity, then mass, and then density. 
As a description of a surface, texture is a 2-D 
property. Porosity is a 3-D version of texture. Porosity 
looks at the spaces between things in a 3-D 
conglomeration. There is a question about just how 
directly porosity can be observed separate from texture. 
After all, it is always the surface of a thing that is 
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observed, even if it is cut open and inside surfaces are 
observed. On the other hand, you can see "into" a sponge 
to some degree and it is a fairly common experience that 
the surface texture of a thing is characteristic of the 
entire volume. I have tended to consider it as directly 
observable, with a complexity of 1, but in class I teach 
it primarily as a combination of texture and volume. If 
considered as derived from texture and volume, it would 
have a complexity of 2. Different shapes that are packed 
together will produce different porosities, and the un¬ 
occupied volume is the focus. 
Mass is directly sensed whenever we try to move an 
object, but it can be understood as the natural extension 
of porosity. Whereas porosity focuses on how much of a 
thing's volume is un-occupied, mass focuses on the part 
that is occupied. Mass measures how much substance there 
is, as opposed to the "empty" spaces. Teaching mass as 
the complement of porosity has been very successful in the 
classroom. It provides students with a good mental image 
of what mass is and what it is not. 
It should be fairly obvious how this avenue of 
conceptual development leads to the concept of density. 
Once students have seen the complementarity of porosity 
and mass, they have an easy conceptual task of seeing 
density as a measure of how closely packed the particles 
are. Describing together changes in density and changes 
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in porosity provides a more complete image that is closely 
linked to simple, directly observable instances. 
Of great importance is the property of direction, 
which has a complexity of 2 since it is derived from speed 
and location. Direction cannot be generalized directly 
from observations. Direction will become a unitary idea 
in its own right that will be counted as one of the 
contributors to complexity, but it itself is not the 
simplest of concepts. It takes a good effort on the part 
of a student to combine speed and location to form the 
unitary idea of a background set of three dimensional 
coordinates within which all motion takes place. 
Process, as previously said, has a complexity of 2 
since it requires keeping in mind the object-concept and a 
property. All processes involve things or substances, and 
during a process some property changes. At its essential 
criterial level, process does not need to focus on the 
different values of the changing property. All that is 
essential is that the property be seen as having different 
values, without a focus on what those values actually are. 
Process thus would produce time, since a process is 
delineated in time by the sequential change in a property. 
Time is the perception that a property of an 
object-concept sequentially changes value. _Thus the 
concept of time, similar to process, requires two ideas to 
be kept in mind: the initial value of the property and 
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the final value of the property. For the concept of time 
to be understood, a single property must be kept in mind 
as two separate ideas, each with a different value of the 
property. Time, like direction, eventually becomes a 
unitary idea, but is fundamentally a more complex, and 
abstract, idea than either an object-concept or a 
property. Eventually, it evolves into the independent 
clock ticking in the background, pacing all processes, but 
its origins and its essential criterial attributes are 
within the observation of the changes that occur during 
any process, and the changes are described by the 
differing values. 
Process would also produce proportionality and 
causality (or cause-and-effeet). Proportionality is the 
idea that two properties (what a mathematician would term 
quantities) are related to each other, in that if one is 
changed, the other reacts and changes, too. The familiar 
mathematical definitions of ratio and proportionality 
appear if the values of the two related properties are 
expressed as ratios of two numbers. Proportionality has a 
complexity of 2 because it requires, at a minimum, keeping 
in mind the two properties that are proportional. During 
a year in which I was teaching Algebra I and nature of 
matter to ninth graders as two different class 
assignments, I was able to compare two approaches to 
teaching proportionality. The Algebra I textbook first 
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introduced ratios, and then defined proportionalities as 
an equation linking two ratios. There was some attempt to 
use illustrations and problems taken from the physical 
world, but the skill being tested clearly consisted of 
manipulating numbers divorced from a physical meaning 
embedded in property values. It was virtually impossible 
to get students to create ratios or proportionalities as 
problem-solving techniques when faced with unfamiliar 
content or context. On the other hand, I was also able to 
teach proportionality in a science class by first 
introducing the concepts of thing and property , then 
adding the concept of measurement, and finally introducing 
proportionality as two linked properties. I would have 
students use symbols and sub-scripts to denote properties 
and the things to which they belonged, and then use the 
symbols to write proportionalities (direct or inverse) 
that linked properties. For example, a worksheet might 
say: 
Write each of the following statements as an 
algebraic proportionality: 
1. The temperature of lake water depends upon its 
depth. 
ANS: T°w,t.r a l/d<japth 
2. The number of traffic fatalities increases with 
the average speed of the cars. 
ANS: Nfatallti.. oi c«r« 
3. If it rains a lot, the grass grows faster. 
ANS: oL/t a Vr4in 
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Once students could write such proportionalities for 
almost any process that they or I could choose, they were 
of course curious about how to turn a proportionality sign 
into an equal sign. The meaning of function and constants 
of proportionality were easy to introduce to a curious 
mind that was well prepared. The ratio and 
proportionality as presented in Algebra I is the simplest 
functional relationship (i.e. linear) and focuses on the 
constant of proportionality. It was thus fairly straight 
forward to have students understand the ideas. 
The conclusion is that my science students understood 
proportionality far better than my Algebra I students. I 
spent about the same time in class (1-2 weeks) covering 
the actual concept of proportionality. However, I had 
spent months in science class on the pre-requisite 
concepts of nature of matter, thing, property, and 
process. There was a considerable conceptual structure 
available to my science students into which they could fit 
the concept of proportionality. On the other hand, the 
Algebra I text had no real conceptual structure to it, and 
most of the chapters were largely autonomous. 
Causality and proportionality, as scientific 
concepts, are easily confused. The similarity is that 
they both are bridges between two linked changes in 
properties. A proportionality is fundamentally a 
correlation, and is based on sign reasoning, in which the 
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presence or absence of one indicates the presence or 
absence of the other. A causality is a proportionality in 
which the link between the properties can be described 
mechanistically. If there is a causality, we can describe 
the process of change as a sequence of events wherein the 
next can be predicted by the prior. This prediction must 
take place within the delineation of the interaction. In 
other words, properties that belong just to the 
interaction itself must be involved. If only the 
beginning and end property values are to be linked, then 
the problem has by definition degenerated back to a 
proportionality, or correlation. Breaking a problem into 
shorter and shorter intervals on it own only reduces the 
scale of the proportionality, without providing any more 
confidence in the relationship. 
A sea change in conceptual understanding occurs when 
proportionality is developed into causality. The 
difference is that a significant change has been made when 
properties of an interaction are delineated and described. 
Up until this point in the conceptual structure students 
would have practiced extensively with attributing all 
properties to a concrete thing or substance. The idea of 
delineating an abstract interaction that, at some future 
point, will be described with properties, is a major step 
in building a robust, easily expanded conceptual 
structure. Causality is the first link concept that is 
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encountered in the model of science curriculum being 
presented, and it is such causal links that give the name 
to link concepts. Causality gives an identity to the 
proportional relationship between the properties of two 
object-concepts. It therefore has a complexity of 3, 
because it requires keeping in mind the two properties 
that are changing value proportionately and the object- 
concept of the relationship or interaction itself. 
When I first worked out this development of 
proportionality and causality, I proposed to a fellow 
teacher that I was going to try it out in the classroom. 
In discussing the approach, he felt that it was unlikely 
that students would be able to understand causality. 
Students would need to know about forces, as the most 
obvious characterization of an interaction, and about 
momentum and energy transfer, as well as a lot of baggage 
carried by all three. I took his opinion seriously 
because it could well be that causality could only be 
learned superordinately, through propositional learning, 
by combining less general concepts. Its complexity would 
therefore change and so would its position within a 
conceptual structure. 
I ended up teaching the unit from the general to the 
specific, as detailed previously. My first task was to 
see if students could grasp the difference between a 
proportionality and a causality by judging whether an 
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explanation was available for WHY or HOW two properties 
were connected. I gave students many clippings from The 
New York Times of science-related articles and asked them 
to judge which kind of relationship was being described. 
Most of the articles dealing with biology and health were 
describing proportionalities, while most of those in the 
physical sciences were describing causalities. With help 
on comprehension and practice, students in ninth grade 
were largely capable of sorting articles accordingly. 
There were, or course, articles describing relationships 
somewhat on the cusp, but these provoked class discussion 
in which it was easy to discern the level of understanding 
among the participants. 
The next step was to somehow have students delineate 
and focus on the linkage, or interaction, itself. These 
class discussions led to such a development with 
relatively little coaching from me. The issue of such 
discussions was the "degree" or "strength" of the 
relationship. I only added the suggestion that the 
discussion use the vocabulary of the strength of the 
causality. I was concerned that this choice of vocabulary 
might not be optimum, since "strength" could eventually be 
assumed to mean force, and the two are not conceptually 
equivalent. However the terminology eventually sorts out, 
what I found was that students were capable of imagining 
the relationship between two changing properties as an 
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entity in its own right, and were able to describe it with 
a property, no matter how hazy, that belonged to the 
relationship. I was satisfied that they had indeed 
learned causality to the level of application. 
The final sub-concept of process is model. Model 
includes equations, graphs, maps and physical models. At 
the minimum, all models call for the comparison of two 
properties. Furthermore, they all require the comparison 
to be one of measurement. Even qualitative models are 
judged against a continuum of values. Therefore the 
complexity of model is 3; it requires keeping in mind at 
least two properties and the concept of measurement. A 
simple example of a model is the scale of a geographical 
map. The student must keep in mind a distance on the map 
drawing, a distance on the real, actual ground and the 
measurement of both. 
Some children do not develop the nature of matter 
concept in any great detail or to any great depth, and, as 
adults, may use only the essential shell of the 
object-concept. One of the first tasks of science 
education is to induce students to develop their 
object-concepts. Much of this task consists of taking the 
nascent concepts that students understand at the concrete 
or identity levels, and increasing their depth of 
understanding so that they are "cognizing supraordinate, 
coordinate, and subordinate relationships involving the 
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concept and other concepts, ... [and] using the concept in 
solving problems" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 13). 
Sequencing a curriculum so that successively taught 
concepts are nascent within the previously taught concepts 
produces a syllabus that follows the natural path of 
cognitive development. The effectiveness of such a 
syllabus is tremendous when compared to a syllabus 
organized otherwise. 
B. The Complexity of Conservation of Energy 
The complexity of each of the remaining five basic 
concepts of the physical sciences (conservation of energy, 
waves, chemical bonding, momentum and forces, and 
electricity and magnetism) will be analyzed in terms of 
the ESSENTIAL criterial attributes of each. As just 
established for nature of matter, each of the other five 
basic concepts can also be elaborated into sub-concepts, 
which in turn can be elaborated into their own 
sub-concepts, and so on. Thus each of the basic concepts 
can be branched into sub-concepts which characterize the 
possible spectrum and extent of the basic concept, similar 
to its structure within the mind of a scientist. The 
component sub-concepts of each of the basic concepts are 
arranged to progress from the most simple to a maximum 
complexity that seems generally to surpass the maximum 
complexity of the preceding basic concept. 
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The stepping stone between nature of matter and 
conservation of energy is causality. The energy quality 
of a thing or substance is a gauge of its ability to 
interact with some other thing or substance. Conservation 
of energy is used to explain why some processes occur, why 
others do not, and how the process proceeds from step to 
step. The amount of energy transferred and the 
transformations among the various energy forms among 
identifiable entities are explicit causes and effects. 
The essential shell of the second basic concept, 
conservation of energy, has a complexity of 2 because it 
is necessary to keep in mind simultaneously two essential 
concepts: The object-concept and a quality contained 
within it that is its energy. The energy is imagined as a 
property of the object, directly extending the student's 
concept of property acquired as part of the nature of 
matter concept. Within nature of matter, properties take 
on a unitary identity that, because they are ubiquitous, 
can be conceived of without simultaneously conceiving of a 
particular object-concept. However, the energy quality is 
not a directly observable property that is associated with 
ALL perceived instances of a particular object-concept, 
and that could therefore take on a unitary identity 
separate from the object-concept. It is a property that 
sometimes is and sometimes is not part of a particular 
object-concept, and the nature and context of the 
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object-concept at the time of observation dictates its 
presence. Therefore, an object-concept must accompany the 
concept of the energy quality. 
In its simplest form, as only a unitary shell formed 
by the two essential criterial attributes, conservation of 
energy need not include distinctions among the various 
energy forms. Together, the forms of energy are a quality 
given to object-concepts that explain many observed 
causalities. "Energy is not thought to be a measurable 
quantity, but more of a quality - ENERGETICNESS - 
(original emphasis) which, like heaviness as opposed to 
weight, can be felt in a sensorimotor way" (Solomon, 
1982, p.416). For example, in observing a candle flame, a 
child imagines the flame as the object-concept and then 
endows it with a quality that represents the flame's 
ability to burn or cause harm to something else, like a 
finger. The intuitive feeling described here as the 
ability to cause harm is the seed of the interaction 
concept. To a child, the directly observable properties 
of the flame's color and temperature are separate from its 
ability to cause harm, as anyone who has watched an infant 
be attracted to a flame can attest. Through experience, 
children learn to endow flames with an additional quality 
that represents its ability to harm. Children will say 
that big flames are hotter than small flames as an 
expression of the relative damage each flame could do 
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their skin, not as an expression of temperature, even 
though they use a term, "hotter," understood by an adult 
to mean temperature. If a child focuses on an un-lit 
candle as the object, it is imagined with a quality such 
that it is capable of producing a flame. The child is 
endowing the candlestick with a quality akin to stored 
chemical energy. It is important to note that if the 
child is explicitly asked if the candle wax has energy, 
the response will probably be negative or confused 
(Solomon, 1982). This result is more a reflection of the 
child's amorphous labelling of concepts than it is of the 
child's actual ideas concerning the candle wax. A child's 
interpretation of a boiling tea kettle is much more 
telling. Even the majority of the fourth graders I taught 
were convinced that the water got hotter and hotter the 
longer it boiled. They are seemingly applying a basic 
understanding of conservation of energy in which the 
continual input of energy to the water from the burner 
must be matched by some increase in a quality of the 
water. They understandably do not include the steam 
within their delineation of the water object-concept. 
Focusing on just the liquid water, they hypothesize the 
only quality change (or at least its vocabulary) with 
which they are familiar. In teaching heats of fusion and 
vaporization, I begin the discussion with what is the 
"thing," attempting to get students to maintain a 
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delineation around the entire sample of water, whatever 
its phase. Once students have so expanded their mental 
pictures, I have found it much easier to get them to see 
that a phase change in itself involves some kind of energy 
change. Thus, conservation of energy deals with processes 
in which energy is transferred and transformed, and for 
children to imagine such processes, they must imagine an 
object-concept with an abstract quality that explains 
possible causalities. 
The qualitative difference between of conservation 
energy and nature of matter is that conservation of energy 
is fundamentally a perception of causality between 
interacting object-concepts. The corresponding changes in 
the energy qualities of two interacting object-concepts 
are perceived to be proportional, meaning that an increase 
in one object-concept's energy is linked to a decrease in 
the other. I have found that many children prefer to see 
the proportionality as, the more one thing has, the more 
the other can get. In either case, the notion that 
something between interacting systems is therefore 
conserved is a natural conclusion for the young mind to 
make, as described by Professor Inhelder, Piaget's close 
associate (cited in Bruner, 1960, p. 41): "The most 
elementary forms of reasoning - whether logical, 
arithmetical, geometrical, or physical - rest on the 
principle of the invariance of quantities: that the whole 
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remains, whatever may be the arrangement of its parts, the 
change of its form, or its displacement in space or time." 
The easiest way for young minds to rationalize their 
observations of many interacting systems is to imagine 
that something flows between the systems and that its 
quantity is conserved. Children might use all sorts of 
names for this something, but what they are imagining is 
what a scientist refers to as energy. Although the form 
of the energy changes as it flows from one object-concept 
to another, its quantity remains constant. 
The investigation that makes up the main body of this 
dissertation focused on children's understanding of 
conservation of energy. In order to test for 
understanding of a concept, it must be defined in 
independent terms. In other words, conservation of energy 
must be defined in terms that do not include energy 
vocabulary. A careful analysis of the prerequisite ideas 
produced the definition of proportional causality during 
an interactive process (p. 139 - 143). This definition 
should now be much more transparent. From the approach of 
describing complexity, conservation of energy grows out of 
proportionality and causality, which are part of the 
process concept. It is most readily observed during 
processes in which two, distinct object-concepts interact. 
Not discussed previously was that each interacting 
object-concept, with it energy quality, need only be 
406 
considered in isolation. Consider a child trying to light 
a stick in a fire. When the child is attempting to light 
the stick, the concept of stick has been supplemented with 
a concept akin to fuel. There is a remembered causality 
between the stick and flame, but this causality is 
embodied in the energy quality of fuel with which the 
stick is imagined. The bigger the stick, the more fire it 
will produce. (In building bonfires with children, I have 
found that they are convinced that bigger sticks means 
more fire, but do not sort out whether "more fire" means 
bigger flames or that the fire will last longer. Again, 
they seem to build their concepts from the general to the 
specific.) As the stick ignites, the child's focus 
switches to the flame. It is not necessary for the child 
to keep the stick in mind when concentrating on the flame. 
Now there is a remembered causality between the flame and 
the things it can harm, and this causality is embodied in 
the energy quality of the flame. Again, the bigger the 
flame, the more harm it can do, the more of the energy 
quality it is imagined having. Conservation of energy 
only requires the mind to focus on one object-concept at a 
time, and that object-concept is endowed with a quality 
that eventually will be differentiated into one or more 
the various forms of energy. 
Conservation of energy not only grows out of nature 
of matter, but also elaborates and extends nature of 
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matter in several ways. The object-concept is extended to 
supposed things like water waves, sunlight, thunder and 
heat (radiation). These object-concepts are mentally 
delineated entities with their own identities, even though 
they are intangible. The idea of a physical property is 
extended to include the energy quality. During many 
interactions between two object-concepts, a combination of 
physical, observable changes in one of the systems is 
perceived to correspond with a combination of physical, 
observable changes in the other. The combination of 
physical changes in each system are perceived as a unitary 
property, the energy quality. Eventually the energy 
quality accommodates to experience and differentiates into 
the forms of energy. Even later, the student who has 
learned the concept of measurement, also part of the 
nature of matter basic concept, can apply it to the 
various forms of energy to produce the familiar component 
factors with which each is calculated. 
The individual forms of energy are first perceived as 
unitary qualities, and only as a subsequent step are they 
each parsed and seen as combinations of observable 
physical properties. If children who would be classified 
as concrete in Piagetian terms are asked to compare two 
roughly similar situations, such as a large car going 
somewhat slower than a small car, they will not be able to 
decide which one could harm them more. "Similarly, they 
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cannot compare the energy of a heavy object a small 
distance above the floor and the energy of a light object 
a great distance above the floor" (Karplus, 1967, p. 22). 
Although children are not able intellectually to separate 
out or manipulate the variables of speed, height and mass, 
they do perceive them in combined, unitary form as what a 
scientist would term kinetic energy (Maloney, 1985) or 
energy of position (as gravitational potential energy will 
be referred to). They perceive the other forms of energy 
in the same manner. They intuitively combine the factors 
upon which the magnitudes of the energy forms depend. The 
forms of energy (energy of position, energy of motion, 
thermal energy, chemical energy, elastic energy, wave 
energy, electrical energy and nuclear energy) are first 
perceived as unitary properties of an object just as color 
or size are. 
In regards the unitary nature of the various energy 
forms, a very interesting piece of research was carried 
out in 1985 by David P. Maloney at Creighton University 
titled "Rule-Governed Approaches to Physics: Conservation 
of Mechanical Energy." In this research, Maloney tested 
college freshmen by presenting them with five tasks in 
which they had to analyze various permutations of 
blocks-on-ramps. They were given numerical values for 
heights, speeds, and masses and were asked to weight the 
contributions of these factors in producing a particular 
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effect. Although the results showed that the subjects had 
a difficult time sorting out the contributions, the vast 
majority of them did know the correct group of factors 
that was relevant. Maloney's research is a possible 
indication that indeed the forms of energy are first 
conceived of as unitary with only a tenuous and fluid 
balance existing among its constituent parts. The 
implication would be that the forms of energy should first 
be taught within the context of interacting 
object-concepts and as unitary concepts. Only later, in 
combination with the concept of measurement, should they 
be further differentiated into their respective factors. 
It is very important to the task of building a 
conceptually based science curriculum to realize that 
kinetic energy is a unitary concept that is formed by 
children. As explained in the chapter on generality, a 
large number, if not the majority, of interactions 
observed by children involve changes in kinetic energy. 
If science curriculum is to follow the natural development 
of a child's intellect, then kinetic energy will become 
one of the foundation blocks upon which to build the basic 
concept of momentum and forces, as will be seen later. 
Having its origins clearly within nature of matter, 
conservation of energy introduces an important concept 
that is an extension of process. Conservation of energy 
begins charting new conceptual territory with the concept 
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of interaction, which is an attribute of the fully 
developed form of causality and therefore process. 
Interaction is also the second link concept, after 
causality, that would occur in a conceptual structure 
organized according to generality, complexity and 
abstractness. When a child attributes an energy quality 
to an object-concept derived from the experience of the 
possible harm the object can cause, then the seed of 
interaction has been planted. "Able to cause harm" is 
essentially a concrete way of saying "able to interact." 
An interaction occurs when energy is transferred between 
two object-concepts. A transfer of energy is the 
definition of interaction. Some interactions, such as, 
for example, occur when an electric door opens, are 
complex, particularly when intermediate steps in chains of 
energy transformations are hidden. But every interaction 
can be broken down into steps in which a transfer of 
energy occurs between two object-concepts. When imagining 
interaction, both interacting object-concepts must be kept 
in mind, and so must the energy quality, a property. The 
energy quality can be imagined as contained within EITHER 
one of the object-concepts, the other object-concept 
taking the role as the causal agent of the change in the 
quality. Thus the complexity of interaction is 3. 
It is at this point within the conceptual structure 
of a science curriculum that the important ‘concept of 
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force, or force pair, as will shortly be seen, should be 
introduced. At its very beginning, force is a measurement 
or value of an interaction. Pushes and pulls can be 
easily generalized to interaction, force measuring the 
intensity of the interaction. Thus a force occurs 
whenever energy is transferred between two interacting 
object-concepts, and force is understood as a quantitative 
version of interaction. Force, conceptualized in this 
manner, has a complexity of 2 because it is necessary to 
keep in mind interaction, a link concept, and measurement, 
giving a value to the interaction. 
Such an introduction of force lays an excellent 
foundation for a later, in-depth development and use of 
force in the basic concept of momentum and forces. 
Starting with the development of force within the idea of 
energy transfer is based on the concrete observation of 
the motion of objects during an interaction, and is very 
close to children's intuitive ideas of what a force is. 
This approach is more concrete than beginning with force 
within the context of impulse and momentum, wherein a 
force acts over time to change a property that is far more 
specific and abstract than the energy quality. During an 
interaction, force is the mechanism by which energy is 
transferred between entities. Children certainly do 
perceive pushes and pulls, but they are perceived, using 
the scientist's lexicon, as the mechanism for energy 
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transfer, or work. If the child does not perceive an 
energy transfer, then the conclusion is that there is no 
push/pull. I had the opportunity to have eighty fourth 
grade students experiment in a tug-of-war with either 
between two groups or with a telephone pole. Their 
interpretation of the two-group tug-of-war was that the 
stronger group, managing to pull along the other, was 
exerting the force, while the weaker group was exerting no 
force. It took considerable coaching to get them to agree 
that the group being pulled was indeed exerting a force as 
well. When it came to the tug-of-war with the telephone 
pole, however, I could get no agreement that the pole was 
exerting a force: "It isn't moving." When I asked them 
how they knew that THEY were exerting a force, they 
replied, "Because I can feel it in my muscles." When I 
then asked them where the force was going, since it was 
not going to move the pole, they had little problem 
replying, "In the rope." To these fourth graders, it 
seems that a force is a means of transferring energy. 
Since the stronger group was transferring energy to the 
weaker, they were exerting the force. The group pulling 
against the pole was putting elastic energy into the rope. 
Unfortunately, a problem of nomenclature arises. 
This is the only occasion within the model of conceptual 
organization being presented when conventional concept 
delineations are not adequate. Force is conventionally 
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understood to be a single headed vector. It is a single 
body force vector in that it only considers the body being 
acted upon and does not consider the origin of the force. 
In other words, as a concept it ignores the balance and 
duality of an interaction, and does not reflect that it is 
part of interaction, a unitary, coherent concept in its 
own right. Newton's third law is invoked to establish the 
balance, but it does so by equalizing the otherwise 
isolated two sides of an interaction, namely two equal but 
oppositely directed force vectors acting on isolated 
bodies. Although related, the single body force vector is 
a different concept from the concept of the intensity of 
an balanced interaction. 
This second concept should have its own name, for 
which I propose force pair. Force then becomes a 
criterial attribute of force pair, which could be 
symbolized as a two-headed arrow between interacting 
object-concepts whose length was proportional to the 
intensity of the interaction. It would be presumptuous to 
think that such a new delineation would be readily 
accepted into science's lexicon, particularly for purely 
pedagogical reasons. The least confusing, albeit awkward, 
alternative, used from here on, is to refer to force 
vector as the single body force vector, and to use force 
pair to denote the intensity of an interaction. 
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Other nascent concepts contained within the simple, 
two-component shell of conservation of energy will 
eventually blossom into the familiar energy concepts of 
work, heat, efficiency and power. The development of the 
various forms of energy as distinct concepts has been 
described. How do these other classic ideas fit into this 
overall structure of a conserved quantity flowing between 
interacting object-concepts? 
Efficiency is described as the calculation of the 
proportion of energy that flows into the object-concept 
and form that is judged as desirable. Necessarily, if 
there is a portion that is desired, then there is also a 
portion that is undesired. The energy is flowing among 
three object-concepts now: the giver and two receivers. 
Besides keeping three object-concepts in mind, it is also 
necessary to keep at least one form of energy in mind. 
Therefore the complexity of efficiency is 4. 
How much energy flows between systems can be measured 
by the increase or decrease in the energy forms of either 
of the two interacting object-concepts, giving rise to the 
formulae for the various forms of energy. However, the 
energy changes can also be measured a third way: by 
measuring the energy AS IT FLOWS. This flow-meter is 
work. Work is the measurement of energy as it flows 
between two systems because a force (either force vector 
or force pair) acting through a distance is the mechanical 
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description of how systems interact. In my experience, 
this explanation of work makes far more sense to a student 
than the definition of energy as the ability to do work. 
Heat is explained as the flow of energy to the internal 
components of an object-concept rather than to the 
object-concept as a whole. Conduction, convection and 
radiation can then be introduced as particular processes 
of the transfer of thermal energy. 
What is the complexity of work? First, it is 
necessary to keep both the energy loosing and energy 
gaining object-concepts in mind to understand work as a 
flow-meter. It is also necessary to keep in mind force 
pair as the measure of the interaction's intensity, and 
distance, as the property measuring the extent, or 
"duration", of the interaction during which energy can 
flow. Thus work has a complexity of 4. Heat also has a 
complexity of 4 since it is conceptually similar to work, 
the only difference being that one or both of the 
object-concepts being imagined is at the molecular level. 
How fast energy flows between object-concepts is 
power. The two object-concepts must be kept in mind, as 
must, at the least, one of the forms of energy in one of 
the object-concepts as it changes value during the 
interaction. Conversely, work could be substituted for 
the form of energy. Either way, it is also necessary to 
keep a formal idea of time in mind in order to understand 
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power as a rate of energy flow. Power thus has a 
complexity of 4. In a conceptual structure organized 
according to generality, complexity and abstractness, it 
would be placed AFTER efficiency, which also has a 
complexity of 4, because of its greater abstractness, 
particularly if conceived of in its conventional guise 
using work. So the familiar energy concepts are seen as 
successive elaborations of superordinate concepts, 
starting with the two essential attributes of an 
object-concept containing an energy quality. 
The tip of an iceberg has emerged in this development 
of conservation of energy, and it will sink all 
understanding of a conceptually based science curriculum 
unless it is now recognized. The iceberg is the role and 
development of scientific equations within a conceptual 
paradigm of science education. Each of the forms of 
energy has an associated equation that mathematically 
relates the various relevant properties of the 
object-concept to produce a numerical measure. The 
paradigm of conventional science curricula is to attempt 
to understand a particular concept, such as any of the 
forms of energy, THROUGH these mathematical expressions. 
This paradigm requires the student to form a concept from 
the bottom up, from the specific to the general, a 
daunting task for most students as history has shown. 
However, in reversing the direction of learning, the 
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paradigm of conceptual learning does not jettison or 
denigrate the mathematical expressions for scientific 
concepts. The proof of the model is that students 
educated conceptually will be better able to apply these 
mathematically expressed concepts in flexible, 
inquiry-based problem solving than will students educated 
conventionally. Both paradigms see mathematics as the 
language of science and see mathematical reasoning to be 
the apogee of scientific understanding. The differences 
are in the approach to this common goal. The conceptual 
paradigm of science education introduces mathematical 
expressions AFTER building a conceptual shell formed of 
already held concepts. These mathematical expressions are 
introduced using measurement, causality, and 
proportionality, concepts that are part of nature of 
matter. The few mathematical expressions that are found 
within nature of matter, such as distance combining to 
form area and volume, or mass and volume combining to form 
density, are all conceptual recipes for combining concrete 
concepts. There is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the mathematical expression and the concept's formation, 
so the beginnings of mathematical reasoning are firmly 
grounded in the concrete. 
The first numerical manipulations within teaching 
conservation of energy would merely ascribes so many units 
of energy to each form contained within each object- 
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concept. Then students must track the amount of energy in 
each object-concept during an interaction. It is like a 
balance sheet. I have found that it takes eighth graders 
three to four weeks to be able to keep these "balance 
sheets" of a myriad of possible energy transformations. 
The time is well spent. It greatly deepens their 
understanding of conservation of energy. It also provides 
them with the context within which they are going to 
calculate the amount of energy from the observable 
properties of the object-concept. 
Once the forms of energy are reached in the student's 
education, the one-to-one correspondence found in nature 
of matter between the mathematical expression and the 
concept's formation disappears. Using proportionality, 
the conceptual paradigm of science education introduces 
these mathematical expressions as simply un-derived 
recipes used to measure a numerical value of a property. 
It is this numerical value that is used on the "balance 
sheets" of an interaction. LATER, as the student becomes 
more familiar with the concept and its mathematical 
manipulation, an integration of the conceptual shell and 
its mathematical expression can take place. The student 
eventually can begin to use the language of mathematics 
with greater insight and facility, understanding the 
meaning of constants of proportionality and the specific 
operational proportionality of each of the factors. Such 
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a progression is similar to the whole language approach of 
teaching children to read and write. For example, kinetic 
energy is introduced as being proportional to the mass and 
speed of an object-concept. The recipe for computing a 
numeric value for kinetic energy involves squaring the 
speed and multiplying by a half, both operations 
INTRODUCED as mathematical expediencies so that a 
numerical analysis of conservation of energy holds true. 
LATER, as a student becomes more and more mathematically 
fluent, the significance of these two operations will 
grow. Eventually the student may come to relate them to 
the other criterial attributes of kinetic energy in a 
meaningful way other than just through measurement. 
Another example is energy of position. It is introduced 
as being proportional to mass and height, and its recipe 
not only multiplies these two factors but also uses a 
constant of proportionality that happens to be the 
acceleration due to gravity. If a student is learning 
energy of position within a curriculum conceptually 
organized according to generality, complexity, and 
abstractness, then energy of position comes fairly early 
on, and the student has not yet acquired a clear 
understanding of the distinction between mass and weight, 
since the distinction depends upon an understanding of 
force vector. Attempting to explain the significance of 
the constant of proportionality in energy of position 
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involves sorting out this distinction. Far better to sort 
it out later when dealing with force vector, and, at that 
time, the student's understanding of energy of position 
will deepen. 
Because the mathematical expressions of science 
concepts are not used to define them, and are subsumed 
under the concept of measurement, they are not relevant to 
the task of defining complexity. 
The use of mathematical expressions as meaningless 
recipes by science students is frequently cited as a major 
weakness of present science education. To understand the 
conceptual paradigm of science education, it is of utmost 
importance to understand that the introduction of 
mathematical expressions as recipes within this paradigm 
is NOT equivalent to this conventional weakness. Within 
the conceptual paradigm, students are FIRST asked to form 
a well-defined concept that is anchored within their 
existing conceptual structure. The mathematical recipe is 
understood WITHIN this conceptual structure. Because it 
is related to the criterial attributes of the concept 
through proportionality, future learning will induce it to 
grow within this fertile context. 
The development of conservation of energy presented 
here is quite different from its traditional form. 
Although the above development was presented from a purely 
theoretical basis, it was actually arrived at through a 
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combination of theory and empirical, classroom experience. 
I was teaching a tenth grade general science class in the 
mid 1970's in which there were several units on energy. 
The superficial coverage of energy sources, uses and 
social issues did little to give the students a meaningful 
understanding of conservation of energy and its 
constituent concepts. I therefore modified the curriculum 
to include a development of conservation of energy 
concepts taken directly from a conventional physics 
curriculum. This approach failed miserably with the low 
performance students to whom the class catered. They were 
not prepared to devote the intellectual effort necessary 
to master it. Over the following five years, I developed 
the approach, piece by piece, described above. At the 
time I was pursuing my Master's degree, for which I 
concentrated on the underlying theory necessary for this 
curriculum development, eventually writing a textbook for 
the course (Leighton, 1980). The results were successful. 
More recently, I have used the approach for a 
heterogeneously grouped eighth grade class with thirty two 
students, and found it to be equally successful. 
In the 1970's, I found the approach to be so 
successful with the low performance students in my tenth 
grade classes that I then used it in my physics classes, 
populated, as usual, with the more intellectually inclined 
students of the senior class. Rather than teaching the 
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traditional development of Mechanics, I started with 
conservation of energy as described above. I then moved 
to momentum and forces, teaching it as explained below. I 
was astounded at the ease with which my students could 
apply these latter concepts to the same problems that I 
had used during previous years. I was also able to 
progress much deeper in each topic area, well beyond the 
textbook we were using. Not only did we go deeper, we 
also went further. During the second year that I taught 
the physics curriculum in this manner, I was able to spend 
two weeks on rotational motion, investigating angular 
momentum, before having to leave Mechanics for the next 
major unit. 
In the early 1980's I found myself working for a 
company that designed and installed all manner of 
alternative energy systems, from wind generators to solar 
systems to wood stoves, as well as conventional heating 
and cooling systems. I was in charge of training about 
fifteen installation and maintenance people. A great deal 
of flexibility on their part was required, since they were 
working with such a variety of systems. However, none of 
them could be said to be intellectually inclined, and 
several of them were functionally illiterate. I 
instituted weekly training sessions in which I taught 
conservation of energy as developed here. Of course, 
there were no lack of applications to use as 
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illustrations, and the relevance of the material certainly 
helped their learning to a great degree. They became 
self-assured and confident in their knowledge. From a 
business perspective, they became versatile and efficient 
installers who could handle almost any field problem they 
encountered. It was very gratifying to see them use their 
knowledge for flexible problem solving. 
C. The Complexity of Waves 
The third basic concept, waves, also has a minimum 
complexity of 2, similar to conservation of energy. In 
waves, the object-concept becomes disembodied as a wave. 
This "wave-concept" must be kept in mind, but the only way 
to do so is to keep at least one of its properties 
(medium, wavelength, amplitude, speed, direction) in mind 
at the same time. The object-concept of wave is very 
difficult to delineate because it is not material. When a 
child is shown a pulse running down a slinky, the wave is 
inseparable from amplitude. When the child is shown a 
light ray, the wave is inseparable from direction. The 
object-concept is being stretched to its limit so that the 
distinction between the object and its properties is vague 
at best. To a scientist, a wave-object IS its properties. 
A scientist might simultaneously imagine wave with all its 
properties, and as such it would have a complexity of 6. 
424 
The classic sub-concepts of waves (superposition, 
reflection, refraction, and diffraction), can be organized 
according to how many wave-concepts and associated 
properties must be kept in mind simultaneously. The 
concept of superposition of waves has a complexity of 2 
because a person need keep in mind the wave object-concept 
and amplitude. Even though multiple waves are being added 
to produce a resultant wave, they are considered 
sequentially, not simultaneously. 
For a person to manipulate the concept of reflection 
there would seem to be two concept-objects to deal with: 
the wave and the object from which it reflects, the 
reflector. But the reflector is imagined with only one 
criterial attribute: it reflects waves. All others are 
irrelevant to the process. The only contribution of the 
reflector object is to change the wave's direction. The 
attribute of reflecting waves does not reside in the 
reflector; its focus is the reflected wave. So reflection 
is imagined as a process in which the direction of a wave 
changes. A person, in imagining reflection, has only one 
object-concept, the wave, in mind at any one time, and 
imagines that wave's direction to change. In a temporal 
sequence, the person first imagines the incident wave, and 
then imagines the reflected wave, the criterial attribute 
of direction having changed. Thus reflection involves 
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keeping in working memory the object-concept of wave and 
the concept of direction; it has a complexity of 2. 
Beyond straight forward specular reflection, 
reflection could also include scattering. However, to 
imagine scattering, it is necessary to imagine the 
particle responsible for the scattering as well as the 
incident wave and direction. Hence scattering also has a 
complexity of 3. 
Refraction has a complexity of 3 because three 
concepts must be kept in mind simultaneously: the wave as 
the object-concept, it's direction, and its speed. 
Similar to reflection, the incident and refracted waves 
need not be imagined simultaneously. 
Diffraction has an undeterminate, but high, 
complexity because it requires thinking of a wave front as 
a very large number of point sources. 
D. The Complexity of Chemical Bonding 
After waves, the next basic concept as determined by 
generality is chemical bonding. The complexity of 
chemical bonding as a basic concept is 3, in that it is 
necessary to imagine simultaneously the two objects that 
are bonding (or were just bonded), and the bond. Bond, as 
discussed previously, is a link concept that is imagined 
in much the same way that a wave is imagined; it is an 
abstract object-concept that is inseparable from its 
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properties, as well as from the two objects that are 
involved in and define the bond. 
Unfortunately, this analysis of chemical bonding 
cannot proceed much further. There is a dearth of 
research on identifying the constituent concepts, much 
less organizing them into a coherent structure. Much of 
the curriculum that is traditionally taught as chemistry 
is covered under nature of matter and conservation of 
energy, so the chemistry curriculum can still be greatly 
improved with just the analyses presented previously. In 
any case, a great deal of research is still needed to un¬ 
pack this basic concept. 
E. The Complexity of Momentum and Forces 
The essence of momentum and forces is dealing with 
the interactions between objects, as epitomized in 
Newton's second and third laws, rather than just looking 
at the before-after conditions. In this context, the 
complexity of momentum and forces, as an essential shell 
that can subsequently be elaborated, is 4. It is of 
course necessary to keep in mind the two interacting 
object-concepts. The interaction itself is embodied in 
the link concept of force-vector or force-pair. And 
finally, direction as a property of force, is also 
necessary. 
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Many of the concepts within momentum and forces also 
have minimum complexities of 4, and therefore cannot be 
organized within a structure according to just their 
relative complexities. They can be arranged, however, 
according to their abstractness. The following analysis 
of the concepts in momentum and forces is presented in an 
order corresponding to increasing abstractness, and the 
analysis of their relative abstractness will be presented 
in the next appendix. 
The roots of momentum and forces are in its 
antecedent basic concepts. Newton's first law is a 
re-phrasing of Galileo's law of inertia, with a very 
important shift in perspective. Inertia is an abstract 
extension of nature of matter, in that "all bodies have 
some constant, intrinsic property that characterizes the 
way their velocity vectors change when they interact with 
other bodies. This property is called inertia... We may 
regard inertia as a measure of a body's intrinsic 
"reluctance" to having its velocity vector changed" 
(Blanpied, 1969, p.92). Inertia is a property of an 
object-concept and, because it thus builds on a student's 
prior conceptual structure, is a good place to being 
learning momentum and forces. Newton's law changes the 
focus from the object-concept to the interaction: An 
object-concept will continue at constant velocity unless 
acted upon by an outside force; in other words, until it 
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is involved in an interaction with some other 
object-concept. During an interaction, it is the momentum 
of the object-concept that changes. So momentum is 
inertia seen from the perspective of interactions. 
Stating that the momentum of an object-concept will stay 
constant unless acted upon by an outside force is 
equivalent to saying that a moving object-concept has 
another property, besides speed and kinetic energy, and 
that property is momentum. If the object-concept is 
involved in an interaction with its environment, then its 
momentum will change values. Both speed and kinetic 
energy are observable properties that are naturally formed 
by children. Momentum, however, is not directly 
observable. Conceptually, it combines kinetic energy and 
direction, each of which has a complexity of 1. 
Conceptually, momentum is directed kinetic energy. 
Mathematically, momentum is a combination of velocity and 
mass, but, as explained at the end of the development of 
the complexity of conservation of energy, the mathematical 
recipe for the numerical value of a concept is not 
necessarily the conceptual recipe. Momentum, a 
complicated property compared to previously learned 
properties, has a complexity of 2, no matter whether it is 
analyzed conceptually or mathematically. 
Mentally working with conservation of momentum is 
similar to working with conservation of energy, except 
429 
that direction must be kept in mind at all times. The 
emphasis is still that, during an interaction, one of the 
object-concepts gains and the other looses a conserved 
quality. Conservation of momentum is very difficult to 
build conceptually from the top down. In other words, it 
is more a principle than a concept. It is difficult to 
identify observable causalities in which momentum is 
conserved that are independent of conservation of energy 
and kinetic energy. There are only so many times that, as 
a teacher, you can invoke pool balls without it becoming 
obvious that you don't have too many other readily 
observable examples to cite. Superordinate learning is 
necessary, in which kinetic energy and direction are 
combined to form momentum. Each object-concept involved 
in an interaction can be focused on individually and 
sequentially, but now the student must imagine each 
object-concept with two properties. So conservation of 
momentum involves keeping in mind three concepts: the 
object-concept, kinetic energy and direction, and thus has 
a complexity of 3. 
To implement the curriculum framework being 
presented, it would, of course, be necessary to look at 
instructional issues. One such issue would be an analysis 
of the various concepts to see which would have to be 
learned through superordinate learning, starting with its 
essential components concepts and from them forming the 
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more general concept. Although such an analysis is not 
carried out, it will become clear that much of the 
learning required in momentum and forces is superordinate. 
The reason stems from the fact that conservation of 
momentum must be so learned and that momentum and forces 
is, therefore, fundamentally a fairly complex basic 
concept. 
To quantify the momentum of an object-concept, the 
equation is mass times speed. As explained earlier, 
within a conceptual paradigm this recipe is given as a 
numerical expediency utilizing proportionality. It is a 
different recipe from that of kinetic energy, one of its 
essential criterial attributes, but then it is a different 
property. Because the recipe for kinetic energy was not 
used to define momentum as a concept, the difference in 
recipes is not a significant instructional stumbling 
block. 
Direction must still be superimposed upon this 
numerical recipe of mass times speed to keep momentum 
coherent and unitary. Velocity can now be introduced as 
the property that conceptually combines speed and 
direction, and the recipe for momentum can then be 
re-interpreted as the product of an object-concept's mass 
and velocity, with the emphasis on the attribute of 
direction contained within velocity. 
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Once momentum has been defined as a property, the 
next step is to track it as it flows between interacting 
object-concepts. Since force pair has been defined so far 
as the measure of an interaction's intensity during which 
there is a balanced gain and loss of qualities, Newton's 
third law should be considered next as it addresses this 
balance. Up to this point, no new conceptual ground has 
been broken by the momentum and forces basic concept. 
Conceptually, it is similar so far to conservation of 
energy, even if it is more complex with the inclusion of 
direction. Newton's third law introduces a new idea. It 
does not look at an interaction as a holistic, unitary 
whole, but splits in into two balanced sides, each of 
which can be focused on independent of the other. It 
states that it is possible to focus on an interaction one 
side at a time. In other words, Newton's third law is a 
pair of conceptual blinkers that just looks at half of the 
force pair while recognizing that it is only half of the 
whole. 
Newton's third law is an excellent forum within which 
to introduce force vector, the traditional interpretation 
of what a force is. It too is a link concept since it is 
defined by the interaction between two object-concepts. 
Even though, as a link concept, it is endowed with an 
identity independent of the object-concepts which surround 
and define it, to imagine Newton's third law it is 
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necessary to keep four concepts in mind: the two 
interacting object concepts and two force vectors; 
therefore Newton's third law has a complexity of 4, 
similar to the complexity of force pair, understood to be 
the intensity of an interaction between two 
object-concepts. Force vector itself has a complexity of 
4 too, since it has two essential criterial attributes in 
addition to the two object-concepts that define it: 
measurement (or magnitude) and direction. Once force 
vector has been introduced, all of the types of forces can 
then be dealt with. Gravity, weight and mass can be 
sorted out within the greater conceptual context of an 
interaction between two object-concepts while focusing on 
the individual object-concept and force vector, as is 
conventionally done. 
In describing the basic complexity of momentum and 
forces as 4, it was asserted that force (as either force 
pair or force vector) needed to be kept in mind. However, 
during a great many interactions, there are a multitude of 
forces, all acting simultaneously, arising from a 
multitude of object-concepts. Shouldn't they all be kept 
in mind simultaneously? The answer is no. Either the 
object-concepts are imagined in pairs, one after the 
other, each with an intervening force, or all the 
intervening forces are combined as a resultant force, 
which is then kept in mind along with direction. 
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Combining individual force vectors to produce a resultant 
is done sequentially, as is any numerical summation, but 
is a more complex task because force vector includes 
direction as well as measurement (magnitude). Resultant 
force, in which the summation of two force vectors is 
imagined, has a complexity of 4 because the measurements 
and directions of both force vectors must be kept in mind. 
As a concept, resultant force is imagined as the 
simultaneous combination of two constituents. Once a 
resultant force has been computed, its constituents are 
blended so as to be indistinguishable from each other, and 
what is left in the mind's eye is another force vector. 
How is resultant force different from force vector? A 
resultant force arises from a multitude of object-concepts 
which are not all kept in mind simultaneously. Certainly 
the object-concept upon which the resultant force is 
acting is kept in mind, but all the other object-concepts, 
whose individual contributions combined to form the 
resultant force, are lumped together as a single 
object-concept that is an amorphous, abstract 
conglomeration best described as a system. The resultant 
force is the intervening force between the targeted 
object-concept and the surrounding system. The answer to 
the question is that a resultant force is indeed a force 
vector, but significantly more abstract. Considered as a 
force vector, the complexity of resultant force is still 
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4: the object-concept, system, measurement (magnitude) and 
direction. 
Continuing with the focus on single body force 
vectors, the next step in the conceptual development of 
momentum and forces is to look at how a force vector 
changes an object's momentum. In contrast to forces 
acting through distances to transfer energy, forces act 
through time to change momentum. Impulse, also a link 
concept, is considered to be the flow meter through which 
momentum, flowing from one object to another, can be 
measured, just as work was the flow meter by which the 
energy flow between systems could be measured. Thus the 
changes in momentum of two interacting object-concepts can 
be measured by either looking at the corresponding 
increases or decreases in either the gaining or losing 
object-concept, or by measuring it as it flows, using 
impulse. Impulse has a complexity of 4 because the two 
interacting object-concepts, force vector and time must be 
imagined simultaneously. 
Acceleration is introduced as the measure of the 
change in an object-concept's velocity, the most common 
result of a change in its momentum. Acceleration also has 
a complexity of 4 because the object-concept, initial 
velocity, final velocity and time must all be imagined 
simultaneously. Newton's second law, F = (m)(a), also has 
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a complexity of 4 because the object-concept, force 
vector, mass, and acceleration must be kept in mind. 
All of the manipulations required by straight-line 
dynamics can now be carried out. The various concepts 
described so far are juggled according to the kinematics 
equations. The one concept that must be superimposed upon 
all of the others during dynamics problem-solving is 
direction. In straight-line dynamics, direction can be a 
fairly concrete matter of forward or back, positive or 
negative. Multi-dimensional motion, such as vector, 
projectile and circular motion, requires a more abstract 
concept of an independent coordinate system within which 
the motion takes place. Finally, rotational dynamics 
requires a highly abstract concept of direction in which 
the direction of properties such as angular momentum and 
acceleration seem to have little to do with observable 
physical reality. 
F. The Complexity of Electricity and Magnetism 
The last of the six basic concepts is electricity and 
magnetism. Its essential shell has a complexity of five. 
It is similar to momentum and forces in that it is 
primarily concerned with the interactions between 
object-concepts. Thus the two object-concepts, the force 
between them, and the direction of the forces are 
essential ingredients, implying a complexity of four. But 
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there is another essential ingredient, and that is either 
the property of charge or magnetic polarity. Just as it 
is essential for the waves concept to keep at least one of 
a wave's defining properties in mind, so it is necessary 
to keep charge or polarity in mind to successfully use the 
concept of electricity and magnetism. Thus the complexity 
of this basic concept is five. 
Electricity and magnetism frequently uses the concept 
of a field. Rather than being another essential 
ingredient, however, it replaces one of the object- 
concepts in the mind's eye. Field is another link concept 
that cannot be separated from the two charged objects 
which give it definition. But once it is defined, the 
object around which it is imagined can be replaced by its 
field. Rather than imagine the object itself, one 
imagines its surrounding field. Thus many questions that 
are best answered with this basic concept are dealt with 
in terms of a field, an object within the field, the 
charge or polarity of that object, the force between the 
object and the field, and how that force changes over 
time. 
Similar to chemical bonding, much research still 
needs to be carried out in order to identify the component 
concepts of electricity and magnetism, as well as to 
organize them into a conceptual structure useful to a 
curriculum designer. The results of such an analysis will 
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probably show that many of the concepts are so complex 




THE CRITERIAL ATTRIBUTE OF ABSTRACTNESS 
"I will not explain what butterflies and superstrings 
are. To explain butterflies is unnecessary because 
everyone has seem them. To explain superstrings is 
impossible because nobody has seem them... Butterflies 
are at the extreme of concreteness, superstrings are at 
the extreme of abstraction. They mark the extreme limits 
of the territory over which science claims jurisdiction" 
(Dyson, 1988, p. 14). Abstractness is the yardstick most 
often used in science to measure and compare the 
difficulty of subjects. Of the three criterial 
attributes, it is the most familiar to science educators. 
Yet it requires some careful definition and discussion 
before concepts can be compared on a continuum of 
abstractness. 
As in science proper, so in the realm of learning 
theory: of the three criterial attributes of a concept, 
abstractness is the least contentious. "As a matter of 
fact, some definitions of intelligence (Stoddard, 1944) 
regard the abstractness of the ideas an individual can 
understand as a good index of the level of intelligence" 
(Bloom, 1956, p. 36). The six theorists whose writings 
are being synthesized in this dissertation all agree that 
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abstractness is a criterial attribute according to which 
concepts can be compared. Most of them actually take for 
granted the importance of abstractness and do not address 
it directly to any great extent, even though they 
implicity do so throughout their respective theories. The 
definition of abstractness is also widely shared. Because 
abstractness accounts for the proximity of a concept to 
direct sensory input, it would constitute the interface 
between the functionalist cognitive psychologist and the 
reductionist neurobiologist. Neurobiologists have lately 
contributed some very interesting findings that build 
connections across this interface. This appendix will 
first present the definition of abstractness and 
investigate the interface between cognitive psychology and 
neurobiology. It will then look at each of the six 
theorists' views of abstractness, finally proceeding to an 
analysis of various concepts in the physical sciences in 
light of this last of the three criterial attributes. 
A. The Definition of Abstractness 
"The principle distinction between abstract and 
factual items, of course, is in terms of level of 
particularity or proximity to concrete-empirical 
experience" (Ausubel et al., 1978. p. 138). Abstractness 
is a property of concepts with a continuum of values 
stretching from concrete at one extreme to abstract at the 
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other. At the concrete end of the continuum, concepts are 
directly observable by one or more of the five senses. 
"We should consider the most fundamental meaning [of a 
concept], which is exhibited in individual behavior by 
responding to object qualities such as those implied by 
the names red, double, circular, and smooth or by common 
objects such as cat, chair, tree and house. It is 
customary to refer to these as CONCRETE CONCEPTS, since 
they can be denoted by being pointed out; in other words 
they are CONCEPTS BY OBSERVATION" (Gagne, 1985. p. 96). 
The object qualities implied by Gagne's list of names are 
color, number, shape and texture. All of these qualities 
can be seen, and all but color can also be felt. These 
concepts are therefore very concrete. As you move up the 
continuum towards increasing abstractness, concepts become 
less noticeable to the senses and more and more dependent 
for their definition upon more concrete concepts. 
"Typically,... abstract material is also characterized by 
greater connectedness than factual material" (Ausubel et 
al., 1978. p. 138). In other words, abstract concepts are 
connected to other concepts because they cannot be 
assimilated through direct sensory input. Abstract 
concepts rely upon more concrete concepts for their 
definitions to such a degree that Gagne uses the term 
defined, rather than abstract, concepts: 
Many concepts cannot be learned... as concrete 
concepts. Instead they must be learned by DEFINITION, 
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and, accordingly, may be called DEFINED CONCEPTS. 
Sometimes they are called abstract, to distinguish 
them from the concrete variety. For example, the 
concept diagonal is a defined concept, not a concrete 
concept... Another example is the concept pivot... 
In this instance it can be seen that the defined 
concept is composed of other concrete concepts... 
This is not always the case, of course; a defined 
concept may be made of one or more concepts that are 
themselves defined rather than concrete... Some 
concepts can only be learned in a defined form. 
Cousin is an example... Abstract concepts like 
family, city, transportation and justice have to be 
learned as defined concepts. They have no concrete 
counterparts that can be identified by their 
appearance." (Gagne, 1985. p.lll, 112, 113) 
Gagne emphasizes the sense of sight, and his emphasis 
would seem well placed since the sense of sight is the 
predominate one; seeing is believing. However, the other 
senses also contribute to forming concrete concepts. 
Phase, as the property that describes whether an object is 
solid, liquid, or gas, can be either seen or felt. 
Texture is a property that is primarily related to the 
sense of touch. Entities with different textures usually 
have different lusters, but the visual observation of 
luster by a child is connected to a memory of touch, not 
to any ideas of reflected light. Weight, understood as 
gravitational mass, is another concrete property because 
it too can be felt whenever a person lifts an object. As 
a matter of fact, the sense of touch is the only avenue 
through which it can be experienced. Temperature is 
concrete because it is felt. It is possible to produce a 
fine calibration for rating the concrete-ness of such 
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concepts according to which combination of the senses 
produces input. For curriculum design in science, 
however, such a small scale of distinction is unnecessary. 
The importance of the three criterial attributes, 
including abstractness, is to produce a conceptual 
structure that reflects the intellectual development of 
students. Children have developed the concrete concepts 
important to the physical sciences, such as those just 
mentioned, by the time they reach first or second grade, 
and the sequence in which they formed them is not 
especially important to the curriculum designer. 
What is important, though, is realizing that a 
concept might be concrete in that it CAN be learned 
through direct sensory perception, but that it can be ALSO 
be learned in a more abstract form through definition and 
derivation from other concepts. The concrete concepts 
that elementary age students have formed naturally 
constitute the basis for school instruction aimed at 
deepening their understanding. "The level to which a 
particular concept as a mental construct is attained by a 
given individual also varies, increasing with further 
learning" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 6). 
Characterizing a particular concept as more or less 
abstract can be misleading. The implication is that a 
particular concept is static and unchanging, which is not 
true. When describing and defining the criterial 
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attribute of complexity, it was recognized that a 
particular concept could evolve and vary as to how many 
component concepts it consisted of, depending upon the 
depth of understanding. Therefore, complexity was 
calculated by looking at the ESSENTIAL criterial 
attributes. Correspondingly, abstractness is established 
by looking at the LEAST level of abstraction necessary to 
form the concept. Thus many of the concrete concepts 
mentioned so far, that are learned directly from sensory 
input, are only first understood at an intuitive, 
visceral, highly concrete level. With increased learning, 
they can be, and usually are, understood with greater and 
greater abstraction as well as complexity, meaning their 
definitions include more and more abstract components. 
"For example, with more learning, an individual's concept 
of plant comes closer to the concept held by a botanist" 
(Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 6). In the context of 
Klausmeier's model, concepts are first understood at the 
concrete level where they are used to discriminate one 
thing from another. Later, the concepts may be learned, 
and taught, to produce a consciously defined and applied 
concept. 
It should be understood that every concrete concept, 
although it may initially be learned by observation, 
can also be learned by definition. Concrete concepts 
that are learned by young children are often given 
fuller meaning and greater precision when they are 
later brought to the formal level (as DEFINED 
CONCEPTS) by learning in school." (Gagne, 1985. p. 
96, 99) 
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Intuitive (semiabstract and often subverbal) 
concepts... are intuitive and relatively 
particularistic in nature because their acquisition 
is dependent upon the availability of 
concrete-empirical props. They are functional for 
purposes of problem-solving and further reception 
learning, but are not nearly as precise, 
transferable, or efficient for these latter purposes 
as are the truly abstract and verbal concept meanings 
that succeed them. However, when they precede the 
later developmental acquisition of their 
abstract-verbal equivalents, they often enhance 
meaningfulness and help prevent rote assimilation of 
new conceptual meanings (p. 104, 105)... [For 
example], it must be appreciated that ’fish' to a 
toddler is not the same superordinate concept that it 
is to an adult. Actually, at first, it is not a 
concept at all, but, rather, a particularistic term 
referring to one or more exemplars of 'fish'; and, 
later, before a categorical concept emerges, the 
basis of classification is a common perceptual core." 
(p. 109) (Ausubel et al., 1978) 
Thus a particular concept, such as mass 
(gravitational), may start out by being very concrete, and 
as such is actually understood by a child to be what a 
scientist would better term matter. Through instruction 
it may become increasingly abstract as it is linked to 
other concepts and its definition becomes more and more 
dependent upon them. Weight is highly abstract when 
understood as the resultant gravitational force on an 
object exerted by all surrounding mass. A curriculum 
planner wants to know when mass (as the measure of the 
matter contained in an object-concept, usually referred to 
by students as weight) can be first introduced, and 
therefore labels it as highly concrete, while building 
into a curriculum structure the later concepts, such as 
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gravity, that will develop mass (gravitational) into its 
more abstract and accurate meanings. 
B. The Relationship between Concrete Concepts 
and Neurobioloqy 
In Appendix B, reductionism, which attempts to 
connect learning and neurobiology, was considered 
peripheral to today's curriculum planning efforts because 
of its relative infancy as a field of study. What 
relevance there is, however, would come now, at this point 
of discussing the concreteness of concepts. Highly 
concrete concepts are based directly on sensory data, and 
the brain, as the receiver and interpreter of sensory 
data, might be expected to show a neurobiological 
manifestation of such concrete concepts. This expectation 
appears to be well founded. "Over the past several 
decades, there has been a gradual merger of two originally 
separate fields of science: neurobiology, the science of 
the brain, and cognitive psychology, the science of the 
mind" (Kandal and Hawkins, 1992, p. 79). "Neuroscientists 
have made great advances in understanding the relation 
between cognitive processes and the anatomic organization 
of the brain" (Goldman-Rakic, 1992, p. 111). In the early 
1970's, Semir Zeki (1992) "proposed the concept of 
functional specialization in the visual cortex, which 
supposes that color, form, motion and possibly other 
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attributes of the visible world are processed separately" 
(p. 71). It is now believed that the brain processes 
language and interprets the natural world by means of 
three separate but interacting structures, one of which 
bears a striking resemblance to what a cognitive 
psychologist would call a conceptual structure based upon 
concrete perceptions: 
First, a large collection of neural systems... 
represents nonlanguage interactions between the body 
and its environment, as mediated by various motor and 
sensory systems... The brain not only categorizes 
these non-language representations (along lines such 
as shape, color, sequence, or emotional state), it 
also creates another level of representation for the 
results of its classification. In this way, people 
organize objects, events and relationships. 
Successive layers of categories and symbolic 
representations form the basis for abstraction. 
(Damasio and Damasio, 1992, p. 89) 
The second and subsequent levels of representation 
that the brain creates from its concrete interactions are 
language based. "Unequivocal evidence for at least two 
distinct representational systems, one language-based and 
one visually based" (Hart and Gordon, 1992, p. 63) within 
the human brain is now available. It also seems as though 
the representations that might start with the concrete 
interactions in the first, visually based system, are 
passed along to the language-based systems, in what a 
cognitive psychologist would consider to be a process of 
increasingly abstract understanding of a concept: 
There is, in some cases, a duplication of some types 
of knowledge for physical attributes across the two 
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systems. It seems apparent that how and in which 
representational system information is stored depends 
on both the type of information (particularly the 
feasibility of forming the appropriate type of code) 
and individual experience. The visual physical 
attributes of objects, as studied in our experiments, 
must be represented in at least the visual system if 
they were acquired through visual experience. But 
they might also be represented in some form in the 
language system... Normally there is a dual 
representation for visual physical attributes, one 
visually based and one language based. (Hart & 
Gordon, 1992, p. 63) 
The first, visually based system also seems to 
distinguish between different properties by storing 
correspondingly different records of neural activity: 
The brain holds, in effect, a record of the neural 
activity that takes place in the sensory and motor 
cortices during interaction with a given object. The 
records are patterns of synaptic connections that can 
re-create the separate sets of activity that define 
an object or event; each record can also stimulate 
related ones... The neural processes that describe 
the interaction between the individual and the 
object... occur in separate functional regions, and 
each region contains additional subdivisions: the 
visual aspects of perception, for example, is 
segregated within smaller systems specialized for 
color, shape and movement (p. 91). (Damasio and 
Damasio, 1992) 
It now seems possible to locate specific groups of 
neurons responsible for the interpretation and storage of 
concrete concepts such as color, shape (or line 
orientation), texture, number and temperature. For 
example, "the neurons capable of retaining the visual and 
spatial coordinates of a stimulus (in other words, of 
keeping its location 'in mind' after it vanishes) appear 
to be organized within a specific area of the prefrontal 
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cortex" (Goldman-Rakic, 1992. p. 114). The functional 
region of the brain that retains motion seems to be 
further differentiated into regions that process speed, 
trajectory in space and temporal sequence. An interesting 
example is an experiment that was recently reported 
(Hilts, 1992) in which a woman had an electrode implanted 
into her brain. When the electrode was activated, she 
lost the concept of size. She was unable to distinguish 
between a tree and an ant on the basis of size. When the 
electrode was de-activated, her concept of size returned. 
Other than this particular loss, her intellectual 
functions were unimpaired. 
Even the thing concept, in which an entity is 
separated from its environment and given a noun name, 
appears to have a specific neural location. While 
investigating the intellectual capabilities of patients 
with brain damage, Damasio and Damasio (1992, p. 92) found 
that 
one of our patients, known as Boswell, no longer 
retrieves concepts for any unique entity (a specific 
place, person, or event) with which he was previously 
familiar. He has also lost concepts for nonunique 
entities of particular classes... In brief, Boswell 
has an impairment of concepts for many entities, all 
of which are denoted by nouns (common and proper). 
He has no problem whatsoever with concepts for 
attributes, states, activities and relations that are 
linguistically signified by adjectives, verbs, 
functors (prepositions, conjunctions and other verbal 
connective tissue) and syntactic structure. 
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Neurobiology and cognitive psychology seem to have 
converged on a list of concrete concepts. There is still 
substantial work necessary to investigate whether the 
complete list of concrete concepts proposed by cognitive 
psychologists are reflected in the brain's neural 
structure, and whether neurobiologists will add to the 
psychologists' list. These two disciplines also seem to 
agree that these basic concepts are combined, either in 
cognitive structure or neural network, to form more 
abstract concepts. Reductionism gives the curriculum 
designer a high level of confidence in specifying the 
concrete concepts that form the basis of intellectual 
thought, and thus the basis of the nature of matter basic 
concept of physical science. Other contributions to 
educational planning in science, perhaps in the 
instructional and evaluative phases, are just beginning to 
be anticipated (Sylwester, 1993/94). Certainly this 
interface between neurobiology and cognitive psychology is 
just beginning to blossom, and many valuable contributions 
to education can be expected. 
C. Six Theorists' Views of Abstractness 
Gagne was quoted extensively in defining 
abstractness. As he summarized, "rules may vary in such 
properties as abstractness and complexity" (Gagne, 1985. 
p. 119). Much of Gagne's theory concentrates on the 
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initial stages of concept development that occur in 
infants. His hierarchy of concept development starts with 
discriminations, which consist of "telling the difference 
between variations in some particular object-property... 
[such as] colors, shapes, sizes, textures... The things 
concepts represent have characteristics that may be 
described (in the ultimate sense) in physical terms" 
(Gagne, 1985, p. 53). Thus Gagne begins his hierarchy of 
concepts with discriminations that are based on concrete 
concepts derived from sensory input and builds upon these 
discriminations to form abstract, or, using his 
terminology, defined, concepts. He devotes a chapter of 
his seminal book (1985) to the formation of concrete 
concepts, followed by a chapter on the formation of 
increasingly abstract concepts. 
Both Ausubel and Novak also base much of their 
theories on the varying abstractness of concepts: 
Cognitive structure itself tends to be hierarchically 
organized with respect to level of abstraction, 
generality, and inclusiveness of ideas (p. 58)... 
One of the most significant trends in concept 
acquisition consists of a gradual shift from a 
precategorical to a categorical basis of classifying 
experience, or from a relatively concrete to a truly 
abstract basis of categorizing and designating 
generic meanings (p. 107). (Ausubel et al. , 1978) 
Novak's theory of education (1977) is explicitly 
based upon Ausubel's assimilation theory, which is based 
upon a presumption of cognitive structure. 
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Turning to Piaget, it would be a fair summary that 
the primary distinction between the concrete operational 
and formal operational stages of cognitive development is 
the child's ability to deal with abstract concepts. The 
concrete operational stage is defined as the stage in 
which a child can mentally manipulate concrete concepts, 
and in the formal stage the child can manipulate abstract 
concepts. There are other components to the distinctions 
between these stages, but the abstractness of the concepts 
capable of being manipulated is central enough to have the 
stages named accordingly. Furthermore, Piaget did not 
just see a categorical difference in abstractness between 
the concrete and formal operational stages. In Gilbert 
Voyat's (1982) excellent explanation of the various 
Piagetian stages, Piaget Systematized, there is continual 
reference to the changes in abstractness of the concepts 
acquired by children throughout their cognitive 
development. 
Of the eight attributes of concepts that Klausmeier 
postulates, the remaining two that have not been accounted 
for so far within generality and complexity can be 
accounted for within abstractness. These two remaining 
attributes are Instance Perceptability and Learnability. 
Instance Perceptability is the attribute whereby "concepts 
vary with respect to the extent to which instances of the 
concepts can be sensed" (Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 9), a 
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very adequate definition itself of abstractness. 
Klausmeier (1974) also assumes a continuum of values for 
abstractness: "For example, plant has many instances 
which can be manipulated, seen, and smelled, whereas 
eternity has no perceptible instances. Between these 
poles are concepts whose instances can be represented with 
varying degrees of accuracy by drawings and other means" 
(p. 9). 
Learnability addresses the fact that concrete 
concepts are easier to learn than abstract ones. 
"Learnability varies among concepts in the sense that some 
are more readily learned than are others... For example, 
concepts that have readily perceptible instances, such as 
dog and tree, are more readily learned than are concepts 
without perceptible instances, such as atom and eternity" 
(Klausmeier et al., 1974, p. 6). 
Klausmeier's four-level model of concept attainment 
is also predicated on the increasing abstraction with 
which a particular concept is understood. His description 
of the use of concepts understood at the first two levels. 
Concrete and Identity, is "using the concept in solving 
simple problems that can be solved on the basis of 
perceptible elements of the situation" (Klausmeier et 
al., 1974, p. 13). 
Within Bloom's taxonomy, the first of the six 
categories is Knowledge. "In the classification of the 
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knowledge objectives, the arrangement is from the specific 
and relatively concrete types of behaviors to the more 
complex and abstract ones" (Bloom, 1956, p. 62). This 
first category effectively describes a continuum of all 
concepts because the other five categories deal with how 
concepts are used rather than with the concepts 
themselves: 
While it is recognized that knowledge is involved in 
the more complex major categories in the taxonomy,... 
the knowledge category differs from the others in 
that remembering is the major psychological process 
involved here, while in the other categories the 
remembering is only one part of a much more complex 
process of relating, judging and reorganizing. 
(Bloom, 1956, p. 62) 
D. Analyzing Some Physical Science Concents 
According to Abstractness 
The six basic concepts of the physical sciences were 
derived from the perspective of generality, and their 
order was also shown to be one of increasing complexity. 
They are also in order of increasing abstractness. The 
analysis of the relative abstractness of the six basic 
concepts will be accomplished in the next sections by 
looking at the abstractness of the various types of 
concepts (i.e. object-concept, property, time, direction, 
link concept). 
It might be appropriate at this point to say that it 
took several years of research and classroom development 
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to develop the list of six basic concepts. Several of the 
particular efforts in this regard have already been 
described elsewhere. However, one of the guiding 
principles of this effort was that the list needed to be 
organized according to the three properties of generality, 
complexity and abstractness. Thus it is no coincidence 
that the six basic concepts are all organized accordingly; 
it was the basis of their creation. 
To get the feel for rating concepts according to 
abstractness, two examples will be given: A positive 
example, and a negative one. The positive example is 
research done several years ago (Renner, Abraham, et al., 
1990) that investigated ninth grade students' 
understanding of four concepts learned primarily through 
the textbook during seventh and eighth grade. The 
students were also rated on an eight-point scale of their 
Piagetian level of cognitive development between concrete 
and formal operational thinking. The four concepts tested 
for, starting with what the research results found to be 
the "easiest" and progressing to the "hardest," were: 
EXPANSION CONCEPT - Expansion is the process in which 
the volume of a substance increases... 
KINETIC ENERGY CONCEPT - Kinetic energy is energy of 
motion. Kinetic energy can be changed to heat 
energy... 
FLOATING CONCEPT - when the mass of the displaced 
liquid is equal to the mass of the object, the object 
floats... 
DOPPLER EFFECT CONCEPT - The Doppler Effect is a 
change in wave frequency caused by the motion of the 
wave source." (p.36) 
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Although the purpose of the research was to 
ascertain the effectiveness of textbook-based curricula 
(the results showing that it is not very effective at 
all), the results are also relevant to a discussion of 
concept abstractness. The above sequenced list is ordered 
according to how well students could apply the concept, 
and students' understanding of the four concepts was 
clearly correlated with their Piagetian developmental 
levels. The list also seems to be ordered according to 
the inherent abstractness of the concepts. 
The researchers considered primarily abstractness in 
differentiating among the four concepts: "The Doppler 
Effect is perhaps the most formal of the four concepts 
upon which the students were evaluated; the expansion 
concept is the concrete concept. Furthermore, the Doppler 
Effect cannot be concretely experienced as can the 
expansion concept" (p.50). "The data... demonstrate that 
all students were much more successful with the concrete 
concept [the expansion concept] than they were with the 
three formal concepts. In fact, the highest percentage 
achieved with the three formal concepts was 50 percent of 
the formal students succeeded with [the kinetic energy 
concept] and 40 percent were successful with {the floating 
concept]. On the other hand, only 10 percent succeeded 
with [the Doppler Effect concept]" (p.46). The 
distinctions among the three formal concepts, as the 
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authors term them, are actually quite clear. Of the 257 
subjects in the research, 83 percent of them were clearly 
in the concrete operational stage. Of these, 58 percent 
had a sound or partial understanding of the expansion 
concept, 30 percent of the kinetic energy concept, 14 
percent of the floating concept, and 1 percent of the 
Doppler Effect. 
The negative example of a concept's abstractness is 
the concept of model. Many science educators, 
particularly at the middle school level, consider this to 
be an excellent unifying concept for a science class. It 
crops up frequently within the context of choosing themes 
around which to organize curriculum. Yet model is highly 
abstract. What exactly is meant by the term, and what 
exactly do we want students to take away with them 
intellectually that they can generalize to unfamiliar 
situations? In a nutshell, model means that reality and 
its representation are not the same. In a classroom, the 
concept is either trivialized, or its metaphysics is 
beyond the comprehension of many adults, let alone middle 
school students. Students understand that their model 
airplanes are built of paper but that real airplanes are 
not. They understand that the Earth is molten rock and 
metal inside, whereas their models are not. When students 
build models of an atom, it can be pointed out that it is 
only a model since electrons are not really made out of 
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clay and do not really run on wire rings. The fourth 
graders I taught considered these statements to be insults 
to their intelligence. Even though insulting, it would 
still be a good departure point, since all students 
understand it, if it were clear where to go. Do we then 
progress to the electron cloud idea, within the conceptual 
structure that any assertion we make might not represent 
reality? Do we then launch into a detailed exposition of 
scientific method where the worth of a model is judged by 
the accuracy of its predictions? At this point, we are so 
far removed from the sensory reality surrounding a student 
that we are far up the continuum of abstractness. One 
seventh grade science teacher I knew well was adamant that 
model was an excellent unifying concept for his entire 
year's course in physical science. Being curious, I spent 
some time talking with him, his students, the special 
education aide that was in his classroom two periods a day 
and looking at the handouts he used. It turned out that 
the term model was a highly flexible and universal 
vocabulary word that was applied to every topic covered, 
but that was never discussed in its own right. Atoms were 
models, so were chemical equations, so were Newton's laws, 
so were graphs, and so were circuits. There was never any 
exposition of what all these things and phenomena had in 
common that justified them all being grouped under the 
same term. In attempting to see if the teacher himself 
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knew what a model was, it became clear that he had never 
really thought about it. His justification was that using 
the term taught students scientific skepticism, since it 
leant an aura of uncertainty to everything that was 
learned. 
The distinction between concept, content and process 
made within the Amalgamated Model clearly focuses on the 
concept as being the important locus for judging the 
abstractness of a curriculum. Without this three-way 
distinction, discussions of abstractness break down 
quickly. For example, a fourth grade, full-time science 
teacher has her students draw topographical maps and 
elevations because it is a highly concrete topic. After 
all, what could be more concrete than the ground we walk 
on? She also has them do the float-and-sink activity of 
building aluminum foil boats because, again, floating is 
highly concrete. Yes, every student has probably driven 
on a highway and can reproduce the whooshing of the on¬ 
coming cars with a clear change in pitch. Yet it is a 
poor assumption that this concrete experience means that 
students can comprehend Doppler effect. In the same vein, 
meteorology is often considered a very concrete unit of 
study since all students necessarily experience weather. 
If meteorology is taught from a descriptive perspective of 
measuring and tracking various properties such as 
temperature and rainfall, then indeed the conceptual 
459 
demands are quite concrete. However, every meteorology 
unit I have seen makes some attempt to explain the 
patterns and causes, at which point the conceptual demands 
become quite abstract. These are only four examples taken 
from too many others of the assumption that because the 
CONTENT is highly familiar, and therefore concrete, then 
students should be able to understand the lesson. What is 
important is that the CONCEPT be concrete. The hands-on 
science movement is based on the assumption that because 
students are physically involved with and manipulating 
materials, then the lesson is concrete and students will 
understand it. Whatever it is that students learn, their 
ability to do flexible, inquiry-based problem solving will 
not be enhanced unless the abstractness of the concept 
that underlies the lesson is also matched to their 
cognitive abilities. 
E. The Abstractness of the Object-Concept 
In order to analyze complexity, five types of 
concepts (object-concepts, properties, link concepts, 
time, direction) were described, and the minimum number of 
such concepts contained within a unitary concept were 
counted. For such counting, no distinctions were made 
among the five types of concepts. However, they differ in 
their relative abstractness. In order to look at the 
abstractness of various physical science concepts. 
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including the six basic concepts, it is first necessary to 
look at the relative abstractness of these five types of 
concept. First, however, a caveat is in order. Each 
individual type can also vary internally according to 
abstractness. This finer-scale dimension will be 
discussed by comparing various science concepts whose 
essential criterial attributes include the same mix of the 
five types of component concepts, but at least one varies 
in abstractness between the concepts. 
An object-concept is generally the most concrete of 
the five types, merely because we understand our natural 
environment by dividing it into objects. The first 
object-concepts with which a child becomes familiar 
consist of readily observable matter. Recognizing the 
boundaries of such an object is coupled with the 
realization that all such delineations have names, such as 
cat, chair, tree and house. Delineating an object 
involves two concrete operations: separating an object 
from its environment by mentally drawing its boundaries, 
and giving it a name. 
Nature of matter deals first with highly concrete 
object-concepts that consist of easily perceived and 
delineated matter. "Ultimately, the word OBJECT is given 
a meaning beyond the conventional one. Samples of liquid 
and even samples of gas are identified as objects because 
they are material in nature" (Karplus & Thier, 1967, p. 
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42). When beginning with conservation of energy, the 
first interactions to be considered would deal with 
concrete object-concepts. As wave energy is introduced, 
the object-concept is extended to something more abstract. 
Within the basic concept of waves, a wave is thought of 
like an object-concept. It is an entity that can be seen 
and experienced, in the form of water waves, sound, light 
or vibrations. Waves can be named and described with 
properties. But they cannot be easily delineated. You 
cannot take a wave, put in a jar on the shelf and point to 
it. The term entity implies the inclusion of such 
abstract object-concepts. Because of this inclusion, 
entity is a more abstract concept than the object-concept. 
Entity is also a good term to use for object-concepts 
that cannot be seen, even though we believe them to be 
delineated. For example, microscopic particles such as 
molecules and atoms are abstract because we cannot sense 
their existence directly. Chemical bonding, dealing with 
such microscopic particles, is a more abstract basic 
concept than waves because we can at least sense a wave to 
some degree, but we cannot sense molecules. In a similar 
vein, work is a more concrete concept than heat because 
work deals with the transfer of energy between entities 
considered as a whole, as can be perceived, whereas heat 
deals with the transfer of energy to the molecular, 
unperceivable components of an entity. 
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In a more abstract form, entity is thought of as 
system, used throughout momentum and forces. No 
coalescence among the constituent particles is now 
necessary, and the grouping is merely a mental delineation 
that does not have to reflect any physical reality of a 
cohesive, integrated entity. In discussing the relative 
complexities of force vector and resultant force, it was 
found that both of them had complexities of 4, requiring 
the same mixture of essential criterial attributes, 
including two object-concepts. The distinction between 
the two is in the abstractness of the object-concepts. 
Force vector can be learned by imagining the interaction 
between two concrete, coalesced object-concepts. But 
resultant force necessarily has as one of its criterial 
object-concepts a system that consists of any number of 
otherwise unconnected object-concepts. Thus resultant 
force is more abstract than force vector. 
Comparing the six basic concepts, there is a 
progression in the abstractness of the entities being 
considered. Even though each basic concept begins by 
considering concrete object-concepts, it ultimately deals 
with entities whose abstractness surpasses that of the 
previous basic concept's maximum. Thus the six basic 
concepts of the physical sciences are arranged in terms of 
decreasing generality, increasing complexity and 
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increasing abstractness in terms of the entities they deal 
with. 
F. The Abstractness of Various Properties 
As a category, properties are only slightly less 
concrete than object-concepts. Although many of them can 
be directly perceived, logically they depend upon the 
delineation of an entity to which the properties can then 
be attributed. Properties are conceived of as part of, or 
intrinsic to, the entity, and thus borrow of the 
concrete-ness of the entity. Even abstract properties, 
such as inertia, charge and magnetism, have a concrete 
aura to them because of their intimate association with an 
entity. 
Even though properties as a category are fairly 
concrete, there is a wide variation in abstraction among 
properties. Nature of matter deals with the physical 
properties of delineated matter, and therefore most of the 
properties associated with this first basic concept are 
quite concrete. From a cognitive perspective, these 
physical properties are the mental tools by which a 
difference between an object-concept and its surroundings 
are noticed. Therefore, properties could be seen as the 
foundation of the object-concept, reversing the logical 
sequence. My own experience in teaching nature of matter 
is that there are five properties that are closely aligned 
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with the object-concept: scale (or size), number, phase, 
composition, and temperature. In order to imagine an 
object-concept, it must be imagined with some 
characteristics. It cannot be imagined as a hollow 
boundary with a name. It is these five properties that 
most often flesh out the mental image of the 
„ object-concept because they are the easily observed ones. 
Therefore, these five properties could be considered as 
the criterial attributes of entity. The choice of these 
five properties is somewhat arbitrary, of course, and is 
largely based on classroom experience of what works. In 
order to teach children the object-concept, I have found 
it most productive to do so in a unit that includes these 
five properties. Someone familiar with the traditional 
middle school physical science curricula will recognize 
these five properties as including the ideas covered by 
the topics generally known as the particle nature of 
matter and the kinetic theory of matter. These five 
properties were also chosen because they facilitated 
classroom implementation issues with teachers unfamiliar 
with the amalgamated Model. In teaching seventh grade 
physical science, I found it much more effective compared 
to the traditional model to organize the entire year's 
curriculum according to the conceptual framework of these 
five properties (embedded within the three more general 
concepts of entity, property, and process.) 
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Scale is one of the pivotal ideas that is common to 
science, math and technology (American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, 1989, p. 130). It includes the 
concept of size, meaning the relative size of an 
object-concept as compared to a standard, usually the 
human body, and described with such terms as tiny, big, 
and huge, and microscopic and macroscopic. At a more 
abstract level, scale could include relative dimensions of 
distance, mass and time as expressed with powers of ten. 
An understanding of scale involves being able to use a 
mental "zoom lens" to delineate smaller and smaller 
things-within-things, as well as larger and larger 
things-containing-things. Scale is closely aligned with 
the mental operation of delineation because delineating an 
object-concept's boundaries automatically establishes its 
size. Combining scale and delineation also yields the 
difference between an object and a substance, such as wood 
or plastic, wherein a substance is not delineated and 
therefore can exist at any scale. Through scale, students 
may be introduced to the hierarchy of matter, wherein 
elementary particles build up atoms, which build 
molecules, which build bulk matter. Similarly, it is the 
avenue for understanding how life is built from cells, 
tissues, organs, organ systems, organisms, populations and 
communities. 
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Both the terms delineation and scale are somewhat 
foreign to conventional science programs, but, looking 
beyond labels, they have been recognized as pivotal 
concepts before. The SCIS elementary science program also 
introduces the object-concept with the delineation 
operation and scale, but uses the terms system and 
subsystem. The following description of the SCIS 
subsystems concept is an excellent description of 
delineation: 
The concept of subsystem is an extension of the 
systems concept. Sometimes one deals with the system 
for an experiment but the attention is really focused 
on only part of the system - consider, for instance, 
a cup containing some water, an ice cube, and a 
thermometer. One may concentrate on individual parts 
of that experimental system such as the ice, the ice 
and water, the thermometer, or even the cup itself. 
These interesting parts, then, become systems to the 
observer as he focuses attention on each one or their 
various combinations in turn. Since each of these 
systems is wholly contained within the original 
system, it is called a SUBsystem. (Karplus & Thier, 
1967, p. 53) 
The term delineation is unfamiliar to most science 
curricula. It describes an action carried out by an 
observer rather than an attribute of the observed. It is 
a very useful term for students to learn because it 
emphasizes that systems exist in their mind; it is they 
who decide what to consider and not consider, as Karplus 
explains so well in the above quote. Systems are not 
"real" in the sense that they are not part of what is 
being observed. In other words, systems are subjective. 
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not objective. Students need to understand that they are 
free to change the system being delineated, the only 
criterion being how useful the delineation is. As such, 
delineation could be considered one of the criterial 
attributes of model, preparing the ground work for such 
highly abstract concepts. 
The SCIS idea of subsystem also includes the concept 
of scale, as Karplus explains: 
The subsystems concept enables [children to]... first 
choose a fairly comprehensive system that includes 
all participating objects, but then concentrating on 
one or more subsystems which can be studied in 
detail... Consider a railroad train... This can be 
regarded as a system composed of an engine and 
several cars. Now it is possible to examine any one 
of these objects as being itself a system - a 
subsystem of the train - composed of objects such as 
the body, roof, wheels, wheel trucks, and so on. 
Each of these, in turn, can be considered as a system 
- a "sub-subsystem" of the train - composed of 
objects, e.g. the wheel having a disk, a rim, a 
bearing, etc. In this way, objects in a system are 
themselves considered systems made up of still 
smaller objects until one arrives at molecular, 
atomic, and subatomic systems. One can also progress 
in the opposite direction to larger and more 
comprehensive structures. The one railroad train is 
then only a subsystem of the entire Souther Pacific 
Railroad system which includes other trains, tracks, 
stations, real estate, and so on. The Southern 
Pacific, in turn, is a subsystem of the nationwide 
railroad network which is itself a subsystem of the 
entire transportation system consisting of railroads, 
airlines, truck lines, bus lines, barge canals, 
taxicabs, etc. (Karplus & Thier, 1967, p. 53, 54) 
After concentrating on scale in teaching my classes, 
I then move to number. Number establishes how many of 
the object-concepts there are; how big a family does it 
belong to? Number is tied to the object-concept since the 
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objects to be counted must be perceived as separate 
entities. Number also includes the idea of counting 
packages of objects, such as dozens and scores. It is 
extremely useful as a later building block to introduce at 
this point the idea of a mole as a delineated package, 
albeit very large, of objects being counted. Combined 
with scale, it is not an extraordinary effort for children 
to understand a mole to be a large package for counting 
small objects such as molecules. When students later 
study chemical bonding, they will then have some basis 
upon which to understand mole gram equivalents. 
Phase establishes whether an object or substance is 
solid, liquid or gas, an easily perceived property. Since 
students have already learned scale and thereby the 
hierarchy of matter, they are prepared to see phase as 
essentially a description of how molecules are related and 
patterned to each other in their ceaseless motion. At a 
greater depth, and more abstract level, phase can be 
extended to include solidity (or structure) and 
volatility, thus dealing with crystalline structures and 
polymers in a manner derived directly from the concrete 
perception of phase. I have had great success at the 
ninth grade level teaching students solidity so that they 
could analyze the solidity of any structure they could 
think of, from the gymnasium roof to muscle tissue to 
sedimentary rock. 
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Composition establishes what the component pieces of 
an object-concept are or what substance or substances it 
is made of. Color, taste and smell all indicate 
composition. The subsumption of color, and to lesser 
degree taste and smell, within composition was a topic of 
extended conversation among several fellow elementary 
teachers, the opposing view being that it should be 
considered as a property in its own right with equal 
status. This opposing view is certainly the path of least 
resistance for a teacher since children are very 
accustomed to considering color as an autonomous property, 
as they also consider taste and smell. Furthermore, these 
three "properties" are in many regards the most concrete 
of all properties since they are the description of direct 
sensory perception. On the other hand, such a natural 
approach has several serious conceptual difficulties that 
can ripple through years of future science learning, and 
the alternative of subsuming them under composition has 
several conceptual advantages that will also ripple into 
the future, but positively. On the negative side, 
considering color, taste and smell as intrinsic properties 
confuses the "detecting instrument" with the thing being 
detected. These three sensory "properties" are really 
processes in which our senses are acquiring information 
about the environment and then coding that information in 
our brains so that we may react to it. Where in the thing 
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is the color, taste and smell? Considering these as 
autonomous properties leads children to imagine them as 
un-connected to the substance that is the thing, somewhat 
as people once thought of phlogiston or caloric. An 
excellent means of investigating these perceptions of 
children is to add various food colorings to water and ask 
them how the water has been changed, in contrast to adding 
sugar or salt. On the positive side, introducing color, 
taste and smell as three ways that the human body detects 
the composition of a thing provides a very concrete image 
for where these properties reside in that thing. Food 
coloring is a substance whose particles happen to have a 
brilliant color, but little or no taste and smell. Adding 
food coloring is adding particles. Propose to children 
that they smell and taste food coloring directly, right 
out of the bottle. Read the ingredients label on the 
bottle. Discuss the composition of paints. The 
perception of color has now become a natural topic to 
investigate, as will also the senses of smell and taste. 
Eventually color can be described as the interaction of 
light with the substance's particles, rather than children 
thinking that substances "give off" their color. And 
finally, clearly connecting these three senses with the 
property of composition lends a great deal of clarity to 
discussion of the sensory processes. 
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Composition is associated with substances, just like 
scale is associated with things and objects. It is useful 
to have first covered phase in order to clarify statements 
such as "Jupiter is made of gases." Such distinctions 
produce strong connections between phase and composition, 
enhancing the depth of understanding of each. Composition 
is also well connected to scale through the hierarchy of 
matter, in which bulk material can be said to be composed 
of molecules, which are composed of atoms, which are 
composed of elementary particles, which are composed of 
quarks. 
Besides identifying component pieces or constituent 
substances, composition is a concrete way of teaching 
percentages. Composition can be combined with number to 
yield an excellent avenue to the ideas of fraction and 
percentage. I have taught these ideas to a math class 
from such a perspective, doing all sorts of hands-on 
measurements that were much more effective than a textbook 
approach at producing understanding among the students. 
The last of the five properties is temperature. 
Temperature, as a feeling of hot or cold that can be 
measured with thermometers, gives few students a problem. 
Certainly this concept will become far more abstract with 
increased learning, particularly as part of conservation 
of energy, but its concrete beginning is in the sense of 
feel. As with color, taste and smell, it is important to 
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distinguish between the sensation and the property that is 
being sensed. Staying focused on the entity that is being 
described, temperature can be described as a measure of 
the average motion of the constituent particles, with the 
emphasis within nature of matter on particle speed as the 
primary contributor rather than mass. It is, of course, 
more correct that temperature is a measure of the average 
kinetic energy of the molecules, and this precision can be 
well established when students later learn thermal energy 
as part of the conservation of energy basic concept. 
Students have already seen in phase that the three 
patterns of molecular motion are distinct, and now they 
can overlay on this concept differing speeds of vibration 
and displacement. 
The concept that is more abstract than any of these 
five properties is the concept of property itself, (or 
attribute or characteristic). The five properties given 
above are all connected directly to entities, and thus 
have a great deal of concreteness to them. Property 
cannot be sensed directly; it is a generalization made on 
the basis of many different observable properties. It is 
one of the most general concepts of science in that all 
science begins by dividing nature into discreet entities, 
and this division is accomplished according to differences 
in properties. Once students have assimilated these five 
properties, I have found little problem in having them 
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generalize to the concept of property, which they can then 
apply to all other properties. 
One of the criterial attributes of property is that 
it can be measured, producing values calibrated in units. 
Measurement is derived directly from concrete observations 
in that the actual, observed value of the property is its 
measurement. Value and unit are criterial attributes of 
measurement, and being directly observable, are quite 
concrete. Temperature is an excellent stepping stone to 
property because even very young students are familiar 
with its numerical measurement. They are used to hearing 
it described in degrees Fahrenheit and, increasingly so, 
in degrees Celsius, and they are familiar with 
thermometers. Thus property and its criterial attributes 
can be learned in the context of a familiar property. 
One of the most effective ways of learning is to 
consider negative examples, the exceptions to the rule, 
and the four properties of scale, number, phase, and 
composition provide ample negative examples for learning 
property. As a matter of fact, when I was first 
developing the "package" of properties to accompany 
entity, a major criterion I used was that the property did 
not adhere to a strict pattern of a numerical value with 
an accompanying unit of measurement. Scale and phase do 
not have numerical values or units of measurement. Number 
is nothing but numerical value, with no units of 
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measurement. Composition, as a list of ingredients, does 
not have numerical values or units, and as a percentage it 
does not have units. (It reverts back to the property, 
such as mass or volume, that is being used for the 
comparison.) Because of these irregularities, these 
properties cannot be easily used in mathematical 
descriptions and equations, and therefore they do not even 
have standard symbols with which to be represented. 
Initially using this criterion of irregularity, I had 
added uniformity (with non-numerical values stretching 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous and no units) to the 
"package" of properties associated with entity. However, 
after two years of attempting to teach this concept, it 
became clear that it is a complex and abstract idea that 
requires considerable mental agility to apply to 
unfamiliar situations (it will be discussed in detail 
shortly). 
Other physical properties of an entity can be added 
easily through subordinate learning stemming from property 
and measurement. Physical dimensions are described by 
distance, area, volume, and shape, including configuration 
and symmetry (Brooks, 1986/87, p. 65). Then speed, 
location, and direction, more abstract, can be added. To 
describe an entity's internal, and therefore even more 
abstract, characteristics, texture, porosity, 
permeability, mass, density, concentration and uniformity 
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can be addressed. These properties are listed in order of 
increasing abstractness to the degree that today's 
research allows. In teaching a full-year course on nature 
of matter to ninth graders and fourth graders, these 
properties form the core of the course. 
As should start to become evident, "concepts and 
generalizations do not occur singly. They form clusters, 
and a decision to include one of them is often tantamount 
to a decision to include the whole cluster. A teacher or 
curriculum developer is not free to include such a concept 
as 'capillarity' and to exclude, for example, 'surface 
tension' " (Johnson, M., 1967, p. 131). These clusters 
culminate in a concept that uses the others as its 
criterial attributes, and the successive conceptual steps 
use the preceding ones as their own criterial attributes. 
I have been teaching distance, area and volume as a 
cluster with the goal of having students understand the 
three dimensions of our physical universe. Even so, it is 
still necessary to start somewhere with one of the three. 
I have tried several combinations, and the only conclusion 
that I have so far come to is that area is the most 
abstract of the three. Careful research is needed to sort 
out which of the two remaining is more abstract, or if the 
difference is so small as to make little difference to 
curriculum design. 
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Shape, both of and on an entity, is a natural 
outgrowth of the three dimensions, and if it is to be 
taught, the three dimensional properties should be taught 
first. Many elementary math and science curricula 
introduce the myriad names of shapes, from sphere to 
rectangular prism to trapezoid, and they are most easily 
categorized according to whether they are one-, two- or 
three-dimensional. Bi-lateral and radial symmetry, as 
well as terms like angular and curved, can be applied to 
descriptions of life forms. Configuration is best 
introduced as a description of shapes ON a thing or 
substance, the most fruitful applications being in 
geomorphological terms such as groove, chasm, mountain, 
valley and even the dendritic shape of river systems. 
Another interdependent cluster is speed, location, 
and direction. Speed is directly observable and children 
have a good intuitive understanding of it. Location is 
actually a reversal of the operation of delineation. 
Delineation is defined as drawing a mental line around an 
object-concept to isolate it from its environment, and 
thereby disregarding its environment. Location focuses on 
the object-concept's environment. If the physical 
environment changes, then its location changes. Direction 
is the conceptual combination of speed and location. 
This cluster obviously introduces concepts associated 
with motion, which can be a conceptual pandora's box, and 
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some further explanation is needed. Looking to how 
Karplus dealt with these ideas in the SCIS elementary 
science program, his approach was to call the whole 
cluster RELATIVITY and he uses the term motion rather than 
speed. Otherwise, he gives an excellent explanation of 
how these concepts are best introduced and related for 
early elementary students: 
The word RELATIVITY is usually associated with 
mathematical mystery and scientific complexity, yet 
the basic concept is simple. The matters of concern 
in relativity are the position and motion of objects. 
The basic concept is that position and motion of an 
object can only be perceived, described, and 
recognized with reference to other nearby objects. 
These other objects, to which the position or motion 
are related, are said to form a REFERENCE FRAME, and 
one speaks of POSITION or MOTION of the original 
object relative to the reference frame (p. 56)... 
The Relativity unit is divided into two major parts. 
Part I builds the concept of relative position on 
some of the children's intuitive notions of distance 
and direction. 
In planning Part II, two possible approaches were 
considered. One was to proceed logically from the 
concept of relative position to comparison and change 
of relative position, and from change of relative 
position to relative motion. The other approach was 
to begin with activities that emphasize the 
smoothness and continuity of motion, for which 
children have an intuitive grasp. After this start, 
the children would be led to recognize the many 
successive positions that were taken up by a moving 
object and the changes in position that occurred 
between. 
We chose the second approach, because it promised 
to create a better link between the children's 
preconceptions and the modern science than did the 
logical approach. One must also remember that the 
logical reasoning ability of nine-to-ten-year-old 
children is limited. (Karplus & Thier, 1967, p. 60) 
Karplus does not include direction in the SCIS 
RELATIVITY unit, but I have found that it is a natural 
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extension of the location (Karplus's position) and speed 
(Karpliis's motion) concepts. 
The next cluster concerns intrinsic properties. It 
begins with texture, which describes the surface of a 
substance, is thus easily visible and touchable, and so is 
quite concrete. It describes the spacing of the bumps or 
ridges (i.e. shapes) on a surface. Porosity is a 
three-dimensional analog of texture in that it measures 
the spacing of the constituent particles by looking at the 
percentage of the volume that is not filled by them. 
Because students must imagine what the inside of an entity 
looks like, extrapolating from its surface texture, it is 
less concrete. Increasing the level of abstraction, 
permeability measures the degree of connection among the 
spaces in an entity. Mass, as a measure of the amount of 
matter contained in an entity, and density are again a 
reversal of focus compared to porosity. Whereas porosity 
focuses on the spaces between particles, mass focuses on 
the particles. Mass measures the number of particles in 
an entity, and density measures how closely packed the 
particles are. Mass, as part of nature of matter, builds 
off of the concrete sensation that most children call 
weight and that is close to what a scientist would call 
gravitational mass. Later, as part of momentum and 
forces, the difference between mass and weight can be 
clarified. 
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Concentration is a matter of extending density. 
Concentration focuses on a particular type of particle 
within a mix of particles, measuring the ratio of the one 
to the whole. 
Uniformity is the most abstract and complex of the 
properties because it entails comparing the values of any 
one of the other physical properties in different parts of 
an entity. Furthermore, it requires choosing a scale at 
which to compare the property values, since different 
scales of comparison produce different conclusions. It is 
the concept of uniformity that provides the intellectual 
doorway to the concept of entropy and the second law of 
thermodynamics. 
In general, each of the five remaining basic concepts 
has unique properties for describing the types of 
processes with which it deals. These unique properties 
are in addition to those covered in the antecedent basic 
concepts. The ordering of the six basic concepts 
corresponds to increasing abstractness because of the 
increasing abstractness of their respective properties. 
To begin, conservation of energy introduces all the 
forms of energy as properties. The forms of energy are 
more abstract than the physical properties dealt with in 
nature of matter because they cannot be directly observed 
as unitary concepts and are inferred from observed 
causalities. Rather, they are a combination of physical 
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properties that must be cognitively lumped together as 
one. Of the forms of energy, kinetic energy and energy of 
position (i.e. gravitational potential energy) are the 
most concrete in that they are the most readily observed, 
being so closely tied to the readily observable properties 
of speed, mass and location. Thermal energy is also 
fairly concrete because it is so closely tied to 
temperature. Wave energy is somewhat more abstract that 
these three in that it is based on observations, such as 
of water waves or the radiant heat from a fire, that are 
not directly associated with highly concrete physical 
properties. At the next level up of abstractness, 
chemical, elastic, and electrical energy seem to be about 
equally abstract in that they all deal with potentials to 
release energy, and when the energy is released, the 
properties of the object-concepts that change are not the 
most concrete of the physical properties. At the highest 
level of abstraction is nuclear/mass energy, in that there 
are no observable instances other than mushroom clouds 
over bomb explosions from which to generalize the concept, 
and even then it is a stretch to deduce the causative 
energy form. Finally, there are groupings of energy 
forms, such as mechanical energy and potential energy that 
are based upon definitions and that cannot be observed 
directly. 
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The third basic concept, waves, introduces amplitude, 
wavelength and frequency as properties. These are also 
abstract because they are difficult to observe directly, 
even with water waves that are continually moving. 
Furthermore, their abstractness is amplified because they 
do not belong to concrete object-concepts, and therefore 
cannot borrow of their concreteness. 
Chemical bonding introduces such properties as 
acidity and electronegativity, that not only deal with 
abstract entities, but that are also properties that 
cannot be easily imagined at a human scale. 
Momentum and forces introduces the properties of 
inertia and momentum, a decidedly difficult property to 
separate out from kinetic energy because it is so 
difficult to imagine in its own right. Both velocity and 
acceleration are abstract because they involve a very 
formal, and abstract, concept of direction. Acceleration 
is also very difficult to observe directly, as a property 
separate from speed. Some of the most difficult 
properties to imagine are those contained in rotational 
motion, such as moment of inertia and angular momentum. 
Electricity and magnetism depends upon such 
properties as charge, and magnetism, again belonging to 
intangible entities and having no analogy at the human 
scale. Properties such as magnetic permeability and 
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hysteresis are at the upper end of the abstractness 
continuum. 
G. The Abstractness of Time 
After properties, the next type of concept counted 
for complexity is time. Within nature of matter, the most 
universal basic concept acquired first by children, the 
concept of time is primitive. Derived from the 
observation of a changing value of an object-concept's 
property, time's only initial criterial attributes, time 
is a sequence of observed events. "The notion of time 
evolves out of the experience of rhythmicity of sequential 
actions with a before and an after" (Maiers, 1978, p. 60). 
Children understand a process to be a sequence of property 
changes, or events, and understand time to be a measure of 
the number of events that have already or will in the 
future take place. Because the natural world is full of 
events that children are constantly observing, there is a 
concrete basis for this primitive understanding of time as 
a sequence of events. 
With such a primitive concept of time, children have 
little if any idea of time as an independent clock ticking 
in the background providing a standard against which the 
occurrence and duration of all events can be measured and 
compared. Piaget termed this independent clock the 
time-metric: "Time-metric implies a further understanding 
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of a... referent (such as the second or the minute) that 
can be repeated and is unaffected by usual external 
circumstances" (Voyat, 1982, p. 105). The idea of time as 
used in physics is "independent of perceptual data" 
(Maiers, 1978, p. 60), and is thus abstract. Time has 
something of the feel of a property, but it does not 
belong to any entity. The best way to think of time is as 
a property of a process, not an entity. But again, on 
this score, time is removed from direct perception and is 
abstract. This abstractness of the formal idea of time 
delays its full understanding. "Only around 9 years of 
age will the child come to dissociate time from space and 
speed" (Voyat, 19882, p. 105). 
An interesting illustration of this transition in the 
understanding of time is children's inability to 
understand death because they cannot understand finality 
until they are about nine years old. An illustration from 
science education was a ninth grade student of mine, 14 
years old, who was struggling to understand the idea of 
the half-life of a radioactive material. Cory, as I shall 
call the student, had come to me after school for help and 
we were working on the following problem: The half-life 
of Iodine 131 is 8.1 days. How much of a 100 kg sample is 
left after 8.1 days? I first went through an explanation, 
making sketches on paper, of the problem's salient points. 
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I used piles of beans as an illustration. Then I asked her 
to answer the problem. 
CORY: I don't know. 
TEACHER: What's your sticking point? 
CORY: I don't know when it stops. 
TEACHER: When what stops? The decay? 
CORY: Yes. 
TEACHER: Why does it need to stop? 
CORY: To get the answer. You won't know if it 
doesn't stop. 
I then attempted to get Cory to look at processes 
such as a passing car and thrown ball as a series of 
instantaneous snap-shots, ascertaining characteristics at 
each instant of observation. Effectively, I was asking 
Cory to superimpose a ticking clock over her perceptions 
of these processes. The effort had little effect. Upon 
returning to the radioactive decay problem, Cory had 
relinquished little of the conception that a process had 
to have a start and end, a before and after, in order to 
measure its duration. The all-important concepts of 
process and causality within nature of matter contain time 
as an essential criterial attribute, but, initially, it is 
only necessary that it be understood in its primitive form 
as a sequence of events. A process is any event, any 
occurrence. All processes take place over time, and can 
always be analyzed as a series of events. Radioactive 
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half-life, however, is a rate, and to be fully understood 
rate involves a more abstract conception of time. 
Rate describes how fast a property changes during a 
process, or, more specifically, how much a property's 
value changes over a standard time period. Even though 
many math texts use rate as a synonym for speed, speed is 
just one example of a rate in which distance is the 
changing property. There are many, many other rates, from 
flow rate (changes in volume), to consumption rate 
(changes in mass), to mortality rate (changes in numbers 
of dead) to warming/cooling rate (changes in temperature). 
Rate is more abstract than an event sequence in that 
time is a standard against which changes in a property are 
gauged. It induces the student to begin forming the 
concept of the independent, background clock. A 
half-life, when applied to beans or pennies, is a very 
concrete example of a rate because the changing property 
is number. Cory's difficulty with the above problem 
stemmed from her lack of understanding of what a rate is, 
even when applied to piles of beans in front of her. Cory 
saw the changes in the piles as occurring in discreet 
events, as her hand, sequentially, halved the piles. She 
could not imagine the process occurring continuously with 
an independent time standard ticking away, available to 
gauge the pace of the process. 
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H. The Abstractness of Direction 
The fourth category of concept type is direction, and 
the analysis of its abstractness is similar to that of 
time. One of Piaget's more familiar findings was that a 
child's topological concepts, dealing with shape and 
position of object-concepts, precede the development of 
geometrical concepts, even though the logical order of 
development is the reverse. By four years old, a child 
has acquired an understanding of position descriptions 
such as in front, behind, on top, and underneath. These 
position descriptions, constituting location, are one of 
the criterial attributes of direction, are observable, and 
are concrete. Because direction is understood as the 
direction of movement of an object-concept from one 
location to another, its other criterial attribute is 
speed. One of the readily observable properties of 
object-concepts is speed, and it "has its roots in the 
spatial order of points of arrival" (Voyat, 1982. p. 115). 
Just as with time, direction is not perceived as a 
property intrinsic to any entity, but rather is seen as a 
property of a process, in this case the process of 
movement. It is a spatial relationship between two 
events: the departure and arrival of a moving entity. 
From its quasi-concrete roots, direction grows into a 
highly abstract concept that has no concrete referents. 
Cartesian coordinates require the imposition of an 
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external reference grid upon a process being observed. 
Direction involves the manipulation of geometrical 
relationships relative to this abstract grid. "However, 
not until much later, when the formal level of thought is 
attained in adolescence, are students able to deal with 
the interplay of proportions involved in... Euclidean 
geometry" (Voyat, 1982, p. 32). It is precisely the 
proportions of changes in location that give rise to 
direction. Thus concepts whose essential criterial 
attributes include direction, such as velocity, are also 
quite abstract. Other such concepts would include all 
those involved in multi-dimensional motions such as vector 
and projectile motion. Direction is at an even higher 
level of abstraction in rotational motion, where the 
directions of such vector properties as angular momentum 
and angular acceleration are counter-intuitive. 
The cognitive development of time and direction are 
extremely important indicators of intellectual maturity, 
as the following interpretation of Piagetian developmental 
stages makes clear: 
The qualitative distinctions between children's 
intellectual performance at various levels... Piaget 
sees primarily as differences in the MOBILITY of 
their mental activity. The highest development of 
thought involves complete mobility; that is to say, 
the thinker can, at will, direct his thinking 
forwards or backwards in time, or in any direction in 
space and at any moment reverse a temporal or spatial 
direction to return to a previous point... Whereas a 
child at an earlier stage may be able to consider... 
[propositional] statements one after the other but 
cannot combine them in any way because he cannot 
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range forwards or backwards over the whole series. 
(Freyberg, 1964, p. 11, 12) 
A thinker demonstrating the high intellectual 
mobility described by Freyberg is clearly using time and 
direction as independent concepts that can be applied to 
and combined with others. 
Momentum and forces as a basic concept tends to 
include highly abstract concepts for two reasons. 
Fundamentally, momentum transfer occurs when a force acts 
over time, and therefore a formal understanding of time is 
necessary. Secondly, both momentum and forces are 
vectors, and therefore a formal understanding of direction 
is also required. Within a conventional science 
curriculum, concepts such as speed, time and direction, 
grouped in this model within nature of matter, are 
intimately grouped with the far more abstract, and 
complex, concepts of velocity, momentum and force vector, 
even though there is a substantial conceptual distance 
between the two groups. 
I. The Abstractness of Link Concepts 
Link concepts are the last type of concept, and they 
are the most abstract of the five. A link concept is the 
embodiment of an interaction between two entities and its 
identity is inextricably linked to the changing properties 
of two interacting entities. However, link concepts are 
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unitary and are endowed with their own identities. Not 
being physical entities, they are highly abstract. 
Furthermore, they are primarily defined by the changing 
properties of two entities. Since generalized properties 
are already one step removed from concrete sensory 
perception, link concepts become two steps removed. 
The first link concept that students would be asked 
to understand and apply to unfamiliar situations would be 
causality. As was explained in Appendix D when link 
concepts were introduced, causality is characterized by a 
proportionality. By characterizing causality by the 
proportionality that it embodies, different degrees of 
abstractness can be then defined. Causalities based on 
inverse proportionalities are more abstract than those 
based on direct proportionalities. Greater mathematical 
sophistication also implies greater abstractness. For 
example, the proportionalities that are first used within 
nature of matter (which are not link concepts) are fairly 
concrete in that they deal with pure properties with no 
functional operations. For example, the proportionalities 
inherent in volume are all direct and contain no 
functions. The two proportionalities contained in density 
contain no functional operants but one of them is an 
inverse. Most of the various forms of energy contain 
functions of the proportional properties, and therefore, 
as proportionalities, they are more abstract. 
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The most familiar example of a link concept is force 
(either force vector or force pair). A force has no 
meaning without conceiving of the two entities that are 
interacting. Force describes the strength or intensity of 
the interaction. The idea of measuring a link concept is 
even more abstract than the link concept itself. Even 
though force has only these two essential criterial 
attributes, interaction and measurement, the abstractness 
of force is quite high. 
J. Sorting Out Nature of Matter. Conservation of Energy, 
and Momentum and Forces 
All six of the theorists being discussed in these 
appendices agree that a child's intellect matures over 
time. From the perspective of the Amalgamated Model, what 
matures is the conceptual structure within a child's mind. 
It is important to sort out how this development takes 
place so that science curriculum can be designed 
accordingly. There is presently much confusion among 
science curriculum designers about how the three basic 
concepts of nature of matter, conservation of energy, and 
momentum and forces develop relative to each other over 
time. Many curriculum specialists in science maintain 
that the basic concept of momentum and forces is a more 
general concept than conservation of energy. As the first 
paragraph of the first chapter of an introductory physics 
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text says: "Most of our understanding of nature is 
derived from our observations of motions and our efforts 
to relate them to their causes" (Kane & Sternheim, 1988, 
p. 3). This assertion is certainly correct for the 
mature, trained thinker. A physicist sees velocities, 
accelerations and forces everywhere in nature and, for a 
physicist, momentum and forces is a highly general basic 
concept. But it does not necessarily follow that the 
developing intellect of the child derives the same 
generalizations from observations of activity in the 
natural world. 
The cases of the specialist and the student are not 
identical. The organization the specialist finds most 
useful is not necessarily the organization that provides 
the easiest learning path for the student. The decision 
to be made is whether to use an organization externally 
imposed by some authority or expert as compared with an 
organization that fits the internal state of the learner 
at his particular stage of development. (Bloom, 1956, p. 
37) 
Engel-Clough and Driver (1986) carried out an 
investigation of student conceptual frameworks to see how 
consistently their frameworks were used in different 
contexts. They found that student frameworks are fairly 
consistent, and provide a picture of how students do 
indeed view the natural world differently from scientists: 
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The results obtained in this study have caused us at 
least to question the assumption that if students do 
not apply the same intuitive principles across 
contexts which scientists construe similarly, then 
they do not have any systematic conceptual framework. 
It may be that we need to ask 'What are the 
situations which students construe in similar ways?' 
since they may categorize situations according to 
different principles than scientists. (p. 489) 
The confusion of these three basic concepts (nature 
of matter, conservation of energy, and momentum and 
forces) in conventional science curricula is largely 
caused by the focus on how scientists think, rather than 
how children think and develop. It is important to keep 
in mind the dictum that science curriculum should be 
designed according to how children and students think and 
learn. Thus an extensive analysis of the inception and 
development of these three basic concepts in the emerging 
intellect of children will be carried out. Piaget's 
developmental phases are the most familiar expression of 
intellectual development and they will be used as the 
central thread of the following analysis. 
There are two major knots in the tangle of these 
three basic concepts. The first is the concept of time, 
and the second is the concept of speed. The primitive 
form of the time concept, understood as a sequence of 
events and incorporated into the primitive process concept 
of nature of matter, is sufficient to support the basic 
concept of conservation of energy . It is NOT sufficient 
to support the basic concept of momentum and forces, which 
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requires a formal understanding of time as the independent 
clock ticking in the background. 
One of the cornerstones of the momentum and forces 
basic concept is the idea of a rate. Velocity and 
acceleration are rates. A rate cannot be understood as a 
sequence of events. Rate is precisely the measurement of 
a process against that independent, background clock that 
is the formal concept of time. For a scientist, "the 
concepts we require for a quantitative description of 
motion [are] position, velocity, and acceleration" (Kane & 
Sternheim, 1988, p. 1). Velocity and acceleration require 
a formal understanding of time because they are both 
rates. The concept of acceleration is far beyond the 
reach of a concrete operational child because it is a rate 
of a rate. Neither is it directly observable as a 
separate characteristic from speed. If acceleration is 
unavailable to the child, then it would seem fruitless to 
deal with forces beyond the qualitative definition of an 
obvious push or pull. 
The second knot that needs to be unravelled has the 
concept of speed at its center. Many science educators 
assume that momentum and forces, as understood by the 
scientist, is an available concept to young children. The 
assumption is natural because children obviously perceive 
speed in their environment and speed is related to 
momentum and forces. Adult science educators then presume 
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that the concepts THEY primarily associate with speed 
(velocity, acceleration, force), that are so close to 
speed in their own conceptual structures, grew from the 
speed-seed. Unfortunately, it is a case of so close, yet 
so far. This presumption has produced much puzzlement 
among scientists attempting to understand Piaget's 
experiments on the subject: 
Thus in order to develop a conception of time, it is 
necessary to develop conceptions of movement and 
velocity. But in order to develop a conception of 
velocity, for example, it is necessary to develop a 
conception of time. It looks like a vicious circle 
(p. 88)... in which the development of each of three 
concepts, time (t = d/v), movement (d = vt), velocity 
(v = d/t), is dependent upon the development of each 
of the others. Have we broken out of this circle? 
I'm not sure that we have. As a matter of fact, the 
physicists themselves have had trouble with this 
one... A French physicist has proposed that velocity 
be defined in terms of the notion of passing, which 
is precisely the way in which the preoperational 
child 'defines' it." (p. 90) (Philips, 1969). 
Children observe speed just as they observe other 
physical properties of objects. They do not cognize it as 
the ratio of distance to time, in other words, as rate, 
which is how it is understood in momentum and forces. 
However, The French physicist referred to in the above 
quote is tacitly acknowledging that a child's conception 
of speed is as a property directly observable in the 
environment: a car observed to be passing a truck is 
obviously going faster than the truck. But in order for 
the child's, or anyone's, concept of speed to germinate 
and produce the other concepts of momentum and forces as 
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associated by a physicist, it must be understood as a 
rate. Efforts to grow these other concepts will be 
fruitless since the seed is sterile; it contains no rate 
attribute. To a child, speed is perceived as a whole, 
without being broken into two constituent parts of 
displacement and time. For a five year old, "a toy car 
that arrives first in a race is the 'fastest,' regardless 
of the shorter distance it may have covered in comparison 
with that covered by the others" (Maiers, 1978, p. 48). 
This terminal-position hypothesis, as well as the passing 
hypothesis, illustrate that speed is seen as a 
characteristic derived from their observations of the 
natural world, not as a composite of distance and time. 
Concepts associated with speed by adults, all predicated 
on it being seen as a ratio, do not begin to develop until 
the end of the concrete operational phase, around 11 years 
old, and development continues well into the next phase of 
formal operations. The evidence for this assertion is 
that, as Piaget showed, concepts associated with time, 
particularly as a rate, are not developed until after 
those of speed. The only way this pattern makes sense is 
if the concept of speed is conceived of as a 
characteristic, just like any other physical property. 
"Concepts related to space [length, weight, volume] 
precede the learning of concepts related to time and speed 




coordination of equal distance and speed" 
1978, p. 60). 
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APPENDIX G 
SUMMARY OF A STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS 
FOR K-12 CURRICULUM 
Appendices B through F developed in some detail a 
model of conceptual organization in which concepts from 
the physical sciences can be rated and then organized into 
a structure according to the three criterial attributes of 
generality, complexity and abstractness. Many examples 
were used during the development of these attributes. An 
attempt was made to discuss as many as possible of the 
concepts so that their respective placements within the 
organizational chart presented in this appendix would seem 
reasoned. 
The organizational chart forms a conceptual structure 
for the physical sciences, intended to guide curriculum 
development. However, a clear warning must be sounded. 
Being on paper, it appears to be one dimensional, it that 
it seems to prescribe a lock-step syllabus of concepts. 
It is in fact not a linear progression. Most important, 
the conceptual structure is "three dimensional." There 
are three pedagogical principles that guide the use of the 
structure: 
A curriculum should proceed, all else being equal, 
A) from the universal to the specific. 
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B) from the simple to the complex, and 
C) from the concrete to the abstract. 
The concepts listed in the structure are placed 
according to their MINIMUM complexity and abstractness. 
Most of them are returned to over and over again as they 
are built upon, being learned at increasingly more 
specific, complex and abstract levels. Concepts further 
up in the presented conceptual structure are taught as 
dependent upon and derived from previously learned 
concepts. These connections not only form the new 
concept, but also serve to increase the depth of 
understanding of the prior concepts. Furthermore, in 
choosing a next step in the structure, there are usually 
several different alternatives because there are always 
trade-offs in exercising the three pedagogical principles. 
Finally, there is the dictum that all instruction should 
proceed from what the students already know. Choosing a 
next step depends upon where they have already been. 
So a myriad of paths lead to the top of the 
conceptual structure. Rather than being constraining, the 
structure challenges a teacher to guide students along an 
optimum path. And each step can be firmly taken because 
the structure is sparse. There are relatively few 
concepts, so a teacher can concentrate on one or two 
concepts for an entire year, giving the student a secure 
footing for the next step. 
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The conceptual structure presented here should be 
seen as a working document. It is presented as a 
beginning that is reliable enough to be used for designing 
significantly more effective science curriculum. There 
are still large gaps. The life sciences have not been 
addressed, and, within the physical sciences, chemical 
bonding and electricity and magnetism still remain to be 
analyzed and structured. The four basic concepts that are 
analyzed in detail have been used as the basis for 
curriculum in classrooms, and the form presented here 
reflects numerous consequent changes. Surely there will 
be additional changes as experience and research 
accumulate. 
The formulation presented here of the first basic 
concept of physical science, nature of matter, is very 
different from traditional science curricula. This 
difference is particularly evident when compared to 
elementary level materials that, at one time, heavily 
emphasized content and that are now being strongly 
influenced by an equally unbalanced emphasis on process 
skills. 
Imagining the conceptual structure as three- 
dimensional, there are concepts that clearly differ 
according to one or more of the three criterial 
attributes, and there are others that, criterially, are 
quite similar. Therefore the following chart includes a 
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sequence code for each concept. Concepts with upper-case 
code letters are judged to be essential to build a strong 
conceptual structure, whereas concepts that are judged to 
be primarily enriching or enhancing are given lower-case 
code letters. These judgements are, of course, fairly 
subjective and are intended only as a guide for selection. 
Concepts with the same code letter, either upper- or 
lower-case, are judged to be similar enough that they 
could be taught in any sequence or simultaneously. 
- A before B before C etc. 
- Same Letter: may sequence in any order. 
- Upper Case: Judged necessary to integrity of 
student's overall conceptual structure. 
- Lower Case: Judged as primarily enriching or 
enhancing.___ 
Figure G.l Sequence Code Key 
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THE NATURE ALL INCLUSIVE: NATURE 
OF OF MATTER 
MATTER A 
THINGS & SUBSTANCES A ALL INCL: THINGS & SUBSTANCES 
















OTHER PHYSICAL PROPERTIES 
CHEMICAL PROPERTIES 
BIOLOGICAL PROPERTIES 
PROCESS B ALL INCL: PROCESS 
CHANGE IN PROPERTIES 
TIME, EVENT SEQUENCE, RATE 
CAUSALITY, PROPORTIONALITY 
MODEL, GRAPH, RATIO 
Figure G.2 Elaboration of a K-12 Physical Science 
Conceptual Structure 





































ALL INCL: CONS. ENERGY 
FORMS & TRANS- A ALL INCL: FORMS & TRANSFORMS 










ENERGY OF POSITION 







GROUPINGS OF E. FORMS 
CONS. OF ENERGY B ALL INCL: CONS. ENERGY 
FIRST LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS 
INTERACTION 
FORCE (i.e. force pair) 
ENERGY DEGRADATION b ALL INCL: ENERGY DEGRADATION 
MOLECULAR DISORDER 
ENTROPY (2nd Law) 
EFFICIENCY C 
ENERGY FLOW C ALL INCL: ENERGY FLOW 
WORK 
HEAT 





POWER D ALL INCL: POWER 
RATE OF ENERGY FLOW A 
DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM b 



















Figure G.2 Continued 
BASIC CONCEPT SUB-CONCEPT SUB-SUB-CONCEPT 
WAVES ALL INCL: WAVES 
DEFINITION OF 
WAVES 
A ALL INCL: DEF OF WAVES 
REPRESENTATION AND PROPER¬ 
TIES OF WAVES A 
TYPE/MEDIA: WATER, SOUND, 
VIBRATION, ELEC-MAG B 
PRODUCTION/ABSORPT. MECH.’s c 
PROPAGATION MECH's c 
SUPERPOSITION B 










TOTAL INTERNAL REFLECTION c 
DOPPLER EFFECT d ALL INCL: DOPPLER EFFECT 
FREQUENCY (number rate) A 
V(wave) = f x (WAVELNGTH) B 
SOURCE SPEED vs. WAVE SPD b 
DOPPLER EFFECT c 





(INCOMPLETE: Further definition and analysis needed.) 




















ALL INCL: MOMENTUM AND 
FORCES 
CONS. OF MOMENTUM A ALL INCL: CONS. OF MOMENTUM 
INERTIA, MOMENTUM 
VELOCITY 
NEWTON’S FIRST LAW 
CONSERVATION OF MOMENTUM 
NEWTON’S THIRD LAW B ALL INCL: NEWTON’S THIRD LAV 
RESULTANT FORCE 
SINGLE BODY FORCE VECTOR 
TYPES OF FORCES 
GRAVITY, WEIGHT, MASS 
C ALL INCL: RESULTANT FORCE 
NEWTON'S SECOND 
LAW 
BALANCED, UNBALANCED FORCES 
PRESSURE 
D ALL INCL: N’S SECOND LAW 
IMPULSE = Ft 
ACCELERATION, KINEMATICS 
F = ma, STRAIT-LNE DYNAMICS 








ALL INCL: E & M 
ELECTRICITY A 
MAGNETISM A 








































































ALL INCL: ECONOMIC 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
TECHNOLOGY & INDUSTRY 
MACRO ECONOMICS 
ALL INCL: CULTURAL 
WOMEN AND MINORITIES 
JOBS AND CAREERS 
ALL INCL: PERSONAL 
BIOGRAPHY 
PERSONALITY & ANECDOTE 
PHILOSOPHY & ETHICS 
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APPENDIX H 
EDUCATIONAL CRITERIA AND DATABASE DESIGN FOR 
CATALOGUING EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS 
A. Introduction and General Scope 
The following specifications of educational criteria 
(see figures H.l, page 522 , and H.2, page 536) and design 
of a computerized database of lessons (called the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER) is intended to implement an overall 
Amalgamated Model of science education as presented in the 
beginning chapters. Within this Model, the computerized 
database is intended, first, to be used by the teacher. 
The teacher may choose to provide students with access to 
the database, but the first objective is teacher use. To 
understand the importance of teachers using the database, 
it is necessary to look at its educational purpose and how 
it reflects the goals of the overall Model. The following 
explanation is a summary of how the CURRICULUM PLANNER is 
connected to the other components of the Amalgamated 
Model. It is intended for the reader who does not wish to 
read the greater detail covered at length in the main body 
of this dissertation. 
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There are two, hand-in-hand, intellectual learning 
goals for the Amalgamated Model: 
1) Students will understand the basic concepts of the 
physical and life sciences, as evidenced by their ability 
to 
2) Demonstrate flexible, inquiry-based problem-solving. 
The cognitive keystone of the Amalgamated Model is a 
structure of concepts organized according to learning 
theory. The goal of secondary science education is for 
students to meaningfully and demonstrably understand these 
concepts. The explicit organization and sequencing of the 
concepts, called the conceptual structure, is designed to 
focus and support the teacher's instruction. 
Because concepts are, by definition, generic, the 
conceptual structure can be applied to any particular 
content field of facts, figures and information. Thus the 
first purpose of the CURRICULUM PLANNER is to allow 
teachers to concentrate on the concept in question while 
varying the content field as well as the context of the 
information. The second purpose is to allow the teacher 
to accommodate materials to the student's performance 
level. Thirdly, it is important that the lesson-delivery 
format also be matched to the student. These five 
parameters (concept, content, context, student performance 
level, and activity format), are the dimensions of choice 
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optimally available to a teacher who is doing curriculum 
or lesson planning. 
These parameters are referred to as educational 
criteria. As characteristics, they describe the 
educational materials and processes that exist among 
teacher and students. They do not describe students, in 
that student parameters such as learning style, level of 
motivation, and readiness are not included. The CONTEXT 
categories pf physical, cultural and social geography are 
meant as descriptors of the educational materials and 
processes, not of the student's place of origin, cultural 
background, or type of community. It is up to the teacher 
whether to choose materials that match a student's own 
characteristics. I can think of several reasons for 
purposefully choosing contrasting or associated contexts 
for a particular student. The point is that meshing a 
student's characteristics with the educational materials 
is a matter of professional choice. Within our American 
society based on individualism, it is contradictory to 
label children or to even establish a framework of student 
labels within the CURRICULUM PLANNER that then would 
control how students are educated. We must trust to the 
professional teacher to be aware of the multitudinous 
possible characterizations of students and to form an 
almost intuitive approach to dealing with each student as 
an individual. The very essense of the educational 
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endeavor is to change children, and any characterization 
of students must necessarily be fluid. It will change 
over time, and it will even change from teacher to 
teacher. Such differences in perception among teachers is 
not a problem. It is the reality of any inter-personal 
relationship. It is a source of different possibilities 
for growth of the student. 
Lessons chosen according to the educational criteria 
are termed APPLICATION LESSONS because they are, 
fundamentally, the application of a few, generic concepts 
to an unlimited number of phenomena and contexts in an 
unlimited variety of levels and formats. These lessons 
are in no way intended to be "teacher proof." They are 
provided as computer files that can be easily modified on 
any word processor. Teachers are encouraged to change and 
elaborate. Creativity certainly can begin with 
modification, and eventually new and creative lessons will 
emerge and occupy their own niches within the ecology of 
possibilities. 
Resting the ability to modify and create lesson 
materials on computer literacy assumes that the teacher is 
computer literate. Although teachers are often described 
as shy of computer technology, there has been relatively 
little offered that truly fits their more pressing needs. 
Given a good reason to learn the technology, they are 
reasonable people and would do so. Perhaps more difficult 
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for teachers will be developing the skills to write good 
lessons. I participated in a grant project where five 
science teachers were each going to write six original 
classroom-ready lessons and then share them with each 
other. Most of us were veteran teachers, yet they all 
found it a difficult exercise. They each knew what they 
wanted their lessons to address, but they were novices at 
the writing process. Most of the lessons turned out to be 
poorly constructed and written, and were not "classroom- 
ready" except for the teacher who wrote the lesson. Since 
the lessons in the CURRICULUM PLANNER come from teachers, 
there might well have to be some sort of quality control 
where new lessons are reviewed by skilled teachers before 
they are made available widely through the PLANNER. 
On the other hand, the act of rating a lesson 
according to the educational criteria makes a teacher 
consider a lesson's qualities and, if the lesson is 
obviously lacking in one category or another, thereby 
improve it. It could be that the discipline imposed by 
the educational criteria would ensure a sufficient level 
of quality, particularly if a proof-is-in-the-pudding 
weeding process were to be used. In this process, lessons 
in the database would be tracked for the number of times 
they were viewed and compared to the number of times they 
were down-loaded. Lessons that are viewed but not down¬ 
loaded are probably not very good in that they do not meet 
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the needs or quality standards of other teachers. Such 
poor lessons could be dropped from the CURRICULUM PLANNER 
so that it does not become cluttered with useless 
materials. Compared to a human-based quality control 
mechanism, such a weeding process has the advantage of 
being automatic. A human-based system also involves 
personal judgements about what a good lesson is, and such 
judgements are probably contentious considering the 
variety of teachers in this country. 
The question becomes, how does a teacher 
realistically choose/design applications lessons according 
to the educational criteria? The most promising option is 
to use a computerized database of resources and 
application lessons, both of which are rated and accessed 
according to educational criteria. Manipulating the 
educational criteria to produce learning tasks for 
students is the essence of curriculum planning and design. 
Thus this computerized database is called the CURRICULUM 
PLANNER computer program. 
B. How the CURRICULUM PLANNER Addresses the Goals 
of the Amalgamated Model 
The CURRICULUM PLANNER is the best option for 
fulfilling the second goal of the Amalgamated Model in 
Science: Students will demonstrate flexible, 
inquiry-based, problem solving. The application lessons 
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on the CURRICULUM PLANNER are written to lead students 
through the process of applying the concepts to questions. 
The many and easily accessed examples, illustrations, 
demonstrations and applications that are in the database 
are the pieces that the teacher then assembles into the 
extensive but enjoyable practice needed to learn anything 
well. 
For this inquiry process to succeed, the student must 
first have at least some interest in the content field or 
its context. Then, the student must be able to exercise 
that interest successfully. The teacher can truly build 
an instructional program based on success when provided 
with the means to vary a lesson according to the student's 
interests and changing performance level. The CURRICULUM 
PLANNER is the means of successfully matching a student's 
background, interests and skill levels with the concept in 
question. 
Once a teacher has led students through several 
rounds of problem-solving, it is time to let them try it 
on their own. Students must incrementally be given 
control of the inquiry process until indeed the student is 
engaged in self-directed inquiry. It cannot be stressed 
enough that the CURRICULUM PLANNER is only a means towards 
the end of inducing self-motivated inquiry from the 
student. When students ask questions, then the teacher 
uses those questions to emphasize how they are addressed 
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through the conceptual structure. It is the questions 
that students ask that will guide the teacher in choosing 
application questions from the database. If a 
satisfactory lesson is not available on the CURRICULUM 
PLANNER, then the teacher may write the lesson and store 
it, available for the future and for other teachers to use 
when they have a similar instructional need. 
Even though the CURRICULUM PLANNER is intended, 
first, to be used by the teacher, its ultimate fate is 
that it eclipse itself: Ideally, the teacher orchestrates 
the cooperative solving of problems originated by the 
students. The CURRICULUM PLANNER is an impressive, 
powerful tool for choosing applications of concepts. This 
power, unfortunately, blinds the view of its necessary 
counter-weight: The conceptual structure. As attractive 
as the CURRICULUM PLANNER is, it would have only marginal 
effect on learning without the conceptual structure that 
is its raison d'etre. The conceptual structure forms the 
pedagogic skeleton upon which hangs the entire Model. It 
is even possible to make significant progress towards the 
goals of the Amalgamated Model by implanting the 
conceptual structure into conventional instruction without 
the use of the CURRICULUM PLANNER. However, in light of 
the two learning goals of the Amalgamated Model, it would 
not be worth the effort to do the reverse, creating the 
database without the underlying conceptual structure. 
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There are many commercially available databases that do 
just this in many varieties. If a database is being 
created as an enrichment device, a reference source, a 
new-medium encyclopedia or some other purpose that is not 
directly instructional, then that database can be shaped 
in a myriad of ways; it does not have to be built around a 
conceptual skeleton. However, if flexible, inquiry-based, 
problem solving is the goal, then the first and last 
question needs to be: What do we want the students to 
learn? What long-term cognitive change do we want to 
induce in the student? The answer to these questions is 
in the first learning goal: Concepts. 
Concepts constitute the rungs of the conceptual 
structure. The conceptual structure is the hub of the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER, around which all the other educational 
criteria revolve. The ability to carry out flexible, 
inquiry-based, problem solving is based upon a conceptual 
understanding, and so these two indivisible goals envelop 
the Amalgamated Model. The CURRICULUM PLANNER is a 
balance between the discipline provided by the conceptual 
structure and the flexibility provided by the other 
educational criteria. The conceptual structure and the 
other educational criteria each reflect one of the two 
goals and are indivisible in making up the CURRICULUM 
PLANNER. 
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When discussing goals, the last word must always be 
left to the piper: Evaluation. The method of evaluating 
whether students have indeed reached a satisfactory 
mastery of the goals is implied in the CURRICULUM PLANNER. 
Students should be able, preferably orally, to be given a 
question at random that pertains to the concept at hand, 
take a few minutes to prepare, and then address the 
question at some level of intelligent discourse. The 
standard of evaluation is fundamentally how well the 
student applies concepts to the question. There are clear 
distinctions between differing levels of performance and 
conceptual intricacy codified into the CURRICULUM PLANNER. 
Teachers and administrators could use these definitions 
and distinctions as a concrete means of defining their 
expectations, standards and, therefore, evaluation 
criteria. 
The CURRICULUM PLANNER is a new medium through which 
to teach. It allows teachers to design and build a 
students' intellectual edifice by choosing from 
essentially infinite combinations of the dimensions of 
choice appropriate to the endeavor. It is a medium for 
creating student intellects. However, the medium is not 
the product. The artist-teacher, provided with the 
medium, must use it to create intellects. The CURRICULUM 
PLANNER only enables the teacher to create; it is the 
teacher who does the creating. Teaching has been 
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analogous, creativity-wise, to the pre-historic cave 
painters who used materials that were not conducive for 
producing art. Similarly, the CURRICULUM PLANNER is 
designed as a medium for creative teaching. Many teachers 
will take advantage of the opportunity and create better 
intellects. 
C. Applicability of the CURRICULUM PLANNER 
to Non-Science Subject Areas 
The coding scheme, and the attendant instructional 
program, could be used in most academic areas (i.e. 
knowledge domains) other than science. Two major changes 
needed to accommodate other domains are: 
A) Replace the conceptual structure of physical 
science with that of the new knowledge domain. Every 
domain has a unique conceptual structure. Some are 
inherently structured in a hierarchical manner; others are 
very flat. Or, a conceptual structure might change over 
time for a domain, such as social studies, that closely 
reflects the ebb and flow of society. Nevertheless, some 
conceptual structure does exist in every domain. 
B) As stated earlier, a conceptual structure can be 
applied to any specific content area of facts, figures and 
information. Particular content areas are specified in 
the CONTENT AREA criterion (see page 512). However, the 
compartmentalization of information, even the same facts 
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and figures, varies from domain to domain. Thus the 
second major change needed to accommodate other domains 
would be to modify the CONTENT AREA specifications, in 
either form or substance. 
For example, the Library of Congress coding system of 
categorizing knowledge could be used. Or, a relational 
organization in the style of Hypermedia could be used. 
Searching for matching words or phrases is also a popular 
option. If a judgement were made that student performance 
objectives were a preferable way to organize information 
on the CURRICULUM PLANNER, then the organizational and 
coding schemes of the CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE and the CONTENT 
AREA described herein would be more than ample to build 
such a system. 
Performance objectives have a proven and laudable 
record in the classroom. The coding scheme presented 
herein is built around a conceptual structure, but also 
includes a separate choice category that overtly allows 
the teacher to access lessons with performance objectives. 
The central use of a conceptual structure is a 
radical innovation for science curriculum design and there 
has not been extensive research into the conceptual 
structures of the physical and life sciences. Research 
that analyzes the life sciences is particularly scarce. 
There are several question marks, large and small, in the 
conceptual structure for the physical sciences. However, 
518 
there is enough structure now to support an effective, 
practical program. The CURRICULUM PLANNER has been 
purposefully designed to be flexible enough to incorporate 
changes and additions to the conceptual structures as 
research is carried out. 
D. Structure of the CURRICULUM PLANNER 
The CURRICULUM PLANNER database is designed to 
translate the educational criteria that a teacher uses for 
lesson design/choice into a code that can be used not only 
to access a lesson but also to tag, or label, it. When 
each of the lessons stored in the CURRICULUM PLANNER is 
entered, it is coded according to the same educational 
criteria that a teacher would use to access a lesson. 
Thus each stored lesson is coded and can be accessed 
through the same code name, or tag. 
The easiest way to understand the structure of the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER is to imagine how a teacher would 
interface with the computer in order to access a lesson. 
The CURRICULUM PLANNER is structured in a branching 
manner. There are six MAJOR CATEGORIES OF CHOICE 
(Language of the lesson. Conceptual Structure, Content 
area. Context, Student performance level, and Classroom 
management), each one branching to sub-categories, each 
sub-category leading to further subordinate categories, 
and so on. The teacher chooses the first of the MAJOR 
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CATEGORIES OF CHOICE and proceeds through successive menus 
of choices until reaching the finest level of branching. 
Once the teacher has made a final choice for the category, 
the computer returns to the original menu of MAJOR 
CATEGORIES OF CHOICE and the teacher selects a second 
major category, then repeating the process of branched 
choosing. 
This procedure for accessing lessons according to 
educational criteria is mirrored in the procedure for 
entering lessons into the CURRICULUM PLANNER. After the 
teacher has written a lesson, he/she would go through the 
branching menus to specify the type of lesson it was. 
Not visible to the teacher-user, the computer 
alpha-numerically codes the choices at each menu-level. 
When the teacher chooses a particular option, the 
associated code is stored by the computer. By stringing 
together all the code segments associated with each of the 
teacher's choices, the computer constructs a comprehensive 
code tag that represents exactly what type of lesson the 
teacher is entering or desires. Using the code tags, the 
computer then either stores the new lesson or goes to the 
database in order to find the lessons that are the closest 
match to what is being requested. A menu of lesson titles 
is displayed, and the teacher may then request a summary 
of any of the listed lessons. If the summary seems 
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satisfactory, the teacher then accesses the full text of 
the lesson. 
The lessons are displayed such that the one closest 
to what is being requested appears in the center of the 
screen. The lessons above and below this best-choice 
option have code tags that are progressively distant, 
meaning that the lessons satisfy educational criteria that 
are progressively further away from what was requested. 
Lessons listed closest to the best-choice option are thus 
possibly useful to the requesting teacher. 
E. Specification of the Educational Criteria 
in the CURRICULUM PLANNER 
Descriptions for each of the categories and 
sub-categories of educational criteria are not given here 
because they are best understood by reading their 
respective lists of options given below in figure H.l, 
page 522 and figure H.2, page 536. Most of the categories 
and their options are self-evident to a teacher. These 
specifications and lists were developed over the course of 
six years with the help and advice of over two hundred 
educators, mostly teachers. After assembling a draft 
list, I would present it to fellow teachers, fellow 
students and professors from graduate education courses at 
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, most of whom 
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at workshops and conferences. The many, many suggestions 
have been incorporated into the specifications presented 
here. 
Figure H.l Table of Major Educational Criteria Used 
by the CURRICULUM PLANNER 
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One category of choice that needs some explanation is 
LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING (a sub-category of STUDENT 
PERFORMANCE LEVEL). This menu lists B1oom1s Taxonomv 
Of Educational Objectives in the Cognitive Domain (Bloom, 
1956), which is essentially a ranking of levels of 
understanding. Bloom's Taxonomy outlines the 
followingevels of increasing cognitive accomplishment and 
understanding: Knowledge, Comprehension, Application, 
Analysis, Synthesis, and Evaluation. These, therefore are 
the menu choices presented when this menu is reached. 
The LEVELS OF UNDERSTANDING menu is important because it 
is the teacher's avenue for accommodating lessons to a 
student's initiative or general interest level. Bloom's 
levels require increasing amounts of concentration, 
judgement, self-reliance, self-discipline, and mental 
risk-taking on the part of the student. The degree to 
which students demonstrate these characteristics is 
largely dictated and indicated by their interest and 
initiative. It is difficult for a teacher to get a 
student to carry out a synthesis task unless that student 
is willing and wanting. Most older adolescents are 
developmentally able to think at the Application or 
Analysis levels (as their ability to analyze professional 
sports so often demonstrates), but it is another question 
whether they are willing to apply themselves at these 
upper levels of Bloom's Taxonomy to classroom materials. 
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A teacher's efforts at motivating students, increasing 
student self-esteem or sparking interest can be seen as 
efforts not only to increase the quantity of student 
learning, but also to increase the quality of learning, 
inducing students to perform at a higher level of 
thinking. 
The CONTENT AREA knowledge fields are intended to be 
content-oriented rather than process-oriented. For 
example, journalism is considered a process rather than a 
content-oriented field. If relevant lessons were desired, 
then the ACTIVITY FORMAT trunk would be the appropriate 
access route, requesting such categories as BOOK/RESEARCH 
REPORT or CREATIVE WRITING. Since a journalist has to 
write about something, then this content interest could be 
expressed through the CONTENT AREA category. 
Explicit descriptions of each of the CONTENT AREA 
knowledge fields are not given. Rather, the descriptions 
are intended to be induced from the list of component 
parts (see page 523 for beginning of lists). The lists 
are designed to be representative of larger, inclusive, 
but indefinite groupings. What is more important than the 
actual groupings given herein is that the delineations are 
designed to be flexible, to accommodate the evolution of 
knowledge and knowledge's structure. If changes are 
deemed necessary, then a simple algorithm can quickly 
re-categorize the affected lessons on the database. 
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A MISCELLANEOUS sub-category is listed for each 
field, allowing for incremental change by providing a bin 
for unusual lessons. If the number of lessons in a 
particular MISCELLANEOUS bin becomes large, then a 
re-categorization probably needs to be considered. 
Another set of menus that need some explanation is 
the ACTIVITY FORMAT menus (a sub-category of CLASSROOM 
MANAGEMENT). Going back to first principles, the purpose 
of the CURRICULUM PLANNER computer program is to provide 
teachers with a medium through which they may become 
creative teachers. As such, it does not directly 
incorporate instructional theory, which is considered to 
be the theory dealing with the how of teaching, the 
organization and delivery of lessons. Instructional 
theory deals with how the options listed on the CURRICULUM 
PLANNER’S menus would best be chosen. It is the theory 
that guides the creative use of the CURRICULUM PLANNER, 
which itself is only the medium for this creative 
endeavor. But, of course, the CURRICULUM PLANNER meshes 
with instructional theory, and the interface is most 
evident in the ACTIVITY FORMAT menus. 
These menus list activities rather than lessons 
because, within instructional theory, there is a rather 
specific definition of the term lesson. Within this 
definition, a lesson has several parts to it. For 
example, according to Madeline Hunter (Hunter, 1982), the 
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parts would be Anticipatory Set, Objective, Input, 
Modeling, Checking for Understanding, Guided Practice, and 
Independent Practice. Each of these parts is termed an 
activity. The ACTIVITY FORMAT menus do indeed list 
activities, according to instructional theory. Thus the 
"lessons" that this CURRICULUM PLANNER stores are, from 
the instructional perspective, actually activities. These 
activities are strung together to form a bona fide lesson. 
It is up to the teacher to create excellent lessons from 
the activities. 
F. Flexibility of Coding of Application Lessons 
for the CURRICULUM PLANNER 
Any particular lesson, no matter what its origin, is 
almost certainly approachable from several perspectives as 
defined by the coding specifications. Each perspective 
can be translated into a corresponding code. Thus, when a 
new lesson is being added to the CURRICULUM PLANNER, 
several options can be chosen from each particular menu at 
the various levels of branching. This procedure means 
that a particular lesson will actually have several 
identifying code tags. From any of the appropriate menus, 
it is possible to choose as many of the options as one 
needs when coding a particular lesson. Every time 
multiple options are chosen, a code tag is constructed for 
each of the options chosen. For example, if one option is 
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chosen from the first menu (LANGUAGE), then the computer 
begins to construct one code tag. If on the next menu two 
options are chosen, then the computer begins to construct 
two code tags, both with the same first-field characters 
derived from the first menu, but with differing 
second-field characters. If on the third menu three 
options are chosen, then the computer begins construction 
of six code tags: All with the same first-field 
characters, three with a different second-field characters 
from the other set of three, and each set of three with 
the same sequence of the last-field characters. As is 
clear, the number of code tags generated increases 
geometrically when multiple options are chosen. Although 
a particular lesson might be approachable from several 
perspectives, there is, of course, a limit to any 
particular lesson's flexibility. It would be possible for 
an unscrupulous person to damage the database by 
continuously choosing multiple options. Thus, the 
computer sets a limit to the number of code tags that can 
be generated on any run-through of the menus. As a lesson 
is being coded, the number of code tags generated up to 
that point is displayed on the screen. 
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G. The Priority Order Used to Retrieve Lessons 
The first menu at which a teacher makes a choice of 
educational criteria is the SEVEN CATEGORIES OF CHOICE 
menu. This menu lists the seven categories in the 
following order: Language of the Lesson, Conceptual 
Structure, Content Area, Context, Student Performance 
Level, Classroom Management, and Miscellaneous. This 
order is the priority order in which the computer will 
sort the lessons on the database. In other words, the 
computer will prioritize all lessons that are in the 
specified language, then it will take those lessons and 
choose the ones that deal with the specified concept, and 
so on. The teacher may access menus and specify criteria 
in any order desired, but the above order or 
prioritization is used for the sorting and retrieving. 
It is a rather straightforward change to have the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER retrieve lessons according to the order 
in which the teacher specifies the SEVEN CATEGORIES OF 
CHOICE. However, there are pedagogical implications in 
giving the teacher total freedom to choose the priority 
sequence. For example, the teacher could specify the 
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE last, thus effectively bypassing the 
critically important question of. What do I want my 
students to learn from this lesson? The teacher would 
then be manipulating the CURRICULUM PLANNER on an almost 
purely content basis. Within the larger context of the 
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Amalgamated Model, the CURRICULUM PLANNER is a balance 
between the flexibility inherent in the computerized 
CURRICULUM PLANNER and the imposed discipline of the 
conceptual structure. Such a balance between structure 
and flexibility is essential to any creative endeavor. If 
the conceptual structure is de-prioritized within the 
educational criteria used for designing lessons, then 
curricular anarchy can swiftly ensue from the resulting 
imbalance, and the goals of the Model are lost in the 
confusion. As long as the teacher's choice from the 
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE is the first criterion used by the 
computer to sort the database of lessons, the order of the 
remaining six educational criteria does not affect the 
balance between structure and flexibility. 
H. The Selection Default Procedures 
Some type of default selection procedure must be used 
by the computer because the extremely large number of 
possible combinations of the code segments, and therefore 
large number of possible lessons, implies that an exact 
match for a requested lesson code will probably not be 
found, particularly when the database is small. For 
practical purposes, a default procedure is necessary to 
ensure that a teacher's request is satisfied to at least 
some level of approximation. 
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The default procedures have been designed so that if 
there is any lesson at all in the MAJOR CATEGORY OF 
CHOICE, no matter how far away its rating is from that 
requested by the teacher, it will eventually be chosen. 
More optimistically, the procedures have been designed to 
first look for lessons close to the requested option and 
then proceed further and further afield. Thus the lists 
of menu choices have been carefully assembled so that 
adjacent options are similar and further distanced options 
are correspondingly remote in nature. The one exception 
is the LANGUAGE OF THE LESSON category. There are no 
defaults built into this category because the choice of 
language is generally inflexible within a classroom. 
There is a difference between the default procedures 
used in the CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE and those used in the 
CONTENT, CONTEXT, STUDENT PERFORMANCE LEVEL, and CLASSROOM 
MANAGEMENT categories of choice. There is a qualitative 
difference between how an option is chosen from the 
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE and how an option is chosen from 
these other MAJOR CATEGORIES OF CHOICE. In these other 
categories, the teacher follows successive branching of 
menus until reaching the final menu at the finest level of 
branching. Whatever option the teacher chooses from this 
final menu is translated into the code segment for the 
field. A teacher may not make a final choice from the 
intermediate menus. 
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In contrast, a teacher may specify a final choice 
from the options at any of the various levels of menu in 
the CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE. Although the CONCEPTUAL 
STRUCTURE is also configured as a branching series of 
menus, the teacher does not need to reach the finest level 
before making a definitive choice. Concepts should be 
learned, and therefore taught, first at the general level 
and then at progressively narrower and more specific 
levels. Thus the teacher must be able to retrieve lessons 
at any level within the conceptual structure. 
Judgements must be made in deciding the best path through 
a conceptual structure, and computers are not good at 
making judgments. Therefore, a sequencing code consisting 
of upper and lower case letters is displayed next to each 
menu option in the CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE. The sequencing 
code is designed to help teachers make judgements. It is 
not intended as a default algorithm for the computer to 
automatically use if a requested concept is not available. 
The reason is simply that it is necessary for the teacher 
to have control of the syllabus. If learning concepts is 
the goal, it is difficult to learn one concept by learning 
another. If the computer automatically defaults and 
chooses a different concept than that requested by the 
teacher, then effectively the computer is changing the 
objective of the lesson. 
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Codifying the links between concepts, the following 
protocol is used for the categories of choice belonging to 
the CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE: 
A) Letters are used for the code character and the 
proper sequence of categories proceeds in alphabetical 
order. Thus a category rated as C is a pre-requisite for a 
category rated D. When several different categories are 
assigned the same letter, it indicates that those 
categories are at the same level in the structure and may 
be used in any order desired or that they should be taught 
simultaneously. 
B) Upper-case letters indicate that the category is 
essential to the development of the concept in question or 
a later concept, and should not be skipped. There are 
also categories with upper case letters that, although not 
essential to the building of a lean conceptual structure, 
are considered important for today's science students. 
C) Lower-case letters indicate that the category is 
non-essential, either tangential or enriching, to the 
development of the concept and could be skipped if needed. 
Their designated position in the conceptual structure is 
meant to be optimum, but there is a great deal of 
flexibility in where they could actually fit with equal 
effectiveness. 
Most of the menus have a NOT APPLICABLE option. 
Procedurally, this option means that no lessons are sorted 
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due to the category. If the teacher skips a MAJOR 
CATEGORY OF CHOICE while specifying a lesson, then the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER assumes the NOT APPLICABLE option for 
the corresponding field. The final list of titles that 
the CURRICULUM PLANNER will give the teacher will not be 
sorted according to the corresponding educational 
criteria. 
These default procedures have the advantage of 
permitting the start-up of a useable database with 
relatively few application lessons contained in its 
memory, even though the potential size of the database is 
enormous. For a given language, a start-up database need 
only contain as many lessons as there are menu options in 
the CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE. With at least one lesson for 
each menu option at every level of the CONCEPTUAL 
STRUCTURE, the teacher requesting a lesson will always get 
one, even if it is not a close match for all the requested 
criteria. This relatively small activation size implies a 
correspondingly small initial investment to launch the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER, since the major effort in building the 
database is writing the lessons. 
Clearly the CURRICULUM PLANNER is intended to grow 
from its activation size. The question is. How is it to 
grow? The answer is from the teachers who are using it. 
As teachers create their own lessons, they may be 
submitted for inclusion in the CURRICULUM PLANNER by 
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merely reversing the process of accessing a lesson: They 
will be coding and then submitting a lesson. As the 
CURRICULUM PLANNER grows, a request for a particular 
lesson will be more and more closely matched. 
The last comment before presenting the coding scheme 
is the qualifier that the details of the scheme are not 
definitive. Many of the categories are subject to debate 
as to where the delineations are drawn between groupings 
and items. Some of the categories themselves could be 
questioned. Recommendations are sure to be made for 
additions as well as deletions. For example, the 
breakdown of the various fields of engineering on the 
CONTENT AREA matrix could be questioned. Or, should there 
somewhere be a separate category for humor? Perhaps 
another category should be included that would allow 
teachers to choose lessons according to specific thinking 
operations such as comparing, summarizing, classifying, 
interpreting, etc. (Raths, Wassermann, Jonas, Rothstein, 
1986) rather than just using Bloom’s Taxonomy. Certainly 
the CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY options could be more detailed. 
Changes are anticipated and welcomed. The organization of 
the coding scheme has been purposefully designed to make 
modification of the categories easy. What is most 
important is the overall look and feel of the coding 
scheme. Its foundation is the sequencing of choices of 
educational criteria. The specific categories of choice 
534 
that are presented here are considered to be a starting 
platform that is reasonably valid, certainly functional 
and easily changed. What is fundamentally being presented 
is a flexible structure that provides teachers with access 
to knowledge in the form they need to carry out 
effectively the task of transmitting it from one 















(See Appendix G for elaboration of the 
concepts for the physical sciences.) 
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Energy tech., misc. 
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Physical Geog., misc 
CIVIL ENGINEERING 
Landscaping 























Envir. engring, misc. 
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HEALTH, MEDICINE, HUMAN 
BODY 
Physiology 
















LAW AND ETHICS 
Morals, ethics, values 
religion 
law and ethics, misc. 
PSYCHOLOGY 





Anthro., arch., misc. 
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OF CHOICE OF CHOICE 
HUMANITIES ART, CRAFT 
(cont.) Music, drama 














Home, building maint. 
Beauty, grooming 
Culinary arts 
Service trades, misc. 
BUILDING TRADES 
Excavation, landscaping 
Bid. trades, misc. 
MANUFACTURING TRADES 
Manuf. trades, misc. 
FARMING 
Farming, misc. 
Continued, next page 
539 
Figure H.2 Continued 
MAJOR CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY 
OF CHOICES OF CHOICE 
SUB-SUB-CATEGORY 
OF CHOICE 
STUDENT GRADE NOT APPLICABLE 
PERFORMANCE LEVEL ELEMENTARY (K - 4) 
LEVEL LOWER MIDDLE SCHOOL (5, 6) 
UPPER MIDDLE SCHOOL (7, 8) 
LOWER HIGH SCHOOL (9, 10) 














BELOW MINIMUM COMPETENCY 
2 yrs BEHIND GRADE LEVEL 
AT GRADE LEVEL 




BELOW MINIMUM COMPETENCY 
2 yrs BEHIND GRADE LEVEL 
AT GRADE LEVEL 
2 yrs AHEAD OF GRADE LEVEL 











Low latitude desert 
Humid sub-tropical 
Mediterranean 
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CLIMATE MIDDLE LATITUDE 
(cont.) Middle latitude desert 
High plain (steppes) 
Coastal (humid marine) 









" - NORTH 
" - SOUTH 
" - EAST 
" - WEST 
" - SAHEL 
ASIA 
" - NORTH 
" - CENTRAL 
" - MIDDLE EAST 
" - FAR EAST 
" - SOUTH EAST 
" - PACIFIC 
" - SOUTH PACIFIC 
AUSTRALIA 
" - COASTAL 
" - INTERIOR 
" - NEW ZEALAND 
EUROPE 
" - NORTH 
" - SOUTH 
" - EAST 
" - WEST 
NORTH AMERICA 
" - UPPER CANADA/ALASKA 
" - LOWER CANADA 
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Figure H.2 Continued 
MAJOR CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY SUB-SUB-CATEGORY 
OF CHOICES OF CHOICE OF CHOICE 
CONTEXT PHYSICAL NORTH AMERICA (cont.) 





















CULTURAL NOT APPLICABLE 
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Figure H.2 Continued 
MAJOR CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY 
OF CHOICES OF CHOICE 
SUB-SUB-CATEGORY 
OF CHOICE 
CONTEXT CULTURAL EAST INDIAN 
(cont.) GEOGRAPHY HIMILAYAN 
(cont.) SOUTHERN PACIFIC 






CLASSROOM RESOURCE/ LESSON 
MANAGEMENT LESSON LESSON WITH OBJECTIVES 
RESOURCE 




A) TEACHER PRESENTATION: 






B) STUDENT READING/WRITING: 
WORKSHEET - DRILL 
QUESTIONS - PROBLEMS 










DISCUSS THEN PRESENT 
ROLE PLAYING 
OUTREACH 
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D) STUDENT KINESTHETIC/EXPERIMENTAL 



























SMALL GROUP (2-4) 
LARGE GROUP (5-8) 
HALF-CLASS (10 - 18) 
WHOLE CLASS 
MULTIPLE-CLASS 
NOT APPLICABLE TIME 
SEGMENT 5 MINUTES 
15 MINUTES 
30 MINUTES 
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